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The Fiirst Afghan W a r

T H E AFGHAN W A R S
I

PART I

CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY

I

SINCEit was thc British complications with Persia which
mainly furnished what pretest there was for thc invasion
of Afghanistan by an Anglo-Indian army in 1839,some
brief recital is necessary of the relations between Great
Britain and Persia prior to that aggression.
By a treaty, concluded between England and Persia
in 1814, the former state bound itself, in casc of the invasion of l'ersia by any European nation, to aid the Shah
either with troops from India or by the payment of an
annual subsidy in support of his war expenses. I t was a
dangerous engagement, even with the caved rendering
thc unclcrtaltir~ginoperative if such invasion should be
provoltecl by Persia. During the fierce struggle of 1825-7,
between Abbas Meerza and the Russian General Paslievitch, England refrained from supporting Pcrsia either
\\lit11 mcn or with money, and when prostrate Persia was
in financial extremities because of the war indemnity
which the treaty of Turlc~nanchai imposed upon her,
A

England took advantage of her needs by purchasing the
cancellation of the inconvenient obligation a t the cheap
cost of about A;3oo,ooo, I t was the natural result of this
transaction that English influence with thc Persian Court
should sensibly declinc, and it was not less natural that in
conscious weakness Persia should fall under the domination of Russian influence.
Futteh Ali, thc old Shah of Pcrsia, died in I 834, and
was succeeded by his grandson Prince Mahomed Mccrza,
a young man who inhcritecl much of the ambition of his
gallant father Abbas Meerza. His especial aspiration,
industriously stimulated by his Russian advisers, urged
him to the enterprise of conqucring the indcpcndcnt
principality of I-Ierat, on the wcstern border of Afghanistan. Herat was thc only remnant of Afghan territory
that still remained to a member of the legitimate royal
house. Its rulcr was Shah Kamran, son of that Mahmoud
Shah who, after ousting his brother Shah Soojall from thc
throne of Cabul, had himself bcen driven from that elevation, ancl had retired to the minor principality of Herat.
The young Shah of Pcrsia was not destitute of justification for his designs on Herat. That this was so was
frankly admitted by Mr Ellis, the British cnvoy to his
Court, who wrote to his Government that the Shah had
fair claim to the sovereignty of Afghanistan as far as
Ghuznee, ancl that KamranJs conduct in occupying part
of the Persian province of Seistan had given the Shah ' a
full justification for commencing hostilities against I-Ierat.'
The serious phasc of the situation for England and
India was that Russian influence was bchincl Persia in
this hostile action against I-Icrat. Mr Ellis pointed out

that in the thcn existing statc of relations bctwcen Persia
and Russia, the progress of thc former in Afghanistan
was tantamount to the advancement of the latter. But
unfortunately thcre remained valid an articlc in the
treaty of 1814 to the effect that, in case of war between
the Afghans and the Persians, the English Government
should no7 interfere with either party unless when callccl
on by both to mediate. In vain did Ellis and his
successor McNeill remonstrate with the Persian monarch
against the Ilcrat especlition. A n appcal to St Yetersburg, on thc part of Grcat Britain, produced tnercly an
evasive reply. How diplomatic disquictudc hacl become
intcnsified may be inferred from this, that whcrcas in
April 1836 Ellis wrote of Persia as a Russian first
parallel of attack against India, Lord Auclcland, then
Govcrnor-General of India, directed McNeill, in the early
part of 1837, to urge thc Shah to abandon his cnterprisc,
on the ground that he (thc Govcrnor-General) ' must vicw
with umbrage and displeasure schemes of interferencc
ancl conquest on our wcstern frontier.'
Thc Shah, unrnovecl by thc reprcscntations of the
British cnvoy, marched on Herat, and the siege was
opened on November 23d, 1837. Durand, a capable
critic, clcclares that the strength of the place, the resolution
of the besiegers, the skill of their Russian military advisers,
ancl the gallantry of the besieged, were alike objccts of
much exaggeration. ' Thc siege was from first to last
thoroughly ill-conducted, and the clefencc, in reality not
better managed, owed its r'clad to Pcrsian ignorance,
timidity and supineness. Thc advicc of Pottingcr, the
gallant English officer who assistccl thc defence, was

scldom asked, a n d still more seldom taken ; ancl no one
spolce more plainly of thc conduct of both besieged ancl
besiegers than did Pottingcr hirnself,' M'Neill effcctcd
nothing definite during a long stay in the l'crsian camp
before Herat, t h e counteracting influence of the Russian
envoy being too strong with the Shall; and the British
representative, wcary of continual slights, at length
quitted the Persian camp complctcly foilcd. Aftcr six
days' bombardment, the l'crsians and their Russian
auxiliaries dclivcrccl an assault in force on June 23dl I 838.
I t failccl, with hcavy loss, and the dispirited Shah
detcrmincd on raising thc sicgc. His resolution was
quickened by the arrival of Coloncl Stoddart in his camp,
with the information that a military forcc from 1301nbay,
supported by ships of n w , had landed on the island of
ICarrack in the Persian Gulf, and with thc peremptory
ultimatum to t h c Shah that he must retire from Herat
a t once. Lord Palmcrston, in ordering this diversion in
the Gulf, had thought hirnself justified by circumstances
in overriding the clear and prccise terms of an article
in a treaty to which England had on several occasions
engaged to adhere. As for thc Shah, he appears to have
been relieved by thc ultimatum. On the 9th September
he mounted his horsc and rode away from Hcrat. T h e
siege had lasted nine and a half months. To-day, half
a century after Simonich the Russian envoy followcd
Mahomed Shah from battcrcd but unconquered Herat,
that city i i still an Afghan place of arms.
Shah Soojah-ool Moolk, a grandson of the illustrious
Ahmcd Shah, reigned in Afghanistan from 1803 till 1809.
His youth had bcen full of trouble and vicissitude. He

had becn a watrderer, on the vergc of starvation, a pedlar
and a bandit, who raised money by plundering caravans.
His courage was lightly reputed, and it was as a mere
creature of circumstance that he reached the throne. His
rcign was perturbed, and in 1809 he was a fugitive and
an exile. Runjeet Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjaub,
defrauded him of the famous Koh-i-noor, which is now
the most precious of the crown jewels of England, and
plundered and imprisoned the fallen man. Shah Soojall
a t length escaped from Lal!ore. .After furthcr misfortunes.
he at Icngth reached the 13ritish frontier station of Loodianah, and in 1816bccarne a pensioncr of the East India
Company.
After the downfall of Shah Soojah, Afghanistan for
many years was a prey to anarchy. At length in 1826,
Dost Mahomcd succeeded in making himself supreme a t
Cabul, and this masterful man thenceforward held sway
until his death in 1863, uninterruptedly save during the
thrce years of the British occupation. Dost Mahomed
was neither kith nor kin to the legitimate dynasty which
he displaced. I-Iis fathcr Poyndah K h a n was an able
statcsman and gallant soldier. He left twenty-one sons,
of whom Futteh Khan was the eldest, and Dost Mahomed
one of the youngest. Futteh Khan was the Warwick of
Afghanistan, but the Afghan ' Kingmaker ' had no Barnet
as the closing scene of his chequered life. Falling into
hostile hands, he was blinded and scalped. Refusing to
betray his brothers, he was leisurcly cut to pieces bjr the
order and in the presence of the monarch whom he had
madc. His young brother Dost Mahomed undertook to
avcngc his dcath. After years of varied fortunes the

Dost had worsted all his enemies, and in 1826 he becalne the ruler of Cabul, Throughout his long rcign
Dost Mahomcd was a strong and wise rulcr. H i s youth
had been neglcctcd and clissolutc. His education was
clcfectivc, and he had been addicted t o wine. Once seated
on the thronc, the reformation of our Hcnry Fifth was
not more thorough than was that of Dost Mahomecl.
He taught himself to read and write, studied t h e Koran,
bccame scrupulously abstemious, assiduous in affairs, no
longcr truculent but courteous. H e is said to have madc
a public acknowledgment of the errors of his previous
lifc, and a firm profession of reformation ; nor did his after
lifc belie the pledges to which he cornmittcd himself.
Therc mas a fine rugged honesty in his nature, and a
streak of genuine chivalry; notwithstanding thc dcspite
he suffered at our hands, he had a real regard for the
English, and his loyalty to us was broken only by his
armed support of the Sikhs in the second Punjaub war.
The fallen Shah Soojah, from his asylum in Loodianah,
was continually intriguing for his restoration. His schemes
were long inoperativc, and it was not until 1832 that
certain arrangements were entered into between him and
the Maharaja Runjcct Singh. T o an application on
Shah Soojah's part for countcnance and pecuniary aid,
the Anglo-Indian Government replied that to afford him
assistancc woulcl bc inconsistent with thc policy of
neutrality which the Government had imposed on itself;
but it unwiscly contributed financially toward his undertalcing by granting him four months' pension in advance.
Sixteen thousand rupees formed a scant war fund with
which to attempt the rccovery of a thronc, but t h e Shah

startcd on his crrand in Fcbruary 1833, After a successful contest with the Ameers of Scinde, hc marched on
Candahar, and besieged that fortress, Canclahar was in
extremity when Dost Mahomcd, hurrying from Cabul,
relieved it, and joining forces with its defenders, he defeated and routed Shah Soojah, who fled precipitately,
leaving behind him his artillery and camp equipage.
During the Dost's absence in the south, Runjeet Singh's
troops crossed the Attock, occupied the Afghan province
of Peshamur, and drove the Afghans into the Khyber
Pass. No subsequent efforts on Dost Mahomed's part
availed to expel the Sikhs from l'eshawur, and suspicious
of British connivancc with Runjeet Singh's successful
aggression, he took into consideration the policy of fortifying hitnself by a counter alliance with Persia. As for
Shah Soojah, he had crcpt back to his refuge at Loodianah.
Lord Auckland succeeded Lord William Bcntinclc as
Governor-Gcneral of India in March 1834. In reply t o
Dost Mahomed's letter of congratulation, his lordship
wrote : ' You are aware that it is not the practice of the
British Government t o interfere with the affairs of other
independcnt states ; ' an abstention which Lord Aucltland
was soon to violate. H e had brought from England the
fceling of disquietude in regard to the designs of Pcrsia
and Russia which the communications of our envoy in
Persia had fostered in the Home Government, but it
would appear that he was wholly undecided what line of
action t o pursue. ' Swayed,' says Durand, ' by the vague
apprehensions of a remote danger entertained by others
rather than himself,' h e despatched to Afghanistan Captain

Burnes on a nominally comlnercial mission, which, in fact,
was one of political discovery, but without dcfinite instructions. Burnes, an able but rash and ambitious man,
reached Cabul in Septembcr 1837, two months beforc the
Persian army bcgan thc sicge of Hcrat. H e had a strong
prepossession in favour of thc Dost, whose guest he had
already bccn in 1832, and the policy he favoured was not
the revival of the legitimate dynasty in thc person of
Shah Soojah, but the attachment of Dost Mahomed t o
British interests by strengthening his throne and affording him British countenance.
Burnes sanguinely bclicvccl that he had arrived a t
Cabul in thc nick of time, for an cnvoy from thc Shah of
Pcrsia was already at Candahar, bearing prescnts and
assurances of support. Thc Dost made no concealmcnt
to Burncs of his approaches to Persia and Russia, in
despair of British good officcs, and bcing hungry for
assistance from any source to meet the encroachments of
the Sikhs, he professed himself ready t o abandon his
negotiations with the western powers if h e were given
reason to expect countenance and assistance at the hands
of the Anglo-Indian Government. Burncs communicated
to his Government those friendly proposals, supporting
them by his own strong representations, and meanwhile,
carried away by enthusiasm, he esceecled his powers b y
making efforts to dissuade the Candahar chiefs from the
Persian alliance, and by offering to support them with
money to enable them to rnalrc hcad against the offensive,
by which Pcrsia would probably seek to revenge the rejection of her overtures. For this unauthoriscd cscess of
zeal Durnes was severely rcprirnanded by his Government,
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ancl was clirectcd to retract his offers to thc Candahar
chick. T h e situation of Burnes in rclation to the Dost
was presently complicated by the arrival at Cabul of a
Russian officcr claiming to bc an envoy from the Czar,
whose crcdentials, howcvcr, were rcgardecl as dubious, and
who, if that circumstance has the lcast wight, was on his
return to Russia uttcrly repudiated by Count Nesselrodc.
The Dost took small account of this emissary, continuing
to assure Uurnes that he cared for no connection cxcept
with the English, and Burnes professed to his Governmcnt
his fullest confidences in the sincerity of thosc clcclarations. But the tone of Lord Aucltland's rcply, addresscd
to thc Dost, was so dictatorial ancl supercilious as to indicatc thc writcr's intention that it should'give offencc. It
had that effect, ancl Burnes' mission a t once bccame hopeIcss. Yet, as a last resort, Dost Mahomed lowered his
pride so far as to write to the Governor-General imploring
him 'to remedy the grievances of the Afghans, and afford
them some little encouragement and power.' The pathetic
rcprcsentation had no effect. The Russian envoy, who
was profuse in his promises of everything which the Dost
was most anxious to obtain, was rcceived into favour and
treated with distinction, and on his return journey hc
effected a treaty with the Candahar chiefs, which was presently ratificd by the Russian minister at the Persian
Court. Burnes, fallen into discredit at Cabul, quitted
that place in August 1838. He had not been discreet,
but it was not his indiscretion that brought about the
failure of his mission. A nefarious transaction, which
ICaye denounces mith thc passion of a just indignation,
connects itself with Burned negotiations mith the Dost;

his official correspondence was unscrupulously mutilated
and garbled in the published Blue Book with deliberate
purpose to dcccivc the British public.
Burnes had failed becausc, sincc hc had quitted India
for Cabul, Lord A ~ ~ c l i l a ~policy
~ d ' s had gradually altered.
Lord Auclcland had Iandcd in India in the character of
a man of peace. That, so late as April 1837, he had no
design of obstructing the existing situation in Afghanistan is proved by his written statement of that datc,
that 'the British Governmcnt had resolved decidedly to
discourage the prosecution by the ex-Icing Shah Soojah001-Moollc, so long as he may remain under our protection, of frwthcr schemes of hostility against thc chicfs
now. in powcr in Cabul and Candahar.' Yet, in thc
following June, he concluded a treaty which sent Shah
Soojah to Cabul, escorted by British bayonets. Of this
inconsistency no explanation pi-csents itself. I t was a
far cry from our fronticr on the Sutlcj to Herat in thc
confines of Central Asia-a distance of more than 1 2 0 0
miles, over some of the most arduous marching ground in
the known world. No doubt the Anglo-Indian Govcrnmcnt was justified in being sornewhat colicerncd by thc
facts that a Persian army, backed by Russian voluntecrs
and Russian roubles, was besieging Herat, and that Pcrsian and Russian crnissaries wcre at work in Afghanistan.
Both phenomena werc rather of thc 'bogey' character ;
how much so to-day shows when the Afghan frontier
is still beyond Herat, and mhcn a descendant of Dost
Mahomed still sits in the Cabul 7msilid But neithcr
England nor India scruplcd to make the Karrack counterthreat which arrcsted the siege of Herat; and the obvious
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policy as regardcd Afghanistan was to watch the rcsults
of the intrigues which were on foot, to ignore thcm should
thcy comc to lo thing, as was probable, to counteract
thcrn by familiar methods if serious conscqucnces should
seem irnpcnding. Our alliance with Rulljeet Sing11 was
solid, and the quarrel bctwcen Dost Mahomed and him
concerning the Pcshawur province was notoriously easy
of arrangement.
On whose memory rests the dark shadow of rcsponsibility for the first Afghan war? Thc late Lord
Broughton, who, when Sir John Cam Hobhousc, was
President of thc Board of Control from 1835 to 1841,
declared before a House of Commons Committee, in
185 I , 'The Afghan war was clone by myself; entircly
without the privity of the Board of Directors.' The
meaning of that declaration, of course, was that it was
the British Government of the day which was responsible, acting through its membcr charged with the control of Indian aFTairs ; ancl f ~ ~ r t h ethat
r , the directorate
of the East India Company was accordcd no voicc in
the mattcr. But this utterance was materially qualified
by Sir J. C. I-Tobhouse's statemcnt in the House of
Commons in 1842, that his despatch indicating the
policy to bc adopted, ancl that written by Lord Auckland, informing him that the expedition had already bcen
undertaken, had crossed each other on the way.
I t woulcl be tcdious to detail how 1-ord Auckland,
under evil counsel, gradually boxed the compass from
peace to war. The scheme of action embodied in thc
treaty which, in thc early summer of 1838, was cot~cluded
bet\veen the Anglo-Indian Government, Runjcct Singh,

a n d Shah Soojah, was that Shah Soojah, with a forcc
officcred from a n 3Indian army, and paid by British
money, possessing also thc goodwill and support of the
Maharaja of the Punjaub, should attempt thc rccovcry
of his thronc without ally stiffening of British bayoncts at
his back. Then it was urgcd, and the rcprcscntation was
it~dccclacccptcd, that t h c Shah woulcl necd thc buttrcss
afforclccl by English troops, and that a couplc of rcgiments only would suffice t o afford this prcstigc. But
S i r I-Iarry Fanc, the Gommandcr-in-Chief, judiciously
intcrposcd his vcto on thc clespatch of a hanclful of British
solclicrs o n so distant and hazarclous a n cxpcditioii.
Finally, thc Governor-Gcncral, committed already to a
mistalccn linc of policy, and urgcd forward by those
about liii-n, took thc unfortunate rcsolution to gathcr
togcthcr a n Anglo-Indian army, and to send it, with the
ill-otncned Shah Soojah on its shoulders, into the unIcnown a n d distant wilds of Afghanistan. This .action
cletcrinined on, it was in accorclatice with thc AngloIl-rdian fitness of things that thc Governor-General s h d d
p-omulgate a justificatory manifcsto. Of this cornpositi011 it is unnecessary t o say more than to quote Durancl's
observation that in it ' thc words " justicc and necessity "
wcrc applicd in a manncr for which therc is fortunately
n o precedent in thc English language,' and Sir Henry
Eclwarcles' not lcss trenchant comment that ' the views
and conduct of Dost Mahomed wcrc misrcprcsented with a
llardihood which a Russian statesman might have envied.'
All lnen whose cxpcricncc gave weight to their words
this ' prcl3ostccoi1s cntcrprisc.' Mr Elphinstot-re,
had been t h e head of a mission to Cabul thirty years

earlier, hcld that ' if an army \vas scnt LIPtllc ~ R S S Cand
S,
if we could feed it, no doubt wc might t a l a Cabul and set
up Shah Soojah ; but it was hopelcss to maintain him
in a poor, cold, strong and remote country, among so
turbulent a pcople.' Lord William Bentinck, 1,orcI Auckland's prcdccessor, clenounccd the project a s an act of
incredible folly. Marquis Wcllcsley rcgarclccl ' this wild
expedition into a distant region of rocks and dcserts, of
sands and icc a n d snow,' as an act of infatuation. Thc
Duke of Wellington pronounced with prophetic sagacily,
that thc consequence of once crossing thc Inclus to sctllc
a governmcnt in Afglianistan would be a pcrcnnial march
into that country.

T H E MAKCI-I TO C A B U L

TIIEtwo main objects of the vcnturesorne oKensive
movement to which Lord Auckland had committed
himself wcre, first, the raising of the Persian siege of
Herat if the place should hold out until reached-the
recapture of it if it should have fallen ; and, secondly,
the establishment of Shah Soojah on the Afghan throne.
T h c forlncr object was the more pressing, and time was
very precious ; but t h e distances in India are great, the
means of communication in 1538 did not admit of celerity, and the seasons control thc safe prosecution of
military operations. Nevertheless, the concentration of
t h e army a t the frontier station of Ferozepore was fully
accornplishcd toward the end of November. Sir Harry
Fane was to be t h e military head of the cxpedition,
and he had just right to be proud of the 14,000 carcf~illy
selected and well-seasoned troops who constitutcd his
Bengal contingent. Thc force consisted of two infantry divisions, of which the first, commanded by MajorGeneral Sir Willoughby Cotton, containecl thrce brigades,
commanded respectively by Colonels Sale, Nott, and
Dennis, of whom t h e two former were to attain high

I

distinction within the borders of Afghanistan. MajorGeneral Duncan comrnandcd thc second infantry division
of the two brigades, of which onc was commanded by
Colonel Robcrts, the gallant father of a gallant son, the
other by Colonel Worsley. Thc 6000 troops raised for
Shah Soojah, who were under Fane's orders, and were
oficered from our army in India, had bcen reccntly and
hurriedly recruited, and although rapidly improving, wcre
not yet in a state of high cfficicncy. Thc contingent
which the Bombay I'resiclency was to furnish to thc
'Army of the Indus,' and which landecl about thc close
of the year ncar the moulh of thc Inclus, was unclcr the
command of Gcneral Sir John Keanc, thc Commanclerin-Chief of the Bombay army. The Bombay force was
about 5000 strong.
I3efore the concentration at Ferozepore had bccn complcled, Lord Auckland reccived official intimation of thc
retreat of the Persians from bcfore IIcrat. With their
departure had gone, also, the sole legitimate object of
the expedition; thcrc remained but a project of wanton
aggression and usurpation. The Russo-Persian failure at
Iierat was scarcely calculated to maintain in the astutc
and practical Afghans any hope of fulfilment of the promises which the western powers had thrown about so
lavishly, while it made clear that, for some time a t least
to come, the Persians woulcl not be found dancing again
to Russian fiddling. The abandonment of the siege of
I-Ierat rendercd the invasion of Afghanistan an ag,uression destitute even of pretext. T h e Governor-General
endeavoured to justify his resolution to persevere in it
by putting forth the argument that its prosecution was

16
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required, ' alike in obscrvation of the treaties entered into
with Runjeet Sing11 and Shah Soojah as by paramount
considerations of defensive policy.' A rcrnarlcable illustration of 'clcfensive policy' to take the offensive against
a rcmotc country from whose further confines had faded
away foiled aggression, leaving behind nothing but a
bitter consciousness of brokcn promises ! As for the
othcrplca, thc ttipartitc treaty contained no covenant that
wc should send a corporal's guard across our frontier.
If Shah Soojah had a powcrful following in Afghanistan,
he could regain his throne without our assistance ; if he
had no holding thcre, it was for us a truly discreditable
enterprise to foist him on a recalcitrant people a t thc
point of the bayonet.
One result of thc tidings from Herat was to reduce by
a division thc strength of the cxpeclitionary force. Fane,
who had never talccn kindly to the project, declined to
associate himself with the diminished array that remained.
The command of the Bengal column fcll to Sir Willoughby
-Cotton, with whom as his aide-dc-camp rode that Henry
Ilaveloclc whosc name twenty years later was to ring
throughj India and England. Duncan's division was t o
stand fast a t Ferozepore as a support, by which disposition
the strcngth of the Bengal marching force was cut down
to about 9500 fighting men. After its junction with the
Bombay colurnn, the army would be 14,500strong, without reckoning the Shah's contingent. There was an interludc at Ferozepore of reviews and high jinks with the
shrewd, debauched old Runjeet Sing11 ; of which proccedings Ilaveloclc in his narrative of the expedition gives
a detailed account, dwelling with extreme disapprobation

on Runjeet's addiction to a ( p e t tipple' strong cnough
to lay out the hardest drinker in the British camp, but
which the old reprobate quaffed freely without turning a
hair.
At length, on December ~ o t h ,1838, Cotton began the
long march which was not to terminate a t Cabul until
August 6th of the following year. T h e most direct route
was across the Punjaub, and up the passes from Peshawm,
but the Governor-General had shrunk from proposing to
Runjeet Singh that the force should march through his
territories, thinking it enough that the IVIaharaja had permitted Shah Soojah's heir, Prince Timour, t o go by Peshawur to Cabul, had engaged to support him with a Sikh
force, and had agreed to maintain an a r m y of reserve at
Peshawur. The chosen route was by the left bank of the
Sutlej to its junction with the Indus, down the left bank
of the Indus to the crossing point a t Roree, and from
Sulckur across the Scinde and northern Belooch provinces
by the Bolan and Kojulc passes t o Candahar, thcnce by
Khelat-i-Ghilzai and Ghuznee t o Cabul. This was a line
excessively circuitous, im~nenselylong, full of difliculties,
and equally disadvantageous as to supplies and communications. On the way the column would have to
effect a junction with the Bombay force, which a t Viklcur
was distant 800 miles from Ferozepore. Of the distance
of 850 miles from the latter post to Canclahar the first half
to the crossing of the Indus presented no serious difficulties, but from Sukkur beyond the country was inhospitable and cruelly rugged. I t needed little military
. lcnowledge to realise how more and yet more precarious
\\lould become thc communications as the chain lengthened,

n

to discern that from Fcrozeporc to the Indus they would bc
at the mercy of the Sikhs, a n d to cornprchend this also,
that a single serious check, in or beyond thc passes, woulcl
involve all but incvitnblc ruin.
Shall Soojah and his lcvies moved inclepenclcntly some
marches in advance of Cotton. Thc Doorancc monarchclcct had already crossed t h e Indus, and was cncamped
at Shikarporc, whcn he was joincd by Mr William H a y
i\[acnaghten, of the Company's Civil Scrvicc, thc high
functionary who had been gnzetkcl as 'Envoy and
IIinistcr on thc part of the Government of India at the
Court of Shah Soojah-001-Moolk.' Durancl pronounces
the selection an unhappy onc, ' for Macnaghten, long
accustomed to irrcsponsiblc office, incspericnccd in men,
and ignorant of the country and pcople of Afghanistan,
was, though an cruclite Arabic scholar, neither practised
in the fcld of Asiatic intrigue nor a Inan of action. H i s
ambition was, however, great, and the expedition, holding
out the promise of distinction and honours, had tnct with
his strcnuous advocacy.' Macnaghten was one of the
tllrec men who chiefly inspired Lord A~icklancl j~liththe
policy to which he had committed himself. H c was
the negotiator of the tripartite trcaty, I-Ie was noiv on
his way toward a region whcrein he was to concern
himself in strange adventures, thc outcon~e of which
was to darken his reputation, consign llim to a sudden
cruel dcath, bring awful ruin on the ellterprise
had
fostered, and inflict incalculable damage on British
prestige in India.
Marching through Bhawulpore and Northern Scinde,
without noteworthy incident save heavy losses of draught

cattle, Cotton's army reached ICoree, the point a t which
the Indus was to be crossed, in the third weck of January
1839. Here a delay was encountered. T h e Scinde
Amccrs were, with reason, angered by the unjust and
exacting terms which Pottinger had been instructed to
enforce on them. They had been virtually indcpendcnt
of Afghanistan for nearly half a century ; there was now
masterfully demanded of them quartcr of a million stcrling
in name of back tribute, and this in the face of thc fact
that they held a solcmn rclcasc by Shah Soojah of all
past and future claims. When t h y demurred to this,
and to other exactions, they wcre peremptorily told that
' neithcr the rcady power to crush and annihilate them,
nor the will to call it into action, was wanting if it
appeared requisite, howevcr remotely, for the safety and
integrity of the Anglo-Indian empire and frontier.'
I t was little wonder that the Arneers were reluctant
to fall in with terms advanced so arrogantly. Iceane
marched up the right bank of the Indus t o within a
couple of marches of I-lyderabad, and having heard of thc
rejection by the Ameers of Pottinger's terms, and of the
gathering of some 20,000 armcd Belooches about the
capital, he called for the co-operation of part of the
Bengal column in a movement on Hyderabad. Cotton
started on his march down the left bank, on January 30th)
with 5400 men. Undcr menaces so ominous the unfortunate Ameers succumbed. Cotton returned to Roree ;
the Bengal column crossed the Indus, and on February
20th its headquarters reached Shikarporc. T e n days
later, Cotton, leading the advance, was in Dadur, at the
foot of the Bolan Pass, having suffered heavily in trans-

110rt animals almost from thc start. Supplics wcrc scarce
in a region so barren, but with a month's partial food on
his beasts of burden he quitted Dadur March loth, got
safely, if toilsomely, through the Bolan, and on 26th
rcach~dQuctta, where he was to halt for orders. Shah
Soojah and Keanc foliowed, their troops suffering not a
little from scarcity of supplics and loss of animals.
ICeane's error in detaining Cotton a t Quetta until he
should arrive proved itself in thc semi-starvation to which
thc troops of the Bengal column were reduced. T h e
Khan of I<hclat, whethcr from disaffection or inability,
lcft unfulfilled his promise to supply grain, and the
result of the quarrel which Rurnes picl<ed with him was
that he shunned coming in and paying homage to 'Shah
Soojah, for which default he was to suffer cruel and
i~njustifiableruin. The sepoys were put on half, the
camp followers on quarter rations, and the forcc for
eleven days had been idly consuming the waning supplies,
when a t length, on April 6th) Keane came into camp,
having already formally assumed the command of the
whole army, and made certain alterations in its organisation and subsidiary commands. There still remained to
bc traversed 147 miles before Candahar should be reached,
and thc dreaded Kojuk Pass had still to be penetrated.
Keane was a soldier who had gained a reputation for
couragc in Egypt and the Peninsula, I-Ie was indebted
to the acuteness of his engineer and the valour of his
troops, for the peerage conferred on him for Ghuznec, and
it cannot bc said that during his command in Afghanistan
he disclosed any marked military aptitude. B u t he had
sufficientperception to recognise that he had brought tile

Bengal column to the verge of starvation in Quetta, and
sufficient coinmon sense to discern that, since if it remained
there it would soon starve outright, thc best thing to be
done was to push it forward with all possible spccrl into
a region where food should be procurable. Acting on
this reasoning, he marched the day after his arrival.
Cotton, while lying in Quetta, had not taken the trouble to
reconnoitre the passes in advance, far less to make a practicable road through the Kojuk defile if that should prove
the best route. The resolution taken to march through
it, t\vo days werc spent in making the pass possible for
wheels ; and from the 13th to the zrst the column was
engaged in overcoming the obstacles it presented, losing
in the task, besides, much baggage, supplies, transport and
ordnance stores. Further back in the Bolan Willshire
with the Bombay column was faring worse; he was
plundered severely by tribal marauders.
By May 4th the main body of the army was encamped
in the plain of Candahar. From the I<ojuk, Shah Soojall
and his contingent had led the advance toward the
southern capital of the dominions from the throne of
which he had been cast down thirty ycars before. The
Canclahar chiefs had meditated a night attack on his raw
troops, but Macnaghten's intrigues and bribes had wrought
defection in their camp ; and while Kohun-dil-Khan and
his brothers were in flight to Girishk on the Helmuncl,
the infamous Hadji Khan I<alzur led the venal herd sf
turncoat sycophants to the fect of the claimant who came
backed by the British gold, which Macnaghten was
scattering abroad with lavish hand. Shah Soojah recovered from his trepidation, hurried forward in advancc

of his troops, and entered Candahar on April 24th. I-Iis
reception tvas cold. The influential chiefs stood aloof,
abiding the signs of the times ; the populace of Candahar
stood silent and lowering. Nor did the sullenness abate
when the presence of a large army with its follo\vers
promptly raised the price of grain, to thc great distrcss
of the poor. The ceremony of the solemn recognition of
the Shah, held close to the scene of his defeat in 1834,
Havclock describes as an imposing pageant, with homagings and royal salutes, parade of troops and prescntation
of mzzttrs; but the arena set apart for the inhabitants
was empty, spite of Eastern love for a kz?,mshn, and the
display of enthusiasm was confined to the immediate
retainers of His Majesty.
The Shah was eager for the pursuit of the fugitive
chiefs; but the troops wcre jaded and sickly, the cavalry
wcre partially dismounted, and what horscs remained were
feeble slteletons. The transport animals neeclcd grazing
and rcst, and their loss of numbers to be made good. The
crops were not yet ripe,'and pro,~isionswere scant and
dear. When, on May gth, Sale marched toward Girishk,
his dctachmcnt carried half rations, and his handful of
regular cavalry was all that two regiments coulcl furnish.
Rcaching Girishk, he found that thc chiefs had fled toward
Seistan, and leaving a regiment of tlte Shah's contingent
in occupation, he rclurned to Candahar.
Macnaghten professed the belief, and perhaps may
have dcluded himself into it, that Candahar had receivcd
the Shah with enthusiasm. He was sanguine that the
~ ~ r toc Cabul
h
would be unopposcd, and he urged on
Keane, who was wholly dependent on the Envoy for
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political information, to move fonvarcl at once, lightening the difficulties of thc march by lcaving the nombay
troops at Candahar. But Iceane clcclined, on the advice
of Thomson, his chief engineer, who asked significantly
whether he had found the information given him by the
political dcpartment in any single instance correct. Food
prospects, however, did not improve at Candahar, and
leaving a strong garrison there as well, curious t o say,
as the siege train which with arduous labour had bcen
brought up the passes, Iccane began the march to Cabul
on June 27th. H e had supplies only sufficient to carry
his army thither on half rations. Macnaghten had
lavished money so frcely that the treasury chest mas all
but empty. How the Afghans regarded the invasion was
evinced by condign slaughter of our stragglers.
As the army advanced up the valley of thc Turnulc,
the climate became morc tempcrate, the harvest was
later, and the troops improved in health and spirit. Concentrating his forces, Kcane reached Ghuznee on July
~ 1 s t . The reconnaissance he made proved that fortress
occupicd in force. Thc outposts driven in, and a close
inspection made, the works were found strongcr than
had been represented, and its rcgular reduction was out
of the
without the battering train which Keanc
had allowed himself t o be persuaded into leaving behind. A wall some 70 fcct high and a wet ditch in its
front macle mining and escalade alike impracticable.
Thornson, however, noticed that the road and bridge to
the Cabul gate were intact. I-Ie obtained trustworthy
information that up to a rccent date, while all the other
gatcs had bccn built up, the Cabul gate had not been so

d e a l t with. As hc watcl~ecl,a horscman was seen to
e n t e r by it. This was conclusive. T h e ground within
400 yards of the gate offered good artillery positions.
Thomson therefore reported that although thc operation
w a s full of risk, and success if attainecl rnust cost dear, yet
ili t h e absence of a less hazardous method of reduction
there offered a fair chance of success in an attempt to blow
o p e n the Cabul gate, ancl then carry the place by a cot$
de wain. Keane was precluded from the alternative of
masking the place and continuing his advance by thc all
b u t total exhaustion of his supplies, which the capture of
Ghuznce would replenish, and he thcrefore rcsolved on
a n assault by the Cabul gate.
During the ~ 1 sJuly
t
the army circled round the place,
a n d camped to the north of it on the Cabul road. T h e
following day was spent in preparations, ancl in defeating
a n attack madc on the Shah's contingent: by sevcral
thousand Ghilzai tribcsmcn of the adjacent hill country.
I n the gusty darkness of the early morning of the 23d the
field artillcry was placed in battery on the heights opposite
thc northern face of the fortress. The 13th regimcnt was
extended in skirmishing order in the gardens under the
wall of this facc, and a detachment of sepoys was detailcd
to make a false attack on the eastern face. Near the
centre of the northern face was the Cabul gate, in front
of which lay waiting for the signal, a storming party consisting of the light companies of the four European regiments, under command of Colonel Dennie of thc I 3th.
T h e main column consisted of two European regiments
a n d the support of a third, the whole commanded by
Brigadier Sale ; the native regiments constituted the

reserve. All those dispositions were completed by
thrcc A.M., and, favoured by the noise of the wind and
the darkness, without alarming the garrison.
Punctually at this hour the little party of engineers
charged with the task of blowing in the gate started forward on the hazardous errand. Captain Peat of the
Bombay Engineers was in command. Durand, a young
lieutenant of Bengal Engineers, who was later to attain
high distinction, was entrusted with the service of heading
the explosion party. The lattcr, leading the party, had
advanced unmolested to within 150 yards of thc works,
when a challenge, a shot and a shout gave intimation of
his detection. A musketry fire was promptly opened by
the garrison from the battlements, and blue lights illuminated the approach to the gate, but in the fortunate absence
of fire from the lower works the bridge was safely crossed,
and Peat with his handful of linesmen halted in a sallyport to covcr the explosion opcration, Durand advanced
to the gate, his sappers piled their powdcr bags against it
and withdrew; Durand and his scrgeant uncoilcd the hosc,
ignited thc quick-match undcr a rain from the battlements
of bullets and iniscellancous missiles, and then retired to
cover out of reach of the explosion.
A t the sound of the first shot from the battlements,
Keane's cannon had opened their fire. The skirmishers
i n the gardens engaged in a brisk fusillade. The rattle of
Hay's musketry was heard from the east. Thc garrison
was alert in its reply. T h e northern ramparts became a
sheet of flame, and everywhere thc cannonade and musketry
fire nrascd i n noise and volume. Suddenly, as the day
~vasbeginning to dawn, a dull, heavy sound was heard by

the l~eadof thc waiting column, scarce audiblc clsewhcre
because of the boisterous wind and the din of the firing.
A pillar of black smoltc shot up from where had been the
Afghan gate, now shattered by thc 300 pounds of gunpowder \vhich Durand had explodcd against it. T h e
signal to the storming party was to be thc Laclvance'
sounded by the hugler who accompanied Pcat. But thc
bugler had bccn shot through the hcad. Durand could
not find Peat. Going back through thc bullets to the
marcst party of infantry, he experienced some delay, but
a t last the column was apprised that all was right, the
'advance' was sounded, Dennie ancl his stormers sped
forward, and Salc followecl at thc head of the main
column.
After a temporary chcck to the latter, because of a
misconception, it pushed on in close support of Dentlie.
T h a t gallant soldicr and his gallant followers had rushed
into the smoking and gloomy archway to find themselves
met hand to hand by thc Afghan defcnders, who had recovered from their surprise. Nothing could be distinctly
seen in the narrow gorge, but the clash of sword bladc
against bayonet was heard on every side. T h e stormers
had to grope their way bctween the yet standing walls in
a dusk which the glimmer of the blue light only made
more pcrplexing. But some clbow room was gradually
gained, and then, since there was neither time nor space
for mcthoclic street fighting, each loaded section gave its
volley and then made way for the next, which, crowding
to the front, poured a dcnclly clischarge a t half pistol-shot
into the densely crowdcd defcnders. Thus the storming
party won steadily its way, till at lcngth Dcnnic ancl his

leading files discerned ovcr the heads of their opponents
a patch of blue sky and a twinlding star or two, and with
a final charge found themselves within the place.
A body of fierce Afghan swordsmen projected themselves into the interval between the storming party and
the main column. Sale, at the head of the latter, was cut
. down by a tulwar stroke in the face; in the effort of his
blow the assailant fell with the assailed, and they rollcd
together among the shattered timbcrs of the gatc. Salc,
wounclccl again on thc ground, and faint with loss of blood,
called to one of his officers for assistance. Icershaw ran
the Afghan through the body with his sword ; but hc still
struggled with the Brigadier. A t length in the grappld
Sale got uppermost, and the11 he dealt his adversary.
a sabre cut which cleft him from crown to eyebrows.
There was much confused fighting within the place, for
the Afghan garrison made furious rallies again and again ;
but thc citadel was found open and unclefended, and by
sunrise British banners \ \ w e waving abovc its battlements'.
Hydcr Khan, the Governor of Ghuznec, one of the sons of
Dost Mahomccl, was found concealed in a house in the
town and taken prisoner. The British loss amounted to
about 200 killed and wounded, that of the garrison, which
was estimated at from 3000 to 4000 strong, was over 500
killed. The number of wounded was not ascertained ; of
prisoners taken in arms there were about 1600. The
booty consisted of numerous horses, camels and rnulcs,
orclnancc and military weapons of various descriptions,
and a vast quantity ot supplies of all kinds.
Kcane, having garrisoned Ghuznee, and left there his
sick and wounded, resumed on July 30th his march on
'

Cabul. Within twenty-four hours after the event Dost
Mahomed heard of the fall of Ghuznee. Possessed of thc
adverse intelligence, the Dost gathercd his chiefs, rcceived
their facile assurances of fidelity, sent his brother the
Nawaub Jubbar Khan to ask what terms Shah Soojah and
his British allies mere prepared to offer him, and recalled
from Jellalabad his son Akbar Khan, with all the force he .
could muster there. The Dost's emissary to thc allied
camp was informed that ' an honourable asylum' in
British India was at the servicc of his brother; an offer
which Jubbar Khan declined in his name without thanks.
Before he left to share the fortunes of the Dost, the Sirdar
is reported to have asked Macnaghten, ' If Shah Soojah is
really our king, what need has he of your army and name?
You have brought him here,' he continued, 'with your
money and arms. Well, leave him now with us Afghans,
and let him rule us if he can.' When Jubbar Khan returned to Cabul with his sombre message, the Dost, having bcen joincd by Akbar Khan, concentrated his army,
and found himself at the hcad of 13,ooo men, with thirty
guns ; but he mournfully realised that he could lean no
reliance on thc constancy and courage of his adherents.
Neverthcless, he marched out along the Ghuznee road, and
drew up his force at Urguncleh, where he commanded the
most direct line of retreat toward the westcrn hill country
of Ramian, in case his people would not fight, or should
they fight, if they were beatcn.
There was no fight in his following ; scarcely, indeed,
was there a loyal supporter among all those who had
eaten his salt for years. Therc was truc manhood in this
chief whom we were replacing by an cffcte puppet. The

Dost, Koran in hand, rodc among his perfidious troops,
and conjurcd them in thc namc of God and the I'rophct
not to dishonour thcmsclves by transfcrring thcir allegiance to one who had fillcd Afghanistan with infidcls and
blasphemers. ' If,' he continued, 'you are rcsolved to
be traitors to me, at least enable mc to die with honour.
Support the brother of Futteh Khan in one last charge
against these Fcringhce dogs. In that charge he will fall ;
then go and make your own terms with Shah Soojah.'
The high-souled appcal inspired no worthy rcsponsc ; but
one is loth to credit the testimony of the soldier-of-fortune Harlan that his guards forsook the Dost, ancl that
the rabble of troops plundered his pavilion, snatched from
under him thc pillows of his divan, seizcd his prayer
carpet, and finally hackcd into pieccs thc tcnt and its
appurtenances. On thc evening of August 2d thc hapless man shook the dust of thc camp of traitors from his
feet, and rode away toward Ramian, his son Akbar
Khan, with a handful of resolutc men, coxring the retreat
of his father and his family. Tidings of the flight of
Dost nIaliomed reached Keanc on the jd, at Sheilcabad,
where he had haltecl to concentrate ; and Outram volunteered to head a pursuing party, to consist of some
British officers as volunteers, some cavalry and some
Afghan horse. I-Iadji Khan I<akur, thc carlicst traitor of
his race, undertook to act as guide. This man's devices
of delay defeated Outram's fiery energy, perhaps in dcceit, perhaps because he regarclcd it as lacking discretion.
For Alcbar Khan rnade a long halt on thc crown of the
pass, ivaiting to checlc any endeavour to press closely on
his fugitive father, and it would havc gonc hard with

Outram, with a few fagged horserncn at his back, if Hadji
Khan had allowcd him to overtake thc resolute young
Afghan chief. As Kcanc moved forward, thcre fcll to
him the guns which thc Dost had left in thc Urgundeh
position. On August 6th hc cncamped closc to Cabul ;
and on thc following clay Shah Soojah made his public
cntry inlo thc capital which hc had last seen thirty years
prcviously. After so many years of vicissitude, adventure
and intriguc, hc was again on the throne of his ancestors,
but placccl tllcre by the bayoncts of thc ~ o v e r n m e n t
whosc crcaturc hc was, an insult to the nation whom he
had the insolcncc to call his pcople.
The cntry, ncverthelcss, was a goodly speclacle enough.
Shah Soojah, dazzling in coronet, jewellcd gircllc and
bracelets, but with no ICoh-i-noor now glittering on his
forelicaci, lscstrode a white charger, whose equipments
glea~ncdwith gold. Ry his side rode Macnaghten and
Burnes ; in the pagcant were the principal officers of the
British army. Sabres flashed in front of the procession,
bayonets sparkled in its rear, as it wended its may
through the grcat bazaar nhich I'ollock was to dcstroy
three years later, and along the tortuous street to the
gate of the Bnlla Hissar. But neither thc monarch nor
his pageant lcindled the enthusiasm in the Cabulees.
There was n o voicc of welcoinc ; the citizens did not
care to trouble themsclvcs so much as to make him a
salaam, and they stared at the European strangers harder
than at his restored majesty. There was a touch of pathos
in the burst of cagerriess to which the old man gave
way as he reachccl the palace, ran through the gardcns,
visitccl the apartments, and commented on thc neglect

everywhcrc apparcnt. Shah Soojah was rather a poor
crcaturc, but hc was by no means altogether clcstitutc of
good points, and far worse men t h a i ~he were actors in
thc strangc historical episode of which hc was thc figurehead. He was humane for an Afghan ; hc ncver was
proved to have been untrue to us; he must have had
sornc courage of a I<ind elsc he would never have remained in Cabul whcn our pcople left it, in thc a11 but
full assurance of thc fate which presently overtook him as
a mattcr of course. J-Iavclock thus portrays him : ' A stout
person of the rnidclle I~eight, his chin covcred with
a long thick and neatly trimmed beard, dyed black to
conceal thc cncroachrnents of time, His manner toward
the English is gcntlc, calm and dignified, without haughtiness, but his own subjects have invariably complained of
his rcception of thcrn as cold and rcpulsive, cven to rudeness. His complexion is darkcr than that of thc generality
of Afghans, and his features, if not decidedly I~andsomc,
are not the rcverse of pleasing; but thc esprcssion of his
countenance would betray to a skilful physiognomist that
rnixture of timidity and cluplicity so often obscrvablc i n
the character of thc higher order of men in Southern
Asia.'

C H A P T E R ,111
TIXE FIRST Y E A R OF OCCUPATION
S1lc J O H N

KAYE,in his picturesque if diffuse history of

the first Afghan war, lays it down that, in seating Shah
Soojah on the Cabul t h r o ~ ~'cthe
, Uritish Govcrnmcnt had
done all that it had undertaltcn to do,' and Durand argues
that, having accornplisl~dthis, 'thc British army could
have thcn been \vithdrawn with the honour and famc of
entire success.' The facts apparently do not justify the
reasoning of either writcr. In thc Simla manifesto, in
which Lord Auclzland embodied the rationalc of his policy,
h e expressed the confident hope ' that the Shah will be
speedily replaced on his thronc by his own subjects and
adherents, and when oncc hc shall be+received in power,
and thc independence and integrity of Afghanistan establishecl, the British army will be withdra\vn.' The Shah
had becn incleecl resto~*eclto his thronc, but by British
bayonets, not by 'his own subjects and adherents.' It
could not seriously bc maintained that Ilc was secure in
power, or that the inclcpendcnce and integrity of Afghanistan were established when British troops wcre holding
Candahar, Ghuznee and Cabul, the only three positions
where the Shah was nominally paramount, whcri the

,

fugitive Dost was still within its borders, when intrigue
and disaffection werc seething in every vallcy and on every
hill-side, and when the principality of Herat maintained
a contemptuous independence. Macnaghten might avow
himself convinced of the popularity of the Shah, and
believe or strive to believe that the Afghans had received
the puppct king ' with feelings early amounting to adoration,' but he did not venture to support the conviction
hc avowed by advocating that the Shah should bc abandoned to his adoring subjects. Lord Auclcland's policy
was gravely and radically erroneous, but it had a definite
object, and that object certainly was not a futile march to
Cabul and back, dropping incidentally by the waysidc the
aspirant to a throne whom he had himsclf put forward,
and leaving him to take his chance among a truculent and
adverse population. Thus early, in all probability, Lord
Auckland mas disillusioned of the expectation that the
effective restoration of Shah Soojah would be of light and
easy accomplisl~rnent.,but at lcast he could not afford to
as yet it was little
have the enterprise a cotip ~mntrp~dwlicn
beyond its inception.
The cost of the expcdition was already, however, a
strain, and the troops engagcd in it werc needed in India.
Lord Auclclancl intimated to Macnaghten his expectation
that a strong brigade would suffice to hold Afghanistan in
conjunction with thc Shah's contingent, and his desire that
the rcst of the army of the Indus should at once return to
India. Macnaghten, on the other hand, in spite of his
avowal of the Shah's popularity, was anxious to retain in
Afghanistan a large body of troops. H e rneditatcd strange
enterprises, and proposed that Kcane should support his
C

project bf scnding a force toward Bolthara to give check
t o a Russian column which Pottinger at Ilerat had heard
was assembling at Orenburg, with Khiva for its objcctivc.
ICeane dcrided the proposal, ancl Macnaghten reluctantly
abandoned it, but he demanded of Lord Aucltland with
success, the retention in Afghanistan of the Bengal division
of thc army. I n t l ~ clnidclle of September Gcneral Willshire marched with the Bombay column, with orders, on
his way to the Inclus to pay a hostile visit to Khelat, and
punish its khan for the 'disloyalty' with \ ~ h i c hhc had
been charged, a com~nissionwhich the Dritish officer fulfilled with a skill and thoroughness that could be admired
with less reservation had the aggression on the gallant
Mehrab been less wanton. A month later ICeane started
for India by the IChyber route, which Wade had opened
without serious resistance when in August and September
he escorted through the passes Prince Timour, Shah
Soojah's heir-apparcnt. During the temporary absence
of Cotton, who accompanied Iceane, Nott had the comnand a t Candahar, Sale a t and about Cabul, and the
troops were quartered in those capitals, and in Jellalabad, Ghuznee, Charikar and Bamian. The Shah and
the Envoy wintered in the milder climate of Jellalabad,
and Burries was in political charge of the capital and its
vicinity.
It was a prophetic utterance that the acco~nplishment
of our military succession would mark but the commencement of our real difficulties in Afghanistan. In theory
and in name Shah Soojah was an independent monarch;
it was, incleecl, only in virtue of his proving himself able
to rule independently that he could justify his claim to

rule at 111. But that he was independent was a contradiction in terms while British troops studded the
country, and whilc the real powers of sovereignty were
exerciscd by Macnaghten. Certain functions, it is true,
the latter did permit the nominal monarch to exercise.
Whilc debarrcd from a voice in measures of external
policy, and not allo\ved to sway thc lincs of conduct to he
acloptcd toward independent or revolting tribes, thc Shah
was allowcd to concern himself with thc administration of
justicc, and in his hands were the settlement, collection
and appropriation of thc revenue of those portions of thc
l~ingclornfrom which any rcvenuc could be cxactcd. He
was allowed to appoint as his minister of state, the companion of his exile, old Moolla Shikore, who had lost
both his memory and his ears, but who had sufficient
faculty left to hate the English, to oppress the people, to
bc corrupt and venal beyond all conception, and to appoint
suborclinatcs as flagitious as himsclf, ' Bad ministers,'
wrote Uurnes, 'are in every government solid ground
for unpopularity; and I doubt if ever a Icing had a worsc
set than has Shah Soojah! The oppressed people appcalcd to the British functionaries, who remonstrated with
the minister, and the minister punishcd the people for appealing to the British fi~nctionarics. The Shah was free to
confer grants of land on his creatures, but when the holders
resisted, he was unable to enforce his will since he was not
allowed to enlploy soldiers; and the odium of the forciblc
confiscation ultimately fell on Macnaghten, who alone had
the ordering of expeditions, and who could not see the
Shah belittled by non-fulfilment of his requisitions.
Justice sold by venal judges, oppression and corruption

rampant in every department of internal administration,
it was no wonder that nobles and people alike resented
the inflictions under whose sting they writhed. They
were accustomed to a certain amount of oppression; Dost
Mahomed had chastised them with whips, but Shah
Soojah, whom the English had brought, was chastising
them with scorpions. And they felt his yolie the more
bitterly because, with the shrewd acutcness of the race,
they rccognised thc really servile condition of this ncw
king. They fretted, too, under the sharp bit of the-British
political agents who were strcwn about the country, in
the exccution of a miserable and futile policy, and whose
lives, in a few instances, did not maintain the good name
of their country. Dost Mahomed had maintained his
sway by politic management of the chiefs, ant1 through
them of the tribes. Macnaghten would have done well
to impress on Shah Soojah the wisdom of pursuing the
same tactics. There was, it is true, the alternative of
destroying the power of the barons, but that policy involved a stubborn and doubtful struggle, and prolonged
occupation of thc country by British troops in great
strength. Macnaghten professcd our occupation of
Afghanistan to be temporary ; yet he was clearly adventuring on the rash expcrimcnt of weakcning the nobles
when he set about the enlistment of local tribal levies,
who, paid from the Royal treasury and commanded by
British officcrs, were espected to be staunch to the
Shah, and useful in curbing the powers of the chiefs.
and
The latter, of course, were alienated and resentf~~l,
the levies, imbued with the Afghan attribute of fickleness, proved for the most part undisciplined and faithless.

The First Y e a r of Occ@atio?t
The winter of 1839-40 passcd without much notcworthy incident. T h e wintcr climate of Afghnuistan is
severe, and the Afghan, in ordinary circumstanccs, is
among the hibernating animals. But down in thc I<hybcr,
in October, the tribes gave somc trouble. Thcy werc dissatisfied with the amount of annual black-mail paid thcm
for the right of way through thcir passes. When the
Shah was a fugitive thirty years previously, they had concealed and protccted him ; and m'indful of thcir kindly
services, hc had promised thcm, unlanomn t o Macnaghten,
the augmentation of their subsidy to the old scalc from
which it llad gradually dwindled. Watlc, returning from
Cabul, did not bring them the assurances they expected,
whereupon they rose and concentratcd and invested Ali
Musjid, a fort which they regarded as thc kcy of thcir
gloomy defile. Mackeson, thc Peshawur polilical officer,
threw provisions and ammunition into Ali Musjid, but
the force, on its rcturn march, was attacked by thc hillmcn,
t l ~ cS i k h ~ ~ b e i nroutccl,
g
and the sepoys incurring loss of
men and transport. Thc emboldcncd Khyhcrccs now
turned on Ali Musjid in earnest; but thc garrison was
strengthened, and the place was hclcl until a couple of
regiments inarched down from Jellalabad, and \ \ w e prcparing to attack the hillmen, whcn it was announced that
Maclceson had rnadc a compact with the chiefs for tllc payment of an annual subsidy which they considered adcquatc.
Afghanistan fifty years ago, and the same is in a
lneasure true of it to-clay, was rather a bundlc of provinces,
some of which owned scarccly a nominal allegiance to the
ruler in Cabul, than a concrete stale. Hcrat and Candaliar were wholly independent, thc Ghilzai tribcs inhabiting

thc wide tracts from thc Suliman rarigcs wcstwarcl beyond
the road through Ghuzncc, betwccn Candahar atid Cabul,
and north\vard into thc ruggcd country betwccn C a b d
and Jellalabad, acknowleclgcd no other authority than
that of their own chick. T h e Ghilzais arc agriculturists,
shepherds, and robbers ; they arc constantly cngagcd in
internal feucls ; they are jealous of their wild independcnce, ancl through thc centuries havc abatcd littlc of
their untamed ferocity. Thcy had rejcctcd Macnagliten's
advances, and had attackcd S h d i .FioojaliJs camp on the
clay before thc fall of Ghuzncc. Outram, in reprisal,
had promptly raidcd part of thcir country. Latcr, the
winter had restrained thcm from activity, but they brolce
out again in thc spring. I n May Captain Aridcrson,
marching from Candahar with a mixcd force about 1200
strong, was offcrcd battle near Jazce, in the Turnuli, by
some 2000 Gliilzai horsc ancl foot. Anclcrson's guns told
heavily among the Ghilzai horsctneo, who, impatient of
thc fire, made a spirited clash on his Icft flank. Grapc
and muskctry checkcd them ; but they rallicd, and twicc
charged homc on tllc bayoncts bcforc they withdrew,
leaving 200 of their number dead on thc ground. Nott
sent a detachment to occupy thc fortress of Khclat-iGhilzai, between Candahar and Ghuzncc, thus rc~ldering
the communications more securc ; and latc;, Macnaghten
bribcd the chief5 by a n annual subsidy of A600 to abstain
from infesting the highways. The terms wcrc cheap,
for the Ghilzai tribcs niusterccl some 40,000 fighting
men.
Shah Soojah and the Envoy returned from Jellalabad
to Cabul in April 1840. A couple of regiments had
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wintered not uncomfortably in the Balla Hissar. That
fortress was then the ltey of Cabul, and v.d~ileour troops
remained in Afghanistan it should not havc been left
ungarrisoned a single hour. The soldicrs did thcir bcst
to impress on Macnaghten the all-importance of the
position. But the Shah objected to its continued occupation, and Macnaghtcn weakly yieldcd. Cotton, who had
returned to the chief military commancl in Afghanistan,
made no remonstrance ; thc Balla I-Iissar was evacuated,
and the troops w r c quartered in cantonments built in an
utterly defenceless position on the plain north of Cabul,
a position whose environs wcre cumbered with walled
gardens, and coinmanded by acljaccnt high ground, and by
native forts which were neither demolished nor occupied.
Thc troops, now in permanent and regularly constructed
quarters, ceased to bc an expeditionary force, and became
substantially an army of occupation, T h c officers sent
for their wives to inhabit with thcm thc bungalows in
which they had settled down. Lady Macnaghten, in the
,spacious mission residence which stood apart in its own
grounds, prcsiclcd over the society of thc cantonmcnts,
which had all thc cheery surrounclings of the half-settlcd,
half-nomadic life of our military people in the East.
There (were thc ' coffee house ' after the morning ride, the
gathering round the bandstand in the evening, thc
impromptu dance, and thc buvra khnna occasionally in
the largcr houses. A racecourse had been laid out, and
there were ' s k y ' races and morc formal meetings, And
so 'as in the days that wcre before the flood, they w r c eating and drinking, ancl marrying and giving in marriage, and
knew not until the flood came, ancl took them all away.'
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Macnaghten cngagecl himself in a welter of internal
and external intrigue, his mood swinging from singular
complacency to a disquietude that sometimes approachcd
despondency. It had come to be forced on him, in spite
of his intermittent optimism, that the Government was
a government of scntry-boxes, and that Afghanistan was
not governed so much as garrisoned. The utter failure ot
the winter march attempted by Pcroffski's Russian column
across the frozen stcppcs on Khiva was a rclief to him ;
but the state of affairs in 1-Icrat was a constant trouble
and anxiety. Major Todd had been sent there as political
agent, to make a treaty with Shah Kamran, and to superintend the repair and improvcment of the fortifications of
the city. Karnran was plenteously subsidisecl ; he tool<
Macnaghten's lakhs, but furtivcly maintained close relations
with Pcrsia. Detecting the double-dealing, Macnaghten
urged on Lord Auckland the annexation of Hcrat to
Shah Soojah's dominions, but was instructed to condone
Kamran's duplicity, and try to bribe him higher. Kamran
by no means objected to this policy, and, while continuing his intrigues with Pcrsia, cheerfully accepted thc
money, arms and ammunition which Macnaghten supplied him with so profusely as to cause remonstrance on
the part of the financial authorities in Calcutta. The
Commander-in-Chief was strong enough to counteract thc
pressure which Macnaghten brought to bear on Lord
Auckland in favour of an expedition against Herat, which
his lordship at length finally negatived, to the great disgust of the Envoy, who wrote of the conduct of his
chief as ' drivelling bcyoncl contcmpt,' and ' sighed for a
Wellesley o r a Hastings.' T h e ultimate result of Mac-
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naghten's rlegotiations with Sha11 I<amran was Major
Todd's withdrawal from I-Icrat. Todd had suspenclcd t h c
monthly subsidy, to the great wrath of I<amranls rapacious
and treachcrous minister Yar Mahorned, who made a
peremptory demand for increased advances, and refused
Todcl's stipulation that a British force should be admitted
into I-Ierat. Todd's action in quitting Ilerat was severcly
censured by his superiors, and he was relegated to regimental duty. Perhaps he acted somewhat rashly, but h e
had not been kept wcll informcd ; for instance, hc had
been unaware that Persia had becomc our friend, and had
engaged to cease relations with Shah ICainran-an irnportant arrangement of which he certainly should havc
been cognisant. Macnaghten had squandered more gold
on Ilerat than the fee-simple of the principality was worth,
and to no purpose; he left that state just as he found it,
treacherous, insolent, grecdy and independent.
The precariousness of thc long lines of communicatio~vi
betwcen British India and thc army in Afghanistan-a
source of dangcr which from thc first had disquieted
cautious soldiers-was making itsclf seriously fclt, ancl
constituted for Macnaghtcn another cause of solicitude.
Old Runjeet Singh, a faithful if not disinterested ally,
had died on Junc 27th, 1839, the day on which I<eane
marched out from Candahar. The breath was scarcely
out of the old reprobate whcn thc Punjaub bcgan to drift
into anarchy. So far as the Sikh share in it was concerncd, the tripartite treaty threatened to become a dead
Ictter. The Lahore Durbar had not adequately fulfilled
the undertaking to support Prince Tirnour's advance by t h c
Khyber, nor was it duly regarding thc obligation to main-

tnin a forcc on the Pcshawur fronticr of the Punjaub. But
thosc things were trivial in comparison with the groming reluctance manifested frccly, to accord t o our troops
and convoys permission to travcrse the runjaub on the
march t o and from Cabul. T h e Anglo-Indian C ~ ~ X I ment scnt Mr Cldrlc to Lahore t o settlc the question as to
t h e thoroughfare. Hc had instructions to be firm, and the
Sikhs did not challenge Mr Clerk's stipulation that the
Anglo-Indian Government must have unmolested right of
way through the P~tnjaub,while he undertoolc to restrict
t h e usc of it as much as possible. This arrangcment by
no means satisfied the exacting Macnaghtcn, and he
continued to worry himself by foreseeing all sorts of troublous contingencies unless mcasures were adopted for
. 'macadamking' thc road through the Punjaub.
The summer of I Sqo did not pass without serious
interruptions to the British communications bctwcen
Candahar and the Indus; nor without unexpected and
ominous disasters before they were restored. General
Witlshire, with the returning Bombay column, had in the
prcvious November stormed Mehrab Khan's ill-manned
and worse armed fort of Khelat, and the Khan, disdaining
t o yield, had fallen in the hopelcss struggle. His son
Nusseer Khan had been put aside in favour of a collateral prctendcr, and becamc a n active and dangerous
malcontent. All Northern Beloochistan fell into a state
of anarchy. A detachment of sepoys escorting supplies
was cut t o pieces in one of the passes, Quettawas attacked
with great resolution b y Nusseer Khan,but was opportunely
relievecl by a force sent from another post. Nusseer made
himself Inaster of Khclat, and there fell into his cruel hands
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Lieutenant Idovcday, the British political officer stationed
there, whom he treated with great barbarity, and finally
murdered. A British detachment under Colonel Clibborn,
was defeated by the Reloochees with heavy loss, and compclled to retreat. Nusseer Khan, clesccnding into the low
country of Cutch, assaulted the important post of Dadur,
but mas repulsed, and taking refuge in thc hills, was routed
b y Colonel Marshall with a forcc from Kotrce, whereupon
he became a skulking fugitive, Nott marched down from
Candahar mith a strong force, occupied I<helat, and fully
re-cstablishecl communications mith the line of the Indus,
while fresh troops movcd forward into Upper Scinde, and
tllcnce gradually advancing to Quetta and Candahar,
materially strengthened the British position in south en^
Afghanistan.
Dost Mahomed, after his flight from Cabul in 1839,had
soon left the hospitable rcfuge afforded him in Khooloom,
a tcrritory west of the I-Iindoo Koosh beyond Bamian,
and had gonc to Bo1;hara 011 thc treacherous invitation of
its Amcer, who threw him into captivity. T h c Dost's
family remaincd at 1Chooloom, in the charge of his brother
Jubbar Khan. The advance of British forces beyond
Barnian to Syghan and Bajgah, induced that Sirdar to comlnit himself and the ladies to British protection. Dr Lord,
Macnaghten's political officer in the Ramian district, was a
rash althongll well-meaning man. The errors he had committed sincc the opening of spring had occasioned disasters
to the troops whose dispositions he controlled, and had
incited thc neiglibouring hill tribes to active disaffection.
In July Dost Mahomed made his escape from Bokhara,
hurried to I<hooloom, found its ruler and the tribes h l l of

zeal for his cause, and rapidly grew in strength. Lord
found it was timc to call i n his advancc posts and concentrate at Barnian, losing in the operation an Afghan
regiment which deserted to thc Dost. Macnaghten reinforced Bamian, and sent Colonel Dcnnie to command
there. On September 18th Dennie moved out with two
guns and 800 men against thc Dost's advance parties raiding in an adjacent valley. Those rletachments driven back,
Dennie suddcnly found himself opposed to the irregular
mass of Oosbeg horse and foot which constituted the army
of the Dost. Mackenzie's cannon fire shook the undisciplined horde, the infantry pressed in to close quarters,
and soon thc nondescript host of the Dost was in panic
flight, with Dcnnic's cavalry in eager pursuit. The Dost
escaped with difficulty, with the loss of his entire personal
equipment. H e was once more a fugitive, and the Wali of
Khooloom promptly subrnittcd himself to the victors, and
pledged himself to aid and harbour thc broken chief no
more. Macnaghten had been a prey to apprehension
while the Dost's attitude was threatening; he was now i n
a glow of joy and hope.
But the Envoy's elation was short-lived. Dost Maho~neclwas yet to cause him much solicitude. Defcated in
Bamian, he was ready for another attempt in the Kohistan
country to the north of Cabul. Disaffection was rife everywhcrc throughout the Itingdom, but it was perhaps most
rife in the I<ohistan, which was seething with intrigues
in favour of Dost Mahomed, while the local chiefs were
intensely exasperated by thc exactions of the Shah's
revenuc collectors. Macnaghten summoned the chiefs to
Cabul. Thcy came, they did homage to thc Shah and
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swore allegiance to him ; they wcnt away from the capital
pledging each other to his overthrow, ancl jeering a t the
scantiness of the force they had seen a t Cabul. Intercepted lettcrs disclosed their schemes, and in the cnd of
September Sale, with a considerablc force, marched out t o
chastise the disaffccted Kohistanees. T h e fort of Tootundurrah fcll without resistance. Julgah, however, the next
fort assailed, stubbornly held out, and officers and men fell
in the unsuccessful attempt to storm it. In three weelis
Sale marched to and fro through thc Kohistan, pursuing
will-o'-the-wisp rumours as to the whereabouts of the Dost,
dcstroying forts on the course of his weary pilgrimage,
ancl subjected occasionally to night attacks.
Meanwhile, in the bclief that Dost Mahomed was close
to Cabul, and mournfully conscious that the capital and
surrounding country were ripe for a rising, Macnaghtcn
had relapsed into nervousness, and was a prey to gloomy
forebodings. The troops at Bamian were urgently recalled. Cannon \\we mounted on the Balla Hissar to
ovcrawe the city, thc conccntralion of the troops in the
fortress was under consideration, and men mere talking
of preparing for a siegc. How Macnaghten's English
nature was undergoing deterioration under the strain of
cvents is shown by his writing of the Dost : ' Would it be
justifiable to set a price on this fellow's head ? ' How his
perceptions were warped was further evinced by his
talking of 'showing no mercy to the man who has been
the author of all the evil mow distracting the country,'
and by his complaining of Sale and Burncs that, 'with
moo good infantry, they are sitting down before a
fortificd place, and are afraid to attack it.'

Lcarning that for certain thcDost had crossed tI~I3.indoo
ICoosh from Nijrao into the Kohistan, Sale, who had been
rcinforccd, sent out reconnaissances which ascertained that
he was in the Purwan Durrah valley, stretching down
from the I-Iindoo Koosh to the Gorebund river; and
the British forcc marched thither on zd November. AS
the villagc was neared, the Dost's peoplc wcre seen
cvacuating it and thc adjacent forts, and making for
thc hills. Sale's cavalry was some distance in advance of
the infantry of the advance guard, but time was precious.
Anderson's horse went to the left, to cut OK retreat down
thc Gorebund valley. Fraser took his two squadrons
of Dengal cavalry to the right, advanccd along thc
foothills, ancl gaincd the head of the valley. H c was too
late to intercept a small body of Afghan horsemen, who
were already climbing Lhc upland; but badly mounted
as Lhe latter were, hc coulcl pursue them with cffcct.
But it scerricd that thc Afghans preferred to fight rather
than be pursucd. The Dost himself was in command
of the little party, and the Dost was a man whose nature
was to fight, not to run. H e wheeled his handful so that
his horsemen faced Fraser's troop down there below them.
Then the Dost pointed to his banner, bared his head,
called on his supporters in the name of God and the
Prophet t o follow him against the unbelievers, and led
them down the slopc.
Frascr had formed up his troopers when recall orders
lrached hiin. Joyous that the situation entitlcd him to
disobey them, he gave instead the word to charge. As
the Afghans came down at no great pace, they fired occasionally ; either b ~ c a u s eof the bullets, or because of an
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access of pusillanimity, Fraser's troopcrs broke and Rcd
ignominiously. The British gentlemen charged home unsupported. Broadfoot, Crispin and Lord wcre slain; Ponsonby, severely \voundecl and his rcins cut, was carried
out of the m W e by his charger ; Fraser, covcred with
blood and wounds, brolie through his assailants, and
brought to Sale his report of the disgrace of his troopers..
After a sharp pursuit of thc poltroons, the Dost and his
followers leisurely quilted the field.
Burnes wrote to the Envoy-he was a soldier, but hc
was also a ' political,' and political employ see~necloften
in Afghanistan to deteriorate the attribute of solclierhoocl
-that there was no altcrnative for the force but to fall
back on Cabul, and cntreatcd Macnaghten to order immediate concentration of all the troops. This letter Macnaghten received the day after the disaster in the Kohistan,
when he was taking his aftcrnoon ride in the Cabul plain.
His heart must have been vcry hcavy as he rode, whcn
suddenly a horscman gallopccl up to him and announced
that the A~neerwas approaching. ' What A~neer? ' aslicd
Macnaghten. Dost Maholncd Khan,' was the reply, and
sure enough there was thc Dost close at hand, Dismounting, this Afghan prince and gentleman saluted the
Envoy, and olfercd him his snrord, which Macnaghten
declinccl to takc. Dost and Envoy rode into Cabul together, and such was thc impression the former made on
the latter that Macnaghten, who a month before had permitted himself to think of putting a price on ' the fellow's'
head, begged now of the Governor-General ' that the Dost
be treated more handsomely than was Shah Soojah, who
had no claim on us.' And then follo\vecl a strange con-

fession for the man to makc who made the tripartite
treaty, a ~ i dapprovcd the Simla manifesto : ' WC had no
hand in depriving the Shah of his kingdom, whevcas we
tyccfetz! the Dost, who vevw ofe?tded us, i?t s?@$ort of our
poh'cy, of which he auns the victim.'
Durand regards Dost Mahomed's surrender as ' evincing a strange pusillanimity.' This opprobrious judgment
appears unjustified.
No doubt he was weary of the
fugitivc life he had been leading, but to pronounce him
afraid that the I<ol~istanccsor any othcr Afghans would
betray him is t o ignore the fact that hc had bccn for
lnontl~samong people who might, any hour of any day,
have betrayed him if thcy had chosen. Nobler motivcs
than thosc ascribed to him by Durand may be supposed
t o have actuated a Inan of his simplc and lofty nature.
H e had given thc arbitrament of mar a trial, and had
rcalised that in that way he could make no head against
us. I l e might, indecd, have continued the futile struggle,
but he was the sort of man to rccognise the selfishness of
that persistency which would involve ruin and death to
thc dcvoted people who mould not desert his cause while
h e claimed to havc a cause. When historians write of
Afghan trcachcry and guile, it seems to have escaped
their perception that Afghan treachery was but a phase of
Afghan patriotism, of an unscrupulous character, doubtIcss, according to our notions, but neverthclcss practical
in its methods, and not wholly unsuccessful in its results.
I t may have been a highcr and purer patriotism that
movcd Dost Mahomed to cease, by his surrender, f r o ~ n
being an obstacle to the tranquillisation of the country of
which hc had been the rulcr.

CI-IAPTER
T I I E SECOND YEAR O F OCCUPATION

DOSTM A H O ~ ~ Eremained
D
for a few clays in thc British
cantonments on the Cabul plain, an lionourecl gucst rathcr
than a prisoner. 1 3 s soldierly frankness, his bearing at
once manly and courteous, his honest liking for and trust
in our racc, notwithstanding the experiencs which he had
undergone, won universal respect and cordiality. Officers
who stood aloof from Shah Soojah viecl with each other
in evincing to Dost Mahomed their sympathy with him
in his fallen fortunes. Shall Soojah would not: sec the
man whom he had ingloriously supplanted, on the pretext that he ' coulcl not bring himself to show common
civility to such a villain.' I-Iow Macnaghten's fccling in
regard to the two men had altered is disclosed by his
comment on this refusal. ' I t is well,' hc mrotc, 'as the
Dost must have suffered much humiliation in being subjectcd to such an ordeal.'
In the middle of November 1 8 4 the Dost began
his journcy toward British India, accompanied by Sir
Willoughby Cotton, who was finally quitting Afghanistan,
and under the escort of a considerable British force which
had completccl its tour of duty in Afghanistan. Sale sucD

ccccled Cotton in temporar~rdivisional command pcncling
t h e arrival of tlic lattcr's successor. About thc middle of
December Shah Soojah and his Court, accompanied by
the British Envoy, arrived at Jcllalabad for the winter,
Burnes remaining at Cabul in political chargc.
Macnaghtcn was ~ncntallyso constitutccl as to bc continually alternating between high elation and the depths
o f dcsponclency ; discerning to-day ominous indications of
ruin in an incident of no account, and to-morrow scorning
imperiously to recognisc danger in the fierce rising of a
province. It may almost bc said that cach lctter of his to
Lord Aucltland was of a diffcrcnt tonc from the one which
had prcccdcd it. Burncs, who was nominally Macnaghten's
chieflieutenant, with more sclf-restraint, had much tlic samc
tcmpcramcnt. IZayc writcs of hiin : ' Sometimes sanguine,
sometimes despondent, sometimes confident, sometimes
crcdulous, nuriles gavc to fleeting impressions all the iinportance and sccming permanency of settlecl convictions,
and imbucd surrounding objccts with the colours of his
own varying mind.' But if Burncs had bccn a discreet and
stcadfast man, he could have cscrciscd no influence on the
autocratic Macnaghtcn, since betwen thc two lncn there
was neither sympathy nor confidencc. Burnes had, inclecd,
n o specific dutics of any kind ; in his o \ ~ nnrorcls, he was in
' t h e most nondescript situation.' Macnaghten gave h i ~ n
n o rcsponsibility, and while Rurnes waited for the promised revcrsion of the office of envoy, he chiefly employed
hiinself in writing long memorials on thc situation ancl
prospects of affairs, on which Macnaghtcn's marginal comments wcrc brusquc, and occasionally contemptuous. T h c
rcsolute and clear-hcaded I'ottinger, \\rho, if thc oppor-
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tunity had been givcn him, might h a w buttresscd and
steadied Macnaghten, was relegated to provincial service.
Throughout his career in Afghanistan the Envoy could not
look for much advicc from the successive commanders of
the Cabul force, even if he had cared to cornmunc with
them. ICeane, indeed, did save him from the perpetration of one folly. But Cotton appears to have been a respectable nonentity. Sale was a stout, honest soldicr, who
was not forLunatc on thc only occasion which callccl him
outside of his restricted f~u(iiel: Poor Elphinstone was an
objcct for pity rathcr than for censurc.
I t happcnecl fortunately, in the impending misfortunes, that two men of stable tcmpcrament and lucid
perception were in authority at Candahnr. Gencral Nott
was a grand old Indian oficcr, in whom there mas no
guile, but a good dcal of tcmper. I-le was not supplc,
and he had the habit of spealring his mind with great
directness, a propensity which accounted, perhaps, for
the rcpcaLec1 superscssions he had undcrgone. A clearheaded, shrewd man, he was disgustccl with very many
things which he recognised as unworthy in the conduct of
the affairs of Afghanistan, and he was not the man to
choose mild phrascs in giving vcnt to his convictions. H e
had in full measure that chronic dislilte which the Indian
commander in the ficld nourishes to the polilical officer
who is imposed on him by the authorities, and who controls his measures and trammels his actions. Nott's
'political,' who, the sole survivor of the men who were
prominent during this unhappy period, still lives among
us estecmecl and rcvered, was certainly thc ablest officer
of the unpopular department to which he bclongcd ; and

how cool was Henry Rawlinson's temper is evinced in his
ability to live in amity with the ruggccl and outspolten
chief who addressed him in such a philippic as the folloming-words all the more trenchant because he to whom
they were addressed must have realised how intrinsically
true they mere :' I have no right to interfere with the affairs of this
country, and I nevcr d o so. But in refcreace to that part
of your note where you speak of political influence, I will
candidly tell you that thcse are not times for inere ceremony, and that under present circumstances, ancl a t a distance of 2000 miles from thc scat of the suprcmc Government, I throw responsibility to the wind, and tell you that
in my opinion you have not had for some time past, nor
have you at present, one particlc of political influence in
this country.'
Nott steadily laboured t o maintain the wol-ale and
discipline of his troops, and thus watching the flowing
tide of misrule ancl embroilmcnt, he calmly made the
best preparations in his power to mcct the storm the
sure and early outbreak of which his clear cliscernmcnt
prognosticated.
Shah Soojah's viceroy a t Candahar was his heir-apparent Princc Timour. The Dooranee chiefs of Western
Afghanistan had not unnaturally expected favours and
influence undcr the rule of the Doorance monarch ; and
wliile in Candahar beforc proceeding to Cabul, and still
uncertain of what might occur there, Shah Soojah had
been lavish of his promiscs. The chiefs had anticipated
that they would bc called around the vice-throne of Prince
Timour ; but Shah Soojall made thc sarnc error as that
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into which Louis XVIII. fell on his restoration. I-Ie
constituted his Court of the men who had shared his
Loodianah cxile. The counsellors who went to Candahar
with Timour mere rcturned h11&~4.., in whom fitness for
duty counted less than the qualification of companionship
in exile. Those people had come back to Afghanistan
poor; now they made haste to be rich by acts of oppressive injustice, in thc cxaction of revenue from the pcople,
and by intercepting from thc Doorancc chiefs thc flow of
royal bounty to which they had looked forward.
Uktar Khan was prominent among thc Dooranec
noblcmen, and he had the double grievancc of having
been disappointed of the headship of the Zemindalvar
province on the westcrn bank of the Helmund, and
having been evilly cntreated by the minions of Prince
Timour. He had raised his clan and routed a force undcr
a royalist follower, when Nott sent a detachment against
him. Uktar Khan had crossed the Helmund into Zemindanrar, when Farrington attackcd him, and, aftcr a brisk
fight, routcd and pursued him. The action was fought
on January 3, 1841, in thc very dead of minter ; the intensity of the cold dispersed Uktar's levies, and Farrington
returned to Candabar.
In reply to Macnaghten's demand for information
rcgarding the origin of this outbreak, Rawlinson wrote
him some home truths which were very distasteful.
Ra~vlinson warned his chief earnestly of the danger
threatened the false position of the British in
Afghanistan. He pointed out how crucl must be the
revenue exactions which enabled Prince Timour's courtiers
to absorb great sums. H e expressed his suspicion that

Shah Soojah had countenat~ccdUktar Khan's rising, and
spoke of iiitrigues of dark and dangerous character. Macnaghten scoutcd Rawlinson's warning, and instructed him
that 'it will makc the consideration of all questions more
simple if you will hereafter take for granted that as
rcgarcls us " thc king can d o no wrong."' I-Iowcver, he
and the Shah did remove from Canclahar the Valcecl and
his clique of obnosious persons, who had been grinding
the faccs of the people ; and the Envoy allo\vcd himsclf
to hope that this measure would restore order to the
province of Canclahar.
The hope was vain, thc evil lay deepcr ; disaffection
to the Shah and hatred to tllc BriLish powcr were becoming intensified from day to day, and the aspiration for
rclief was s~vellinginto a passion. In the days beforc our
advent thew had been venality and corruption in public
places-occasionally, likcly cnough, as Macnaghtcn asserted, to an estcnt all but incredible. But exaction so
swecping could have occurrccl only in rcgions under complete domination; and in Afghanistan, cven to this day,
thcrc are few regions wholly in this condition. When the
yoke became ovcr-weighty, a people of a nature so intractable knew how t o resent oppression and oppose exaction.
But now thc tax gatherer swaggered over the land, and thc
people had to cnclurc him, for a t his back were the solcliers
of the Feringhees and the levies of the Shah. T h e latter
werc paid by assignments on the revcnues of specified
districts ; as thc levics constitutcd a standing army of
some size, the contributions demanded were heavicr and
more pcrrnanent than in bygonc times. Macnaghtcn,
anrare of the discontent cngcndered by the system of

assignments, dcsircd to alter it. 13ut thc Shah's nceds
werc prcssing ; the Anglo-Indian trcasury was strainccl
already by the cxpenditurc in Afghanistan ; ancl it was
not easy i n a pcriod of turmoil ancl rcbcllion to carry out
the arncndment of a fiscal system. That, since thc surrcndcr of the Dost, thcrc hacl been no scrious rising in
Northern or Eastcrn Afghanistan, sufficccl to makc Macnaghten an optimist of thc ~norncnt. I i c hacl cornc by
this timc to a rcluclant acl~nission of tlic fact against
which hc had set his facc so long, that Shah Soojah was
unpopular. ' I-Ic has incurred,' hc ivrotc, ' thc odium that
attachcs to him from his alliancc with us '; but thc Envoy
would not admit that our position in Afghanistan was a
falsc onc, in that we wcrc maintaining by our bayonets,
against the will of thc Afghans, a sovcrcign whom they
detested. ' I t would,' hc plcatlecl, ' bc an act of downright
dishonesty to clescrt His Majcsty bcfore hc has found the
means of taking root in thc soil to which wc havc transplanted him.' Whilc hc wrotc, Macnaghten must havc
cxpcricncccl a sudclcn thrill of optimism or of sclf-delusion,
for hc continuccl: 'All things consiclcrccl, thc prescnt
tranquillity of this country is to my mind perfectly miraculous. Alrcady our presencc has bcen infinitely bcncficial
in allaying animosities and in pointing out abuses.' If
it had been tllc casc that the country was tranquil, his
adjective would have becn singularly appropriate, but not
precisely in the scnse he meant to convey.
But there was no tranquilliLy, miraculous or otherwisc.
While Macnaghten was writing thc letter which has just
been quoted, Brigadier Shelton, who, about the New
Year, had reached Jcllalabad with a brigade from British

India in rclief of the force which was withdrawing with
Cotton, was contending with an outbreak of the wild
and la\vless clans of t h e Khyber. When Macnaghten
wrote, he had already received intelligence of the collapse
of his projccts in I-Ierat, and that Major Todd, who had
bcen his representative there, judging it imperative to
break up the mission of which he was the head, had
abruptly quitted that city, and was on his way to Candahar. Mischief was simmering in the Zernindaivar country.
The Ghilzai tribes of t h e 1.egion between Candahar and
Ghuznee had accepted a subsidy to remain quiet, but the
indomitable independence of this wild and fierce race was
not to be tamcd by bribes, and the spirit of hostility was
manifesting itself so truculently that a British garrison
had been placed in Khelat-i-Ghilzai, right in the heart
of the disturbed territory. This warning and defensive
measure thc tribcs had rcgardecl with angry jealousy ; but
it was not until a rash ' political ' had dirccted the unprovoled assault and capture of a Ghilzai fort that the tribes
passionatcly flew to arms, bent on contesting the occupation of their rugged country. Colonel Wymer was sent
from Canclahar with a force, escorting a convoy of stores
intended for the equipment of Khelat-i-Ghilzai. The tribes
who had been loosely beleaguering that place marched
down the Turnulz upon Wymer, and on May 19th attacked him with great impetuosity, under the command
of a principal chicf who was lcnown as the 'Gooroo.'
Wymer, in the protection of his convoy, had to stancl on
the defensive. T h e Ghilzais, regardless of the grape which
torc through their masses, fell on sword in hand, and with
an intuitive tactical perception struck Wymer simultane-
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ously in front and flank. His sepoys had to change their
dispositions, and the Ghilzais took the opportunity of their
momentary dislocation to charge right home. They were
met firmly by the bayonet, but again and again the hillmen renewed their attacks ; and it was not till after five
hours of hard fighting which cost them heavy loss, that
at length, in the darkness, they sudclcnly drew off. Had
they been Swiss peasants defending their mountains, or
Poles struggling against the ferocious tyranny of Russia,
their gallant effort might have excited praise and sympathy. Had they been Soudanese, a statesman might
have spoken of them as a people ' rightly struggling to be
free I; as it was, the Envoy vituperated them as ' a parcel
of ragamuffins,' and Wymer's sepoys were held to have
' covered themselves with glory.' Macnaghten proceeded
to encourage a sense of honour among the tribes by proposing the transfer to another chief, 011 condition of his
seizing and delivering over the inconvenient ' Gooroo,' of
the share of subsidy of which the latter had been in receipt.
While this creditable transaction was under consideration, Uktar Khan was again making himself very unpleasant ; so much so that Macnaghtcn was authorising
Rawlinson to offer a reward of 10,000 rupees for his
capture, which accomplished, Rawlinson was instructed
to 'hang the villain as high as Haman.' T h e gallows
was not built, however, on which Ulctar was to hang,
although that chief sustained two severe defeats at the
hands of troops sent from Candahar, and had to become
a fugitive. The Ghilzais, who had gathered again after
their defeat under the ' Gooroo,' had made little stand
against the detachment which Colonel Chambers led out

Can&Jlar, and they were azain tclllporarily dispersed. The c Gooroo' llimsclf was in our hands. I f the
disaffectioll was in no degree din~inishecl,the activc cbullitions of it \\rere a s s u r c d l ~qucllcd for thc timc. I t was
true, to be sure, that Altbar IChan, thc ficrcc and resolute
overtures
son of Dost Mahorned, had refused the ELIVOY'S
to comc in, and was wandering and plotting in I<hooloom,
quite rcady to fulfil Macnaghten's prol~heticapprehensioll
that ' t h e fcllow will bc after some mischief should the
opportunity prcscnt itself '; that the Dooranees wcre still
defiant; that an insurgent force was out in the Dehrawat ; and that the ta~nelcsschief Altram Khan was being
blown from a gun by the crucl and feeble Timour. But
unquestionably therc was a cornparativc although shortlived lull in the ovcrt hostility of the Afghan peoples
against Shah Soojah and his foreign supporters ; and Macnaghten characteristically announced that 'thc country
was quiet from Dan to Beersheba.' To one of his corrcspondents he wrote : ' From Mookoor to the Khybcr Pass,
all is content and tranquillity ; and whercvcr we Europeans
go, we are received with respect, attention and wclcome.
I think our prospects are most cheering; and with the
materials wc have there ought to bc little or no difficulty
in the managemcnt of the country. The people are perfect children, and they should be treated as such. I f
we put one naughty boy in the corner, the rest will be
terrified.'
General Nett a t Candahar, who 'never interfered in the
government o f the country,' but regarded the situation
with shrewd, clear-headed common sense, differed utterly
from the Envoy's view. T h e stout old soldier did not

squanclcr his fire ; it mas a close volley he cliscl~argcdin
the following words : ' The conduct of the thousand and
one politicals has ruined our cause, and bared the throat
of evcry European in this country to the sword and knifc
of the revengeful Afghan and bloody Belooch; and unless
several regiments be quiclrly sent, not a man will be left
to describe the fate of his comrades. Nothing will ever
make the Afghans submit to the hatcd Shah Soojah, who
is most certainly as great a scoundrel as cver livcd.'
Nott's conclusions wcre in the main justified by after
events, but thc correctness of his prcmiss may bc questioned, That the conduct of some of the political
officers intensified the rancour of the Afghans is unhappily true, but the hate of our domination, and of thc
puppct thrust upon them by us, seems to have found its
.origin in a dceper feeling. The patriotism of a savage
race is marked by features rcpi~lsivc to civiliscd communities, but through the ruthless cruelty of the inclis,criminate massacre, the treachery of the stealthy stab,
and thc lightly broken pledgcs, thcre may shine out the
noblest virtue that a virilc peoplc can possess. A semibarbarian nation whose manhood pours out its blood
like water in stubborn resistance against an alien yoke,
may be pardoned for many acts shocking to civilised
communities which have not known the bitterness of
stern and masterful ssubj~~gation.

CHAPTER V
THE B E G I N N I N G OF TI-IB END

TIIE deceptive quietude of Afghanistan which followed
the sharp Icssons administered to the Dooranees and the
Ghilzais was not seriously disturbed during the month
of September 1841, and Macnaghten was in a full glow of
cheerfulness. His services had been recogniscd by his
appointment to the dignified ancl lucrative post of Governor
of the Bombay PresidencyJ and he was looking forward to
an early departure for a less harassing ancl tuinultuous
sphere of action than that in which he had been labouring for two troubled years. T h e belief that he would leave
behind him a quiescent Afghanistan, and Shah Soojah
firmly established on its throne, was the complement, to a
proud and zealous man, of the satisfaction which his
promotion afforded.
One distasteful task he had to perform before he
should go. T h e I-Iome Government had become seriously
disquieted by the condition of affairs in Afghanistan.
The Secret Committee of thc Court of Directors, the
channel through which the ministry communicated with
the Governor-General, had espressed great concern a t
the heavy burden imposed on the Indian finances by the
cost of the maintenance of the British force in Afghanistan,
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and by the lavish expenditure of the administration which
Macnaghten directed. The Anglo-Indian Government
was urgently required to review with great earnestness
the question of its future policy in regard to Afghanistan,
and to consider gravely whether an enterprise at once so
costly and so unsatisfactory in results should not be
frankly abandoned. Lord Auckland was alive to the
difficulties and embarrassments which encompassed the
position beyond thc Indus, hut he was loth to admit that
the policy of which he had been the a ~ ~ t h oand
r , in which
the Home Government had abetted him so eagerly, was
an utter failure. I-Ie and his advisers finally decided in
favour of the continued occupation of Afghanistan ; and
since the Indian treasury was empty, and the annual
charge of that occupation was not less than a million and
a quarter sterling, recourse was had to a loan. RIacnaghten
was pressed to effect economics in the administration,
and he was specially enjoined to cut down the subsidies
which wcre paid to Afghan chiefs as bribes to keep them
quiet. Macnaghten had objected to this retrenchment,
pointing out that the stipends to the chiefs wcre simply
compensation for thc abandonment by them of their
immemorial practice of highway robbcry, but he yielded
to pressure, called to Cabul the chief5 in its vicinity, and
informed them that thenceforth thcir subsidies would be
reduced. The chiefs strongly remonstrated, but without
effect, and they then formed a confederacy of rebellion.
T h e Ghilzai chiefs were the first to act. Quitting Cabul,
they occupied the passes between the capital and
Jellalabad, and entirely intercepted the colnrnunicatio~~s
with India by the Khyber routc.

Macnaghten did not take alarm at this significant demonstration, regarding the outbreak mcrely as ' provoking,'
and writing to Rawlinson that 'the rascals would be well
trounced for their pains.' Yet warnings of gathering
danger were rife, which but for his mood of optimism
should have struck home to his apprehension. Pottinger
had come down from thc Kohistan, wherc he was acting
as political officer, bent o n impressing on him that a
gcneral rising of that region was certain unless strong
measures of prcvcntion mere resorted to. For some time
bcfore the actual outbrcalc of the Ghilzais, the Afghan
hatred to our people had been showing itself with exceptional openness and bitterness. Europeans and camp
followers had been murdered, but the sinister cvida~cesof
growing danger had bcen regarded merely as ebullitions
of private rancour. Alcbar Khan, Dost Mahorned's son,
had nlovecl forward from I<hooloom into the Bamian
country, and there was little doubt that he was fomenting
the disaKection of the Ghilzai chiefs, with some of whom
this indomitable man, who in his intense hatred of t h e
English intruders had resolutely rejected all offers of
accommodation, and preferred the life of a homeless exile
to the forfeiture of his independencc, was closely connected by marriage.
The time was approaching when Sale's brigade was t o
quit Cabul on its return journey to India. Macnaghten
seems t o have originally intended to accompany this
force, for he wrote that he 'hoped to settle the hash of
the Ghilzais on the way down, if not before.' The rising,
however, spread so widely and so rapidly that immediate
action was judged ncccssary, and on October 9th Colonel

Monteath marched towards thc passes with his own
,regiment, thc 35th Native Infantry, some artillery and
cavalry details, and a detach~nentof Broadfoot's sappers.
How able, resolute, and high-souled a man was Georgc
Broadfoot, the course of this narrative will later disclose.
I-Ie was one of thrcc gallant brothers, all of whom died
sword in hand. T h e corps of sappers which he commanded was a remarkable body -a strange medley
of IHinclustanees, Goorlihas, and Afghan tribesmen of
divers regions. Many were desperate and intractable
characters, but Broadfoot, with mingled strength and
kinclness, ~noulcled his hetcrogeneous recruits into skilful,
obedient and disciplined soldiers. Broadfoot's description of his endeavours to learn something of the nature
of the duties expected of him in the expedition for which
he had been detailed, and to obtain such equipment as
those duties might require, throws a rnclancholy light on
the deteriorated statc of affairs among our people a t this
period, and on the relations between the military and
civilian authorities.
Broadfoot went for information, in the first instance, to
Colonel Monteath, who could give him no orclers, having
received none himself. Monteat11 declined to apply for
details as to the expedition, as he knew 'these people'
(the authorities) too well; he was quite aware of the
danger of going on service in the dark, but explained
that it was not the custom of the military authorities a t
Cabul to consult or even instruct the commanders of
expeditions.
Broadfoot then went to the General.
Cotton's successor in the chief military command in
Afghanistan was poor General Elphinstonc, a most gal-

lant soldier, but with no esperience of' Indian warfarc,
and utterly ignorant of the Afghans and of Afghanistan.
Wreclted in bocly and impaired in mind by physical ailments and infirmities, hc had lost all faculty of energy,
and such mind as remained to him was swayed by the
opinion of the person with whom he had last spoken.
The poor gentleman was so exllausted by the exertion of
getting out of bed, and being helpcd into his visiting-room,
that it was not for half-an-hour, and after several ineffectual
efforts, that he could attend to business. He knew nothing
of the naturc of the service on which Monteath was ordered,
could givc Broadfoot no orders, and was unwilling to refer
t o the Envoy on a matter which should have bcen left to
him to arrange. I-Ie complained bitterly of the way in
which he was reduced to a cypher-'degraded
from a
gencral to the " Lord- Lieutenan t's hcad constablc." '
Broadfoot went from the General to the Envoy, who
'was peevish,' and denounced the Gencral as fidgety.
Hc cleclarcd the cnemy to be contemptible, and that as
for Broadfoot and his sappers, twenty men with piclcaxes
wcre enough ; all they were wanted for was to pick stones
from undcr the gun wheels. When Broadfoot represented
thc inconvenience with which imperfect information as to
the objects of the expedition was fraught, Macnaghten
lost his temper, and told Broaclfoot that, if he t l ~ o ~ ~ ~ l ~ t
Monteath's movcment likely to bring on an attack, he
nced not go, hc was not wanted'; whereupon Broadfoot
declined to listen to such language, and made his bow.
.
Returning to thc General, whom he found 'lost and pcrplexed,' he was told t o follow his own judgment as to
what quantity of tools he should take. Thc Adjutant-

General came in, and 'this officer, aftcr abusing thc
Envoy, spoke to the General with an imperiousness and
clisrespect, and to me, a stranger, with an insolence it
was painful to see the influence of on the General. His
advicc to his chief was to have nothing to say to Macnaghten, to me, or to the sappers, saying Monteath had
men cnough, arid needed neithcr sappers nor tools.' A t
parting the poor old man said to Broadfoot : ' If you ,no
out, for God's sakc clear the passes quickly, that I may
get away; for if anything were to turn up, 1 am unfit for
it, donc LIP in body and mind.' This was the man whom
Lord Auclcland had appointed to the most responsible
and arduous command at his disposal, and this not in
ignorance of Gcneral Elphinstone's disqualifications for
active service, but in the fullest l<nowleclgeof thcm !
Monteath's camp at Bootl<hal<,thc first halting-place
on thc Jellalabad road, was sharply attaclced on thc
night of the gth, and the assailants, many of whom
were the arnlcd retainers of chiefs livini in Cabul sent
out specially to take part in the attack, although unsuccessf~~l,
inflictcd on Monteath consiclerablc loss. Next
day Sale, with 13.M.'~ 13th, joined Monteath, and 'on
the 13th llc forced the long and dangerous ravine of the
Khoord Cabul with sharp fighting, but no very serious
loss, although Sale hirnself was wou~~decl,
and had to relinquish thc active command to Coloncl Dennie. Manteat11 encampcd in the valley beyond the pass, and Sale,
with the 13th, returned without opposition to Uootl~hal:,
there to await reinforce~nents and transports. I n his
isolated position Montcath remained unmolcsteci until the
night of the 17th, when he repulsed a Ghilzai attack made
E

in considcrable strength, and aided by the treachery of
' friendlyJ Afghans who had been admitted into his camp;
but hc had many casualties, and lost a number of camcls.
On the 20th Sale, reinforced by troops returned from the
Zurmut expedition, ~novedforward on Montcath, and on
the 22d pushed on to thc Tezeen valley, meeting with
no opposition cither on the steep summit of the H u f t
Kotul or in thc dccp narrow ravine opening into the
valley. T h e Ghilzais wcrc in force around the mouth of
thc dcfile, but a few cannon-shots brolcc them up. T h e
advance guard pursued \\.it11 over-rashness ; the Ghilzais
rallied, in the sl<irmish which ellsued an officcr and several
mcn were killed, and the retirement of our people unfortunately degenerated into prccipitate flight, with the
Ghilzais in hot pursuit. T h e 13th~to which the fugitive
cletacl~me~~t
mainly belonged, now consisted mainly of
young soldiers, whose constancy was impaired by this
untoward occurrcnce.
Macnaghten had f~~rnishcd
Sale with a force which,
in good hcart and vigorously commanded, was strong
enough to have cffccted grcat things. The Ghilzai chief
of Tezeen possessed a strong fort full of supplies,.which
Dennie was about t o attack, when thc wily Afghan sent
to Major Macgregor, the political officer accompanying
Salc, a tender of suhmission. Macgrcgor fell into the
snare, desircd Salc to countermand the attack, and
entered into negotiations. In doing so hc committed a
fatal crror, and hc cxcecdecl his instructions in the concessions which he made. Macnaghten, it was true, had lcft
matters greatly to Macgrcgor's discretion ; and if ' the
rebels were vcry humblc,' thc Envoy was not disposcd to

be too hard upon them. Rut one of his firm stipulations
was that the defences of Khoda Ruxsh's fort must be
demolished, and that Goo1 Mahomcd Khan 'should have
nothing but war.' Both injunctions were disregarded by
Macgrcgor, who, with unimportant exceptions, surrendered
all along the line. The Ghilzais claimed and obtained
the restoration of thcir original subsidies ; a sum was
handcd to them to enable thcm to raise the tribes in order
to keep clear the passes ; I<hocla B ~ x s hheld his fort, and
sold the supplies it contained to Sale's commissary at a
fine pricc. Every item of thc arrangcment was clcacl in
favour of thc Ghilzais, and contributory to their devices.
Sale, continuing his march, would be separated further and
further from the now di~ninishcdforce in Cabul, and by
the feigned submission the chiefs had madc they had
escaped the permanent establishment of a strong dctachment in their midst at Tezeen.
Macnaghten, discontented though he was with the
sweeping concessions which Macgregor had granted to
the Ghilzais, put: thc best face he could on thc completccl
transaction, and allowed himself to believe that a stable
settlcment had been effected. On thc 26th Salc continued his march, having made up his baggage animals at
the expense of the 37th Native Infantry, which, with half
of the sappers and three guns of the mountain train,
he sent back to Kubbar-i-Jubbar, thcrc to halt in a
dangerously helpless situation until transport should be
sent down from Cabul. His march as far as ICutti
Sung was unmolested. Mistrusting the good faith of liis
new-made allies, he shunned thc usual route through the
Purwan Durrah by taking thc mountain road to the south

I

of that defile, and thus reached thc J~~gclull~~l;
valle~rwith
little opposition, baulking the dispositions of the Ghilzais,
l~r]lo,espccting him to travcrsc the Purwan Durrah, were
massed about the southern end of thc defile, ready to
fall on the column when committed to the tortuous
gorge.
From thc Jugdulluk camping ground there is a stcep
and winding ascent of three miles, commanded until near
the su~nnlitby heights o n either sidc. Salc's main body
had attained Lhe crest with trivial loss, having detachcd
parties by the way to ascend t o suitable flanking positions, and hold those until thc long train of slow-moving
baggage should have passed, when they were to fall in
and come on with the rear-guard. Thc dispositions would
havc been successful but that: on reaching the crest the
main body, instead of halting there for the rear to close
up, liurricd down the reverse slope, leaving baggage, detachments, and rear-guard to endure the attacks which
the Ghilzais promptly delivered, pressing fiercely on the
rear, and firing down from cither sidc on the confused
mass in the trough below. The flanking detachments had
relinqnishcd their posts in panic, and hurried forward in
confusion to get out of thc pass. The rear-guard was in
disordcr, when Broadfoot, with a few officers and some of
his sappers, valiantly checked the onslaught, but the crest
was not crosscd until upwards of 120 men had fallen, the
wounded anlong whom had to be abandoned with the
dead. On October 30th Sale's force reached Gundamuk
ivithout further molestation, and halted there temporarily
to await orders. During the halt melancholy rumours
filtered down the passes from thc capital, and later came

confirmation of the evil tidings from the Envoy, and
orders from Elphinstone directing the immediate return
of the brigade to Cabul, if the safety of its sick and
wounded could be assured. Sale called a council of war,
which pronounced, although not unanimously, against a
return to Cabul ; and it was resolved instead to march
on to Jellalabad, which was regarded as an eligible
I)oini d'cjpzci on which a relieving forcc might move up
and a retiring force might move clown. Accordingly
on Novcmber I ~ t hthe brigade quittecl Gundamuk, and
hurried down rather precipitately, and with some fighting by the way, to Jellalabad, which was occupied on
the 14th.
Some members of the Gunclamul<council of war, foremost among whom was Uroaclfoot, argued vigorously in
favour of the return march to Cabul. Havelocl<, who
was with Sale as a staff-officer, strongly urged the further
retreat into Jellalabad. Others, again, advocated the
middle course of continuing t o hold Gundamuk. I t may
be said that a daring general would have fought his way
back to Cabul, that a prudent general mould have remained a t Gundamuk, and that the occupation of Jellalabad was the espcdient of a weak general. That a wellled march on Cabul was feasible, although it might have
been difficult and bloody, cannot be questioned, and the
advent of such men as Broadfoot and Havelocl< would
have done much toward rekindling confidence and stimulating the restoration of soldierly virtue, alike in the military authorities and in the rank and file of the Cabul force.
A t Gundamuk, again, the brigade, \veil able to maintain
its position there, would have made its influence felt all

through the Ghilzai country and as far as Cabul. The
evacuation of that capital decided on, it would have been
in a position to give the hand to the rctiring army, and
so t o avert at lcast the worst disasters of the retreat. The
rctirement on Jellalabad, in the terse language of Durancl,
'served no conceivable purpose esccpt to betray wcakncss, and still further to encourage revolt.'
While Sale was struggling through thc passes on his
way to Gundamuk, our peoplc a t Cabul were enjoying unwonted quietude. Casual cntries in Lady Salc's journal,
during the later days of October, afford clear eviclence how
utterly unconscious wcre thcy of the close gathcring of
thc storm that so soon was to break upon thcm. Her
husband had writtcn to hcr from Tezecn that his wound
was fast healing, and that the chiefs were extremely polite.
Shc complains of thc intcrruption of the mails owing to
the Ghilzai outbreak, but comforts herself with the anticipation of their arrival in a day or two. Shc was to leave
Cabul fol; India in a fcw days, along with the Macnaghtens
and General Elphinstone, and her. diary expresses an
undernote of regret at having to leave the snug house in
t h e cantonments which Sale had built on his own plan,
the excellent kitchen gardeain which her warrior husband,
in the intervals of his soldiering duties, grew fine crops of
peas, potatoes, cauliflowers and artichokes, and thc parterres of flowers which she hcrself cultivated, and which
were the admiration of the Afghan gentlemen w11o came
t o pay their morning calls.
The defencelessness of the position at Cabul had long
engaged the solicitucle of men who were no alarmists.
Engineer oficer after engincer officcr had unavailingly

urged the construction of barracks in the Balla Hissar,
the repair and improvement of the defences of that stronghold, and the occupation of it by our troops. The cantonments on the plain northward of the city would have
served their purpose fairly as residential quarters in peace
time if the Balla Hissar, which in case of need could
have accommodated all our people, had bcen repaired
and adequately garrisoned. Rut the fateful errors were
made of yielding to the Shah Soojah's objections lo the
British occupation of the Ualla I-Iissar, and of making a
pretence of rendering thc cantoninents defensible by surrounding the great parallelogram with the caricature of
an obstacle in the shape of a skallow ditch and feeble
earthwork over which an active cow could scramble. The
enclosed area was commanded on all sides by Afghan
forts, i&ch were neither occupied nor destroyed. The
commissariat stores were actually located in a fort outside the cantonments altogether, the communication with
which was commanded by a fort held by the Afghans.
In all essentials of a defensive position the Cabul cantonments, at the beginning of the outbreak, wcre simply
contemptible.
Sir William Macnaghten and his political staff occupied
the Mission compound, an annexe of the cantonments.
General Elphinstone had his quarters in the cantonments ;
Sir Alexander Rurnes lived in a house in the city opposite
to the Treasury, which was in charge of Captain Johnson,
and several other officersresided in the suburbs. Brigadier
Shelton, a brave and experienced soldier, but of curiously
impracticable and ill-conditioned nature, was in camp with
a considerable force on the Seah Sung hills, about a mile

and a half from the cantonmcnts, with the Cabul river
intervening. With Shelton's troops and thosc in the
cantonments General Elphinstone had at his disposition,
apart from the Shah's contingent, four infantry regiments,
two batteries of artillery, three companies of sappcrs, a
force
rcgiment of cavalry, and some irregular horse-a
fully equipped and in good order. In the Balla Hissar
Shah Suojah had a considerable, if rather mixecl, body of
military and sevcral guns.
Thc rising of thc ad Xovember may not have been
the result of a fully organisecl plan. Therc are indications that it was premature, and that the revolt in force
would have bcen postponed until after the cxpcctcd
departure of the Envoy and the General with all the
trodps except Shelton's brigade, but for an irrepressible
burst of personal rancour against Uurnes. Durand holds,
ho\vever, that the malcontents actcd on the belief that to
kill Burncs and sack thc Treasury was to inaugurate tlic
insurrection with an imposing success. Re this as it
may, a truculent mob early in thc morning of November
zd assailed Burnes' house. H e a t first regarded the
outbreak as a casual riot, and wrote to Macnaghten to
that effect. Having harangued the throng without effect,
he and his brother, along with William Broadfoot his
secretary, prepared for defence. Broadfoot was soon
killed, ancl a little later Burnes and his brother mere
hacked to pieces in the garden behind the house. T h e
Treasury was saclced; the sepoys who had guarded it ancl
Burnes' house were massacred, and both buildings were
fired ; the armed mob swelled in numbers, and soon the
whole city was i n a roar of tumult.

Prompt and vigorous military action would no doubt
have crushed the insurrection, at least for the time. But the
i~~difference~vacillation
and delay of the British authorities
greatly encouraged its rapid development. Macnaghten
at first 'did not think much of it.' Shclton was ordercd
into the Balla Hissar, countcrmandcd, a second time
ordered, and again instructcd to halt for orders. At last
the Envoy himself despatchecl him, with the loosc ordcr
to act on his own judg~ncnt in communication with the
Shah. Shelton marchcd into tlic Balla I-Iissar \\lit11 part
of his forcc, and thc rest of it was moved into the cantonmcnts. When tlic Brigadier wcnt to thc Shah, that
potcntate demanded to know who sent him, and what
he had come for. But the Shah, to do him justicc, had
himself taken action. Informed that Burncs was attaclccd
and the city in revolt, he had ordercd Campbell's regiment
of his own levics and a couple of guns to n~archto his
assistance. Carnpbcll recltlcssly attempted to push his
way through thc hcart of the city, instead of rcaching
13urncsJhouse by a circuitous but opcncr route, and after
some sharp street fighting in which he lost hcavily, he
was driven back, unable to pcnetratc to the sccnc of
plunder and butchcry. Shelton remained inactive i n the
Balla Hissar until Ca~npbellwas reported beatcn and
retreating, when hc took some feeble measures to covcr
the retrcat of the fugitive?, who, however, abandoned their
guns outsidc the fortrcss. Thc day was allowed to pass
without anything further being done, except the despatch
of an urgent rccall to Major Griffiths, whom Sale had left
at Icubbar-i-Jubbar, and that good soldier, having fought
evcry step of the way through the passes, brought i n his

detachment in unbroliell order and without loss of baggage,
notwithstanding his weakness in transport. Sllcltoll, reinforccd in the Balla I-Iissar, maintained a n intcl-mittent
and ineffectual fire on thc city. Urgent orders w e r e despatched to Sale, recalling him and his brigade-orders
with \vhich, as has been mentioned, Sale did not complyand also to Nott, at Candahar, begging him to send a
brigade to Cabul. I n compliance with this requisition,
Maclaren's brigade immediately started from Candahar,
but soon returned owing to the incleme~lcyof the weather.
Captain Maclwnzie was in charge of a fort containing
the Shah's commissariat stores; this fort was o n the
outsliirts of a suburb of Cabul, and was fiercely attacked
on thc 2d. For two days Maclienzie maintained h i s post
with unwearying constancy. His garrison was short of
water and of ammunition, and the fort was crowded with
women and children, but he hcld on resolutely u n t i l the
night of the gd. No assistance was sent, n o noticc,
indeed, of any kind was taken of him ; his garrison was
discouraged by heavy loss, and by the mines which the
enemy were pushing forward. At length, when the gate
of the fort had been fired, and his wounded were dying'
for lack of medical aid, he cvacuated the fort, and fought
his way gallantly into cantonments, bringing in his
wounded and tlie women and children. With t h i s solitary exception the Afghans had nowhere encountered
resistance, and the strange passiveness of our people encouraged them to act with vigour. From the enclosed
space of tlle Shah Ragh, and the adjacent forts of Mahmood Khan and Mahomed Sherecf, they were threatening
thc Commissariat fort, hindering acccss to it, a n d bc-

setting the south-western flank of the cantonments. A
young officer commanded the hundrcd sepoys garrisoning
the Commissariat fort ; he reported himself in dauger of
being cut off, and Elphinstone gave orders that hc and
his garrison should be brought off, and the fort and its
contents abandoned. Sevcral efforts to accomplish the
withdrawal were thwarted by the Afghan flanking firc,
with the loss of sevcral oficers and many mcn. Thc
commissary officer urgcd on the Gcneral thc disastrous
consequenccs which the abanclonment of the fort \\.auld
entail, containing as it did all the stores, adding that
in cantonments there wcre only two days' supplies, without prospcct of procuring any morc. Orders nrcre then
sent to Warren to hold out to thc last extremity ; which
instructions he denied having received. Early in thc
morning of the 5th troops were preparing to attack the
Afghan fort and reinforce thc Commissariat fort, whcn
Warren and his garrison rcached the cantonments. The
gate of thc Commissariat fort had been fired, but tlic
enemy had not effccted an ent~ance,ycl Warrcn and his
people had evacuatcd the fort through a hole cut in its
'wall. Thus, with scarcely a struggle to savc it, was this
vital fort allowed to fall into thc cnemy's hands, ancl
thenceforward our unfortunate people were to be reduced
to precarious and scanty sources for their food.
From the 5th to the 9th Novembcr there was a good
dcal of desultory fighting, in the course of which, aftcr onc
failure, Mahomed Sherccf's fort was stormed by a detachment of our people, under the command of Major Griffiths ;
but this success had little influence on the threatening
attitilde maintained by the Afghans. On the gth, owing

t o the mental and physical weakness of poor General
Elphinstone, Brigadier Sllelton was summoncd into cantonments from t h e Balls Hissar, hri~lgingwith him part of
the garrison with which h e had been holding the latter post.
T h e hopes entertained t h a t Shclton would display vigour,
and restorc the confidence of the troops, wcre not realised.
H e from the first had n o belief in the ability of the occupants of the cantonment t o maintain thcir position, and h e
ncver ceased to urge prompt retreat on el la lab ad. From
the purely military point of view he was roba ably right ; the
Duke of Wellington shared his opinion when hc said in
the House of Lords : 'After thc first fcw days, particularly
after the negotiations a t Cabul had commenced, it became
h o i ~ l c s sfor General Elphinstone to maintain his position.'
Shclton's situation was ~ ~ ~ c l ~ ~ s t i o n a b l y a ~ e r y u n c o m f ~ r t a b
one, for Elphinstone, brolccn as hc was, yet allowed his
second in command n o frcedom of action, and was testily
pertinacious of his prerogative of command. If in Shelton,
who after his manncr w a s a strong man, thcre had been
combined with his resolution some tact and temper, h e
might have exerciscd a beneficial influence. As it was he
became sullen and clespondcnt, and rctired behind an ' uncommunicative and disheartening rescrve.' Brave as hc
was, he secms t o have l a c l d thc inspiration which alone
could rcinvigoratc the drooping spirit of thc troops. I n a
word, though he probably was, in army language, a 'good
duty soldier,' he certainly was nothing more. And something more was nceded thcn.
Action on Shelton's part became necessary the day after
he came into cantonmcnts. T h e Afghans occupied all thc
forts on the plain bctwccn the Seah Sung heights and thc
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cantonments, and from the nearest of them, the Rikabashcc fort, poured in a heavy fire a t close range, which
the return artillery fire could not quell, On Macnaghten's
urgcnt requisition the General ordered out a strong force,
under Shelton, to storm the obnoxious fort. Captain
Bcllew missed the gate, and blew open merely a narrow
wicket, but the storming party obeyed the signal to advance. Through a heavy fire the leadcrs reached the
wiclcet, and forced their way in, followcd by a few soldiers.
The garrison of the fort hastily evacuated it, and all seeinecl
well, when a sudden stampede ensued-the handful which,
lcd by Colonel Macltrell of the 44th and Lieutenant Bird
of the Shah's force, had already cntercd the fort, rcrnaining
inside it. The runaway troops were rallied with difficulty by Shelton and the subordinate officers, but a call for
volunteers from the European regiment was responded to
but by one solitary Scottish private. After a second advance, and a second retreat-a retreat made notwithstancling strong artillery and muslcctry support-Shclton's efforts
brought his people forward yet again, and this time the
fort was occupied in force. Of those who had previously
entercd it but two survivors were found. The Afghans,
re-entering the fort, had hacltcd Maclcrell to pieces and
slaughterccl the men who tried to escape by thc wiclcet.
Lieutenant Bird and a sepoy, from a stable'the door of
which they had barricaded with logs of wood, had fended
off their assailants by a steady and deadly fire, and when
they were rescued by thc cntrance of thc troops they had
to clamber out over a pile of thirty dead Afghans whom
the bullets of the two men had struck down.
I t had come to our people in those gloomy days, to

regard as a 'triumph' a combat in which they wcrc not
actually worsted ; and even of such dubious successcs
the last occurrcd on November 13, whcn the Afghans,
after having pressed our infantry down the slopes of thc
Behmaroo ridge, were driven back by artillery fire, and
forced by a cavalry charge to retreat further, leaving behind them a coup:c of guns from \vhich they had been
sending missiles into the cantonments. One of those guns
was brought in without difficulty, but the other the Afghans
covcrcd with thcir jezail fire. The Envoy had sent a message of entreaty that ' the triumph of the dayJ should be
completed by its capture. Major Scott of the 44th made
appeal on appeal, incffcctually, to the soldierly feelings
of his men, and while tllcy would not move the sepoys
coulcl not be induced to advance. A t length Eyrc spilced
the piece as a precautionary measurc, and finally some
men of thc Shah's infantry succeeded in bringing in the
prize. The return march of the troops into cantonments
i n the dark, was renclercd disorderly by the close pressure
ofthe Afghans, who, firing incessantly, pursued the broken
soldiery up to the cntrance gate.
O n the depressed garrison of the Cabul cantonments
tidings of disaster further afield had been pouring in apace.
Soon after the outbreak of the rising, it was lcnown that
Lieutcnant Maule, commanding the Kohistanee regiment
at Kurdurrah, had bcen cut to pieces, kvith his adjutant
and sergeant-major, by the men of his own corps ; and on
November 6th intelligence had come i n that the Goorlcha
regiment stationed a t Charikar in thc Kohistan, where
Major Pottinger was Resident, was in dangerous case, and
that Codrington, its commandant, and some of his officcrs

had already fallen. And now, on the 15t11, therc roclc
wearily into cantonments two wou~~decl
men, who bclicved
the~nselves the only British survivors of the Chariliar
force. Pottinger was wounded in the leg, Haughton, the
adjutant of the Goorliha corps, had lost his right hand,
and his head hung forward on his breast, half severed
from his body by a great tulwar slash. Of the miserable
story urhich it fell to Pottinger to tell only the briefest
summary can be given. His residence was a t Lughmanee,
a few miles from thc Charikar cantonments, when carly
in the month a number of chiefs of the Kohistan and the
Nijrao country assembled to discuss with him the terms on
which they would reopen the communications with Cabul.
Those chiefs pro\ml treacherous, slew Rattray, Pottinger's
assistant, and besieged Pottinger in Lughmanee. Finding
his position untenable, he withdrew to Chariliar under cover
ofnight. On the morning of the 5th the Afghans assailed
the cantonrncnts. Pottingcr was wounded, Codrington was
killed, and the Goorkhas were driven into the barraclis.
Haughton, who succcedcd to the command of the regiment,
made sortic on sortie, but was finally clrivcn in, and thc
enemy renewed thcir assaults i n augmentcd strength.
Thenceforward the position was all but hopeless. On
the 10th the last scant remains of water was distributed.
Efforts to procure water by sorties on the nights of the I rth
and 12th wcre not successful, and the corps fell into disorganisation because of losses, hardships, exhaustio!~,hunger
and thirst. Pottinger and Ilaughton agreed that there was
no prospect of saving eveii a remnant of the regiment unless
by a retreat to Cabul, which, however, was clearly possiblc
only in the case of the stronger men, unencumbered with
I?
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women and children, of whom, unfortunately, there was
a great number in the garrison. On the afternoon of the
13th Haughton was cut down by a treacherous native
officer of the artillery, who then rushed out of the gate,
followed by all the gunners and most of the Mahommedans of the garrison. I n the midst of the chaos of
disorganisation, D r Grant amputated Haughton's hand,
dressed his other wounds, and then spiked all the guns.
When it was dark, thc garrison moved out, Pottinger leading the advance, D r Grant the main body, and Ensign
Rose the rear-guard. From the beginning of the march,
discipline was all but entirely in abeyance ; on reaching
the first stream, the last remains of control were lost,
and the force was rapidly disintegrating. Pottinger and
Haughton, thc latter only just able to keep the saddle,
pushed on toward Cabul, rested in a ravine during thc
day, evaded the partisan detachment sent out from Cabul
to intercept them, rode through slceping Cabul in the
small hours of the morning, and after being pursued and
fired upon in the outsltirts of the city, finally attained
the cantonments. I t was aftcrwarcls learned that a. portion of the regiment had struggled on to within twenty
miles from Cabul, gallantly headed by young Rose and
Dr Grant. Thcn the remnant was destroyed. Rose was
Idled, after despatching four Afghans with his own hand.
Dr Grant, escaping the massacre, held on until within
three miles of the cantoi~inents,when he too was killed.
Macnaghten was naturally much depressed by the ncws
cominunicated by Pottinger, and realised that the Afghan
masses already encompassing the position on the Cabul
plain would certainly be increased by bands from the
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I<ohistan ancl Nijrao, flushed already with tllcir Charilmr
success. H e sided strongly with the large party among
the officers who were advocating the measure of abandoning the cantonments altogether, and moving the force now
quartered thcre to the safer and more commanding position in the Balla Missar. The military chiefs opposed the
project, and propounded a varicty of objections-to it, none
of which were without n ~ i g h tyct
, all of which might hare
been overconie by energy ancl proper clispositiol~s, Shclton,
l~owcvcr,was opposccl to the scheme, sincc if carried out it
. would avert or postpone thc accomplishmci~tof his policy
of rctrcat on Jellalabad ; Elphitistone was against it in the
inertia of debility, and thc project gradually came to bc
regarded as abandoned. Anothcr projcct, that of driving
the Afghans from Mallmood Khan's fort, commanding
thc direct road between thc cantonincnts and the Balla
Hissar, and of occupying it with a British force, was so
far advanced that tlic timc for thc attempt was fixed, and
the storining party actually warned, \ \ J ~ C I I some petty
objcction intervened and the enterprise was abaiicloiied,
never to be revived.
T h e rising was not three clays old whcn already
Elphinstone had lost heart. 011 the 5th he had written
to Macnaghten suggesting that the latter should 'consider
what chance there is of making terms,' and since then he
had been repeatedly pressing on thc Envoy the ' hopelessness of further resistance.' Macnaghten, vacillating as he
was, yet had more pith i n his nature than was left in the
dcbilitated old general. He wrote to Elpl~instoneon the
18th recommending, not very strenuously, the policy of
holding out where they were as long as possible, and

indeed throughout the winter, if subsistence could be
obtained. H e pointed out that in the cantonments,
which he believed to be impregnable, there were at least
t h e essentials of wood and \\rater. Arguing that a retreat
on Jellalabad must be most disastrous, and was to be
avoided except in the last extremity, he nevertheless
ended somewhat inconsistently by leaving to the military
authorities, if in eight or tcn days there should appear n o
prospect of an improvement of the situation, the decision
whether it would bc wiser to attempt a retrcat or to withdraw from the cantonments into the Balla Hissar.
Far from improving, the situation was speedily to becolne all but hopelcss. T h e village of Behmaroo, built on
the north-eastern slope of thc ridge
of the same namc
bounding the plain on the north-west, lay about half a
mile clue north of the cantonments, part of which some
of the houses on the upper slope commanded. From
this village, after the loss of the Co~nmissariat fort, our
people had been drawing supplies. On the morning of
the 22d the Afghans were seen moving in 'force from
Cabul toward Behrnaroo, obviously with intent to occupy
the village, and so deprive the occupants of the cantonments of thc resource it had becn affording them. A detachment: under Major Swayne, sent out to forestall this
occupation, found Bchmaroo already in the possession of
a body of l<ohistanees, who had so blocked the approaches
that S\vayne did not consider himself justified in attempting the fulfilment of his orders to storm the place ; and he
contented himself with maintaining all day an ineffectual
musketry fire on it. A diversion in his favour by a gun
supported by cavalry had no result save that of casualties
-

-
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to the gunncrs and troopers ; reinforccments brought out
by Shelton effected nothing, and in the evening the troops
were recalled. On this ill-fated day Akbar Khan, Dost
Mahorned's fierce and implacable son, arrived in Cabul,
and the evil influence on the British fortunes which hc
exerted immediately made itself felt, for thc events of
the following day were to bring about a crisis in the fate
of our ill-starred people.
Recognising the mischief wrought by the hostile occupation of our only source of supplies, the Envoy strongly urged
the immediate clespatcli of a strong force to occupy the
Behmiroo ridge, and dislodge from the village its Kohistanec garrison. Shelton opposcd the measure, urging the
dispirited state of the troops, their fatigue from constant
defensive duty, and their ~veakenedphysique because of
poor and scanty rations. H e was overruled, and before
daybreak of the 23d a force under his command, consisting
of five companies of the 44th, twelve cornpjnies of native
infantry, some cavalry, and one horse-artillery gun, was in
position on the north-castern extremity of the ridge ovcrhanging the village. The gun opened fire on the village
with grapc, and after'a short resistance the greater part of
its garrison quitted it. The storming party intrusted to
Major Swaync did not, however, act, and mas withclrawn.
Leaving a detachment on the lcnoll above the village,
Shelton moved his force along the upland to a position
near the gorge intersecting the ridge, forming his infantry
into two squares, with the cavalry in rcac The further hill
beyolid the gorge was crowded with hostile Afghans from
Cabul, and the long-range firc of their jezails across the
dividing depression, carried execution into the squares

.
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\vhicll Sheltoll had inexplicably formed as if to furnish his
foes with a target which they could not miss. The rnuslcets
of his Inell could not retaliate, and the slcirmishers he threw
forward to the brow of his hill could not endure the Afghan
fire. Shclton's single gun maintained a hot and telling fire
on the Afghan masses on thc opposite hill, and baullced an
attempt against his right flank made by the Afghan cavalry
swarming i n the outer plain; but when its vent became too
hot for the gunners to serve it, the dullest comprehension
became ativc to the folly of sending a single gun into the
field.
Shelton's men, falling fast though they were, and faint
wit11 fatigue and thirst, yet had endured for hours a fusillade to which they could not reply, when a body of Afghan
fanatics suddenly sprang up out of the gorge, swept back
with their fire the few skirmishers who had been still
holding the brow of the hill, and planted their flag within
thirty yards of the front of the nenrcr of the squarcs.
Shelton offered a large reward to the man who should
bring it in, hut there was no responsc. In a passion of
soldierly wrath, the vetcran commanded a bayonet charge;
not a man sprang forward at the summons which British
soldiers are wont to welcome with cheers. The cowed infantry remained supine, when their officers darted forward
and threw stones into the faces of the enemy ; the troopers
heard but obeyed not that trumpet-call to ' Charge ! '
which so rarely fails to thrill ,the cavalryman with the
rapture of the fray. T h e gunners only, men of that noble
force the Company's Horse-Artillery, quitted themselves
valiantly. They stood to their piece to the bitter end.
Two of them were killed beside it, another was severely

wounded, a fourth, refusing to run, took refuge under the
gun, and miraculously escaped death. But the gallant
example of the artillerymen in their front did not hearten
the infantrymen of the leading square. The panic spread
among them, and they brolcc and fled. Fortunately they
were not pursued. The rear square stood fast, and the
officers by great exertion succeedecl in rallying the fugitives under the cover it afforded. The news that a principal chief, Abcloolah Khan, had bccn severely woundcd
in the plain gave pause to the offensivc vigour of the
Afghans, and the assailants fell back, abandoning the gun,
but carrying off the limber and gun-team. Our people
reoccupied the position, the gun recommenced its fire, and
if the cavalry and infantry could have been persuaded t o
take the offensive the battle might have bcen retrieved.
But they remained passive. The reinforced Afghans
renewed their long-range fire with terrible effect ; most of
the gunners had fallen, and the Brigadier, recognising the
growing unsteadiness of his cotnlnand and the imminent
danger of capture to which the solilary gun was again
exposed, ordel-ed a retirement on the detachment left near
Behmaroo and the limbering up of the gun, to which a
second limber had been sent out from thc cantonments.
The movement was scarcely begun when a rush of fanatic
Afghans completely broke the square, and all order and
discipline then disappeared. A regular rout set in down
the hill toward cantonments, the fugitives disregarding
the efforts of the officers to rally them, and the enemy in
full pursuit, the Afghan cavalry making ghastly slaughter
among the panic-striclcen runaways. Thc detachment
near Bchmaroo attempted to fa11 back in orderly fashion,

but thc reinforced garrison of the villagc swept out upon
it, surroundecl it, broke it up, and threw it into utter rout
with the loss of a large proportion of its strcngth, one
whole company being all but annihilated. I t seemed as if
pursued and pursucrs would enter the cantonments togethcr
so closely were thcy comminglccl; but the fire from the ramparts and an opportune chargc of horse arrested thc pursuit. Yet E y r e reckons as the chief reason why all the
British force that had gone out to battle was not destroyed,
the fact that a leading Afghan chief forced his men to
spare the fugitives, and ultimatcly halted and withdrew
his peoplc when the opportunity for wholcsalc slaughter
lay open to then?. Most of the wounded were left on
thc field, where they werc miserably cut to pieces; and the
gun, which had been overturned in thc attempt of the
drivers t o gallop clown thc face of the hill, finally passed
into the possession of the Afghans. Shelton's dispositions
as a commander could not well have been worsc; his
bearing as a soldier, although undaunted, imparted to his
haplcss troops nothing of inspiration. The obstinacy
with which he held the hill after the impossibility of
even partial succcss must have been patent to him, was
~~niversally
condcmnecl. I t necd scarcely be adclcd that
his loss was very sevcre.
No more fighting was possiblc. What, then, was to
be done? Elphinstone and Shclton nerc at one in opposing removal into the Balla Ilissar. Macnaghten, to \\,horn
Shah Soojal~had communicated his urgcnt recommcndation of that measure as the only expedient which could
securc the safety of thc British troops, fell in with tile
vicws of the military authorities. Thcre calnc to hiln a
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letter from O s ~ n a nKhan, the chief who had called OK his
adherents on the previous day from pursuing the fugitives
flccing into cantonments. Osman wrote that, if his troops
had followcd u p their successes, the loss of the cantonments and the dcstruction of the British force werc inevitable; but, hc continued, that it was not the wish of
the chiefs to proceed to such cxtrcmities, their sole desire
being that our peoplc should quietly cvacuatc the country,
lcaving the Afghan sirdars to govern it according to their
own customs, and with a king of their own choosing. In
communicating this letter to Gcneral Elphinstone, Sir
William askcd for the latter's opinion on the military
possibility, or the reverse, of thc retention of the British
position in Afghanistan. Elphinstone, in reply, enumerated
sundry reasons which led him to the conclusion which
he stated, that ' i t is not feasible any longer to maintain
our position in this country, and that you ought to avail
yoursclf of thc offer to negotiate which has bccn made
to you.'

C H A P T E R VI
T H E R O A D TO R U I N

As the result of the military disaster of November 23d,
and of the representations of the General, recorded in
the last chapter, Macnaghten, with whatever reluctance,
permitted himself .to entertain proposals for an arrange- ,
rnent made by the Afghan leaders. From the beginning of the outbreak, while urging on the military
authorities to exert themselves in putting down the
revolt, he had been engaged i n tortuous and dangerous
intrigues, with the object of sowing discord among the
Afghan chiefs, and thus wealcening the league of hostility
against Shah Soojah and his British supporters. I n
the conduct of these intrigues he used the services of
Mohun Lal, who had been one of Burnes' assistants,
and who, having escaped the fate of his chief, had
found refuge in the city residence of a I<uzzilbash
chiet Mohun La1 was a fitting agent for the sort of
work prescribed to him, and he burrowed and suborned
with assiduity, and not altogether without success. But
it is unhappily true that he was comn~issionedto carry
out a darker enterprise, the removal by assassi~~ation
of
certain of the more virulently hostile among the Afghal~

Icaders. The incident is the blackest of the many discreditable transactions which chequer the inner political
history of this melancholy chapter of our annals. I t is
unfortunately certain that Lieutenant John Conolly, Macnaghten's kinsman and his confidential representative
with Shah Soojah, authorised Mohun Lal, in writing, to
compass the taking off of prominent Afghan leaders. I n
a letter to Mohun Lal, of 5th Novcmbcr, Conolly wrote :
' I promise I O ,rupees
~
for thc hcad of each rebel chief'
Again, on the 11t11, he wrotc: 'Therc is a man called
Iladji Ali, who might be induced by a bribe to try and
bring in the heads of one or two of the Mufsids.
Endeavour to let him know that ~o,ooorupees will be
given for each head, or even I 5,000 rupees.' Two chiefs
certainly did die under suspicious circumstances, and in
each case the blood-money mas claimed. It was refused
by Mohun La1 on the plea that thc stipulation that the
heads of the dead Afghans shor~ldbe brought in was
not fulfilled.
Whether Macnagl~ten inspircd those nefarious machinations, whether indeed he was activcly aware of them, are
questions \vhich, in the absence of conclusive cvidcnce, may
judiciously bc left unanswered. Thcre is extant a letter
from him to Mohun Lal, written Dccember 1st) which has
the following passage: ' I am sorry to find from your
letter of last night that you sl~ouldhave supposed it was
ever my object to cncouragc assassination. The rebcls
are very wicked men, but wc must not talcc unlawful
means to dcstroy them.' And latcr he is reported to
have informed an Afghan dcputation that, 'as a British
functionary, nothing ~ ~ ~ o uinduce
lcl
him to pay a pricc for

blood.' Durancl holds that it was thc belief on the part
of the Afghan chiefs that tthc British Envoy had sct a
price on their heads which destroycd all confidencc in
Macnaghten's good faith, ancl which was Alcbar Khan's
chief incentive to his murder.
The terms proffered on Novcmbcr 25th by an Afghan
deputation were so humiliating that Macnaghtcn peremptorily rcjectecl thcrn; ancl thc thrcat of inlmecliatc
hostilitics udcss our pcople promptly surrenclerccl their
arms and withclrcw was not carried out. A pcriod
of inaction strangely ensucd, which on thc Afghan side
was a t~cacl~erous
lull, but which Macnaghten, hoping
against hopc that somc turn in our favour might yet
occur, regarded with complacency. The chiefs, awarc
that winter was approaching with added hardship to
the forlorn garrison, temporarily dcsisted from urging
negotiations. But the British military authorities, with
troops living from hand to mouth on precarious half
rations, and with transport cattlc dying fast of starvation, kept urging the Envoy to activity in making
tcrms, if absolute starvation was to be averted. Futile
projccts wcre discussecl betwecn Envoy and General,
only to bc put aside. As the dreary days of inaction
and depletion passed, the deterioration of military spirit
among our people manifested itself inore and more
plainly. British soldiers stolidly watched the Afghans
destroying our bridge across the Cabul' river, within a
quarter of a mile from cantonments. Scared by the
threat of an assault, which, in the scornful words of
brave Lady Sale, a child with a stick might have repulsed, the garrison of the Mahomed Shcreef fort aban-

cloned it in a panic, the while soldiers of the 44th
sI~.owing the example of pusillanimity to the sepoys
whom thcir cowardice demoralisecl. Next clay the cletachment of the 44th which had guarded an exposed
position had to be withdrawn, ceding the post of honour
to thc stauncher sepoys. The camp followers were
living on carrion ; the commissaries reported but four
days' provisions in store, ancl their inability to procure
any more supplies. At length on December 8th the
four scnior military officers informed ~ I I C Etlvoy that it
was imperatively necessary he should negotiale a retreat,
on the bcst t e r m he could obtain.
Macnagllten had to bring himself to recognise that
thc alternatives were negotiation or starvation, and on
the 11th December, with a draft treaty in his hand, hc
met the principal Afghan chiefs on the river side between thc cantonments and the city. After the introductory palavers, Macnaghten read thc proposed treaty,
whose purport was as follo~vs:that the British should
cvacuate Afghanistan forthwith unmolested, furnished
with supplies and accompanied by hostages, on their
march to India; that the Dost, his family, and other Afghan
political exiles, should be allowed to return to their
country ; that Shah Soojah should have the option of remaining at Cabul or going d o to~India ; that amnesty
should be accorded to all adherents of Shah Soojah and
his British allies; that all prisoners should bc released ;
and that perpetual friendship ancl mutual good offices
should thenceforth endure between the British and the
Afghans.
Alcbar Khan madc demur to some of thc provisions,

but was overruled, and thc main stipulations of the treaty
were agreed to by the chiefs. The conference brokc up
with the understanding that the British troops should
evacuate cantonments within threc days, and that meanwhile provisions sl~oulcl be sent in for thcir use. T h e
treaty was simply a virtual capitulation all along the
line; but the inherent falseness of our position, the incapacity of the military chicfs, and the debased spirit of
the troops, consequent partly on low rations but mainly
because of the utter absence of competent and vigorous
leadership such as a Broadfoot or a I-Iavclocl~would havc
supplied, enforced on thc reluctant Envoy conditions
humiliating bcyond previous parallel i n the history of our
nation.
From the outset the Afghan chiefs defaulted from
their promise of sending in supplies, but some grain was
brought into cantonments by the troops, whose evacuation of the Balla Nissar on the 13th was cffccted under
humiliating circumstances. The Afghans de~nandcdthe
surrender of the forts in British occupation in the vicinity
of the cantonments. The requisition was complied w i h ,
and thc Magazine fort furnished the enemy with both
arms and ammunition.
The three stipulated days passed away, and still the
British force remained motionless in the cantonments.
Macnaghten was bent on procrastination, and circumstances seemed to favour a policy which to all but hi~nself
was inesplicable. By the treaty, Shah Soojah was in
effect committed to withdraw to India, but soon after its
acceptance the chiefs had invited him to remain in Cabul
as king, on the stipulation that he should give his daughters

in marriage to leaders of the malcontents. After considerable deliberation, thc Shah had consented to remain
on the condition named, but a few days lates he withdrew
his acceptance. His vacillation increased the suspicions
of the chiefs, and they demanded the immediate evacuation of the cantonments, refusing to f~irnishprovisions
until that was done. Meanwhile they sent in no transport animals, although large sums had becn handed over
for their p u r c l ~ ~ s e Our
.
pcoplc were still immobile, and
already, on the 18th~there had occurred a fall of snow
several inches dccp.
Thc Envoy was engagcd in strange and dubious intrigues, and sincc the Afghans were not fulfilling their sharc
of the treaty obligations, he appears to have regarclcd himself as no longer bound by its conditions, ancl frec to try
to obtain better terms from other sources, in pursuit o f
which purpose he was espcnding moncy in a variety of
dircctions. T h c dark and unscrupulous Mohun La1 was
his confidant and instrumcnl. Akbar Khan and the
chiefs of his party had bccoine awarc of MacnaghtenJs
machinations, ancl thcy laid a snare for him into which he
fcll with open cyes. Emissaries were sent to him with
the sinister proposals that the British should remain in
Afghanistan until the spring, when they werc to witlldraw
as of their own accord; that the head of Ameenoolla
Khan, onc of the most ponrerful and obnoxious of thc
rebel leaders, should be presented to the Envoy in return
for a stipulated sum of money; and that for all those
services the British Government should requite Akbar
Khan with a present of thirty lal<hs of rupces, and an
annual pension of four lalihs.
Macnaghten refused

peremptorily the proffer of Ameenoolla's head, but did
not rcjcct co-operation in that chiefs capture by a
dubious device in which British troops were to participate ; he did not hesitate to accept the general terms of
the proposals ; and he consented to hold a confcrcnce
with Akbar IChm on the following day to carry into
effect the projected measures.
On the morning of the 23d thc deceived and doomecl
man, accompanied by his staff-officers, Lawrence, Trevor
and Macl<enzie, rode out from cantonments to keep t h e
fatcful tryst on the bank of t h e Cabul river. His manner
was 'distracted and hurried.' When he tolcl Lawrence of
the nature of the affair on which he was going, that shrewd
officer immediately warned him that it was a plot against
him. ' A plot ! ' he replied hastily, ' let me alone for that ;
trust me for that ! ' and Lawrence desisted from useless expostulation. Poor old Elphinstone had scented treachery;
but the Envoy had closed his mouth with the impatient
words : ' I understand these things better than you !' A s
h e rode out, h e admitted the danger of the enterprise, but
argued that if it succeeded it was worth all risks. ' A t all
events,' hc ended, 'let the loss be what it may, I would
rather die a hunclred deaths than live the last six weeks
over again.' The escort halted, and the four British gentlemen advanced t o the place of rendezvous, whither came
presently Akbar Khan and his party. Akbar began the
conference by asking the Envoy if he was ready to carry
out the proposals prcsented t o him overnight. 'Why not?'
was Sir Willian1's short reply. A number of Afghans,
armed t o the teeth, had gradually formed a circle around
the informal durbar. Lawrence and Maclenzie pointcd

out this environment to some of the chicfs, who affected to
drive off the intruders with their whips ; but Akbar obscrved
that it did not matter, as they 'were all in the secret.'
'Suddenly,' wrote Maclenzie, ' I heard Alcbar call out,
" Uegeer ! begeer ! " (" Seize ! seize ! ") and turning round I
saw him grasp the Envoy's left hand with an expression
on his face of the most diabolical ferocity. I think it was
Sultan Jan who laid hold of thc Envoy's right hand.
They dragged him in a stooping posture down thehillock,
thc only words I heard poor Sir William utter bcing, " Az
barae I<hooda " (" For God's sake "). I saw his face, however, and it was full of horror and astonishment.' Neither
Mackenzie nor Lawrence, the surviving companions of
the Envoy, witnessed the actual end. ' Whether,' writes
&ye, 'he died on the spot, or whether hc was slain by
the infuriated gliazees, is not very clearly known; but
the fanatics threw then~selveson the prostrate body and
haclied it with thcir Icnives.' There is no doubt that the
head of the unfortunate Macnaghten was paraded in
triumph through the streets of Cabul, and that the
mangled trunk, after being dragged about the city, was
hung up in the great bazaar. Of t h e three officers who
accompanicd the Envoy to the conference, Trevor was
massacred, Lawrencc and Maclcenzie wcre saved with
L

difficully by fricndly chiefs, and brought into the city,
wherc they and Captain Skinner joined the hostages,
Captains Connolly and Airey, under the safe roof of the
venerable Mahomed Zernaun Khan.
That "ikbar and the confederate chiefs sprcad a snare
for the Envoy is plain, and that they regarded his acceptance of their deceitful proposals as a proof of his faithless-
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lless to the treaty obligations to which he 11x1 bound
himself. I t was no elemcnt in thcir reasoning that since
thc)r had not rcgarclcd thc treaty the British functionary
might without breach of faith hold that it did not bind
]lime But it is improbable that the murder of Macnaghten was actually included in their schemc of action.
Their intention seems to have been to seizc him as a
hostage, with intcnt thus to secure the evacuation of
Afghanistan and the restoration of Dost Mahomecl, T h e
ill-fated Envoy's espressions on his may to the rendezvous indicate his unhinged statc of mind. I-Tc went forth
to sure treachery; Alcbar's gust of sudden fury convertecl the planned abduction into savage murder, and his
abrupt pistol bullet baullcccl the more wily and lcss ruthless project which had probably hcen dcviscd in cold
blood.
The escort brought back into cantonments tidings that
the Envoy had been seized. The garrison got undcr arms,
and remained passive throughout the day. The defences
were manned a t night, in the appt-ehcnsion that thc noise
and disturbance in the city portended an assault ; but that
clamour was caused by thc mustering of the Afghans in
espectation that thc British would attack the city, bent on
vengcance on the murderers of the Envoy. Action of that
nature was, ho\vcver, wholly absent from the prostrate
nlil~dsof the military chiefs. On thc following after110011
Captain Lawrence transmitted certain overtures from thc
chicfs, as the rcsult of a conference held by them, when,
notwithstanding severe cornmcnts on the conduct of the
Envoy, professions were made of sincere regret for his
death. With ccrtain alterations and additions, the treaty -

drawn up by Macnaghtcn was taken by the chiefs as the
basis for the negotiations which they clesirecl to renew.
Major Pottinger, as now the senior 'political' with the
force, was called on by General Elphinstone to undertake
the task of conducting negotiations with the Afghan
leaders. The high-souled Pottinger rose a t the summons
from the sickbed to which he had bcen confined ever since
his wonderful escape from Charikar, and accepted the
thankless and distasteful duty. I t is not necessary t o
recount the details of ncgotintions, cvery article and
every stagc of which display thc arrogance of the men
who knew themselves masters of thc situation, and revcal
not less the degrading humiliation to which was submitting itself a strong brigade of British troops, whose arms
were still in the soldiel-s' hands, and ' over whose ranks
hung banncrs blazoned with victories that shall be memorable clown the ages. On the sombre and cheerless Christmas Day Pottinger rose in the council of men who wore
swords, and rcrnonstrated with soldierly vigour and
powerful argument against the degrading terms which
the chiefs had contumeliously thrown to them. H e proclucerl letters from Jellalabacl and Peshawur giving information of reinforcements on the way from India, and
urging the maintenance of resistance. H e argued that
to conclude a treaty with the Afghans would be a fatal
error, and suggested two alternative courses which offered
a prospect of saving their honour and part of the armythe occupation of the Balla Hissar, which was the preferable measure, or the abandonment of camp, baggage,
and encumbrances, and forcing a retreat down the passes.
Thc council-Pottinger must have written s a r c a ~ t i c a l l ~

when h e tcrmcd it a ' council of war1-unanimously dccided that to remain in Cabul and to force a retreat
WCI-c alike impracticable, and that nothing remained but
the endeavour to release the arrny by agreeing to thc
conditions oKered by the cncrny. 'Under thcsecircutnstances,' in the words of I'ottingcr, 'as the Major-General
coincided with the officers of tllc council, ancl refused to
attempt occupying the Balla Ilissar, and as his second
in command declared that impracticable, I comidered it
my duty, notwithstanding my repugnance to ancl disapproval of t h e measure, t o yield, and attempt to carry
on a negotiation.'
This Pottingcr accordingly did. T h e first demand
with which he had to comply was to give bills for the
great sums promised by the Envoy t o the chiefs for
thcir services i n furthering and supporting his treaty.
This imposition had to be submitted to, since thc Afghans
stopped the supplies until the extortion was complied
with. T h e next concession required was the surrender
of thc artillery of the force, with thc exceptiorl of six
field and threc mule guns ; and the military chiefs endured this humiliation, against which even the demoralised soldiery chafed. Then the demand for hostages
had t o be complied with, and four officers were sent on to
join the two hostages alreacly in Afghan hands. The chiefs
had demanded four married hostages, with their wives
and children, and a circular was sent round offering to
volunteers the inducement of a large stipend; but the
sentiment of repulsion was too strong to be overcorne by
thc bribe. T h e sick and wounded who could not bear
the march were sent into t h e city in accordance with an

article of the treaty, two surgeons accompanying thcir
patients.
The treaty, ratified by the leading chiefs and scnt into
cantonments on New Year's Day 1842, providcd that thc
British troops, within twenty-four hours after receiving
transport, and under the protcction of certain chiefs and
an adequate escort, should begin their march of evacuation, the Jcllalabad garrison moving down to Pesha\vur
in advance ; that thc six hostages left in Cabul should bc
well treated, and liberated on thc arrival at l'csha\vur of
Dost Mahomcd ; the sick and woundcd lelt behind to be
at liberty to return to India on their recovery; all small
arms and ordnance stores in the cantonment magazine to
be made over to the Afghans 'as a token of friendship,'
on which account also, they were to have all thc British
cannon except as above mentioned; the Afghans to
escort the Ghuzncc garrison i n safety to Pcshawur;
and a further stipulation was that the British troops
in Candahar and Wcstern Afghanistan werc to rcsign
the territories occupicd by them and start quicltly for
India, provisioned and protected from molestation by
1he way.
Sevcre and humiliating as were those terms, thcy werc
not obtained without difficulty. Thc tcrtns put for\varct in
the earlier drafts or the treaty werc yet more csacting,
and the tone of the demands was abrupt, contemptuous,
and insulting. l'ottingcr had to plcacl, to entreat, to be
abject; to beg the masterful Afghans 'noL to ovcrpowcr
the weak with sufferings'; ' t o be good enough to cscuse
thc women from the suffering ' of remaining as hostagcs ;
ancl to entreat thcm 'not to forget kindness' slio\vii by us
'

in f ~ r m e days.
r
Onc blushes not for but with thc gallant
Pottinger, loyally carrying out the miserable duty put
upon him. The shame was not his; it lay on the council
of superior officers, who overruled his remonstrances, and
ground his face into the dust.
Our people were made to pass under the yolic every
hour of their wretched lives during those last winter days
in the Cabul cantonments. T h e fanatics and the common
folk of the city and its environs swarmed around our
petty ramparts, with their foul sneers and their blackguard
taunts, hurled with impunity from where they stood a t the
i n ~ z z l e sof the loaded guns which the gunners were forbidden t o fire. Officcrs and rank and filc were in a
condition of smouldering fury, but no act of reprisal or
retribution was permitted. If the present was one continuous miscry, thc future lowered yet morc gloomily.
I t was of common knowledge as wcll in the cantonments
as in the city, that the engagements made by the chiefs
werc not worth the paper on which they had been written,
and that treachery was bcing concerted against the force
o n its impending travail through the passes. It was told
by a chief to one of the officers who was his friend, that
Alibar Khan had sworn to have in his posscssion the
British ladies a s security for the safc restoration of his
own family and relatives, and, strange forecast to be fulfilled almost to the very letter, had vowed to annihilate
every soldier of the British army with the exception of onc
man, who should reach Jcllalabad to tell the story of the
massacre of all his comrades. I'ottinger was well aware
how despcrate was the situation of thc hapless pcople on
whose behalf he had bent s o low his proud soul. Mohun

La1 warned him of thc treachery thc chiefs were plotting,
and assured him that unless their sons slloulcl accompany
the army as hostages, it would be attacked on thc march.
Day after day the cleparture was dclayed, on the pretest
that the cliicfs had not completed their preparations for
thc safe conduct of the force and its encumbrances. Day
after day the snow was falling \vith a quiet, ruthless
persistency. The bitter night frosts werc destroying the
sepoys and the calnp follomcrs, their vitality \veakened
by scmi-starvation and by the lacl< of firewood which
had long distressed tlicm. At length on J a n ~ ~ a r911,
y
Sturt the engineer officer got his instructioiis to throw
down into the ditch a section of the eastern rampart,
and so furnish a freer esit than the gates could afford.
The supply of transport was inadequate, provisions wcre
scant, and the cscort promised by the chiefs mas not
forthcoming. Pottinger advised waiting yet a little
longer, until supplies and escort should arrive; but
for once the military chiefs were sct against thc
policy of delay, and firm orders were issucd that the
cantonmc~its should be evacuated on the following
day.
Sliali Soojali remained in Cabul. The resolution
became him bctter than anything elsc we know of the
unfortunate man. It may be he rcasoncd that he had a
chance for life by remaining i n tlie Balla Hissar, and
that from wliat hc lcnew, there was no chance of life
for anyone participating in thc fateful march. Ile behaved fairly by the British authorities, sending more
than one solemn warning pressing on them the occupation of the Balk I-Iissar. And there was some dignity in

his appeal to Brigadier Anquctil, who commanded his
own contingent, ' if it were well to forsake him in the
hour of need, and to deprive him of the aid of that
f'm-ce which he had hitherto been taught to regard as
his own ? '

CHAPTER VII

THEill-omened evacuation by our doomcd people of the
canlonments wherein for two months they had undergone every extremity of humiliation and contumely, was
begun on the dreary winter morning of January 6th,
1842. Snow lay decp on plain and hill-side ; the cruel
cold, penetrating through the warmest clothing, bit fiercely
into the debilitated and thinly clad frames of the scpoys
and the great horde of camp followers. The military
force which marched out of cantonments consisted of
about 4500 armed men, of whom about Ggo wcre
Europeans, 2840 native solclicrs on fool, and 970 native
cavalrymen. The gallant troop of Company's HorseArtillery marched out with its full cornplcment of sis
guns, to which, with thrcc pieces of the mountain train,
the artillery arm of the departing force was restrictcd by
thc degrading terms imposed by the Afghan chiefs. In
good heart and resolutely commancled, a body of clisciplined troops thus constitulecl, and of a lighting slrength so
respcctablc, might have bcen trusted not only to hold its
own against Afghan onslaught, but if necessary to taltc
the oifensivc with success. 13ut alas, the heart of thc

IlapIcss force had gone to water, its discipline was a
\\rrccl\r,its chicfs were feeblc and apathetic ; its steps were
doggcd by thc incubus of some 12,000 camp followers,
\\,it11 a great company of women and children. T h e
awful fate brooded ovcr its forlorn banners of expiating
by its utter annihilation, the wretched folly and sinistcr
prosecution of thc cntcrprise whosc dcservecl failure was
to be branded yet deepcr on thc gloomiest page of our
national history, by thc impending catastrophe of which
the dark shadow already lay upon thc blighted column.
The advance bcgan to move out from cantonments
at ninc A.ar. The march was delayed at the river by
the non-completion of the te~nporarybridge, and the
whok of the advance was not across until after noon.
Thc main body under Shelton, which was accompanied by
the ladies, invalids, and sick, slowly followed. I t as well
as the advance was disorganised from the first by the
throngs of camp followers with thc baggage, who could
not be prevented from mixing themselves up with thc
troops. The Afghans occupied the cantonments as
portion after portion was evacuated by our people, rending the air with their exulting crics, and committing every
kind of atrocity. It; was late in the afternoon before
the long train of camels following the main body had
cleared the cantonments ; and meanwhile the rear-guard
was masscd outside, in the space bet\~cen the rampart
and the canal, among the chaos of already abandoned baggage. It was exposed there to a vicious jezail fire poured
into it by the Afghans, who abandoned the pleasures of
plunder and arson for the yet greater joy of slaughtering
the Feringhees. When the rear-guard moved away in the
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twilight, an officer ancl fifty mcn werc lcft dcad in Lhc
snow, thc victims of the Afghan fire from the rampart of
the cantonment; and owing to casualties in thc gun teams
it had becn found neccssary to spike and abandon two of
the horse-artillery guns.
The rear-guard, cut into from behind by the pestilent ghazees, found its route encumbered with heaps
of abandoned baggage around which s\varmed Afghan
plunderers. Otlicr Afghans, grccdicr for blood than for
booty, were hacking and slaying among thc nuniberless
sepoys and camp follo\vcrs who had dropped out of
the column, and were lying or sitting on the waysidc in
apathetic despair, waiting for death and careless whetlicr
it came t o thcm by knife or by cold. Babes lay
on the snow abandoncd by their rnothcrs, themselves
prostrate and dying a few hundred yards further on.
It was not until two o'clock of thc following morning
that the rear-guard rcacl~ecl tlie straggling and chaotic
bivouac in which its comraclcs lay in the snow a t the
end of thc first short march of sis miles. Its wcary
progrcss had bccn illuminated by tlic conflagration raging
in the cantonments, which had been fircd by the Afghan
fanatics, rabid to erasc every relic of the detested unbelievers.
I t was a night of bitter cold. Out in the opcn among
the snow, solcliers and camp follo\\~crs,fooclless, firelcss,
and shelterless, froze to death in numbers, and numbers
more werc frost-bitlen. The cheery msrning noise of
ordinary camp life was unheard in the rnournfd bivouac.
Captain Lawrence outlines a melancholy picturc. ' The
sileiice of tlie Inen betrayed their despair and torpor. I n
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the morning I found lying close to me, stiff, cold, and
quitc dead, in full regimentals, with his sword drawn in his
hand, an old grcy-haired conductor named Macgregor,
who, utterly exhausted, had lain down there silently to
die.' Already defection had set in. One of the Shah's
infantry regiments and his detachment of sappers and
miners had descrtecl bodily, partly during the march of
the previous day, partly in the course of the night.
No orders were given out, no bugle sounded the
march, on the morning of the 7th. The column heaved
itself forward sluggishly, a mere mob of soldiers, camp
followers and cattle, destitute of any semblance of
order or discipline. Quite half the sepoys were already
unfit for duty ; in hundreds they drifted in among the
non-combatants and increased the confusion. The advance of the previous day was now the rear-guard. After
plundering the abandoned baggage, the Afghans set to
harassing the rear-guard, whose progress was delayed by
the disorderly multitude blocking the road in front. T h e
three mountain guns, temporarily separated from the
infantry, were captured by a sudden Afghan rush. In vain
Anquetil strove to rouse the 44th to make an effort for
their recapture. Green was more successful with his handful of artillerymcn, who followed him and the Brigadier
and spilted the pieces, but being unsupported were compelled a second time to abandon them. On this march it
bzcame necessary also, from the exhaustion of their teams,
t o spike and abandon two more of the horse-artillery guns ;
s o that thcre now remained with the force only a couple
of six-pounders. While the rear-guard was in action, a body
of Afghan horse charged on thc flailk, right into the heart

of the baggage column, snrcpt anpay much plunder, and
spread confusion and dismay far and wide. T h e rear of
the column would probably ]lave bcen entirely cut off,
but that reinforcements from the advance under Shelton
pushed back the enemy, and b y crowning the lateral
heights kept open the thoroughfare. A t Uootkhal< was
found Akbar Khan,
professed t o have been commissioned to escort the force t o Jellalabad, and who
blamed our peoplc for lla\ring marched out prcmnturcly from thc cantonlncnts. H c insistcd on thc halt
of the column a t I3ootl<llnl<until the following morning,
when he \roulci provide supplies, but he demanded an
immcdiatc subsidy of I 5,m rupees, and that Pottingcr,
Lawrence and Maclccl~zicsllould be given up to him as
hostages that the force would not march beyond Tezecn
until tidings should arrive that Sale had evacuated
Jellalabad. T h o w officers by the General's instructicrns
joined the Afghan chief on the following morning, and
Altbar's financial rcquisitiol~ was obscquiously fulfilled.
Aftcr two days' marching our pcoplc, \\rho had brought out
with them provisions for but five and a half days, especting within that timc to rcach Jcllalabad, were only ten
miles forward on thcir march.
Another night passed, with its train of horrors-starvation, cold, exhaustion, death. Lady Sale relates that
scarcely any of the baggage now remained ; that there
was no food for man or bcast ; that snow lay a foot decp
on the ground ; that even water from thc adjacent stream
was difficult to obtain, as the carriers were fired on in
fetching it ; and that she thought herself fortunate in
being sheltered in a small tcnt in which ' we slept ninc,

all touclljng each otl~cr.' Daylight brought merely a
lnorc bitter realisation of utter misery. Eyre expresses
his wonderment at the effcct of two nights' cxposure to
the fi-ost in clisorganising the force. ' I t had so nipped
even thc strongest men as to complctely prostrate their
p i r c r s and incapacitate them for service ; even the
cavalry, who suffered less than the ~ c s t ,were obliged
to be lifted on their horses.' In fact, only a few hundred
serviceable lncn remained. At the sound of hostile fire
the living struggled to their feet from their lairs in thc
snow, stiffened with cold, all but unable to move or hold
a wcapon, leaving many of their more fortunate comlades stark in death. A turrnoil of confusion reigned.
The Afghans wcre firing into thc rear of the mass, and
there was a wild rush of camp followers to the front, who
stripped thc baggage cattle of their loads and carricd the
animals off, leaving the ground strewn with ammunition,
treasure, platc, and other property. The ladies wcre
no longer carried in litters and palanquins, for thcir
bearers were mostly dead ; they sat in thc bullet fire
packed into pannicrs slung on camels, invalids as some
of them mere-onc poor lady with her baby only five days
old. Mess stores were being recltlessly distributed, and
Lady Sale honestly aclcnowledges that, as she sat on hcr
horse in the cold, she felt very gratcful for a tumbler of
sherry, which at any othcr time would havc rnade ller
' vcry unlaclylikc,' but which now merely tvarmcd her.
Cups full of sherry were drunk by young chilclrcn without in the least affecting their heads, so strong on them
was the hold of the cold.
It was not until noon that the living maw of Inen and

animals was oncc morc in motion. Thc troops wcrc in
utter clisorganisation; the baggage was mixed u p \\lith thc
advancc guard ; thc camp followers wcrc pu~hingahead
in precipitate panic. The task before the wretched congcrics of peoplc mas to thrcad tlic stupcndous gorge of
the Khoorcl Cabul pass-a dcfilc about five milcs long,
hcmmcd in on cither hand by steeply scarped hills.
Down thc bottom of the ravinc dashcd a mountain
torrent, whose edges wcrc lined with thiclc layers of ice,
on which had formcd glacier-like masses of snow. The
'Jaws of Dcath' wcrc barely entered whcn thc slaughter
began. With the advance rode several Afghan chiefs,
whosc followers, by their command, shouted to the Ghilzais
lining the heights to hold their fire, but the tribesmen
gave no heed to the mandate. Lady Sale rode with the
chiefs. The Ghilzai. firc a t fifty yards mas closc and
deadly. Thc men of the advance fell fast. Lady Salc
had a bullct in her arm, and threc more through hcr
dress. But thc weight of the hostile fire fell on the main
column, thc baggage escort, and thc rear-guard. Some of
the ladies, who mostly were on camels which wcrc led
with thc column, had strange advcnturcs. On onc camcl
was quite a group. In one of its pannicrs wcrc Mrs I3oyd
ant1 her little son, in the other Mrs Mainwaring, with hcr
own infant and Mrs Anderson's eldest child. The camel
fell, shot. A I-Iindustance trooper took up Mrs Boyd e 7 ~
troupe, and carried her through in safety ; another horseman behind whom her son rode, was killed, and the boy
fell into Afghan hands. T h e Anderson girl sharecl thc
samc fate. Mrs Mainwaring, with her baby in her arms,
t load upsct,
nttemptccl to mount a baggagc pony, b ~ the

and she pursued Ilcr way on foot. An Afghan horscman
rode at hcr, threiltcned her with his sword, and tried t o
d r a g away tllc shawl in which she carricd her child. She
was rcscued by a sepoy grenadier, who shot the Afghan
dead, and thcn conducted the poor lady along the pass
through thc dcad and dying, through, also, the close fire
wl~icllstruck down people ncar to hcr, almost to the exit
of the pass, when a bullet lcilled t l ~ cchivalrous scpoy, and
Mrs Mainwaring hacI to continue her tramp to the bivouac
alone.
A very fierce attack was made on the rear-guard, consisting of the 44th. I n the narrow throat of the pass thc
regimcnt was compelled to halt by a block in front, and in
this stationary position suffered severely. A flanking fire
told heavily on the handful of European infantry. T h e
belatcd stragglers masked their fire, and a t length the
soldiers fcll back, firing volleys indiscriminately into the
stragglers and the Afghans. Near the exit of the pass
a comlnancling position was rnaintaincd by some cletachrnents which still helcl together, strengthened by the only
gun now remaining, the last but one having bcen abancloned in the gorge. Ullcler cover of this stand the rear
of the mass gradually drifted forward while the Afghan
pursuit was checl~ecl,and at length all the surviving force
reached the camping ground. Thcrc had bcen left dead
in the pass about 500 soldiers and over 2500 camp
followers.
Akbar and the chiefs, taking the hostages with them,
rodc forward on the track of thc retreating force. Alcbnr
professed that his object was to stop the firing, but
R/lackenzie writcs that Pottinger said to him : ' Mackenzie,

,

rcmember i f I am killed that I hcard Akbar Khan shout
"Slay them ! " in Pushtoo, although in Persian he called
out to stop thc firing.' The hostages had to be hidden
away from the ferocious ghazees among rocks in the
ravinc until near cvening, when in . passing through
the region of the heaviest slaughter they 'came upon
one sight of horror after another. All the bodies were
stripped. Therc were childrcn cut in two. I-Iindustanee
women as well as men-somc
frozcn to clcath, somc
literally cl~oppccl to pieces, many with thcir throats cut
from ear to car.'
Snow fcll all night on the unfortunates gathcrecl tentless on the Khoorcl Cabul camping ground. On the
morning of thc 9th the confuscd ancl disorderly march
was resumed, but after a milc hacl bccn travcrsed a halt
Tor thc clay was orclerecl at the instance of Akbar
I<han, \vho scnt into camp by Captain Skinner a proposal that thc laclics and chilclrcn, with whosc clcplorable condition hc profcsscd with apparcnt sincerity
to syrnpathisc, shoulcl bc maclc ovcr to his protcction,
and that the marrictl officcrs should accompany their
wives ; hc plcdging hi~nsclf to preserve the party from
furthcr harclships and clangers, ancl afford its members safe escort through the passes in rcar of thc force.
The Goncral had little faith in the Sirtlar, but hc was fain
to givc his conscnt to an arrangement which promised
alleviation to thc wretchcdncss of the ladies, scarce any of
whom hacl tasted a mcal sincc Icaving Cabul. Some, still
\vcak from cl~iltlbirth,were nursing infants only a few clays
old ; othcr poor creatures were momentarily apprehending thc pangs of motl~crhood. There wcre invalids whosc
H

only attire, as thcy rock in the camel pannicrs or shivercd
on tllc snoi\r,\\ras the nightdresses they wore when leaving
the c;ultonmcnts in their palanquins, and none possessed
nll~.tIlillg
sa\~cthe clothes on their backs. I t is not surIxising, tl~cn,that dark and cloubtful as was the future to
wllic]i tlic~r\\lcrc consigning themselves, the ladies preferrctI its rislts and chanccs to the awfi~lcertainties which
lay bcfore the cloo~iieclcolumn. Thc Afghan chief had
cunningly made it a conclitio~~
of his proffcr that the
husbands sliould accompany their wives, and if there
was a strugglc in the breasts of the former between
public and private duties, thc Gcncral liumancly decided
thc issuc by ordering thcrn to share the fortunes of their
families.
Akbar l<linn scnt in no supplies, and the march was
rcsumctl on tlic morning of thc 10th by a force attenuated
by starvation, cold, and despair, diminished furthcr by
cstcnsivc desertion. Aftcr much exertion thc aclvancc,
consisting of all that rcmained of the 44tl1, thc solitary
gun, and a detachment of cavalry, forced a passage
to thc front through the rabble of camp follo\vers,
and mnrchcd unmolested for about two miles until the
Tunghce Tarilii was rcached, a deep gorge not more
than tcn fcct widc. Rlen fell fast in the horrid defile,
struck cio\vn by thc Afghan lirc from thc heights ; but
thc pass, if narrow, was short, and thc advancc having
strugglccl through it nioved on to the halting-place a t
Kubbar-i-Jubbar, and waited thcre for the arrival of the
main body. Rut that body was never to emerge from out
the sliamblcs in the narrow throat of the Tunghee Tarilii.
Thc aclvancc was to lcarn from the fcw stragglers who

rcachccl it the ghastly truth that it now was all that
remained of thc strong brigadc which four days before
had marched out from the Cabul cantonrncnts. The
slaughter from the Afghan fire had blocked thc gorge
with dcacl and dying. The Ghilzai tribesmcn, at the turn
into tke pcn a t thc other cncl of which was the bloclml
gorge, had closccl up fiercely. Thcn the sleep slopes
suddenly sivarmccl with Afghans rushing s\vorcl in hand
clown to thc \vorlz of butchcry, and thc rnassacrc stinted
not while living victims remainecl. Thc rcar-guard rcgirncnt of scpoys was cslcrminatecl, s a w for two or thrcc
clespcratcly \vounclccl officcrs w11o contri\recl to rcach tllc
aclvance.
Thc remnant of the army consistccl now of about
seventy files of thc 44tl1, about loo troopcrs, ancl n cletachmcnt of horsc-artillery with a singlc gun. T h e
General sent to Akbar Khan to rcmonstratc ~vithhim on
the attack 11e had allo\vccl to be made aftcr having guaranteed that thc forcc should mcel with no furthcr ~uolestation. Alibar protested his rcgret, ancl plcatlcd his
inability to control the wild Ghilzai hillmcn, over ivho~n,
in their lust for blood and plunder, thcir own chiefs I ~ a d
lost all control ; but he was willing to guarantee thc safe
conduct to Jcllalabacl of the European officers and men
if they \vould lay clown their arms and commit thelllsclves
wholly into his hands. This sinistcr proposal the General
refused, and the march was continued, led in disorder by
the remnant of the camp followers. In the steep descent
from the Huft Kotul into the Tezeen ravine, the solcliers
following the rabble at some distance, came suclclcnly on
a fresh butchcry. 'The Afghans had sucldenly fallen on

t l ~ cconf~~secl
throng, and the descent was covered with
dead and dying.
During thc n~archfrom Kubbar-i-Jubbar to the Tezccn
valley Shelton's doggcd valour had mainly saved tlic force
fl.om rlestri~ction. With a few stauncli soldiers of liis OWII
rcgimcnt, tlic one-armed \rctcsan, restored now to liis
,)roper mh'er of stubborn fighting man, had covercd the
rear ;mcl rcpelled the Gliilzai assaults with persevering
energy and dauntless fortitude. And lie it was who 11ow
suggestdl sincc Altbar Khan still held to his stipulation
that tlie forcc sl~oulcllay down its arms, that a resolute
cffort should be made to press on to Jugclullulc by a rapid
night march of four-and-twcnty miles, in the hopc of clearing thc passcs in that vicinity bcforc the enemy shoulcl
havc time to occupy them.
That thc attcmpt woulcl prove successful was doubtful, sincc thc force was already exhaustecl ; but it was the
last chancc, and Shelton's s~~grgcstion
was acloptccl. In
tlic c;dy moonlight tlic march silently began, an ill omen
marking tlie start in thc sliapc of the forced abandonment of the last gun. Fatal delay occurrecl between
Sell Baba and Kutti Sung because of a panic among the
camp followers, ~ h oscarcd
,
by a fcw sliots, clriftcd backwards and forwards in a mass, retarding the progress of
thc column and for thc timc cntirely arrcsting the advance of Shelton's and his rear-guard. -The force could
not closc up until thc morning, tcn miles short of Jugdulluk, and already the Afghans were swarming 011 every
acljacent height. All the way down tlie broken slope
to Jugdulluk the little column trudged tlirougli the
ga~l~itlet
of jczail fire which lincd the road with dead

and wounded. Shelton and his rear-guard handful performed wonders, again ancl again fending off with closc
lire and levellcd bayonets the ficrce rushes of Ghilzais
charging sword in hand. The harassed advance reached
Jugdulluk in thc afternoon of the ~ ~ t and
h , took post
behind some ruins on a height by the roadside, the surviving officers forming line in support of the gallant
rear-guard struggling forward through its cnvironment of
assailants. As Shclton and his bravc felloars burst
through the cordon they were grectcd by checrs from
the knoll. But therc was no rcst for the cshar~stccl
pcoplc, for the Afghans promptly occupied commanding
positions whcncc they maintained a fire from which thc
ruins afforded but scant protection. To men parchcd
with thirst the stream a t the foot of their knoll was but
a tantalising aggravation, for to attempt to rcach it was
certain dcath. The snow thcy devoured only increased
their sufferings, ancl but little stay was afiordcd by the
raw flesh of a few gun bullocks. Tl~roughoutthe day
volley aftcr volley was pourcd down upon thc weary band
by the incsorable encmy. Frequent sallics \verc madc,
and thc heights wcre cleared, but the positions were soon
reoccupied and the ruthless fire was rene\vcd.
Captain Skinncr, summoned by Alcbar, brought back
a message that General Elphinstone should visit him to
take part in a conference, and that Brigadier Shelton and
Captain Johnson should be givcn over as hostages for the
evacuation of Jellalabad. Compliance was held to bc imperative, and the temporary conmand was entrusted to
nrigadier Anquetil. Alibar was cxtre~ncly 11ospit;lble to
his compulsory gucsts; but he insisted on including the

Gcncral among his hostages, ancl was not moved by
Elphinstonc's representations that he would prefer death
to t h e disgrace of being scparatcd from his command in
its time of peril. T h e Ghilzai chicfs camc into confercncc
burning with hatred against thc British, and rcvelling i n
the anticipated delights of slaughtering them. Altbar
scemed sincere in his cffort to conciliate them, but was
long unsuccessful. Their hatred seemed indeed stror~ger
than their greed ; but a t length toward nightfall Altbar
announced that pacific arrangcrnents had becrl acccptecl
by the tribes, ant1 that what I-cmained of thc force shoulcl
be allowed t o ~narchunmolestccl to Jellalabacl.
I-Iow futile was thc compact, if indcecl therc was any
compact, was soon revealed.
day among thc ruins
on the linoll had passccl in dark and crucl suspensein kunger, thirst, and exhaustion, in the presencc of
frequent -.
'death; and as the evcning fell, in anguish and
all but uttcr dcspair. As darlcness set in thc conviction
enforced itself that to remain longer in thc accurscd place
was madness ; and thc littlc band, [caving behind perforce
thc siclc and w~unclecl,marched out, resolute to push
through or dic fighting. In thc valley the only molestation
at first was a desultury fire from the camping Ghilzais,
who were rather talten by surprise, but soon bccamc wide
awake to their opportunitics. Somc hurried forward t o
occupy the pass rising from the valley to the Jugdulluk
crest; others, hanging on the rear and flanks of thc
colu~nn encumbered with its fatal incubus of camp
followcrs, mixed among the unarmed throng with their
deadly knives, ancl Iiillcd ancl plundered with the dextcrity of long practice. Throughout the tcclious march

up thc steeply rising clefilc a spattering fire came from
the rocks and ridges flanking the track, all but blocked
by the surging concoursc of miserable followers. T h c
advance had to employ cruel lneasurcs to force its
\\ray through the chaos toward the crest. A s it is approachcd from the Jugdullulc direction the flanking clevations reccde and merge in the transverse ridge, which is
cronrncd by a low-cut abrupt rocky upheaval, worn clown
sornewhat wherc thc road passes over the crest by the
friction of traffic. Just hcrc the tribesmen had constructed
a formidable abattis of prickly brr~shn~ood,
which strctchecl
athnmt thc road, and dnmrnecl back the fugitives in the
s h a l l o ~oval basin betivecn the termination of the ravinc
and thc summit of the riclgc. In this trap mere caught
our hapless people ancl the swarm of thcir native followers,
and now thc end was vcry ncar. From behind the barrier,
ancl around thc lip of the grcat trap, thc hillmcn fired their
hasdest into thc secthing mass of soldiers and followers
~vrithingin the awful Gehcnnn on which the calm moon
shonc clown. On the edgcs of this \vhirlpool of clcath the
fcll Ghilzais wcrc stabbing ancl haclting with the ferocious
industry inspired by thirst for blood and lust for plunder.
It is among thc characteristics of our diverse-natured racc
to die game, ancl cvcn to thrill with a stlange fierce joy
\vhen hope of cscapc from death has all but passed away
ancl there remains only to scll life at thc highest possible
premium of exchange. Among our pcople, facc to face
with dcath on the rocky J ~ ~ g c l u l office~s
l ~ ~ l ~ , and soldicrs
alike fought with cool clcaclly rancour. The brigaclicr and
the privatc engaged in the srunc fierce u z t Z h , fought sidc
by sicle, and fcll sidc by side. Stalwait Captain Doclgin

of the 4 t h slcw five Afghans bcfore lic fell.

Captain
Niclloll of the horse-artillery, gunless now, rallied to him
felv staunch gunners who werc all that remained to
of his noble and historic troop, and led them on to
with him a heroic death.
All dicl not pcrish on thc rugged summit of tlic
Jugclullulc. Tlic barrier was finally broken through, and
a scant rcmnant of the force wrought out its escape from
the slaughter-pit. S~nalldetaclments, harassed by sudden
o~islauglits,and delaycd by reluctance to descrt wounded
colnracles, wel-c trudging in the clarlcncss clown the long
slop" to thc Soorlchab. Thc morning of thc 13th dawncd
llcar Gundamulc on tlic straggling group of somc twcnty
officers and forty-five European soldiers. Its march
arrested by sharp attacks, tlic little band moved aside to
occupy a defensive position on an adjacent hillock. A
local sirdar invited tlic senior oficer to consult with
him as to a pacific a~rangenient, and while Major
Griffitlls was absent on this errand there was a temporary suspension of hostilities. The Afghans meanwhile
sivarmcd around thc detachrncnt with a pretence of friendship, but prcsently attempts were made to snatch from thc
soldiers their arms. This conduct was stcrnly resented,
and the Afghans were forced back. They ascended an
adjacent elevation and set themelves to the work of
deliberately picking off officer after officer, Inan after man.
The few rounds re~nainingin tlie pouches of the soldiers
were soon exhausted, but thc detachment stood fast, a ~ l d
calmly awaitecl tlie inevitable end. Rush after rush
was driven back from its stcadfast front, but a t last,
nearly all being Icilled or ~vgyncled,a final oqset of the

enemy, sword in hand, terminated the struggle, anti cornplcted the dismal tragedy. Captain Soutcr of the ~ t h ,
with thrcc or four privates all of whoin as \\rell as himself
were woundctl, was spared and carried into captivity ; he
saved the colours of his regiment, whicl~ he had tied
round his waist before leaving Jugdulluk. A group of
mounted officers had pushed forward as soon as they hael
cleared the barrier on the crest. Sis only rcachccl Futtchabad in safety. There they wcrc treacl~crousl~
offcrcd food,
and while they haltcd a fcw momcnts to cat tn.0 \vcrc
cut clown. Of the four who rock away thrcc wcrc oIrcrtxken and killccl within four milcs of Jellalabacl ; onc
oficcr alone survivcd to reach that haven of refugc.
T h e ladies, the married officers, and thc original 110stages, followed Alibar I<han down thc passcs to\saril
J ~ g d ~ l l ~pursuing
li,
the line of retreat strewn with its
ghastly tolxns of slaughter, and rccognising almost nt
every step the bodies of friends oncl comrades. At Jugdullulc they found General Elphi~~stonc,
Brigaclier Shclton,
and Captain Johnson, and Icarnccl thc fate \\,hich had
overtalcen the marching force. On thc follo\ving clay
Akbar quitted Jugdullulc with his hostngcs and thc
ladies, a11 of whom werc virtually prisoners, and rodc
the mountains in a northerly clircction.
a\vay tl~rougl~
On the fourth clay the fort of Uucliabacl in thc LughInan valley was renchcd, where Alcbar lcft the prisoners
he went to attempt the reduction of Jellalabad.

CHAPTER VIII
THE SIEGE AND DEFENCE OF JELLALAJ3AD
Sar.~'s brigade, retreating from Gunclamuk, reachecl
Jellalabacl on the 12th November 1841. An investigation into the state of thc fortifications of that place
showed thcm, in their existing condition, to be incapable of resisting a vigorous assault. But it was resolved
to occupy the placc, and to Captain George Rroadfoot,
as garrison engineer, \\?as committcd thc duty of making
it defensible. This assuredly was no light taslc. The
cncicntc was far too extensive for thc slender garrison,
and its tracing was radically bad. The ramparts wcre
so dilapidated that in places they wcre scarcely discernible, and thc ruins strewn over what shoi~ld have
bcen thc glacis afforded near cover to assailants, whose
attitude was already so thrcatcning as to hinder tlic
beginning of repairing operations. Their fire swept
the defences, and their braves capered dcrisivcly to the
strains of a bagpipe on the adjacent rocky elevation,
which thenceforth went by the name of ' Piper's Hill.'
A sortie on the 15th cleared the environs of the troublesome Afghans, supplies began to come in, and Broadroot was free to sct his sappers to the taslc of repairing

-

thc fortifications, in which work the entrenching tools hc
had wrenched from the Cabul stores proved invaluable.
How grcatly Sale had erred in shutting up his force in
Jellalabad was promptly demonstrated. The connecting
posts of Gundamuk and Peshbolalc had to be cvacuatcd;
and thus, from Ju~nrooda t the foot of thc Khybcr up to
Cabul, there remained no inter~necliate post in 13ritish
possession with thc solitary exception of Jellalabad, and
communications werc entirely interrupted except through
the medium of furtive messcngcrs.
T h c Jcllalabacl garrison \\.as lcft un~nolcstcdfor nearly
a fortnight, and tlic rcpairs were wcll advanced whcn on
thc 29th the Afghans came down, invested the place, and
pushed thcir slcirmishers close up to the walls. On
Decembcr 1st Colonel Dennie headcd a sortic, which
worsted thc bcsiegcrs with considcrablc slauglitcr and
drove thcm from the vicinity. Bad ncws camc at i ~ ~ t e r vals from Cabul, and at thc ncw year arrived a melancholy letter from I'ottingcr, confirming thc rumours
already rife of the ~nurclcr of thc Envoy, and of thc
virtual capitulation to which thc Cabul force had submitted, il mcclc latcr an official communication was
~.eccivedfrom Cabul, signed by General Elphinstonc and
Major Pottingcr, formally announcing the convcntion
\vhich thc Cabul forcc had cntcrccl into with thc chiek,
ancl ordering thc garrison of Jcllalabad forthwith to
evacuatc that post ancl retire to Pcshawur, leaving behind
with 'the new Governor,' an Afglian chicr who was the
l~earerof thc humiliating missivc, thc rortrcss guns and
such stores ancl baggzagc as thcrc laclcccl transport to
remove. The council of war summoned by Sale was

in favour of non-compliance with this mandate, 13roadfoot: urged with vigour that an order by a
superior nrllo was no longer a frec agcnt and ~ 1 1 0issued
it
duress, coulcl impose no obligation of obedience.
sxlcpronounced llilnsclf untrammelled by a convention
forcccl from people ' with knives a t their throats,' and was
rcsolutc in tile expression of his determination to 1101~1
Jcllalabad u111css orclcrecl by the Government to withdra\v.
More and more ominous tidings pourcd i n from Cabul.
A, lcttcr rcceived on January 10th reportccl the Cabul
force to bc still in the cantonments, living utterly a t thc
mercy of t11c Afghans ; another arriving on thc 12th told
of thc abandonment of the cantonments and the beginning of the march, but that the forlorn wayfarers were
lingcriag i n detention a t Bootkhalc, halted in their misery
by the ordcrs of Akbar Khan. Those communications in
a measure prcparcd the peoplc in Jellalabad for disaster,
but not for L.he awful catastrophe of which Dr Bryclon
had to tell, when in the afternoon of the 13th the lonc
man, whose approach to the fortress Lady Rutler's painting so pathetically depicts, rode through the Cabul gate
of Jcllalabad. Dr Rrydon was covered with cuts and
contusions, and was utterly exhaustecl. His first few
hasty sentences esting~~ishecl
all hopc in the hearts of the
listeners regaiding their Cabul comrades allc1 friends,
There was naturally great excitement in Jellalabad,
but no panic. The working parties \\rere called in, the
assembly \\'as sounded, the gates were closed, tile walls
were lined, and the batteries were mannecl ; for it was
bekved for the molnent that the enemy were i n f u l l

pursuit of fugi tivcs following in J3ryclon's track. Thc
situation impressed Broadfoot with thc conviction that
a crisis had come in the fortunes of the Jcllalabacl
garrison. I l e thought it his duty to lay before tlic
General the conclitions of the critical moment which hc
believed to have arrivcd, pointing out to him that the
imperative alternatives wcre that he should eithcr firmly
resolve on the clefcnce of Jcllalabacl to the last extremity,
or that he shoulc~ make up his mincl to a retreat that
very night, whilc as yct rctrcat was pactic;tblc. Salc
decided on holcling on to thc placc, and immccliatcly
runnounccd to the Comrnanclcr-in-Chicf his resolvc to
persevere in a clcterminccl defence, relying on the promise of the earliest possible relief.
Because of the defection of his Silch auxiliaries ancl
the faint-lncartcc111essof his sepoys, Wild's cfforts to cross
the thrcsholcl of the Khybcr hacl failed, ancl with the tidings of his failure there came to Salc the information that
the cffort for his relief must bc inclcfinitcly postponed. It
map be assumed that this intimation rvcakenecl in somc
dcgrec the General's csprcsscd resolution to hold Jellalabad with determination, and it is not to be denied that
this resolution was in a mcnsure conditional on thc not
unwarranted cspcctation of early rclief. Ncither hc nor
.his adviser Macgregor appears to havc rcalised ho\v
incumbent on thc garrison of Jellalabad it was to hold
out to the last extremity, irrcspcctive of consequences to
itself, unless it shoulcl receive a peremptory rccall from
higher autho~ity; or to havc recognised tlnc glorious
opportunity presentccl of inspiriting by its staunch constancy ancl high-soulccl sclf-abnegation a weal; govern-

lncnt staggering under a burclcn of calamity. Than Sale
no bralrcr soldier ever worc sword, but a man may delight
to llcacl
forlorn hope and yct lack ncrve to carry with
Ilig11 llcart a loacl of responsibility ; nor was Macgregor so
constituted a4 to ani~nate his chief to noble cmprise.
Fast oIl the I1ceIs of the gloomy tidings from thc IChybcr
lnoutll tllerc came to them from Shah Soojah, ~ 1 1 0was
still the nominal sovcrcign at Cabul, a curt percmptol-y
lcttcr obviously written under compulsio~~,
of which the
follonling \vcre the terms : ' Your people have concluded
a treaty with us ; you arc still in Jcllalabacl ; what are
your intentions? Tell us quicldy.'
Sale summoncd a council of mar, which assembled a t
his quarters on Janilary 27th. Its proceedings were recorcled, and the documents laid bcforc it were preserved
by Captain Henry I-Iavelock i n his capacity as Sale's starofficcr. Record and papers were reclaimed from I-Iavclock's custody by Gcneral Salc bcforc the evacuation of
Afghanistan, and had been long lost to sight. They have
recently been deposited among the records of the India
Office, but not before their latcst non-oflicial possessor had
publishcd some extracts from them. It is to be hoped
that the more important documents may be given to the
public in full, since passages from documents, ,vhether
intentiollally or not, may be so extracted as to be misleading. nroaclfoot, who had been a Inember of the
council of war, and who was apparently aware of the
suppression of the official recorcls, wrote in 1843 a detailed narrative of its proceedings while his recollection of
them was still fresh, and this narrative he sent to Havelock desiring him to note 'any points erroneously stated,

distinguishing bctween what you may merely not rcmembcr a n d \\rhat you know I am rnistalccn in.' Havclock,
who was a loyal and ardcnt admircr of General Sale,
having sparscly annotatctl Broadfoot's narrative, returned
it with the statement that he had compared it with
memoranda still in his possession, and that he considerctl
that it 'contributes a fair and correct staternent of that
which occurred.' T h c officers comprising the council to
whom Salc and Macgregor addressed thcrnselves were
Colonel Dcnnic of the 13t11, Colonel Montcath of thc
35th N. I., Captain5 13aclchousc ancl Abbott of the
artillcry, Captain Olclficld commancling thc cavalry, and
Captain 13roaclfoot thc garrison engineer. T h e following is a summary of the proceedings, as rccorded by
Broad foot and authenticatcd by I-lavelock.
Aftcr a Tcw formal words from Gcncral Sale, hc called
on Macgrcgor to submit a mattcr on \vhich that political
officcr and himself were agreecl. Macgregor then described thc situ;~tionfrom the point of view of Salc and
himsclf, ancl cspressccl thcir unitcd conviction that nothing
\\las to bc hoped Tor from tlic Government. Reserving
his own liberty of action, he sought the opinion of thc
officers on olicrs reccivcd from Alcbar IChan to treat for
thc evacuation of Afghanistan, ant1 he laid before thcm
a draft ans\\,er to Shah Soojah's curt letter, professing the
rcadincss of thc garrison to evacuate Jcllalabad on his
requisition, sincc it was held only for him, but naming
certain conditions : thc cschange of hostages, the restoration of British prisoners and hostages in exchange for thc
Afghan hostages on arrival of the force a t Pcshawur,
escort thither ' in safcty and honour,' with arms, colours,

and guns, ancl aclcquate assistance of supplies ancl transport. Both Sale and Macgregor frankly owned that they
were resolvecl to yield, and negotiate for safe rctreat.
G r e a t excitement from the first had pervaclecl the assemblage, and \\:hen i\lIacgregor had finished his statement
Broadfoot arose in his wrath. I-Ie dcclinccl to believe that
the Government had abandoned the Jellalabacl garrison to
its fate, and t h e .\\cis a general outburst of indignation
when Sale produced a letter carrying that significance.
Broadfoot waxed so warm in his remonstrances against
thc proposed action that an acljournment was agrecd to.
N e x t day Sale ancl Macgrcgor urged that it was impossiblc t o hold out much longer, that latcr retrcat woulcl be
impracticable, and that thc schcrne they proposed was
safe and honourable. Broadfoot denounced it as disgraceful, contenclcd that they coulcl hold Jellalabacl indefinitely-'could colonise if they lilced '-and retreat at
discretion. Ile denied that the place was held for Shall
Soojah, ancl challenged their right to surrender the post
unless by Government order. I-Iostages he proclailned
wol-thless while the Afghans held hcavier pledges of ours
in the shape of prisoners and hostages. I-Ie denounccd as
disgraceful the giving of hostages on our part. Monteath's
remark that nobody would go as a hostage roused Oldfielcl
to express himself tersely but pointedly on the subject.
' 1 for one,' he cxclaimecl in great agitation, '\\rill fight
here to the last drop of my blood, but I plainly declare
t h a t I will never be a hostage, and I am surprised that
a n y o n e should.propose such a thing, or rcgard an Afghan's
word as worth anything.' The resolution to trcat for the
abandonmcnt of Jcllalabad was carried, Oldficld only
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voting with Broadfoot against it, but thc stipulations
regarding hostages were omitted. Rroadfoot continucd
to press modifications of the conditions set out in thc
proposed rcply, pleading, but in vain, that the restoration.
of the prisoners in Afghan hands beforc departure of the
garrison should be insisted on ; and that since evacuation
was resolvcd on, it should a t least be conducted as a
military operation, and not degradingly under cscort.
Then, and little wonder, he objected to cspressions in
the draft lctter as too abject, and h c was succcssf~~l
in
procuring the alteration of thcm. T h c lctter was writtcn
out, signcd by Macgregor, and despatched t o Cabul. I t
was agreed that those members of the council who chose
to do should record in writing the reasons for their votcs,
and this was done by Dennie, Monteath, Abbott, and
Broad foot.
Broadfoot, pending an answer from Cabul, set the
garriso~ito work in digging a clitch round thc fortifications. The rcply from the Shah, to thc cffcct ' I f you are
sincere in offcrs, Ict all the chief gentlemen affix thcir
seals,' was laid beforc thc reassembled council on Fcbruary
12th. The implied imputation on thc good faith of British
officcrs might well liavc stung to indignation the rnecltest ;
but the council's opinion was taken as to the expediency
of complying with the dcrogatory request made by tlie
Shah, as wcll as of a stipulation-a modification of what
Broadfoot had originally urged in vain-for the surrender
of all priso~iers,hostages, sick, and woundcd unclcr detcntion in Afghanistan, on the arrival a t Pcshawur of the
Jellalabad brigade. The members of council, who in the
long interval since tlie previous rnceting had bccn gracluI

ally regaining their self-respect and mental equipoise,
unanimously dcclined to accept the proposals tendered
them by their commanding officer and his political ally;
and a letter written by Monteath was accepted, which 'was
not a continuation of the negotiation.'
Thus ended the deliberations of the memorable council
of war, whose eleventh hour resolve to' hold the fort ' mainly
avcrted thc ruin of British prestige in India and throughout
the regions bordering on our Eastern Empirc ; and the
credit of its final decision to repudiatc the humiliating
proposals of Salc and Macgregor belongs to Gcorge Broadfoot, who was firmly though silently baclced by Ilavelocl<.
T h e day after that decision was formulated a letter came
from Peshamur informing the garrison that every e f i r t
would he made for its rclief; ancl thenceforth there was no
morc talk of surrender, nor was the couragc of the little
brigade impaircd evcn \+-hen thc cartlqual<e of Fcbruary
19th shook tllc ncwly repaired fortifications into wreck.
Broad foot's vehement cnergy infected the troops, and by
the end of the month the parapets wcrc entirely restored,
the bastions rcpaired, and every battery re-establislled.
After the council of war had rcjected the proposals
laid before it, a decision which in effect involved the
maintenance of the dcfcnce to the last extremity, nearly
two months passcd without the occurrence of any important event, exccpt the spccdily retrieved m i s f o r t l ~ ~ e
of the earthquake of February 19th. Thc close investment of the place by k\l<bar Khan thwarted thc efforts of
the foraging parties to obtain much needed supplies.
Those efforts were not vigorous, for Sale, aware of his
garrison's poverty of ammunition, was bent on a passivc

defence, and steadily refused his consent t o vigorous
sorties. The policy may have had its abstract merits,
but it was certainly unsatisfactory in this respect, that
perseverance in it involved the unpleasantness of apparently inevitable starvation. General Pollocl< had
arrived in Peshawur, and was making energetic efforts t o
get his force in order for the accomplishment of the relief
of Jellalabad. But he foresaw serious delays, and so late
as the middle of March was still unablc to specify with any
definiteness thc probable date of his arrival at- that place.
The European troops in Jellalabad would be out of meat
rations early in April, and I-Iavclock's calculation was that
the grain, on which mainly subsisted the native soldiers,
who had been on half rations since the new year,would
be exhausted before the middle of that month. Sale
modified his policy of inactivity when he learned that
the blocliading Afghans were attempting to drive a mine
under a salient of the defences, and Dennie on March
I ~ t led
h out a sally, destroyed the works, and thrust back
Akbar's encroachments. The gcncral lack of vigour,
however, on the garrison's part emboldened the Afghans
so much that they actually grazcd thcir flocks of sheep
within Goo yards of the walls. This was too impudent,
and thc General consented to a raid, which resulted in thc
acquisition of some 500 sheep, an invaluable addition to
the commissariat resources. It is worth recording that
the native regiment gave up its share of the sheep to the
soldiers of the r3th, on the ground that Europeans needcd
animal food more than did natives of India.
On April 6th the Afghan lcader firccl a salute in
triumph for a supposititious repulsc of Pollocli in the

I<Ilyber. In regard to what then happened there is a
strange conflict of testimony. General Sale, in a private
letter \vrittcn sis weeks latcr, states: ' I made m y
arrangements wit11 Macgregor to sally the next day,
provided \ve did not hcar that Pollocli had forced the
pass.' Akbar's salutes, and the information of spies that
Pollocli had fallen back, 'made us look very grave-our
case desperate, our provisions nearly out, and no relief
at hancl. I therefore dccided to play a bold strolcc to
relieve ourselves, and give courage to Pollock's force in
case of success. If we failed in thrashing Alcbar, we
\\~ouldhave left our bones 011 the field.' Abbott's diary
of April 5th and (5th rccorcls that spies reported that
Pollock had been repulsed a t Ali Musjid, and that the
]leads of three of his officers had been sent in to Alcbar,
~vhcreupon 'all thc commanding officers waited on the
General, beseeching him to attack Akbar instantly.
Thc 13th and the battery got all ready for work, but
the old Gcneral was obstinate, and refused to act.' Baclrhouse's diary (April 6th) mentions that Pollock having
bccn reported repulsed, and Akbar having fired a salute,
thc officers commanding corps and detachments wcnt
in a body and proposed to thc General to attack Alcbar
instantly, but without success. ' Immediately thc matter
was broached, thc General set his face against anything
of the I h d , and disagreed about evcry point-illsisted
that the enemy had 5coo or 6000 mcn in camp, and wcrc
too strong for us ; and then, thc next minute, that it was
no use going out ;LS we ~0~11dn't
punish them, as they
~ ~ ~ k l ' zsrt '~t ? ~ and
d ; concluding with usual excuse for inactivity, " It isn't our game." Words ran precious high. . '

.
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Whether spontaneously or under pressure, General
Sale must have ordered a sortie in force; for at dawn
of the 7th thrce infantry columns marched out by thc
Cabul gate, the right commanded by Haveloclc, the
centrc by Dennie, the left by Monteath, General Sale
being in command of the whole force. Akbar, reputed
about 5000 strong, mas in formation in front of his camp
about three miles west of Jellalabad, his left flank resting on the river, with an advanced post of 300 men in
the 'patched up' fort about midway between his camp
and Jellalabad. T h c prescribed tactics were to march
straight on the enemy, with which Monteath and Ilavelock complied ; but Dennie, whether with or without
orders is a mattcr in dispute, diverged to assail the
'patched up' fort. The outer defences were carried,
gallant old Dennie riding at the head of his men to
receive his death wound. In vain did the guns for which
Sale had sent batter a t the inner keep, and the General
abandoning the attempt to rcduce it, led on in person
the centre column. Meanwhile Havelock and Monteath
had been moving steadily forward, until halted by orders
when considcrably advanced. Haveloclc had to form
square once and again against the Afghan l~orsemen,
who, however, did not dare to charge home. The artillery
came to the front at the gallop, and poured shot and
shell into Akbar's mass. T h e three columns, now
abreast of each other, deployed into line, and moving
forward at the double in the teeth of the Afghan
musketry fire, s\vept thc enemy clean out of his position, capturing his artillery, firing his camp, and putting
him to utter rout. Akbar, by seven o'clock in the

April morning, had been signally beaten in the open
field by the troops he had boasted of blockading in the
fortress.
T h e garrison of Jellalabacl had thus wrought out its
own relief. Thenceforth it experienced neither annoyance nor scarcity. Pollock arrived a fortnight after the
dashing sally which had given the garrison deliverance,
and the head of his column was played into its camp
on the Jellalabad plain by the band of the 13th' to. the
significant tune ' O h , but ye've been lang o' com'ing.'
The magniloquent Ellenborough dubbed Sale's brigade
' the Illustrious Garrison,' and if the expression is overstrained, its conduct was without question eminently
creditable.

CHAPTER IX
IIETlZIBUTION A N D R E S C U E

1.r was little wonder that the unexpected tidings of the
Cabul outbreak, and the later shock of the catastrophe
in the passes, should have temporarily unnerved the
Governor - General. But Lord Auckland rallied his
energies with creditable promptitude. His successor
was on the voyage out, and in thc remnant of his term
that remained he could not do more than make dispositions which his successor might find of service. Every
soldier of the 'Army of Retribution ' was despatched to
the frontier during Lord Aucltland's rulc. Lord Auckland .appointed to thc comnland of the troops wllich he
was sending forward a quict, stcadfast, expcricnccd officcr
of the artillery arm, who had fought under Lalce at Deig
and Bhurtpore, and during his forty years of honest scrvice had soldiered steadily from the precipices of Nepaul
to the rice-swamps of thc Irrnwaddy. Polloclc was essentially the fitting man for the service that lay before him,
characterised as lie was by strong sense, shrewd sagacity,
calm firmness, and self-command. When his superior
devolved on him an undue onus of responsibility he was
to prove himself thoroughly equal to the occasion, and

the sedate, balanced man murmured not, but probably
was rather amusecl when he saw a maker of phrases
essaying to deck himself in his laurels. There were
many things in Lord Auckland's Indian career of which
it behoved him to repent, but it must go to his credit
that he gave I'ollocl< high command, and that he could
honestly proclaim, a s he made his preparations t o quit the
great possession whose future his policy had endangered,
that he had contributed toward the retrieval of the crisis
by promptly furthering 'such operations as might be required for-the maintenance of the honour and interests of
the British Government.'
Brigadier Wild reached Peshawur with a brigade of
-four sepoy rcgiments just before the new year. H e was
-.destitute of artillery, his sepoys were in poor heart, and
.the ,Sikh contingent was utterly untrustworthy. T o force
.the Khyber seemed hopeless. Wild, however, made the
attempt energetically enough. But the Sikhs 'mutinied,
xexp.clled their officers; and marched back to Peshawur;
Wi-Id's -sepoys, behaving badly, were driven back with
.loss from the mouth of the pass, and Wild himself was
.wounded. When Pollock reached Pesha\vur on February
6th). 1842, he found half of Wild's brigade sick in hospital,
a n d , t h e whole of it in a state of utter demoralisation.
.A second brigade commanded by Brigadier-Genel'al
.MiCaskill, had accompanied Pollock, the sepoys of which
promptly fell under thc evil influen'ce of Wild's c1is.pirited
and disaffected regiments. Pollock had to resist the pressi n g appeals for speedy relief made to him from Jelldabad,
ancl patiently to devote weeks and months to the restoration o f . the morale and discipline of the disheartened
,
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.sepoys of his command, and to the reinvigoration of their
physique. By lcindness combined with firmness he was
able gradually to inspire them with perfect trust and faith
in him, and when in the end of March there reached him
a third brigade, comprising British cavalry and horseartillery, ordered forward by Lord Aucicland on receipt
of tidings of the destruction of the Cabul force, he
felt himself at length justified in advancing with confidence.
Before daylight on the morning of April 5th I'olloclc's
army about Sooo strong, consisting of cight infantry
regiments, three cavalry corps, a troop and two batteries
of artillery, and a mountain train, marched from the
Jurnrood camping ground into the portals of the Khyber.
Pollock's scheme of operations was perfect in conception
and complete in detail. His main column, with strong
advance and rear-guards, was to pursue the usual road
through the pass. It was flanked on each side by a
chain of infantry detachments, whose assigned duty
was to crown the heights and swcep them clear of
assailants in advance of the head of the central column.
The Afreedi hillmen had blocked the throat of the
pass by a formidable barrier, behind which they were
gathered in force, waiting for the opportunity which was
never t o come to them. For the main body of Polloclc's
force serenely halted, while thc flanking columns, brealcing into skirmishing order, hurried in the grey dawn
along the slopes and heights, dislodging the Afreedi
pickets as they advanced, driving them bcfore them
with resolute impetuosity, and pushing forward so far
as to take in reverse with their concentrated fire the

grcat barrier and its defenders. The clansmen, recognising the frustration of their devices, dcserted the position in its rear, and rushed tumultuously away to crags
and sungahs where ltnife and jezail might still be plied.
T h e centre column then advanccd unmolested to the
deserted barricade, t h r o ~ ~ g which
h
the sappers soon
cleared a thoroughfare. T h e guns swept with shrapnel
the hill-sides in front, the flanking detachments pushed
steadily fi~rther and yet further forward, chasing and
slaying the fugitive hillmen ; and the Duke of Wellington's observation was that morning fully made good,
that ' h e had ~ieverheard that our troops were not equal,
as well in their personal activity as in their arms, to contend with and overcome a n y natives of hills whatever:'
T h c whole British force, in ils order of three columns,
the centre in the bed of thc hollow, the wings on the
flanking ridges, steadily if slowly moved on in the
assured consciousness of victory. I t was sunset before
the rear-guard was in camp under the reoccupied Ali
Musjid. T h c Sikh troops who were to keep open
Polloclis communicatio'ns with Peshawur movcd simultaneously on Ali Musjid by a more circuitous route.
While Pollock was halted opposite the throat of the
Khyber waiting for the demolition of the Afreedi barricade, t h e ill-starrcd Shah Soojah was being murdered, on
his way from the Balla Hissar of Cabul to revicw on
the Siah Sung slopes the reinforcements which Akbar
Khan was clamouring that he should lcacl down to aid
that Sirdar in reducing Jellalabad before relief should
arrive. Ever since the outbreak of November Shah
Soojah had led a dog's life. He had reigned in Cabul,

but he had not ruled. T h e Sirdars dunned him for
money, and jeered a t his protestations of poverty. I t is
not s.0 much a matter of surprise that he shoulcl have
been murdered as that, feeble, rich, and loathed, he should
-have been let live so long. . I t does not seem'worth while
to discuss the vexed question whether or not he was faithful to his British allies. H e was certainly eritit'led t o
argue that he owed US nothing, since what we did in regard to him was nakedly for our own purposes. Shah
Soojah's second son Futteh Jung had himself proclaimed
his father's successor. The vicissitudes of his short reign
need not be narrated. While Pollock was gathering his
brigades at Gundamuk in the beginning of the following
September, a forlorn Afghan, in dirty and tattered rags,
rode into his camp. This scarecrow was Futteh Jung, who,
unable to endure longer his sham kingship and the ominous
tyranny of Akbar Khan, had fled from Cabul in disg~iise
t o beg a refuge in the British camp.
Pollock's' march from Ali Musjid to Jellalabad wa.s
slow, but almost unmolested. He fouiid, in his own words,
'the fortress strong, the garrison healthy ; and escept fo;
wine and beer, better off than we are.' One principal object
of his commission had been accoinplished; he had relieved
the garrison of Jellalabad, and was in a position to ensure
its safe withdraival. But his commission gave him a con-'
sidcrable discretion, and a great company of his countrymen and countrywomen were still i n Afghan durance. T h c
calm pulsed, resolute commander had views'of his own as
t o his duty, and he determined in his patient, steadfast
way to tarry awhile on the Jellalabad plain, in the hope
that the course of events might play into his hands.
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Maclaren's brigade, which in the beginning of November I S ~ IGeneral Elphinstone had instructed General
Nett t o despatch with all speed to Cabul, rcturned to
Candahar early in December. Nott in despatching it had
deferred reluctantly to superior authority, and probably
Maclaren not son-y to have in the snowfall a pretext for
retracing his steps. A t t a Mahomed Khan, sent from
Cabul t o foment mischief in the Candahar regions, had
gathered to his banner a considerable force. Gencral
Nott quietly waited until the Sirdar, a t the head of some
10,000 men, came within five miles of Candahar, and then
he crushed him after twenty minutes' fighting. The
fugitives found refuge in the camp of the disaffectcd
Dooranee chiefs, whose leader Meerza Ahmed was sedulously trying to tamper with Nott's native troops, severe
weather hindering the General from attacking him. Near
the end of Fcbruary there reachcd Nott a letter two
months old from Elphinstone and Pottinger, ordering him
to evacuate Candahar and retire to India, in pursuance
of t h e convention into which they had entered. T h e
Dooranee chiefs astutely urged that Shah Soojah, no
longer supported by British bayonets, was now ruling in
Cabul, as an argument in favour of Nott's withdrawal.
Nott's answer was brief: ' I will not treat with any person
whatever for the retirement of the British troops from
Afghanistan, until I have received instructions from the
Supreme Government -a blunt sentence in curious contrast t o the missive which Salc and Macgregor laid before
the Jellalabad council of war. When prescntly there
came a communication from 'Government intimating that
the continued occupation of Candahar was regardcd as

Retribution and Rescue

<

1

141

conducive to the interest of the state, Nott and RaivIinson were in a position to congratulate themselves on
having anticipated the wishes of their superiors. The
situation, however, became so mcnacing that early in
March its Afghan inhabitants were expelled from the
city of Candahar to the last soul ; and then Nott, leaving
a garrison in the place, took the field in force. T h e old
soldier, wary as he was, became the victim of Meerza's
wily strategy. As he advanced, the Afghans rctired,
slcirmishing assiduously. Leaving Nolt in the Turnuk
valley, they doubled back on Candahar, and in the early
darltness of the night of the loth March they furiously
assailed the city gates. They fired one of the gates, and
the swarming ghazces tore down with fury its blazing
planks and the red-hot ironwork. The garrison behaved
valiantly. Inside thc burning gate thcy piled up a rampart of grain bags, on which they trained a couple of gulls
loaded \(rith case. For three hours after thc gate fell did
the fanatics hurl assault after assault on the interior
barricade. They were terribly critical hours, but the
garrison prevailed, and at midnight, with a loss of many
hundreds, the obstinate assailants sullenly drew OK Nott,
although urgently summoned, was unable to reach Candahar until the 12th.
Candahar was forlunatcly preservcd, b u t a t the end
of Marc11 the unpleasant tidings came that Gl~uznee,
which British valour had carried by slorrn three years
before, had now reverted into Afghan possession. Tllc
siege had lasted for nearly threc and a half months. In
mid-December the besiegers occupied the city in force,
introduced by the citizcns through a subterranean way ;

and thc garrison, consisting chicfly of a regiment of
sepoys, u~itl~clre~v
into the citadel. Thc bittcr wintcr and
the scant rations took the heart out of the nativcs of the
warm and fertile Indian plains; but nevertheless it was not
until March 6th that the garrison, under pledge of bcing
escorted t o Pcshawur with colours, arms, and baggage,
marched out. T h e unfortunates would have done bettcr
to have dicd a soldierly death, with arms in their hands
a n d the glow of fighting in their hearts. As the evcnt
was, faith- with them was brokcn, and save for a few
officers who were madc prisoners, most were slaughtered,
or perished in a vain attempt t o escape.
During his long isolation Nott's resources had been
scriously clcpleted, and hc had orclcred up from Scinde a
brigade, escorting much needecl treasurc, ammunition, and
medicines. Brigadier England was entrusted with the
co~nmancl of this force, whose assemblage at Quetta
mas cxpccted about t h e c n d of March. Pcnding its
gathering England had moved out toward the cntrancc
of the Kojulc Pass, where h e met with a sharp and
far from creditable repulse, and fell back on (21ietta
miserably disheartened, suggesting in his abjectness that:
N o t t should abandon Candahar and rctirc on him. The
stout old soldier a t Candahar waxed wroth at the limpness of his subordinate, and addressed to England a
biting letter, orclering peremptorily the latter's prompt
advance t o Candahar, engaging to dry-nursc him through
t h e Kojulc by a brigade sent down from Candahar for thc
purpose, and remarking sarcastically, ' I am wcll aware
that war cannot bc made without loss ; but yct perhaps
British troops can opposc Asiatic armies without defeat.'
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Thus exhorted England moved, to find his march
through the Kojuk protected by Wymcr's sepoys from
Candahar, who had crowned the latcral heights before
he venturcd into the pass; and he rcached Candahar without maltreatmcnl: on the 10th May, bringing t o Nott the
much needed supplies which renclcred that resolute man
equal to any enterprise.
I t remained, however, to be seen whether any enterprise was to be permitted to him and to his brother
commander lying in camp on the Jellalabad plain. Lord
Ellenborough, thc successor of Lord Auckland, had struck
a firm if somewhat inexplicit note in his earliest manifesto,
dated March 13th. A single scntence will indicate its
tenor : 'Whatever course we may hereafter take must
rcst solely on military considerations, and hence in thc
first instance regard to the safety of our detached
garrisons in Afghanistan ; to thc security of our troops
now in the ficld from unnecessary risks; and finally, to
the rc-cstablishmcnt of our military reputation by the
infliction upon the Afghans of some signal and dccisive
blow.' Those were brave \vords, if only they had bccn
adhered to. But six weeks later his lordship was ordcring Nott t o evacuate Candahar and fall back on Quetta,
until thc season should permit further retirement t o the
Indus ; and instructing I-'ollocl<,through thc Commandcrin-Chief, to withdraw without delay evcry British soldicr
from Jellalabad to I'eshawur, exccpt under certain
specified eventualities, none of which were in course of
occurrence. Pollocl< teinporisecl, holding on to his advanccd position by the plea of inability to retire for want
of transport, claiming mildly Lo find discretionary powers
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in the Government instructions, and cautiously arguing
in favour of an advance by a few marches to a rcgion
where bettcr climate was to be found, and whcnce h e
might bring to bear stronger pressure for thc liberation
of the prisoners. Nott was a narrower man than Pollock.
Whcn he got his orders he regarded thcm as strictly
binding, no lnattcr how unpalatable the injunctions. ' I
shall not lose a moment,' hc wrotc, 'in making arrangemcnts to carry out my orders, without turning to the
right or the left, and without inquiring into the reasons
for the measures enjoined, whatever our own opinions o r
wishes may bc.' He reluctantly began preparations for
withdrawal. Carriage was ordered up from Quctta, and
a brigade was dcspatchcd to withdraw the garrison of
IChelat-i-Ghilzai, and to dcstroy thc fort which Craigie
had so long and valiantly defended.
It would be tedious to dctail the vacillations, the
obscurities, and thc tortuosities of Lord Ellenborough's
successive communications to his two Gcnerals in Afghanistan. Pollock had bccn permitted to remain about Jellalabad until the autumn should bring cooler marching
weather. Nott had been detained at Candahar by the
necessity for crushing menacing bodies of tribal levies,
b u t as July waned his preparations for withdrawal were
all but complete. O n thc 4th of that month Lord
Ellcnborough wrote to him, reitcrating injunctions for
his withdrawal from Afghanistan, but permitting him the
alternatives of retiring by the direct route along his line
of communications over Quetta and Sukkur, or of boxing
the compass by the curiously circuitous 'retirement' via
Ghuznee, Cabul, and Jellalabad. Pollock, for his part,

was permitted, if he thought proper, to advance on Cabul
in order to facilitate Nott's n?ithclrawal, if the latter should
elect t o 'retreat' by the circuitous route which has just
been described.
One does not care to charactcrisc the 'heads I win,
tails you Iose' policy of a Governor-General who thus
shufflcd off his responsibility upon two soldiers who
previously had been sedulously rcstricted within narrow
if varying limits. Their relicf from thosc trammcls sct
them free, and it was their joy to acccpt thc devolvcd
responsibility, ancl to act with soldierly initiative and
vigour. T h e chief crcdit of the qualified yct substantial
triumph over official hcsitation certainly belongs to
Pollock, who gently yct firmly forced thc hand of the
Governor-Gencral, \vhile Nott's merit was limitcd to a
ready acceptance of the responsibility of a proffered
option. A letter from Nott intimating his determination
to retire by way of Cabul ancl Jellalabad reached Pollock
in the middle of August, who irnmcdiately advanccd from
Jellalabad ; and his troops having conccntratcd at Gundamuli, he marched from that position on 7th Scptcmbcr, his
second division, commanded by MiCaslcill, following next
clay. P0110~1iwas woefully short of transport, and thcrefore was compelled to leave some troops behind at
Gundamuk, and even then could carry only half the complement of tentage. I3ut his soldicrs, who carried in their
haversaclcs scven days' provisions, would gladly have
marched without any baggage at all, and thc chief himself was eager to hurry forward, for Nott had written that
he expected to reach Cabul on 15th September, and
Pollocl; was burning to be there first. I n the Jugdulluk
I<

Pass, on the Sth, he found the Ghilzais in considcrable
force on the heights. Regardless of a heavy artillcry fire
they stood their ground, and so galled Pollocl<'~troops
with sharp discharges from their jczails that it became
neccssary t o send infantry against them. They were dislodged from the mountain thcy had occupied by a portion of the Jellalabacl brigade, Icd by gdlant old General
Sale, who had his usual luck in the shape of a wound.
This Jugdullulz fighting was, however, little more than
a skirmish, and Pollock's people were to experience
more severe opposition before they should emerge from
the passes on to the Cabul plain. On the morning of the
13th the concet~trated force had quitted its camp in
the Tezcen valley, and had cornlnittcd itself without clue
precaution to the passage of the ravine bcyoncl, whcn
thc Afghan levies with which Akbar Khan had manned
thc flanking heights, opencd their fire. The Sirdar had
been dissuaded by Captain Troup, onc of his prisoners,
from attempting futilc ncgotiatio~~s,
and advised not to
squander lives in useless opposition. Akbar had replied
that he was too dceply committed to recede, and that his
people were bent on fighting. Thcy wcre not baullwd in
the aspiration, which assuredly their opponents shared
with at lcast cqual zeal. I'olloclc's advance-guard was
about the middle of the defilc, when the enemy were
suddenly discoverccl blocl<ing thc pass in front, and holding the heights which Po1locl~'s light troops should liave
crowned in advance of the column. Alcbar's force was
calculated to be about 15,ooo strong, and the Afghans
fought resolutely against the British regiments which
forced their way up t h c heights on the right and Icft.
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The ghazees cldshed down to nicet the red soldiers halfway, and up among the precipices there were many handto-hand encounters, in which the sword and the bayonet
fought out the issue. The Afghans made their last stand
on the rocky summit of the Huft Kotul ; but frorn this
commanding position they were finally driven by Broadfoot's bloodthirsty little Goorkhas, who, hillmcn theinselves from their birth, chased the Afghans from crag to
crag, using their fell l<ookcrics as they pursucd. It was
Alcbar I<han's last effort, and the quelling of it cost
Polloclc the trivial loss of tliirty-two Idled and 130
woundcd. Thcrc was no more opposition, and it was well
for the Afghans, for thc awfi~lspectacles presented in the
Khoord Cabul Pass traversed on the following day, kindled
in Pollock's soldiers a white heat of fhy. ' The bodies,'
wrotc Baclchouse in his unpublished diary, ' lay in heaps
of fifties and hundreds, our gun wheels crushing thc bones
of our late comrades at every yard for four or five miles ;
indeed, the wholc inarch frorn Gundamuk to Cabul may
be said to have been over the bodies of the massacrcd
army.' Polloclc inarched unmolested to Cabul on the
15th, and camped on the old racecourse to the east of
the city.
Nott, in evacuating Candahar, divided his force into
two portions, the weaker of which General England took
back to India by Quetta and S d i k ~ rwhile
,
on August
9th Nott himself, with two European battalions, the
'beautiful sepoy rcgilnents' of which he had a right to
be proud, and his field gui~s, marched away from
Candahar, his face sct towards Cabul. His march was
uneventful until about midway between Khelat-i-Ghilzai

and Gl~uznee,wiicn on the 28th the cavalry, unsupported
and badly handled in a stupid and unauthorised foray,
lost sevcrely in officcrs and men, took to flight in panic,
and so gave no little encouragement to the enemy hanging on Nott's flank. Two days later Shumshoodeen, the
Afghan lcader, drew up some ro,ooo men in order of battle
o n high ground left of the British camp. Nott attaclted
with vigour, advancing to turn the Afghan left. I n
reprisal the enemy threw thcir strength on his left, supporting their jezail fire with artillery, whereupon Nott
changed front t o the left, deployed, and then charged.
T h e Afghans did not wait for close quarters, and Nott
was no morc seriously molested. Reaching the vicinity of
Ghuznee on Scptcmbcr 5th, he clcarcd away the hordcs
hanging on the heights which encircle the placc. During the 11iglltthe Afghans evacuated Ghuznce. Soon aftcr
daylight the British flag was waving from thc citadel.
Having fulfilled Lord ~llenborough's'ridiculous order t o
carry away from the tomb of Sultan Mahmoud in the
environs of Ghuznee, the supposititious gatcs of Somoath,
a once famous I-Iindoo shrine in thc Rombay province of
Kattiawar, Nott inarched onward unmolested till within
a couple of marches of Cabul, when near Maidan he had
some stubborn fighting with an Afghan force which tricd
ineffectually t o block his way. On the 17th he marched
into camp four miles west of Cabul, whence he could discern, not with entire complacency, the British ensign
already flying from the Balla I-Tissar, for Pollock had won
t h e race t o Cabul by a couple of days.
For months there had bcen negotiations for the release
of the British prisoners whom Akbar Khan had kept in

durance ever since they came into his hands in the course
of thc disastrous retreat from Cabul in January, but they
had been unsuccessful, and now it was known that the
unfortunate company of officers, women, and children,
had been carried off westward into the hill country of
Bamian. Nott's officers, as thc Candahar column was
nearing Cabul, had more than once urged him to detach a
brigade in the direction of Bamian in the hope of effecting
a rescue of the prisoners, but he had steadily refused, leaning obstinately on thc absence from thc instructions sent
him by Government of any permission to engage in thc
cnterprise of attempting their release. H e was not less
brusque in the intimation of his declinature when Polloclc
gave him the opportunity to send a force in support of
Sir Richmond Shalcespear, whom, with a detachment of
I<uzzilbasl~horse, Pollock had already despatched on the
mission of attempting thc liberation of the prisoners.
The narrow old soldier arguccl cloggedly that Governmcnt
had thrown the prisoners overboard.' Why, thcn, should
he concern himself with their rcscuc? If his superior
officer should give him a firm order, of coursc he would
obey, but he would obcy under protcst. Pollock disdained
to impose so enviable a duty on a recalcitrant man, and
committed to Sale the honourable and welcome serviccall the morc welcome to that officer because his wife and
daughter were among the captives. At the head of his
Jellalabad brigade, he was to push forward by forced
marclles on the track of Shakespear and his horsemen.
The strange and bitter experiences of the captives,
from that miserable January Sabbath day on which thcy
passcd under the 'protection' of Akbar Khan until the
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mid-Scptember noon when Shalccspear galloped into
their midst, are recorded in full and interesting detail in
Lady Sale's journal, in Vincent Eyrc's C ~ ~ t h i l and
y , in
Colin Mackenzie's biography published undcr the title of
S t o r m n d Suitshhe of n Soklieu's Life. Here it is
possiblc only briefly t o summarisc thc chief incidents of
the captivity. The unanimous testimony of the released
prisoners was t o the effect that Akbar Khan, violent,
bloodyJ and passionate man though he was, behaved
toward thcm with kindness and a certain rude chivalry.
Thcy remained for nearly three months at Budiabad,
living in great squalor and discomfort, For the whole
party there were but fivc rooms, cach of which was
occupied by from five to ten officers and ladies, the few
solcliers and non-coinmissioncd officers, who wcre mostly
woundcd, being quartered in sheds and cellars. h'Iackenzic drily remarks that thc hardships of tllc common
lot, and the close intimacy of prison life, brought into
full relief good and evil qualities ; 'conventional polish
was a good deal rubbccl off and replaced by a plainness
of spcech quite: unheard of in good society.' Ladies and
gentlemen were necessitated to occupy the same room
during the night, but the men 'clearccl out' early in the
morning, leaving the ladies to themselves. The dirt and
vcrmin of their habitation werc abominably offensive to
people t o whom scrupulous cleanlincss was a second
nature. Rut the captives wcrc allowecl to take cxercise
within a limited range ; they had among them a few
boolcs, and an old newspaper occasionally came on to thcm
from Jellalabad, with which place a fitful correspondence
in cypher was surreptitiously maintained. They had a few

packs of playing cards ; they made for themselves backgammon and draught-boards, and when in good spirits they
sometimes played hopscotch and blindman's -buff with
the children of the party, T h e Sundays were always
lcept scrupulously, Lawrence and Maclienzie conducting
the service in turn.
Thc earthqualie which shook down thc fortifications of
Jellalabad brought their rickety fort about the ears of the
captives. Several escaped narrowly with their livcs when
walls and roofs yawned and crumbled, and all had to
turn out and slecp in the courtyard, whcre they suffered
from cold and saturating dews. After the defeat of
Akbar b y thc Jellalabad garrison on April 7th) therc
was keen expectation that Sale would march to their
rescue, but he came not, and there were rumours among
the guards of their impcnding massacre in revenge for
the crushing reverse Alcbar had experienced. Presently,
however, Mahomed Shah Khan, Alibar's lieutenant,
arrivcd full of courtesy and 1-eassurance, but with thc
un\velcome intimation that the prisoners must prepare
themselves to leave Budiabad at once, and move to a
greater distance from Jellalabad and thcir friends. For
some preparation was not a difficult taslc. 'All my
worldly goods,' wrote Captain Johnson, ' might be stowed
away in a towel.' Othcrs who possessed heavicr impedimenta, were lighter~edof the encumbrance by the Gllilzai
Sirdar, who plundered indiscriminately. The European
soldiers werc left behind at Budiabad, and the band of
ladics and gentlemen started on the aftcrnoon of April
~ o t h ,in utter ignorance of their destination, under the
escort of a strong band of Afghans. At thc ford across

thc Cabul rivcr the cavalcade found Alibar Khan wounded,
haggard, and dejected, seated in a palanquin, which, weak
as h c was, he gave up t o Ladies Macnaghten and Sale,
who wcre ill. A couple of days were spent at Tczcen
among the melancholy relics of the January slaughter,
whence most of the party were carricd several milcs
further into the southern mountains to the village of
Zandeh, while General Elphinstone, whose end was fast
approaching, remained in the Tezecn vallcy with Pottinger, Maclcenzie, Eyre, and onc .or two others. On the
evening of April z3d the poor General was finally released
from suffering of mind and body. Akbar, who when too
late had offered t o frec him, scnt thc body down to
Jellalabacl under a g ~ ~ a r c and
l,
accompanied by Moore
the Gcncral's soldier servant ; and Elphinstone lies with
Colonel Dcnnic and the dead of the dcfencc of Jellalabad in thcir nameless graves in a waste place within the
walls of that place. Toward the end of May the captives
were moved up the passes to thc vicinity of Cabul, where
Akbar Khan was now gradually attaining the ascendant.
Prince Futteh Jung, howevcr, still lleld out in the Bnlla
Hissar, and intcrmittcnt firing was heard as the weary
cout'2ge of prisoners reached a fort about three milcs short
of Cabul, which the ladies of the proprietor's zenana had
evacuated in their favour. Hcre they lived if not in contentment a t lcast in considerable comfort and amenity.
T h e y had the privacy of a delightful garden, and enjoyed
the freedom of bathing in the adjacent river. After the
strife between Alibar Khan and Futteh Jung ceascd
they werc evcn permitted to exchange visits with their
countrymen, the hostages quartered on the Balla Hissar.

They were able to obtain money from the Cabul usurers,
and thus to supply themselves with suitable clothing and
additions to their rations, and their mails from India and
Jellalabad were forwarded to them without hindrance.
The summer months were passed in captivity, but it was
no longer for them a captivity of squalor and wretchedness. Life was a good deal bclter worth living in the
pleasant garden house on the bank of the Logur than it
had bcen in the noisomc squalor of Budiabad and the
vermin-infested huddlernent of Zandeh. But they still
lived under thc long strain of anxiety arid apprehension,
for none of them knew what thc morrow might bring
forth. While rcsicling in the pleasant quarters in the
Logur valley the captives of the passes werc joined by
nine officers, who were the captives of Ghuznee. After
the capitulation the latter had bccn treated with clue1
harshness, shut up in one small room, and debarred from
fresh air and exercise. Coloriel Pallner, indeed, had
undergone the barbarity of torture in thc cncleavour to
forcc him to disclose the whereabouts of treasure which
he was suspected of having buried.
Alcbar had full and timely intimation of thc mutual
intention of the B~itishgenerals at Jellalabad and Candahar to march on Cabul, and did not fail to recognise
of what value to him in extremity might be his continued
possession of the prisoners. They had been warned of
their probable deportation to the remote and rugged
Bamian; and the oil some journey thither was begun on
the evcning of August 25th. A couple of ailing families
alone, with a surgeon in charge of them, were allonred to
remain behind; all the others, hale and sick, had t o travel,
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the former on horseback, the latter carried in camel
panniers. The escort consisted of an irregular regiment
of Afghan infantry commanded by one Saleh Mahomed
Khan, who when a subadar serving in one of the Shah's
Afghan regiments llad deserted to Dost Mahorned. The
wayfarers, female as wcll as male, wore the Afghan
costume, in order that they might attract as little notice
as possible.
Bamian was reached on September 3d, where the
wretchedness of the quarters contrasted vividly with the
amenity of those left behind on the Cabul plain. But
the wretchedness of Bamian was not to be long endured.
A n intimacy had been struck up between Captain ~ b h n son and Saleh Mahomed, and the latter cautiously hinted
that a reward and a pension might induce him to carry
his charges into the British camp. On September I ~ t h
there was a private rnccting between the Afghan commandant and three British officers, Pottinger, Johnson,
and Lawrence. Saleh Mahomcd intimated the receipt of
instructions from the Sirdar to carry the prisoners over
the Hindoo Koosh into Khooloom, and leave them there
to seeming hopeless captivity. But on the other hand a
messenger had reached Saleh from Mohun La1 with the
assurance that General Pollock, if he restored the
prisoners, would ensure him a reward of 20,000 rupees,
and a life pension of 12,000 rupees a year. Saleh
Mahomed demanded and received a guarantee from the
British officers ; and the captives bound themselves to
make good from their own resources their redemption
money. T h e Afghan ex-Subadar proved himself honest ;
the captives mere captives no longer, and they proceeded

to assert themselves in the masterful British manner.
They hoisted the national flag ; Pottinger became oncc
again the high-handed 'political,' and ordered the local
chiefs to come to his durbar and receive dresses of
honour. Their fort was put into a statc of defence, and
a store of provisions was gathered in case of a siege. But
in mid-September came the tidings that Altbar had been
'defeated a t Tezeen, and had fled no one knew whither,
whereupon the self-emancipated party set out on thc
march to Cabul. A t noon of the 17th they passed into
the safc guardianship of Shakespear and his horscrnen.
Three days later, within a march of Cabul, there was
reached the column which Sale had taken out, and on
September 21st Polloclt grceted the company of men and
women whose rescue had been wrought out by his cool,
strong stcadfastness.
Little more remains to be told. There was an
Afghan forcc still in arms a t Istalif, a beautiful village
of the inveterately hostile Kohistanecs; a division
marched to attack it, carricd the placc by assault, burnt
part of it, and scvcrely smote the garrison. Utter destruction was the fatc of Chariltar, thc capital of the
Kohistan, whcre Cod rington's Goorkha regiment had
been destroyed. Pollock determined to set a mark '
on Cabul to cornmeinorate the retribution which the
British had exacted. H c spared the Balla Hissar, and
abstained from laying the city in ruins, contenting
himself with the destruction of the principal bazaar,
through which the heads of Macnaghten and Burnes
had been paraded, and in which their mangled bodies
had bcen exposed. Prince Futteh Jung, tired of his

vicissitudes in the character of an Afghan monarch,
cedcd what of a throne he possessed to another puppet
of his race, and gladly accompanied thc British armies
to India. Other waifs of the wreck of a nefarious and
disastrous enterprise, among them old Zemaun Khan,
who had been our friend throughout, and the family of
the ill-fated Shah Soojah, were well content to return to
the exile whic11 afforded safcty and quietude. There also
accompanied the march of the humane Polloclc a grcat
number of the mutilated and crippled camp followers of
Elphinstone's army who had escaped with their lives
from its destruction. On the 12th of October the forces
of Pollock and of Nott turned their backs on Cabul,
which no British army was again to see for nearly forty
years, and set out on their march clown the passes.
Jellalabad and Ali Musjid wcre partially destroyed in
passing. Pollock's division reachccl Peshawur without
loss, thanks to the precautions of its chief; but with
M'Caslcill and Nott the indomitable Afghans had the
last worcl, cutting off their stragglers, capturing their
baggage, and in the final skirmish killing and wounding some sixty men of Nott's command.
Of the bombastic and grotesque p a n s of triumph
emitted by Lord Ellenborough, whose head had bcen
turncd by a success to which he had but scantly contributed, nothing need now be said, nor of the garish
pageant with which hc received the armies as they reentered British territory a t Ferozepore. As they passed
down through thc Punjaub, Dost Mahorned passed up
on his way to reoccupy the position from which he hacl
been driven. And so ended thc first Afghan war, a

period of history in which no redeeming features are
perceptible except the defence of Jellalabad, the dogged
firmness of Nott, and Pollock's noble and successful
constancy of purpose. Beyond this effulgence thcre
sprcads a sombre welter of misrepresentation and
unscrupuIousness, in trigue, moral deterioration, and cl ishonour unspeakable.
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T H E SECOND AFGHAN WAR

CI-IAPTER I
'SIlE FIRST CAMPAIGN

A BRIEF period of peace intervencd between the ratification o f the treaty of Gundamulc on May 30th' 1879, and
the renewal of hostilities consequent on the massacre at
Cabul of Sir Louis Cavagnari and the whole e&urclge of
the mission of which he mas the head. There was nothing identical or even similar in the motives of the two
campaigns, and regarded purely on principle they might
be regarded as two distinct wars, rather than as successive
campaigns of one and the same nrac But the interval
between them was so short that the ink of the signatures to the treaty of Gundamulc may be said to have
been scarcely dry when the murder of the British Envoy
tore t h a t docuinent into bloody shreds; and it seems the
simplest and most conveiiient method to designate the two
years of hostilities from November 1878 to Scptcmber
1880, as the ' second Afghan war,' notwithstanding the
three months' interval of peace in the summer of 1879.
L
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Dost Mahomcd died in 1863, and aftcr a long struggle
his son Shere Ali possessed hirnsclf of the throne bequeathcd to him by his fathcr. Thc relations between
Shcre Ali and the successive Viceroys of India were
friendly, although not close. Thc consistent aim of the
British policy was to maintain Afghanistan in the position
of a strong, friendly, and independent statc, prepared in
certain contingencies to co-opcrate in lceeping a t a distance foreign intrigue or aggression ; and while this objcct
was promoted by donations of money and arms, to abstain
from interference in the internal affairs of the country,
while according a fricndly rccognition to thc successive
occupants of its throne, without undertaking indefinite
liabilities in their interest. T h e aim, in a word, was to
utilisc Afghanistan as a ' buffcr ' state between the northwestern frontier of British India and Russian advances
from the direction of Central Asia. Shere Ali was nevcr
a very comfortable ally; he was of a saturnine and suspicious nature, and he seems also to have had an overweening sense of the value of the position of Afghanistan, interposed between two great powers profoundly jealous one
of the other. He did not succeed with Lord Northbroolc
in an attempt to work on that Viceroy by playing off the
bogey of Russian aggression ; and as the consequence of
this failure h e allowed himself to display marked evidences
of disaffected feeling. Cognisance was talcen of this ' attitude of extreme reserve,' and early in 1876 Lord Lytton
arrived in India charged with instructions to break away
from the policy designated as that of ' rnastcrly inactivity,'
and t o initiate a new basis of relations with Afghanistan
and its Ameer.

Lord Lytton's instructions directed him to despatch
without delay a mission to Cabul, whose errand would be to
require of the Ameer the acceptance of a permancnt Kesident and free access to the frontier positions of Afghanistan on the part of British officers, who should have opportunity of conferring with the Ameer on matters of common
interest with 'becoming attention to their friendly
councils.' Those wcse demands notoriously obnoxious
to the Afghan ~nonarchand the Afghan people. Compliance with thcm involved sacrifice of indcpenclencc, and
the Afghan loathing of Feringhec officials in their midst
had been ficrcely evinccd in the long bloody struggle and
awful catastrophe recorded in earlier pagcs of this volume.
Probably the Ameer, had he desired, would not havc
dared to concede such demands on any terms, no matter
how full of advantage. But thc terms which Lord Lytton
was instructed to tender as an equivalent were strangely
meagre. The A w e r was to receive a money gift, and
a precarious stipend regarding which the new Viceroy was
to 'deem it inconvenient to commit his government to
any permanent pecuniary obligation.' The desiderated
recognition of Abdoolah Jan as Shere Ali's successor was
promised with the qualifying reservation that thc promise
'did not imply or necessitate any intervcntion in the
internal affairs of the state.' The guarantee against
foreign aggression was vague and indefinite, and the
Government of India reserved to itself entire ' freedom of
judgment as to the character of circumstances involving
thc obligation of material support.'
T h e Ameer replied to the notice that a mission was
about to proceed to Cabul by a courteous declinature to
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receive an Envoy, assigning several specious reasons.
H e was quite satisfied with the existing friendly relations,
and desircd no changc in t h c m ; he could not guarantee
the safety of the Envoy and his peoplc ; if he admitted a
British mission, he would havc no cxcuse for rcfusing to
rcceivc a Russian one. A n intimation was conveyed to
the Ameer that if he should persist in his refusal to receive
thc mission, the Viccroy would have no other alternative
than t o regard Afghanistan as a statc which had ' voluntarily isolated itself from the alliance and support of the
British Government.' T h e A ~ n c e r arrangcd that the
Vakeel of the Indian Government should visit Sirnla,
carrying with him full explanations, and charged to lay
before the Viceroy sundry gricvanccs which were distressing Shere Ali. T h a t functionary took back to Cabul
certain minor concessio~ls,but conveyed the message also
that those concessions were contingent on the AmeerJs
acceptance of British officers about his frontiers, and
that it would be of no avail to send an Envoy to the
conference a t Peshawur for which sanction was given,
unless he wcre commissioned t o agree to this condition as
the funclarnental basis of a treaty. Before the Valceel
quitted Sirnla he had to listen t o a truculent address from
Lord Lytton, in the course of which Shere Ali's position
was genially lilcened t o that of ' a n earthen pipkin
between two iron pots.' Before Sir Lewis Pelly and thc
Ameer's representative met a t Peshawur in January 1577,
Shere Ali had not unnaturally been perturbed by the
pcrrnanent occupation of Quetta, on the southern vergc of
his dominions, as indicating, along with other military
dispositions, an intended invasion. The Peshawur con-

t

ference, which from the first had little promise, dragged
on unsatisfactorily until terminated by thc dcath of the
Amcer's representative, whereupori Sir Lewis Pelly was
recalled b y Lord Lytton, notwithstanding the latter's
cognisance that Shere Ali was despatching to Pesbawur
a fresh Envoy authorised to assent to all the British demands. T h e justification advanced by Lord Lytton for
this procedure was the discovery purported t o have been
m a d e b y Sir Lewis Pelly that the Ameer was intriguing
with General Icaufmann a t Tashlcend. Since Shere Ali
ivas a n independent monarch, it was no crime on his part
to c n t e r into negotiations with another power than Great
Britain, although if the worried and distracted man did so
the c h a r g e of folly may be laid to him, since the Russians
were pretty certain to betray him after having made a
cat's-paw of him, and since in applying to them he involved himself in the risk of hostile action on the part of
the British. The wisdom of Lord Lytton's conduct is not
apparent. T h e truculent policy of ivliich he ivas the
instrument was admittedly on tlic point of triumphing ;
and evcilts curiously falsified his short-sighted anticipation of the unlil~elihood, because of the Russo-Turkish
war t h e n impending, of any m@roche7went betwcen the
A m e c r and the Russian authorities in Central Asia. T h e
Viceroy withdrew his Valceel from Cabul, and in the
recognition of the Ameer's attitude of ' isolation and
scarcely veiled hostility ' Lord Salisbury authorised Lord
L y t t o n to protect the British frontier by such measures
as circumstances should render espedicnt, ' without regard
t o t h c wishes of the Ameer or the interests of his
dynasty.' Lord Lytton took no measures, cspeclient or

otherwise, in the direction indicated by Lord Salisbury ;
the Amccr, as if he had been a petted boy consigned
to the corner, was abandoned to his sullen ' isolation,' and
the Russians adroitly used him to involve us in a war
which lasted two years, cost us the lives of many valiant
men, caused us to incur an expenditure of many millions,
and left our relations with Afghanistan in all essential
respects in the sarnc condition as Lord Lytton found
them when he reached India with the ' new policy' in
his pocket.
I f thc Russians could executc as thoroughly as they
can plan skilfully, there jvould be hardly any limit to
their conquests. When England was rnobilising her
forces aftcr the treaty of San Stefano, and ordering into
the Mediterranean a division of sepoys drawn from the
three presidencies of her Indian Empire, Russia for her
part was concerting an important diversion in the clirection of the north-western fronticr of that great possession.
But for the opportune conclusion of the treaty of Berlin,
the question as to the ability of sepoy troops stiffened
by British regiments to cope with thc mixcd levies of
the Tzar might have been tried out on striclcen fields
between the OXLISand the Indus. When Gortschalcoff
returned from Berlin to S t Petersburg with his version of
' Peace with HonourJ-Ressarabia a n d Batoum thrown
in-Icauf~nann had to countermand the concentration of
troops that had been in progress on the northern frontier
of Afghanistan. But the Indian division was still much
in evidence in the Mecliterrancan, its tents now gleaming
on t h e brown slopes of Malta, now crowning the upland
of Larnaca and nestling among thc foliage of Icyrenea.

Kaufmatin astutely retorted on this demonstration by
despatching, not indeed an, expedition, but an embassy
to Cabul; and when Stolietoff, the gallant defender of
the Schipka Pass, rode into the Balla Hissar on August
Shere Ali received him with every token of
I ~ t h 1878,
,
cordiality and regard.
No other course was now open to Her Majesty's
Government than to insist on the reception a t Cabul of
a British mission. The gallant veteran officer Sir Ncville
Cl~amberlain,known to be held in regard by the Ameer,
was named as Envoy, and an emissary was sent to Cabul
in advance with information of the date fixed for the
setting out of the mission. Shere Ali was greatly perplexed, and begged for more time. ' I t is not proper,' he
protested, ' to use pressure in this way ; it will tend to a
complete rupture.' But Sir Neville Chamberlain was
satisfied that the Ameer was trifling with the Indian
Government; and he had certain information that the
Ameer, his Ministers, and thc Afghan outpost officers,
had stated plainly that, if necessary, the advance of the
mission would be arrested by force. This was what in
effect happened when on September z ~ sMajor
t
Cavagnari
rode forward to the Afghan post in the Khyber Pass.
The officer who courteously stopped him assured him
that he had orders to oppose by force the progress of
Sir Neville and his mission, so Cavagnari shook hands
with the Afghan major and rode hack to Peshawur.
T h e Viceroy sought permission to declare war immediately, notwithstanding his condition of unpreparedness ; but the Home Government directed him instead to
require in temperate language an apology and the accept-
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ance of a permanent mission, presenting at the salne time
the ultimatum that if a satisfactory reply should not be
received on or bcforc the 20th November hostilities nrould
immediately commence. Mcanwliile military prcparations were actively pushed forward. The scheme of
operations was as follows: three columns of invasion
were t o move simultaneousIy, one througl~the Khyber
l'ass t o Dakka, another through the Kuram valley, south
of the I<hyber, with the Peiwar Pass as its objective, and
a third from Quetta into the Pisheen valley, t o march
forward to Candahar after reinforcement by a division
from Mooltan. T o General S i r . Sam Browne was assigned the command of the Khyber column, consisting
of about ~ o , o o omen, with thirty guns; to General
Roberts the command of the Kuram valley column,
of about 5,500 men, with twenty - four guns ; and to
General Bicldulph t h e c o m ~ n a n dof the Quetta force,
numbering some 6000 men, with eighteen guns. When
General Donald Stewart should bring up from Mooltan
the division which was being concentrated there, he
was t o command the whole southern force moving on
Candahar.
T h e reserve division gathering at Hassan
Abdul and commanded by General Maude, would support t h c Khyber force ; another reserve division massing
a t Suklzur under General Primrose, would act in support of the Candahar force ; and a contingent contributed by the Silth Feudatory States and comlnancled
.by Colonel Watson, was to d o duty on the Kurum line of
communication. T h e Generals commanding columns
were t o act independently of each other, taking instructions direct from Army and Government headquarters.

No answer to the ultimatum was received from the
Aineer, and on the morning of Novembcr 21st Sir Sam
Browne crossed the Afghan frontier and moved up the
Khyber on Ali Musjid with his third and fourth brigades
and the guns. Overnight he had detached Macphcrson's
and Tytler's brigades with the commission to turn the
Ali Musjid position by a circuitous march, the former
charged to descend into the Khyber Pass in rear of the
fortress, and block the escape of its garrison; the latter
instructed to find, if possible, a position on the Rhotas
heights on the proper left of the fortress from which a
flank attack might be delivered. About noon Sir Sam
reached the Shagai ridge and came under a brisk fire
from the guns of Ali Musjid, to which his heavy cannon
and Manderson's horse-battery replied with good results.
The Afghan position, which was very strong, stretched
right athwart the valley from a n entrenched line on the
right to the Rhotas summit on the extreme lcft. T h e
artillery duel lasted about two hours, and then Sir Sam
determined to advance, on the expectation that the turning brigades had reached their respective objectives. H e
himself moved forward on the right upland ; on the opposite side of the Khyber stream Appleyard led the
advance of his brigade against the Afghan right. No
co-operation on the part of the turning brigades had made
itself maiiifest up till dusk; the right brigade had been
brought to a halt in face of a precipitous cliff crowned by
the enemy, and it was wisely judged that to press the
frontal attack further in the meantime would involve a
useless loss of life. Sir Sam therefore halted, and sent
word to Appleyarcl to stay for the night his further ad-

vance, merely holding the ridge which he had already
carried. But before this order reached him Appleyard
was sharply engaged with the enemy in their entrenched
position, and in the fighting which occured before the
retirement was effected two officers were killed, a third
wounded, and a good many casualties occurred among
the rank and file of the native detachments gallantly
assailing the Afghan entrenchments.
Early next morning offensive operations were about
to be resumed, when a young officer of the 9th Lancers
brought intelligence that the Afghan garrison had fled
under cover of night, whereupon the fort was promptly
occupied. T h c turning brigades had been delayed by
the difficult country encountered, but detachments from
both had reached K a t a Kustia in timc to capture several
llundrecl fugitives of the Ali Musjid garrison. The mass
of it, however-its total strength was about 4000 meneffected a retreat by the Peshbolalz track from the right
of thc entrenched position. Sir Sam Brownc's advance
to Dalzka was made without molestation, and on 20th
December h e encamped on the plain of Jellalabad, where
he remained throughout the winter, Maude's reserve
division keeping open his communications through the
Ichyber Pass. T h e hill tribes, true to their nature, gave
great annoyance b y their continual raids, and several
punitive expeditions were sent against them from time
to time, but seldom with decisive results. The tribesinen
for the most part carried off into the hills their moveable
effects, and the destruction of their petty forts apparently
gave them little concern. For the most part they maintained their irreconcilable attitude, hanging on the flanks

o f o u r detachments on their return march through the
l a t e r a l passes to their camps, and inflicting irritating if
n o t very severe losses. Occasionally they thought proper
t o make nominal submission with tongue in cheek,
breaking out again when opportunity or temptation
presented itself.
Detailed description of those raids
a n d counter-raids would be very tedious reading. It was
w h e n starting to co-operate in one of those necessary but
tantalising expeditions that a number of troopers of the
10th I-Iussars were drowned in a treacherous ford of
t h e Cabul river near Jellalabad.
General Roberts, to whom the conduct of operations
in t h e Kuram district had been entrusted, crossed the
frontier on November arst, and marched up the valley
w i t h great expedition. Thc inhabitants evinced friendlin e s s , bringing in live stock and provisions for sale.
R e a c h i n g I-Iabib Killa on the morning of the 28th, h e
received a report that the Afghan force which he knew
t o . b e opposed t o him had abandoned its guns on the
h i t h e r side of the 'Peiwar Kotul, and was retreating in
confusion over that summit. Roberts promptly pushed forw a r d in two columns. Building on the erroneous informat i o n that the enemy were in a hollow trying to withdraw
t h e i r guns-in reality they were already in their entrenched
positioi~on the summit of the Kotul-he ordered Cobbe's
( t h e left) column to turn the right of the supposed Afghan
position, and debar the enemy from the Kotul, while the
o t h e r column (Thelwall's) was ordered t o attack in front,
t h e object being t o have the enemy bctween two fires.
Cobbe's leading regiment near the village of Turrai found
i t s advance blocked by precipices, and a withdrawal was

ordered, the advantage having been attained of forcing
the.:enerny t o disclose the position which he was holding.
Further reconnaissa~~ces
proved that the Afghan line of
defence extended along the crest of a lofty and broken
mountainous range from the Spingawai summit on the
left t o the Peiwar Kotul on the right centre, the right
itself resting on commanding elevations a mile further
south. T h e position had a front in all of about four miles.
I t was afterwards ascertained to have been held by about
3500 regulars and a large number of tribal irregulars.
General Roberts' force numbered about 3100 men.
H i s scheme of opcrations he explained to his cornmanding officers on the evcring of December 1st. With
the bulk of the force he hi~nselfwas to malie a circuitous
night march by his right on the Spingawai Kotul, with
the object of turning that position and taking the main
Afghan position o n the Peiwar Kotul in reverse; while
Brigadier Cobbe, with whom wcre to remain the 8th
(Queen's) and 5th Punjaub Infantry regiments, a cavalry
regiment and six guns, was instructed to assail the
.cnernyls centre whcn the result of the flank attack on his
left should have made itself apparent.
T h e turning column, whose advance the General led
in person, consisted of the 29th N. I. (leading),. 5th
Goorlthas, and a mountain battery, all under Colonel
Gordon's command ; followxl by a wing of the 72d
Ilighlanders, zcl Punjaub Infantry, and 23d Pioneers,
with four guns on elephants, under Brigadier Tllelwall.
T h e arduous march began at ten P.M. Trending a t first
rearward t o the Peiwar village, the course followed was
then to the proper right, up the rugged and steep Spin-

g a w a i ravine. In the darl<ncss part of Thclwall's force
l o s t its way, and disappeared from lien. Furthcr on a
c o u p l e o f shots were fircd by disaffected Patl~ansin the
r a n k s o f t h e 29th N. I. That regimcut was promptly
d e p r i v c d of the lead, which was taken by thc Goorkha
regiment, a n d the column toiled on by a track described
by General Roberts as ' nothing but a mass of stones,
h e a p e d into ridges and furrowed into deep hollows by
the action of the water.' Day had not broken when the
h e a d of t h e column reachcd thc foot of the steep asccnt
to t h e Spingawai ltotul. T h e Goorlillas and the 72d
r u s h e d forward on the first stockaclc. I t was carricd
w i t h o u t a pause save to bayonet the defenders, and
stoclcade after stockade was swept over i n rapid and
brilliant succession. I n half-an-hour Gencral Roberts
w a s in f ~ ~possesion
ll
of the Spingawai defences, and the
A f g h a n left flank \vas not only turned but driven in.
C o b b c was ordered by signal to co-opcrate by pressing
o n his frontal attack ; and Roberts himself hurried forw a r d on his enterprise of rolling up the Afghan left and
s h a k i n g its centrc, Rut this provccl no easy t~sli. The
A f g l ~ a n smade a good defence, and gave ground rcluctantly. T h e y made a resolute stand on the further side
o f a narrow dcep-cut ravine, to dislodge them from which
effort after effort was ineffectually madc. The General
t h e n determined to desist from pressing this line of
attaclc, and to make a sccond turning movement by
urhich he hoped to reach the rear of the Afghan centre.
H e led t h e 7zd wing, thrce native rcgilnents, and ten
g u n s , in a direction which should enable him to thrcaten
t h e linc of the A f ~ h a nretreat, Brigadier Cobbc since
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morning had been steadily although slo\vly climbing toward the front of the Peiwar ICotul position, After an
artillery duel which lastcd for three hours the Afghan
fire was partially quelled ; Cobbe's infantry pushed on
and u p from ridge to ridge, and at length thcy reached
a crest within Soo yards of tlic guns on the I<otul,
whence their rifle fire compelled the Afghan gunncrs to
abandon thcir batterics.
Meanwhile RobertsJ second
turning movement \vas developing, and thc defcnders of
the Kotul placed b e t w e n two fires and their line of retreat compromised, began to wavcr. Brigadier Cobbe
had bccn wounded, but Colonel Drcw led forward his
gallant youngsters of thc Sth, ancl after toilsomc climbing
they cntercd the Afghan position, which its dcfcnclers
had just abandoned, leaving many dead, eighteen guns,
and a vast accu~nulation of storcs and ammunition.
Colonel 13. Gough pursued with his cavalry, and possessed himself of several more guns which the Afghans
had relinquished in their precipitate flight. The decisive
success of the Peiwar Kotul combat had not cost heavily ;
the British losses were twenty-one killed and seventytwo wounded.
His sick and wounded scnt back to Fort Icuram,
General Roberts advanced t o Ali Khel, and thence
made a reconnaissance forward to the S1iutargurclan
Pass, whose summit is distant from Cabul little mo1.c
than fifty miles. I t s height is great-upwards of I 1,200
feet-but
it was regarded as not presenting serious obstacles to the advance by this route of a forcc from thc
Kuram valley moving o n Cabul. A misfortune befell
the baggage guard on o n e of the marchcs in the trans-

,

Peiwczr region when Captains Goad and Powell lost thcir
lives in a tribal onslaught. T h e some\vhat chequered
experiences of General Robcrts in the Khost valley
need not be told in detail. After some fighting and
more marching he withdrew from that turbulent region
altogether, abjuring its pestilent tribesmen and all their
works. Thc Kuram force wintercd in excellent health
spite of the rigorous climate, and toward the end of
March 1879 its forward concentration about Ali Kheyl
was ordered, which was virtually accomplished beforc
the snow had melted from the passes in the latcr w e l t s
of April. Adequate transport had been got together
and supplics accumulated ; Colonel Watson's contingent
was occupying the posts along the valley; and General
Roberts was in full readiness promptly to obey the orders
to advance which he had been led to expect, and on
which his brother-general Sir Sam Browne had already
acted t o some extent.
T h e march on Candahar of the two divisions under
the command of General Stewart had the character, for
the most part, of a military promenade. T h e tramp
across the deserts of Northern Reloochistan was arducus;
the Bolan, the Gwaga, and the Kojult passes had to be
surmounted, and the distances which both Biddulph and
Stewart had to traverse were immensely in excess of
those covcrcd by either of the forces operating from the
north-wcstcrn fi-ontier line. But uneventful marches,
however long ancl toilsome, do not call for detailed
description. Stewart rcde into Candahar on January 8th,
1879, and the troops as thcy arrived encampcd on thc
adjacent plain. The Governor and most of his officials,
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together with the Afghan cavalry, had fled toward
Herat ; the Deputy-Governor reinainccl to hand over
the city to Gcneral Stewart. For commissariat reasons
one division under Stewart presently moved by the
Cabul road on Khelat-i-Ghilzai, which was found empty,
the Afghan garrison having evacuated it. Simultaneously with Stewart's departure from Candahar Bidclulph
marched out a column westwarcl toward the Helmund,
remaining in that region until thc third week in February.
On its return march to Candahar the rear-guard had a
sharp skirmish a t I<husl~k-i-Nalchud with Alizai tribesmen, of whom 163 were lcft dead on the field. Soon
after the return of Stewart and Bicldulph to Candahal;
ordcrs arrived that the former should retain in Candahar,
Quetta, and Pishin a strong division of all arms, sending
back to India the rcrnainder of his command under
Bidclulph-the march to be made by the previously unexplored Thal-Chotiali routc t o the eastward of the
Pisheen valley.
Before Sir Sam Browne moved forward from Jellalabad to Gundamuk he had been able to report to the
Viceroy the death of Shere Ali. That unfortunate man
had seen with despair the departure on December rot11
of the last Russian from Cabul-sure toliell that he need
hope for nothing from ICaufmann or the Tzar. His
chiefs unanimous that further resistance by him was
hopcless, he released his son Yalcoub Khan from his
long harsh imprisonment, constituted him Regent, and
then followed the Russian mission in the direction of
Tashltend. Kaufmann would not so much as allow him
to cross the frontier, and after a painful illness Shcrc

Ali died on February arst, 1879, near Ballch in northern
Afghanistan. H c was a man who deserved a better
fatc than that which befell him. His aspiration was
to maintain the independence of the kingdom which he
ruled with justice if also with masterfulness, and he
could not brook the degradation of subjection. But,
unfortunately for him, he was the 'earthen pipkin ' which
the ' iron p o t ' found inconvenient. Therc had been
plenty of manhood originally in his son and successor
Yakoub Khan, b ~ much
~ t of that attribute had witherecl
in him during the long cruel imprisonment to which he
had bcen subjcctcd by his frither. Shere Ali's dcath
made him nominal master of Afghanistan, but the
vigour of his youth-time no longcr characterised him.
H e reigned but did not rule, and how precarious was
his position was evidenced by the defcction of many
leading chiefs who came into the English camps and
were ready to make terms.
After thc flight of Shere Ali some corrcspondence
had passed between Yakoub Khan and Major Cavagnari,
but the former had not expressed any willingness for the
re-establishment of friendly rclations. In February of
his own accord he made ovcrtures for a reconciliation, and
soon after intimated the death of his father and his own
acccssion to the Afghan throne. Major Cavagnari, acting
on thc Viccroy's authorisation, wrote to the new sovereign
stating the terms on which the Anglo-Indian Government
was prcpared to cngage in negotiations for peace. Yakoub
temporiscd for some time, but influcnced by the growing
defection of the Sirdars from his cause, as well as by the
forward movements of the forccs commanded by Browne
$1

and Robcrts, he intimated his intention of visiting Gullclamuk in order to discuss matters in personal conference
with Major Cavagnari. A fortnight later he was on his
way down thc passcs.
Instructions had been givcn by the Viceroy that
Yakoub Khan should be received in the British camp
with all honour and clistinctio~~.When his approach mas
announced on May Sth, Cavagnari and a numbcr of
British officers rodc out to meet him ; whcn he reacllcd
the camp, a royal salute grected him, a guard of honour
prescntcd arms, alicl Sir Sam Browne and his staff gave
him a ceremonious welcome. Cavagnari had full powcrs
to represent his Govcrnmcnt in the pending negotiations,
as t o the terms of which lic had receivecl from the
Viceroy detailed instructions. Thc Amccr and his
Gcneral-in-Chicf, Daoud Shah, came to the conference
attired in Russian uniforms. Thc ncgotiations wcre
tedious, for the Ameer, his Minister, and his General
made dificulties with a somewhat elaborate stupidity,
but Cavagnari as a diplomatist possessed thc gift of
being at once patient and firm ; and at length on May
26th the treaty of peace was signed, and formally ratified
by the Viceroy four clays later. By the treaty of Gunclamulc Afghanistan was deprived for the timc of its
traditional charactcr of a 'buffer state,' ancl its Ameer
became virtually a feudatory of the British Crown. I-Ie
was no longer an independcnt princc; although his
titular rank ancl a nominal sovereignty remained to him,
his position under its articles was to be analagous t o that
of t h e mediatised princes of the German Empire. T h e
treaty vested in thc British Government the control of

the external relktions of Afghanistan. The Atneer consented to the residence of British Agents within his
don~inions, guaranteeing their safety and honourable
treatment, while the British Government undertoolc that
its rcprescntatives should not interfcre with the internal
administration of the country. T h e districts of Pisheen,
Kurmn, and Sibi were ceded to the British Government
along with the permanent control of the Khyber and
Michnai passes, and of the mountain tribcs inhabiting thc
vicinity of those passes ; all other Afghan territory in
British occupation was t o be restored. The obligations
t o which the treaty committed the British Government
were that it should support thc Ameer against foreign
aggression with arms, money, or troops at its discretion,
and that it should pay to him and his successor an annual
subsidy of L60,ooo. Commercial relations between India
and Afghanistan were to be protected and encouraged ;
a telegraph line between Cabul and the I h r a m was forthwith to be constructed ; and thc Amccr was to proclaim
an amnesty relieving all and sundry of his subjects from
punishment for services rendered to the British during
the war.
That the treaty of Gundamulc involved our Indian
Empire in serious responsibilities is obvious, and those
responsibilities were the more serious that they were
vague and indefinite, yet none the less binding on this
account. I t is probable that its provisions, if they had
remained in force, would have been found in the long run
injurious to the interests of Uritish India. For that realm
Afghanistan has the value that its ruggedness presents
exceptional obstacles to the march through it of hostile

armies having the Indian fronticr for thcir objective,
and this further and yet more important value that the
Afghans by nature are frank and impartial Ishmaelites,
thcir hands against all foreigners alike, no matter of what
nationality. If this character be impaircd, what virtue
thc Afghan has in our cycs is lost. I n his implacable
passion for inclepenclctice, in his fierce intolerance of the
Feringhee intruder, he fulfils in relation to our Indian
frontier a kindred ofice to that served by abattis, che7~~m.r
dt. fvisc, ancl wire entanglements i n front of a military
position. The short-livcd treaty, for which the sanguine
h h Stanhopc claimed that it had gained for England ' a
friendly, an indcpenclent, and a strong Afighanistan,' may
now bc chicfly rcmembcred bccause of thc circumstnncc
that it e w e effect for the moment to Lord Uexonsfield's
' scientihc fronticr.'
Tlic \vitliclra\val of the two nortliern forces to positions \vithin the new frontier began immediately on the
ratification of the treaty of Gundamuk, the evacuation of
Candahar being postponed for sanitary reasons until
autumn. The march of Sir Sam Bro\vncJs force from
the breezy upland of Gundamulc clown the passes to
Peshawur, made as it was in the fierce heat of miclsummer through a region of bad nanic for insalubrity,
and pervacled also by virulent cholera, was a ghastly
journey. That ~nelaricholy pilgrimage, every lialtingplace in whose course \\!as marlced by graves, and from
which the living emerged 'gaunt and haggard, marching
with a listless air, their clothing stiff with dried perspiration, their faces thick with a mud of dust ancl sweat
through which their red bloodshot eyes looked forth,

many surering from heat prostration,' dwells in the
memory of British India as thc 'death march,' and its
horrors have been recounted in vivid and pathetic words
by Surgeon-Major Evatt, one of the few medical officers
whom, participating in it, it did not kill.

CHAPTER I1
T I I E O P E N I N G OF T H E SECOND CAMPAIGN

T I ~ Rwcre
E many who mistrusted the stability of the
treaty of Gundamulc. Perhaps in his heart Sir Louis
Cavagnari may have had his misgivings, for he was gifted
with shrewd insight, and no man knew the Afghan nature
better; but outwardly, in his quiet, resolute manner, he
professed the fullest confidence. Cavagnari was a remarkable man. Italian and Irish blood commingled in his
veins. Both strains carry thc attributes of vivacity and
restlessness, but Cnvagnari to the superficial observer
appcared as phlegmatic as hc was habitually taciturn.
This sententious imperturbability was only on the surface ;
whether it was a natural characteristic or an acquired
manner is not easy to dccide. Below the surface of
mcasured rcticent composure t h e lay a tcmperament of
ardent enthusiasm, and not less ardent ambition. In
subtlety hc was a match for tlie wiliest Oriental, whom
face to face he dominated with a placid daimtless masterfulness that was all his own. The wild hill tribes among
whoin lic went about escortless, carrying his life continually in his hand, recognised the complex strength of his
personal sway, and fcared a t once and loved tlie quiet,
firm man, the flash of whose eye was sometimes ominous,

but who could cow the fiercest hill~nanwithout losing a
tittle of his cool composure.
Cavagnari had negotiated the treaty of Gundamuk,
the real importance of which consisted in the Afghan
acceptancc of a British Resident at Cabul. The honour,
thc duty, and thc clangcr naturally fell to him of being
the first occupant of a post crcated mainly by his own
mingled tact and strength. Many of his friends rcgarded
him in the light of the leadcr of a forlorn hope, and
probably Cavngnari recognised with perfect cleasness the
risks which encompassed his embassy ; but apart from
mayhap a little added gravity in his leave-takings when
he quitted Simla, he gave no sign. I t was not a very
imposing mission a t whose head he rode into the
Balla Hissar of Cabul on July 24t11, 1579. I-Iis companions were his secretary, Mr William Jenkins, a young
Scotsman of the Punjaub Civil Scrvice, Dr Ambrose
I<elly, thc mcdical oficer of thc embassy, and the gallant, stal\vart young Lieutenant W. R.P. Hamilton, V.C.,
commanding the modest escort of ceventy-five soldiers of
the Guides. I t mas held that an escort so scanty was
sufficient, since the Ameer had pleclgcd himself personally for the safety and protection of the mission. The
Envoy was received with high honour, and conducted to
thc roomy quarters in the Balla I-Iissar which had becn
prepared as the Residency, within easy distance of thc
Arneer's palace. Unquestionably the mission was wclcome neither to the Afghan rulcr nor to the people, but
Cavagnari, writing to the Viceroy, made the best of things.
The arrival at the adjacent Sherpur cantonments of thc
I-icrat regiments in the beginning of August was cxtre~nely
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unfortunate for thc mission. Those troops had been inspired by their commander Ayoub Khan with intense
hatred to the English, and they marched through the
Cabul streets shouting objurgations against the British
Envoy, and picking quarrels with the soldiers of his
escort. A pensioned sepoy who had learned that the
Afghan troops had been ordered to abuse the Eltchi,
warned Cavagnari of the danger signals. Cavagnari's
calm remark was, ' Dogs that bark don't bite.' T h e old
soldier earnestly urged, ' But these dogs do bite, and
therc is danger.' 'Well,' said Cavagnari, ' they can only
kill the handful of us here, and our death will be
avenged.' T h e days passed, and it seemed that Cavagnari's diagnosis of the situation was the accurate one.
T h e last words of his last message to the Viceroy, despatched o n September zd, were 'All well.' The writer
of those words was a dead man, and his mission had
perished with him, almost as soon as the chcerful
message borne along the telegraph wires reached its
destination.
I n the morning of September gcl some Afghan regiments paraded without a r m in thc Ualla Hissar to
receive their pay. An instalrnent was paid, but the
soldiers clanloured for arrears due. Thc demand was
ref~ised,a riot began, and thc shout rose that the British
Eltchi might prove a free-handed paymaster. There was
a rush toward the Residency, and while some of the
Afghan soldiers resortcd to stone-throwing, others ran
for arms to thcir quarters, and lootcd the Arsenal in the
upper Ralla I-Iissar. T h c Residency gates had been
closed on the first alarm, and firc was promptly opencd

on the rabble. The place was never intended for defcnce,
commanded as it was at close range from the highcr level
of the Arsenal, whence a heavy continuous firc was from
the first poured down. The mob of the city in their
thousands hurried to co-operate with the mutinied
soldiers and share in the spoils of the sack, so that the
Residency was soon besieged. As soon as thc outbreak
manifested itself Cavagnari had sent a mcssage to the
Amecr, and the communication admittedly rcached the
latter's hands. H e had more than zoo0 troops in
thc Balla Hissar, still at least nominally loyal ; he had
guaranteed tlle protection of the mission, and it bchoved
him to do what in him lay to fulfil his pledge. But thc
Ameer sat supine in his palace, doing no more than send
his General-in-Chief Daoud Shah to remonstrate with
the insurgents. Daoud Shah went on the errand, but
it is questionable whether he showed any cncrgy, or
indced dcsired that the besiegers should desist. I t was
claimed by and for him that he was maltreated and
indeed wounded by the mob, and it appcars that he clid
ride into the throng and was forcibly dismounted. I-Ic
might perhaps have exerted hin~selfwith grcatcr determination if he had received morc specific orders from his
master the Amcer. That fceble or treacherous prince
ncver stirred. To the frequent urgent mcssages sent him
by Lieutenant Hamilton, hc replied vaguely : ' As God
wills ; I am malting preparations.' Meanwhile the little
garrison maintained with gallant staunchness hour aftcr
hour the all but hopeless defence. 'While the fighting
was going on,' rcported the pensioner who had previously
lllarned Cavagnari, ' 1 myself saw the four Europcan
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officers charge out a t the head of some twenty-five of the
garrison ; they drovc away a party holding somc broken
ground. When chased, the Afghan soldicrs ran like
sheep before a wolf. Later, anothcr sally mas made by
a detachment, with but three officcrs a t thcir head.
Cavagnari was not with them this time, A third sally
was made with only two officers leading, Hamilton and
Jenkins ; and the last of thc sallics was made by a Silcl~
Jcmadar bravely leading. No more sallics were made
after this.' About noon the gates wcre forced, and the
Residency building was fired ; but the defenders long
maintained their position on the roof and in a detached
building. A t length thc fire did its work, the \valls and
roof fcll in, and soon the fcll deed was consummated by
the slaughter of the last survivors of the ill-fated garrison.
Hamilton was said to have died sword in hand in a final
desperate charge. Tidings of t h e illassacrc were carried
with grcat speed to Massy's outposts in the Kurain
valley. The news reached Simla by telegraph carly on
the morning of the 5th. The authorities there rallied
from the shock with fine purposeful promptitude, and
within a few hours a telcgram was on its way to Gcneral
Massy's headquarters at Ali Khcl instructing him to
occupy the crest of the Shutargurdan Pass with two
infantry regiments and a mountain battery, which force
was t o entrench itself thcre and await orders.
T h e policy of which Lord Lytton was thc fig~~rehead
had comc down with a bloody crash, and the ' ~ n a s t e r l ~
inactivity' of wise John Lawrence stood vindicated in
the eycs of Europe and of Asia. But if his policy had
gone to water, the Viccroy, althougl~ he was soon to

default from the constancy of his purpose, saw for thc
present clear before him the duty that now in its stead
lay upon him of inflicting summary punishment on a
people who had ruthlessly violated the sacred immunity
from harm that shields alike among civilised and barbarous communities the person and suitc of an ambassador accepted under the provisions of a deliberate
treaty. Burncs and Macnagl~ten had met their fate
because they had gone t o Cabul the supporters of a
detested intruder and the unwelcome representatives of
a hated power. But Cavagnari had becn slaughtered
notwithstanding that he dwelt in the Balla Hissar Residency in virtue of a solemn treaty between the Empress
of India and the Amrer of Afghanistan, notwithstanding
that the latter had guaranteed him safety and protection,
notwithstanding that Britain and Afghanistan had ratified
a pledge of mutual friendship and reciprocal good offices.
Lord Lytton recognised, a t least for thc moment, that
no consideration of present cxpeclicncy or of ulterior
policy could intervene to deter him from the urgent
impcrativc duty which now suddenly confronted him.
The task, it was true, was besct with difficulties and
dangcrs. Thc forces on the north-western frontier had
been reduced to a peace footing, and the transport for
economical reasons had been severely cut down. T h c
bitter Afghan winter season was approaching, during
which military opcrations could be conducted only under
cstremely arduous conditions, and whcn thc line of
communications would be liable to serious interruptions.
The available troops for a prompt offensive did not
amount to more than 6500 inen all told, and it was

apparent that many circumstances might postpone their
reinforcement.
When men are in earnest, difficulties and dangers are
recognised only t o be coped wit11 and overcome. Whcn
the Simla council of war broke up on the afternoon of
September 5th the plan of campaign had been settled,
and the leader of the enterprise had been choscn. Sir
Frederick Roberts was already deservedly esteemed one
of the most brilliant soldiers of the British army. He
had fought with distinction all through the Great Mutiny,
earning the Victoria Cross and rapid promotion ; he had
served in the Abyssinian campaign of 1865, and bcen
chosen by Napier to carry home his final despatches ;
and h e had worthily shared in the toil, fighting, and
hon6urs of the Umbeyla and Looshai expeditions. In
his command of the Kuram field force during the winter
of 1875-gh e had proved himself a skilful, resolute, and
vigorous leader. Tllc officers and men who servcd under
him believed in him entl~usiastically, and, what wit11
soldicrs is the convincing assurance of whole-souled confidence, they had bestowed on him an affectionate nickname-they lmew him among themselves as ' little Bobs.'
His administrative capacity he had proved in the post of
Quarter~naster-General in India. Ripe in esperience of
war, Roberts a t the age of forty-seven was i n the full
vigour of manhood, alert in mind, and of tough and enduring physique. H e was a very junior Major-General,
but even among his seniors the conviction was general
that Lord Lytton the Viceroy, and Sir I;. Ilaines the
Commander-in-Chief, acted wisely in entrusting to him
the most activc command in the impending campaign.

Our rctcntion of the Kuram vallcy was to prove very
usefill in the emergency which had sucldenly occurrccl.
Its occupation enabled Massy to seize and hold the
Shutargurdan, and the force in thc valley was to constitutc the nucleus of thc little army of invasion and
retribution to the comlnand of which Sir Frederick
Roberts was appointed. The a p e s a t thc Shutargurdan
of the salient anglc into Afghanistan which our possession of the Kuram valley furnished was within little morc
than fifty miles of Cabul, whcreas thc clistancc of that
city from Lundi Kotul, our advanced position a t the
hcad of the Khyber Pass, was about 140 miles, and the
route exceptionally difficult. Iiobcrts' column of invasion was to consist of a cavalry brigade commanded by
Urigadicr-General Dunham-Massy, and of two infantry
brigades, the first commanded by Brigadier-General
Macpher~on, the secollcl by Brigadier-General Balccr,
three batteries of artillery, a company of sappcrs and
miners, and two Gatling guns. T h c Kuram vallcy bctween the Shutargurdan and the basc was to bc garrisoned adequately by a forcc about 4000 strong, in
protection of Roberts' co~n~nunications
by that line until
snow should closc it, by which time it was anticipated
that co~nmunication b y thc Khyber-Jellalabad-Gundamulc line would bc opcnccl up, for gaining and maintaining nrllich a force of about 6600 men was t o be detailed
under thc command of Major-General Bright, which was
to furnish a movable column to establish communications on\varcl to Cabul. A strong reservc force was to
be gathercd between Pcshawur and Rawal Pincli under
the command of Major-Gcncral Ross, to move forward

a s occasion might require. 111the south-west Sir Dona!cl
Stewart was to recall t o Candahar his troops, which,
having begun their march toward India, were now mainly
cchclonccl along the route to Quetta, when that General
would have about goo0 men at his disposition to
dominate the Candahar province, reoccupy Khelat-iGhilzai, ancl threatcn Ghuznee, his communications with
the Indus being kept opcn by a brigade of Bombay
troops commanclcd by nrigadicr-Gcneral Phayre.
S i r Frederick Robcrts left Simla on 6th September
along with Colonel Charles Macgregor, C.B., the brilliant
and daring soldier whom h e had chosen as chief of staff,
and travelling night and day they reached Ali IChel on
the 12th. T h e transport and supply difficulty had to be
promptly net, ancl this was cffccted only by making a
clean sweep of all thc t-csources of the Pesha\vur district,
greatly but unavoiclably to the hindrancc o l the advance
of the Khyber column, and by procuring carriage ancl
supplies from thc friendly tribes of the ICuram. Notwithstanding the most strenuous exertions it was not
until the 1st October that Roberts' little army, having
crossed the Shutargurdan by detachments, was rendezvoused at and about the village of I<usl~iin the Logur
plain, within forty-eight miles of Cabul. Somc sharp
sl<irmisl~eshad been fought as the troops traversed the
rugged ground bet\w.cn Ali Khel and the Shutargurdan,
but the losses were trivial, although the Gencral himself
had a narrow escape. A couple of regiments and four
guns under the command of Colonel Money were left in
an entrenched camp to hold the Shutargurdan.
T h e maqsacre of the British mission had no sooner

been perpetrated than Yalioub Khan found himself in a
very bad way. The Cabul Sirdars sided with the disaffected soldiery, and urged the Arneer to raise his banner
for a j d n d or religious war, a measure for which he had
no nerve. Nor had he the nerve to remain in Cabul until
Roberts should camp undcr the Balla Hissar and demand
of him an account of the stewardship he had undertaken
on behalf of the ill-fatcd Cavagnari. What reasons actuated the anxious and be\vilderecl Inan cannot precisely be
Iinown ; whether he was simply solicitous for his own
wretched sliin, whether he acted from a wish to save
Cabul from destruction, or whether hc hopcd that his
entreaties for delay might stay the British advance until
the tribcs~nenshoulcl gather t o bar the road to the capital.
H e resolved to fly from Cabul, and commit himself to the
protection of General Roberts and his army. The day
before General Roberts arrived at I h s h i the Ameer presented hilnsclf in Baker's camp, accompanied by his cldest
son and some of his Sirdars, among whom was Daoud
Shah the Commander-in-Chief of his army. Sir Frederick
on his arrival a t Kushi paid a formal visit to the Ameer,
which the latter returned the same afternoon and took
occasion to plead that the General should clelay his
advance. Thc reply was that not even for a single clay
would Sir Fredericli defer his inarch on Cabul. The
Ameer remained in camp, his personal safety carefully
protected, but under a species of honourable surveillance,
until it should be ascertained j~~dicially
wlicther or not
he was implicated in the massacrc of the mission.
Yalioub had intimated his intention of presenting
himself in the British camp some clays in advance of

his arrival, and as telcgraphic communication with headquarters was open, his acceptance in the character of an
honoured guest was presumably in accordancc with instructions from Siinla. T h c man who had made himself
personally responsible for the salety of Cavagnari's
mission was a strange guest with an army whose avowed
errand was to exact retribution for the crime of its destruction. I t might seem not unreasonable to expect
that, as an indispensable preliminary to his entertainment, he should have at least afforded somep~imzfaak
evidence that he had been zealous to avert the fate which
had befallen the mission, and stern in the punishment
of an atrocity which touched him so nearly. Hut instead,
he was taken on trust so fi~llythat Afghans resisting thc
British advance were not so much regarcled as enemies
resisting an invasion and a s constructive vindicators of the
massacre, as they were held traitors to their sovereign
harbouring in the British camp.
O n the morning of October zd the whole force
marched from Kushi towarcl Cabul, temporarily cutting
loose from communication with the Shutargurclan, to avoid
diminishing the strength of thc column by leaving detachments to kecp the road open. All told, Roberts' army
was the reverse of a mighty host. Its strength was little
greater than that 01 a Prussian brigade on a war footing.
Its fate was in its own hands, for befall it what might it
coulc-l hope for no timely reinforceincnt. I t was a mere
detachment marching against a nation of fighting men
plentifully supplied with artillcry) no longer shooting
laboriously with jezails, but carrying arms of precision
equal or little inferior t o those in thc hands of our own

soldiery. But the mcn, Europeans and Easterns, hillmen
of Scotland and hillrnen of Nepaul, plainmen of I-Iampshirc ancl plainmen of the Punjaub, strode along buoyant
with confidence and with health, believing in their leader,
in their discipline, in themselves. - Of varied race, no
soldier who followed Roberts hut camc of fighting stock ;
ever blithely rejoicing in the combat, one and all burned
for the strife now before them with more than wonted
ardour, because of the opportunity it promised to exact
vengeance for a dcecl of foul treachcry.
T h e soldiers had not long t o wait for the first fight of
thc campaign. On the afternoon of the 5th Balccr's
brigade, with most of the cavalry and artillery, and with
the 92d Highlanders belonging to Macpherson's brigade,
camped on the plain to the south of the village of
Charasiah, Macpherson remaining one march in rear to
escort thc convoy of ammunition and stores. North of
Charasiah rises a semicircular curtain of hills ascending
in three successive tiers, the most distant ancl loftiest
range closing in the horizon and shutting out thc vicw
of Cabul, distant only about eleven miles. T h e leftward
projection of the curtain, as onc looks northward, comes
down into the plain almost as far as and somewhat to
the left of Charasiah, dividing the valley of Charasiah
from the outer plain of Chardeh. T o the right front of
Charasiah, distant from it about three miles, the range is
cleft by thc rugged and narrow Sung-i-Nawishta Pass,
through which run the Logur river and the direct road to
Cabul by Beni Hissar. Information had been received
that the Afghans were determined on a resolute attempt
to prevent the British force from reaching Cabul, and the
N

position beyond ~ h a k t s i a hseemed so tempting that it
was regarded as surprising that cavalry reconnaissances
sent forward on three distinct roads dctected no evidences
of any large hostile gathering.
But next morning 'showed another sight.' A t dawn
on the Gth Gencral Roberts, anxious to secure the Sung-iNawishta Pass and to rcndcr the track through it passable for guns, sent forward his pioneer battalion with a
wing of the 92d and two mountain guns. That detachment had gone out no great distance when the spectacle
before it gavc it pause. From the Sung-i-Nawishta dcfile,
both sides of which were held, the semicircular sweep of
the hill-crests was cronrncd by an Afghan host in great
strength and regular formation. According to subsequent informatioil no fcwer than tllirtccn regiments of
the Afghan regular army took part in the combat, as
well a s large contingcnts of irregular fighting men from
Cabul and the adjoi~~ing
villages, while the British camp
was threatened from thc heights on either side by formidable bodies of tribesmen, to thwart whose obviously intcndcd attack on it a considerable forcc had to be retained.
Thc dispositions of the Afghan commander Nek Mahomed
Khan were madc with some tactical skill. The Sung-iNawishta Pass itself, the heights on either side, and a low
detached cminencc fi~rtherforward, wcre strongly held by
Afghan infantry; in the mouth of the pass weie four
Armstrong guns, and on the flanking height twelve
mountain guns were in position. The projecting spur
toward Charasiah which was the extreme right of the
Afghan position, was held in force, whence an effective
fire would bear on the left flanlc of a force advancing to

a direct attaclc on the pass. But Roberts was not the
man to play into the hands of the Afghan tactician. H e
humoured his conception so far as to send forward on his
right toward the pass, a sinall detachment of all arms under
Major White of the gzd, with instructions to maintain
a threatening attitude in that direction, and to seize the
opportunity to co-operate with the flanking movement
entrusted to Gencral Balcer as soon as its development
should have shaken the constancy of the enemy. T o
Baker with about 2000 infantry ancl four guns, was
assigned the task of attacking the Afghan right on the
projecting spur and ridge, forcing back and clispcrsing
that flank; and then, having reached the right of the
Afghan main position on the farthest ancl loftiest range,
he was to wheel to his right and sweep its defenders from
the chain of summits.
B a l m inoved out toward his left front agahst the
eminences held by the Afghan right wing, wl~ich Nelc
Mahomed, having discerned the character of RobertsJ
tactics, was now reinforcing with grcat activity. T h e
72d Highlanders led the attaclc, supported vigorously by
the 5th Goorlchas ancl the 5th Punjaub Infantry. The rcsistance of the Afghans was stubborn, especially opposite
our extreme left, ~vhencefrom behind their sungahs on a
steep hill they poured a heavy fire on the assailants. A yet
heavier fire came from a detached knoll on Baker's right,
which the artillery fire gradually beat down. T h e Afghans
continued to hold the advanced ridge constituting their first
,position until two o'clock, when a direct attaclc, accompanied by a double flanking fire, compelled their withdrawal. They, however, fell back only to an intermediate

loftier position about 700 yards in rear of the ridge from
which thcy had been driven. Approached by successive
rushes under cover of artillery fire, they were then attacked
vigorously and fell back in confusion. No rally was permitted them, ancl by three o'cloclc the whole Afghan right
was shattered and in full Right along the edge of the
Chardell vallcy. Baker unfortunately had no cavalry,
else the fugitives would have suffered severely. But t h e
rout of the Afghan right had dccicled the fortunc of the
day. Its defenders were alrcady dribbling away from
the main position when Baker, ~vheelingto his right,
inarched along the lofty crcst, rolling up and sweeping
away the Afghan dcfencc as he moved tolvarcl the Sungi-Nawishtn gorge. That defile had already been entered
by tllc cavalry of White's dctachrnent, supported by some
infantry. While Balcer had becn turning the Afghan
right, White ancl his little force l m l been distinguishing
themselves not a little. After an artillcry preparation
the detached hill had becn won as the result of a hancl-tohand struggle. Later had fallen into the hands of White's
people all the Afghan guns, and the heights to the iminecliate right and left of the gorge had been carried, the
defenders driven away, and the pass opened up. B u t
the progress through it of the cavalry was arrested by
a strongly garrisoned fort completely commanding t h e
road. On this fort Baker directed his artillery fire, at
the same time sending down two infantry regiments to
clear away the remnants of the Afghan army still lingering in the pass. This accomplished, the fighting ceased.
It had been a satisfactory day. Less than half of Roberts'
force had been engaged, ancl this mere brigade had routed

the army of Cabul and captured the whole of the artillery
it had brought into the field. T h e Afghan loss was estimated at about 300 Idled. T h e British loss was twenty
killed and sixty-seven wounded. On the night of the
combat part of Baker's troops bivouacked bcyond the
Sung-i-Nawishta, ancl on the following d a y the whole
division passed the defile and camped at Beni Ilissar,
within sight of the Balla Hissar and thc lofty ridge
overhanging Cabul.
O n the afternoon of the 7th a violent explosion was
heard in thc 13eni I-Iissar camp from the direction of the
Sherpur cantonment north of Cabul, near the site of the
British cantonments of 1839-41. N e s t morning information came in that the Sherpur magazine had been blown
up, and that the cantonmcnt had been abandoned by
the Afghan regiments which had garrisoned that vast
unfinished structure. General Massy led out part of
his brigade on a rcconnaissance, and took possession of
the deserted Sherpur cantonmcnt, and of the seventyfive pieccs of ordnance parked within thc walls. Massy
had observecl from thc Siah S u n g heights that the A s ~ n a i
heights, overhanging the Cahul suburb of Deh Afghan,
were held by a large body o f Afghan soldiery, a force, it
was afterwards learned, composed of the rcmnants of thc
regiments defeated at Charasiah, three fresh regiments
from the Kohistan, ancl tllc rabble of the city and adjacent villages, having a total strength of nearly 3000 men,
with twelve guns, undcr the lcadership of Mnhomcd Jan,
who later was to figure prominently as thc ablest of our
Afghan eneinies. Massy heliograpl~cdhis information to
General Robcrts, who sent Baler with a force to drive

the enemy from the heights ; and Massy was instructed
t o pass through a g a p in the ridge and gain the Charde1-1
valley, where he might find opportunity to intercept the
Afghan retreat toward the west. Massy pierced the
ridge a t thc village of A ~ ~ s h aand
r , disposed his troops
on the roads crossing the Chardeh vallcy. Meanwhile
Baker found the ascent of the Shcr Derwaza heights so
steep that the afternoon was far spent before his guns
came into action, and it was still latcc before part of his
infantry effected their descent into the Chardeh valley.
Reinforcements necessary to enable him to act did not
reach him until dusk, when it ~vouldhave been folly to
commit himself to a n attack. A night patrol ascertained
that t h e Afghans had evacuated the position under cover
of darlrness, leaving behind their guns and camp equipage. O n the 9th the divisional camp movcd forward to
the Siah S u n g hcights, a mile eastward from the Balla
I-lissar, and there it was joined by Baker, and by Massy,
who on his way to camp led his wcaried troopcrs thrtiugh
the city of Cabul without mishap or insult. Thc Goorkha
regiment was detachcd t o hold the ridge commanding the Balla Hissar, and a cavalry regiment was quartered in the Sherpur cantonment to protect it from the
ravages of the villagers.
A melancholy interest attaches to the visit paid by
Sir Frederick Roberts t o the Balla Hissar on the I ~ t h .
Through the dirt a n d squalor of the lower portion he
ascended thea narrow lane leading to the ruin which a
few weeks earlier had becn the British Residency. T h e
commander of the avenging army looked with sorro\vful
eyes o n the scene of heroism and slaughter, on the

smokc-blacltened walls, the blood splashes on the whitcwashccl walls, the still sn~oulderingdi;hris,thc half-burncd
sl<ulls and bones in the blood-dabblcd chamber where
apparently the final struggle had been fought out. I-Ic
stood in the grcat breach in the quarters of the Guidcs
where the gate had been blown in after the last of the
sorties made by the gallant I-Tarnilton, and lingered in
the tattered wreck of poor Cavagnari's drawing-room, its
walls dinted with bullet-pits, its floor and walls brutally
dcfiled. Next day he nladc a formal cntry into thc Balla
I-Iissar, his road lined with his staunch troops, a royal
salutc greeting the banner of Britain as it rose on thc
tall flagstaff abovc the gateway. H e held a Durbar in
the 'Audience Chamber' in the garden of the Ameer's
palace; in front and in flank of him the pushing throng
of obsequious Sirdars of Cabul arraycd in all the colours
of the rainbow; behind them, standing immobilc at attention, the guard of British infantry with fixed bayonets
which the soldiers longed to usc. T h e Gcneral read t h e
mild proclamation announcing the disar~namcntof the
Cabulcse and the punishment of fine which \\?aslaid upon
the city, but which never was exacted. And then he
summarily dismissed the Sirdars, three only, the Mustaphi,
Yahuja Khan the Ameer's father-in-law, and Zakariah
Khan his brother, being desired t o remain. Their smug
complacency was suddenly changed into dismay when
thcy were abruptly told that they were prisoners.
Anothcr ceremonial progrcss the Gcncral had to perform. On the 13th hc marched through thc streets of
Cabul at thc head of his little army, the bazaars and dead
walls echoing t o the music of the bands and the wild

scream of the bagpipes. In the Afghan quarter no
salaams greeted the conqucring Fcringhees, and scowling
faces frowned on the spectacle from windows ancl siclestreets. Three clays later occurred an event which might
have been a grcat catastrophe. Captain Shafto of the
ordnance was conducting an exanlination into the contents of the arsenal in the upper Balla Hissar, and had
already discovered millions of cartridges, and about
I 50,ooo lbs, of gunpowder. Daoud Shah, however, e s pressed his belief that at least a million pounds wcrc in
store. Captain Shafto, a very cautious man, was pursuing his researches ; thc Goorlthas were quartered in the
uppcr Balla Hissar near the magazine shed, and the 67th
occupied the Amccr's gardcn lowcr down. On the ~ G t h
a dull report was heard in the Siah Sung camp, followed
irnmcdiately by the rising abovc thc Balla Hissar of
a huge column of grey smol<e, which as it drifted away
disclosed flashes of flamc and sudden jcts of smolte tclling
of repeated gunpowder explosions. T h e 67th, powdered
with dust, cscaped all but scathless ; but the Goorltha
regiment had been heavily smitten. Twelve poor fellows
were killed, and seven wounded ; among the formcr \vcl.c
five principal Goorkha officers.
T h e Ralla Hissar was promptly evacuated. Occasional cxplosions occurred for several days, the hcaviest
of those on the afternoon of the 1Gt11, which threw on the
city a great shower of stones, beams, and bullets. By
a jet of stones blown out through the Balla Ilissar gatc
four Afghans were ldled, ancl two sowars and an Afghan
badly hurt. Captain Shafto's body and thc remains of
the Goorkhas werc found later, and buried; and the

determination was formed to have no more to do with
the Balla Ilissar, but to occupy the Sherpur cantonment. Meanwhile General Hugh Gough was despatchccl
with a small force of all arms t o escort to Cabul Money's
gallant garrison of thc Shutargurdan, and to close for the
winter the line of communication via the Kuram valley.
Colonel Money had undergone with fine soldierly spirit
and action not a fcw turbulent experiences since Robcrts
had left him and his Silchs on the lofty crest of the
Shutargurdan. T h e truculent Ghilzais gave him no
pcace; his method of dealing with them was for the
most part with the bayonet point. T h e last attempt on
him was made b y a horde of Ghilzais some 17,000strong,
who completely invested his camp, and after the civility
of requesting him to surrender, a compliment which
he answered by bullets, made a close and determined
attack on his position. This was on the 18th October ;
on the following day Gough hcliographed his arrival a t
Kushi, whereupon Money took the offensive with vigour
and scattered to the wincls his Ghilzai assailants. On
30th October the Shutargurdan position was evacuated,
and on the gd November the Cabul force received the
welcome accession of headquarters and two squadrons
9th Lancers, Money's gd Sikhs, and four mountain guns.

THE LULL

l3EI;ONTi: TkIE STORAl

SIR FREDE~ICIC
ROBERTS had been hurried forward
on Cabul charged with the duty of avenging the perpetration of a foul and treacherous crime, 'which had
brought indelible disgracc upon the Afghan nation.'
T h e scriptural injunction t o turn the other cheek to
the smiter has not yet become a canon of international
law o r practice ; ancl the anti-climax to an expedition
engagccl in with so stern a purpose, of a nominal clisarmament and a pctty fine never cxactecl, is self-evident.
Our nation is given to walk in the path of precedent ;
and in this juncturc the authorities had to their hand the
most apposite of precedents. Pollock, by dcstroying the
Char bazaar in which had been exposed the mangled remains of Burncs and Macnaghtcn, set a ' mark ' on Cabul
the mcmory of which had lasted for decades. Cavagnari
ancl his people had been slaughtered in the Balla Ilissar,
and their bones were still mingled with the smouldering
ruins of the Residency. Wise men discerned that the
destruction of the fortress followed by a homeward march
a s swift yet as measured as had been the march of
invasion, could not but havc made a deep ancl lasting
impression on the Afghans ; while the complications,
humiliations, and expcnse of the long futile occupation
would have bccn obviated. Other counsels prevailed.

T o discover, in a nation virtually acccssory as a whole
after the fact to thc slaugllter of the mission, thc men
on whom lay thc suspicion of having becn the instigators and the perpetrators of the cruel decd, to accorcl
them a fair trial, and to send t o the gallows those on
whose hands was found the blood of the massacred
mission, was held a more befitting and not less telling
course of retributive action than to raze the Balla
Hissar and sow its site with salt. Sldfully and patiently evidence was gathered, and submitted to the
Military Commission which General Roberts had appointed.
This tribunal took cognisance of crimes
nominally of two classes. I t tried men who were accuscd of having been conccrnecl in the clestruction
of the British mission, and thosc charged with treason
in having offercd armed rcsistance to the British troops
acting in support of the Ameer, who had put himself
under their protection. Of the five prisoners first tried,
condemned, and duly hanged, two were signal criminals.
One of them, the Kotmal or Mayor of Cabul, was provcd
to have superintended the contu~neliousthrowing of thc
bodies of the slaughtered Guides of the mission escort
into the ditch of the Balla Hissar. Another was proved
to have carried away from thc wrecked Residency a head
believcd to have been Cavagnari's, and t o have exhibited
it on the ridge above the city. T h e other three and
many of thosc who were subsequently executed, suffercd
for the crime of ' treason' against Yalcoub Khan. Probably there was n o Afghan who did not approve of the
slaughter of the Envoy, and who would not in his heart
have rcjoiced at the annihilation of the British force ; but

it seems strange law and stranger justice to hang men
for ' treason ' against a Sovereign who had gone over
to the enemy. On the curious expedient of ternporarily governing in the name of an Ameer who had
deserted his post to save his skin, cornmcnt would be
supcrfluous.
Executions continued ; few, however, of
the mutinous sepoys who actually took part in the
wanton attack on the British Residency had been
secured, and it was judged expedient that efforts should
be made to capture and punish those against whom
there was evidence of that crimc, in the shape of the
muster-rolls of the regiments now in the possession
of the military authorities. I t was known that many
of the disbanded and fugitive soldicrs had i-cturned
to their homes in the villages around Cabul, and
carly in November General Baker took out a force
and suddenly encircled the village of Indilcee, on thc
edge of the Chardeh valley-a
village reported full of
Afghan sepoys. A number of mcn were brought out
by the scared headmen and handcd over, answering
to their names called over from a list carricd by Baker;
and othcr villages in the vicinity yielded a considerable harvest of disbanded soldiers. 13elore the Commission the prisoners made no attempt to conceal
their names, or deny the regiments to which they had
belonged; and forty-nine of them were found guilty and
hanged, nearly all of wholn belonged to the regiments
that had assailed the Residency.
O n 12th November Sir Frederick Roberts proclaimed
an amnesty in favour of all who had fought against the
British troops, 011 condition that they should surrender

their arms and return to their I~omcs; but exempted
from the benefit were all concerned in the attack on the
Residency. The amnesty was well timed, although
most people would have preferred that fewer sepoys
and more Sirdars should have been hanged.
Our relations with the Hmeer during the earlier part
of his residence in the British camp were not a little
peculiar. Nominally he was our guest, and a certain freedom was accorded to him and his retinue. There was
no doubt that the Sirdars of the Hmeer's suite grossly
abused their privileges. Whether with Yaltoub Khan's
cognisancc or not, they authorisecl the use of his name
by the insurgent leadcrs. Nek Mahorned, the insurgent
commander at Charasiah, was actually in the tents of
the Ameer on the evening before the fight. T o all
appearance our operations continued to have for their
ultimate object the restoration of Yaltoub Khan to his
throne. Our administrative measures werc carried on
in his name. T h e hostile Afghans we designated as
rebels against his rule ; and his authority was proclaimed as the justification of much of our conduct.
But the situation gradually becaine intolerable to
Yaltoub Khan. H e was a guest in the British camp,
but he was also in a species of custody. Should our
arms reinstate him, he could not hope to hold his throne.
His harassecl perplexity came to a crisis on the morning
of the 12th October, the clay of General RobertsJ durbar
in the Balla I-Iissar, which he had been desired to attend.
What he specifically apprehended is unltnown ; what
he did was t o tell General Roberts, with great escitelnent, that he would not go to the durbar, that his lifc
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was too miserable for long endurance, that he ur0~11cI
rather bc a grass-cuttcr in the British camp than remain
Amecr of Afghanistan. H e was firmly resolved to resign
the throne, and begged that: he might be allowed to do
so a t once. Gencral Robcrts csplained that the acceptance of his resignation rested not wit11 hi111 but with the
Viceroy, pending wliose decision matters, the Gcncral
desired, should remain ,as they were, affairs continuing
to be conductcd in the Ameer's name as before. TO
this t h e Ameer consented ; his tents were moved to thc
vicinity of General Roberts' headquarters, and a somewhat closer surveillance over him was maintained.
Secrecy meanwhile was preserved until the Viceroy's
reply should arrivc. T h e nature of that rcply was intimated
by the proclamation which General Roberts issued on the
aSth Octobcr. I t announced that the Ameer had of his
own free will abdicated his throne and left Afghanistan
without a government. ' The British Government,' the
proclamation continued, ' now commands that all Afghan
authorities, chiefs, and sirdars, do continuc their functions
in maintaining order. . . Thc British Government, after
consultation with the principal sirdars, tribal chiefs, and
others rcpresenting thc interests and wishes of the various
provinces and cities, will declare its will as to the future
permanent arrangements to be made for the good government of thc peoplc.'
T h i s adi?ztehz assumption of the rulership of Afghanistan may have been adopted as the only policy which
afforded even a remote possibility of tranquillity. But it
was essentially a policy of speculative makeshift. T h e
retributive and punitive object of the swift march on

Cabul can scarcely be regarded as having been .fulfilled
by the esccution of a numbcr of subordinate participants
and accessories in the destruction of the mission and by
the voluntary abdication of Yalcoub Khan. That the
Afghan ' authorities, chiefs, and sirdars,' would obey the
command to ' maintain order' issued by thc leader of a
few thousand hostile troops, masters of little more than
the ground on which they were encamped, experience
and common sense secmed alike to render improbablc.
T h e Afghans suborclinatcd their internal quarrels to their
common hatred of the masterf~~l
foreigners, and the des-'
perate fighting of December proved how fiercely they
.
wcre in earnest.
Yakoub Khan had been regarded as merely a wealc
and unfortunate man, but the shadows gradually darkened
around him until at length he came to be a man under
grave suspicion. General Roberts became satisfied from
the results of thc procecdings of the court of inquiry, that
the attacli on the Resiclency, if not actually instigated by
him, might at least have becn' checl<ed by active esertion
on his part. Information was obtained which convincecl the
Gencral that the ex-Ameer was contemplating a flight toward Turltestan, and it was considered necessary to place
him in close confinement. He remained a close prisoner
until December 1st. On the early morning of that clay he
was brought out from his tent, and after taking farewell
of the General and his staff, started on his journey to
Pesllacwu-,surrounded by a strong escort. If the hill tribes
along his route had cared enough about him to attempt
his rescue, the speed with which he travelled affor'ded.
.
.. .
them no'time t o gather for that purpose.
,

During those uneventful October and November days,
when the little army commanded by General Roberts lay
in its breezy camp on the Siah Sung heights, there was
no little temptation for the unprofessional reader of the
telegraphic information in the newspapers to hold cheap
those reputedly formidable Afghans, mhosc resistance a
single sharp skirmish had scemingly scattered to the
winds, and who were now apparently accepting without
active remonstrancc the dominance of the few thousand
British bayoncts glittering there screnely over against
the oncc turbulent but now tamed hill capital. One
may b e certain that the shrewd and careful soldier who
comrnandcd that scant array did not permit hirnsclf to
sharc in the facilc optiinism whether on thc part of a
govern~nentor of thc casual reader of complacent telegrams. It mas true that the Govcrnment of India had
put or was putting some 30,ooo soldiers into the ficld on
thc apparent errand of prosecuting an Afghan war. But
what availcd Roberts this host of fighting men whcn he
had to realise that, befall him what might in the immediate o r near future, not a man of it was available to
strengthen or to succour him ? The quietude of thosc
cool October days was very pleasant, but the chief knew
well how precarious and deceitful was the calm. For the
present the Afghan unanimity of hostility mas affectcd in
a measure by the fact that the Ameer, who had still a
party, was voluntarily in the British camp. But when
Yakoub's abdication should be announccd, hc Iinew the
Afghan nature too wcll to doubt that the tribal bloodfeuds would be soldcred for the time, that Dooranee and
Barakzai would strikc hands, that Afghan regulars and
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Afghan irregulars would rally under the sarnc standarcls,
and that the fierce shouts of 'Deen! deen!' would resound
on hill-top and in plain. Cut loose from any basc, with
slo~vlydwindling strength, wit11 waning stock of ammunition, it was his part to hold his ground here for the winter,
he and his staunch soldiers, a firm rock in the midst of
those surging Afghan billows that wcre certain to rise
around him. Not only would he withstand them, but he
would mect them, for this bold man linew the valuc in
dealing with Afghans of a rcsolute and vigorous offensive.
Hut it behoved him above all things to malie timcly choicc
of his wintes quarters where hc slioulcl collcct his supplies
and house his troops and the followers. After careful
delibcration the Sherpur cantonment was selected. I t
was overlarge for easy defence, but hard work, careful
engincering, and steadfast courage would redcem that
evil. And Sherpur had the great advantagc that besides
being in a mcasurc a ready-made dcfcnsive position, it
had shelter for all thc European troops and most of thc
native soldicry, and that it would accommoclate also the
horses of the cavalry, tllc transport animals, and all the
needful supplies and stores.
An Afghan of the Afghans, Shcre Ali nevertheless
had curiously failed to discern that thc nrarlilic strength
of the nation which he ruled lay in its intuitive aptitude
for irregular fighting ; and hc had industriously set himself to the effort of warping the combative genius of his
people and of constituting Afghanistan a military power
of thc regular and disciplincd type. H e had created a
large standing army the soldiery of which wore uniforms,
underwent rcgular drill, obcycd words of comrnancl, and
0
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carried arms of precision. H e had devoted great pains to
the manufacture of a formidable artillery, and what with
presents from the British Government and the imitative
&ill of native artificers he was possessed at the outbreak
of llostilities of several hundred cannon. His artisans
were s k i l f ~ ~enough
l
to turn out in large numbers very fair
rifled small-arms, which they copied from British models ;
and in the Ualla Hissar magazine were found by our
people vast quantities of gunpowder and of admirable
cartridges of local manufacture. There were many
rcasons why the Cabul division of Shere Ali's army
should be quartered apart from his turbulent and refractory capital, and why its cantonment shouldtake thc form
of a,permancnt fortified camp, in which his soldiers might
be isolated from Cabul intrigues, while its prosimity to
the capital should constitute a standing menace to the
conspirators of the city. I-Iis original design apparently
was t o enclose the Bellmaroo heights within the walls of
his cantonment, and thus form a great fortified square
upon the heights in the centre of whicll should rise a
strong citadel dominating the plain in every direction.
The Sherpur cantonment as found by Roberts consisted
of a fortified encientc, enclosing on two sides a great
open space in the shape of a parallelogran~ lying along
the southcrn base of tllc Bellmaroo heights. When the
British troops took possession, only thc \vest and s0ut.h
faces of the encientc wcre completed ; although not long
built those were already in bad repair, and the esplosion
of the great magazine \vlicn the Afghan troops abandoned
the cantonment had ~ ~ ~ r c c la~ section
ccl
of the western face.
The eastern face had becn little more than traced, and the

northcrn side had no artificial protection, but was closed
in by the Bchmaroo heights, whosc centre was cleft by a
broad and deep gorge. The- dcsign of thc encientc was
peculiar. There was a thick and high exterior wall of
mild, with a banquette for infantry.. protected by a
parapet. Inside this wall was a dry ditch forty fect wide,
on the inner brink of which was the long range of barrackrooms. Along the 'interior front of the ban-ack-rooms
was a verandah faccd with arches supported by pillars, its
continuity brokcn occasionally by broad staircases conducting to the roof of the barracks, which affordcd a
scconcl linc of defence. The closing in of thc verandah
would of course give additional barraclc accommodation,
but there were quarters in the barraclc-rooms for at lcast
all the European troops. In -the southern face of thk
enciente were threc gdteways, and in the centre of the
western face thcre was a fourth, each gate' covered adequately by a curtain. Hctwecn each gate were semicircular bastions for guns. In thc interior therc was
space t o manceuvre a division of all arms. There was a
copious supply of water, and i f thc aspect of the great
~ ~ n t o n m e was
n t grim because of the absence of trees and
the utter barrenness of the cnclosed spacc, this a.!sthctic
consideration went for little against its ~nanifes-taclvantages as snug and deferisible winter quarters. Shere Ali
had ihdeed been'all unconsciously a friend in need to the
British force wintering in the heart of that unfortunate
potentate's. dominions. I-Iurnan nature is perverse and
exacting, and thcre were those who objurgated his
memory because he had constructed his cantonmcnt a
fern sizes too large, to be. co,~nfortablydcfcndcd by Sir
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Frederick Roberts' little force. But this was maoifcstly
; and in serious truth the Sherpur canton~~nrcasonable
mcnt was a real godscnd to our pcople, Supplies of all
kinds were steadily being accumulated thcrc, and the
woodwork of the houses in the Balla Nissar was being
carried to Sherpur for use as firewood. On the last clay
of October the force quitted the Siah Sung position
and took possession of Shcrpur, which had undergone a
rigorous process of f~~migationand clcansing. The
change was distinctly for thc bettcr. Thc force was
compacted, and the routine military duties were appreciably lightened since there were necdcd merely piqucts
on t h e Behmaroo heights and sentries on the gatcs ; thc
littlc army was healthy, temperate, and in excellent case
in all respects.
T h e dispositions for field scrvicc made at the outsct
of the campaign by the military authorities have already
becn detailed. Regarded simply as disposit~ons they
left nothing to be desired, and certainly Sir Frederick
Roberts' force had been organiscd and cquippecl with
a fair amount of expedition. But it was apparent that
the equipment of that body of 6500 men-and that equipment by no mcans of an adequate character, had exhausted
for the time thc resources of the Government as regarded
transport and supplies. Promptitude of advance on the
part of the force to which had been assigned the line of
invasion by the Khybcr-Jellalabad routc, was of scarccly
less moment than the rapidity of the stroke which Roberts
was colnmissioned to clcliver. The former's was a treblc
duty. One of its tasks was to open up and maintain
Roberts' communications with India, so that the closing

.

of the Shutargurdan should not lcave him isolated.
Another duty resting on the Khyber force was to constitute for Roberts a ready and convenient rcservc, on
which he might draw when his occasions demanded. N o
man could tell how soon after the coinmencement of his
invasion that necessity might arise ; .it was a prime nzison
d'&e of the Khyber force to be in a position to give him
the hand when he should intimate a need for support.
Yet again, its presence in the passcs dominantly thrusting forward, woulcl llave the effect of retaining the eastern
tribes within their own borders, and hindering them from
joining an offensive combination against the little force
with 1v11ich Roberts was to strike a t Cabul. But delay
on delay marlced the mobilisation and aclvance of the
troops operating in the Khyber linc. There was no lack
of earnestness anywhere ; the eagerness to push on was
universal from the commander t o the corporal. But the
barren hills and rugged passes could furnish no supplies ;
the base had to furnish everything, and there was nothing a t the base, neither any accumulation of supplies
nor means to transport supplies if they had been accumulated. Weelcs elapsed before the organisation of the
force approached completion, and it was only by a
desperate struggle that General Charles Gough's little
brigade received by the end of September equipment
sufficient to enable that officer to advance by short
marches. Roberts was holding his durbar in the Balla
I-Iissar of Cabul on the day that the head of Gough's
advance reached Jellalabad. N o man can associate the
idea of dawdling with Jenkins and his Guides, yet the
Guides reaching Jellalabad on October 12th were not a t

Gundamuk until t h e 23d, and Gundarnuli is but thirty
miles beyond Jcllalabad. The anti-climax for the time
of General Bright's exertions occurred on November Gth.
O n t h a t day 11c with Gough's brigade reached so far
Cabul\vard a s Kutti Sung, two marches beyond Gunclamuk. Thcre he met General Macpherson of Roberts'
force, who had marchcd down from Cabul with his
brigade on the errand of opening communications with
the head of the Iihybur column. The two brigades had
touch of each other for the period of an interview between
the Generals, and then they fell apart and the momentary
union of communication was disrupted. General Bright
had t o fall back toward Gundarnuli for lack of supplies.
T h e breach continued open only for a few days, and
then it was closed, not from down country but from up
country. Roberts, surveying the rugged country to the
cast of Cabul, had discerned that the hill road toward
Jugdulluk by Luttabund, was a t once opener and shorter
than the customary tortuous and overhung route through
the Khoord Cabul Pass and by Tezcen. T h e pioneers
were set to work t o improve the former. Thc Luttabund road became the habitual routc along which, from
Cabul downwards, were posted detachments maintaining
the communications of the Cabul force with the Khyber
column and India.
Nearly simultaneo~s with this
accomplishment was the accordance to Sir Frederick
Roberts of the local rank of Lieutena~it-General, a
promotion which placed him in command of all the
troops in Eastern Afghanistan down to Jurnrood, and
enabled him to order up reinforcements from the
Khyber column a t his discretion, a power he refrained
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from exercising until the moment of urgent need was
impending.
After his interview a t Kutt i Sung with General Bright,
Macpherson, before returning t o Cabul, made a short rcconnaissance north of the Cabul river toward the Lughman valley and into the Tagao country inhabited by
the fanatic tribe of the Safis. From his camp a t Naghloo
a foraging party, consisting of a company of thc 67th
escorting a number of camels and mules, movocl westward
toward a villagc near the junction of the l'anjshir and
Cabul rivers, thcrc to obtain supplies of grain and forage.
Thc little detachment on its march was suddenly mct by
the fire of about row Safi tribesmen. Captain Poole,
observing that the tribesmen wcrc moving t o cut him OFT,
withdre\v his party through a defilc in his rear, and taking
cover undcr the river bank maintained a steady firc
while the camels werc being retired. T h c Safis werc
cxtrernely bold and they too shot very straight. Captain
I'oole was sevcrely wounded and of his handful of fiftysix men eight were either killed or wounclcd, but their
comrades resolutcly held' their position until reinforcements ca'me out from the camp. T h e Safis, who retired
with dogged reluctance, werc not finally routed until
attaclced by British infantry in front and flank. After
they broke the cavalry pursued them for six miles, doing
severe execution ; the dead of the 67th wcre recovered,
but thc poor fellows had been mutilated almost past
recognition. Gencral Macphcrson returned to Sherpir
on the 20th November, having left a strong garrison
temporarily a t Luttabund to strengthen communicatio~ls
and open out effect~~ally
thc new routc castward.
'

General Roberts, with all his esertions, hacl been unable to accuinulate sufficient winter of grain for his native
troops and forage for his cavalry and baggage animals.
Agents had been purchasing supplies in the fertile district
of Maidan, distant from Cabul about twenty-five miles in
the Ghuznee direction, but thc local people laclced carriage
to convey thcir stocks into camp, and it was necessary
that the supplies should be brought in by the transport
of the force. T h e country toward Ghuxnee was reported
to be in a state of cliscluiet, and a strong body of troops
was detailed under t h e command of General Baker for
the protection of the transport. This force marched out
from Sherpur 011 November zrst, and nest day camped
on the edge of the pleasant Maidan plain. Balcer encountered great difficulties in collecting supplies. The
villages readily gave in their tribute of grain and forage,
but evinced extreme reluctance t o furnish the aclditional
quantities which our necessities forced us to requisition.
With the villagers it was not a question of money; the
supplies for which Bal<erJscommissaries demanded money
in hand constituted their provision for the winter season.
But the stern maxim of war is that soldiers must live
although villagers starve, and this much may be said in
our favour that we are the only nation in the world.
which, when compelled t o rcsort to forced requisitions,
invariably pays in hard cash and not in promissory
notes. Baker's ready-money tariff was far higher than
t f e current rates, but nevertheless he had to resort to
strong measures. I n one instance he was defied outright..
A certain Bahadur Khan inhabiting a remote valley in
thc Bainian direction, ref~lsedto sell any portion of his

great store of grain and forage, and declined to comply
with a summons to present himself in Raker's camp. I t
was known that he was undcr the influence of the aged
fanatic Moulla the Mushk-i-Alum, who was engaged in
fomenting a tribal rising, and it was reported that he was
affording protection to a number of the fugitive sepoys
of the ex-Ameer's army. A political officer with two
squadrons of cavalry was sent to bring into camp the
recalcitrant Bahadur Khan. His fort: and village were
found prepared for a stubborn defcnce. Received with
a heavy fire from a large body of men while swarms
of hostile tribesmen showed themselves on the adjacent
hills, the horsemen had to withdraw. I t was judged
necessary to punish the contumacious chief and to disperse the tribal gathering before it should make more
head, and Balcer led out a strong detachment in light
marching order. Therc was no fighting, and the only
enemies seen were a few tribcsrnen, who drew off into the
hills as the head of Bal<er's column approached. Fort,
villages, and valley were found uttcrly dcsertcd. There
were no means to carry away the forage and grain found
in the houses, so the villages belonging to Bahadur Khan
were destroyed by fire. Their inhabitants found refuge
in the surrounding villages, and thcre was absolutely no
foundation for the statements which appeared in English
papers to the effect that old men, women, and children
were turned out Lo die in thc snow. In the words of
Mr Hensman, a correspondent who accompanied the
column : 'Therc were no old men, women, and children,
and there was no snow.' British officers cannot be supposed to have found pleasure, on the verge of thc bittcr

Afghan winter, in the destruction of the hovels and the
winter stores of food belonging to a number of miserable
villagers ; but experience has proved that only by such
stern measurcs is there any possibility of cowing the rancour of Afghan tribesmen. No elation can accompany an
operation so pitiless, and thc plea of stcrn necessity must
be advanced alike and accepted with a shudder. Of the
nccessity of some such form of reprisals an example is
afforded in an experience which befell Gencral Baker a
few days later in this same Maidan region. H e visited
the villagc of Beni-Badam with a small cavalry escort.
The villagers with every demonstration of friendliness
entertained the officers ancl men with milk and fruit, and'
provided corn and forage for their horses. There were
only old men in thc village with the women and children,
but no treachery was suspected until suddenly two large
bodies of armed men were scen hurrying to cut off t h e
retreat, and it was only by hard fighting that the General
with his escort succccded in escaping from the snare.
Next day hc dcstroyed the village. Baker probably acted
on gcncral principles, but had he cared for precedents he
would have found them in the conduct of the Germans in
thc Franco-Prussian war. H e remained in the Maidan
district until the transport of the army had brought
into Sherpur all the supplies which he had succecded
in obtaining in that rcgion, and thcn returned to the
cantonment.
By the terms of the proclamation which he issued on
the 28th October Sir Frederick Roberts was announced
as thc dominant authority for the time being in Eastern
ancl Northern Afghanistan. I-Ic occupied this position

just as far as and no further than he co~~lcl
make it good.
And he could m a l e it good only over a very circumscribed arca. Even more than had becn true of Shah
Soojah's government forty years previously was it true
of Roberts' government now that it was n government
of sentry-boxes. I-Ie mas firm inaster of the S h e r p ~ ~ r
cantonment. General Hills, his nominee, held a somewhat precarious sway in Cabul in the capacity of its
Governor, maintaining his position there in virtue of the
bayonets of his military guard, the support of the
adjacent Sherpur, and the waiting attitude of the populace of the capital. East of Cabul the domination of
Britain was represented by a series of fortified posts
studding the road to Gundamuk, whencc to Jumrood the
occupation was closer, although not wholly'undisturbed.
When a column marchcd o u t from Sherpur the British
pomcr was dominant only within the area of its fire zone.
T h e stretch of road it vacatcd as it moved on ceased t o
bc territory ovcr wl~ichthc Uritisli held dominion. This
narrowly restricted nature of his actual sway Sir Frcdcriclc
Roberts could not but recognise, but how with a force of
7000 mcn all told was it possiblc for him t o enlarge its
borders? One espcdient suggested itself which could
not indeed extend the area of his real pomcr, but which
might have the cffect, to usc a now familiar cspression, of
widening the sphere of his influence. From among the
Sirdars who had regarded it as their interest t o cast in
their lot with thc British, he selectcd four to represent
him in the capacity of governors of provinces which his
bayonets mere not long enough to reach. T h e experiment
made it disagreeably plain that thc people of the pro-
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vinces to which he had deputed governors wcrc utterly
indisposed to have anything to do either with them or
with him. The governors wcnt in no statc, they had
no great sums to disburse, they were protected by
no armed escorts, and they wcre regarded by the
natives much as the Southern states of the Amcrican
Union after the Civil War regardcd the 'carpet bag'
governors whom the North inlposed upon them. The
Logur Governor was treated with utter contempt. The
Kohistanees despitefully used Shahbaz Khan, and when
a brothcr of Yaltoub Khan was sent to use his influence in favour of the worried and threatened governor,
he was reviled as a 'Kafir ' and a ' Feringhce,' and
ordercd peremptorily back to Sherpur if he had any
regard for his life. Sirdar Wali Maliomcd, the governor-nominate to the remotc Turkestan, found pretext
after pretext for delaying to proceed to take up his
f~~nctions,and had never quitted the British camp.
When Baker returned from Maidan he reported that he
had left the district peaceful in chargc of the governor
whom he had installed, the venerable and amiable
Hassan Khan. Baker's rear-guard was scarccly clear of
the valley when a mob of tribesmen and sepoys attacked
the fort in which the old Sirdar was residing, shot him
through the head, and then hacked his body to pieces.
It was too clear that governors unsupported by bayonets,
and whose only weapons were tact and persuasiveness,
were at an extreme discount in the condition which
Afghanistan presented in the end of Novernbcr and
the beginning of Decembcr.

C H A P T E R IV
T H E DECEMBER STORM

THE invader of Afghanistan may count as inevitable a
national rising against him, but the Afghans are a people
so immersed in tribal quarrels and domestic blood feuds
that tlle period of the outbrcalc is curiously unccrtain.
T h e British force which placed Shah Soojah on the
throne and supported him there, was in Afghanistan
for more than two years before the waves of the national
tempest rose around it. The national combination
against Roberts' occupation was brcalcing its strength
against the Sherpur defences while as yet the Cabul
field force had not been within sight of the capital for
more than two months. There secms no relation bctween
opportunity and thc period of the inevitable outburst.
If in November 1541the Cabul Sirdars had restrained
themselves for a fern days longer two more regiments
would have becn following on Sale's track, and the
British force in the cantonments would have been proportionately attenuated. Roberts might have been assailed
with better chance of success when his force mas dispersed between the Siah Sung camp, the Balla Hissar,
and Sherpur, than when concentrated in the strong defensive position against which the Afghans beat in vain.
Perhaps the rising ripencd faster in 1879 than in 1841
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because in the former period no Macnaghtcn fomented
intrigues and scattered gold. Perhaps Sllerc Ali's military
innovations may havc instilled into the masses of his time
sornc rough lessons in the art and practicc of spccdy
mobilisation. T h e crowning disgrace of 1842 was that
a trained army of regular soldiers should havc been annihilated by a few thousand hillmcn, among whom there was
no symptom either of rcal valour or of good leaclcrship.
T o Roberts and his forcc attaches thc ci-cdit of having
defeated the persistent and clespcratc efforts of levics a t
lcast ten times superior in numbers, well armed, far from
undisciplined, courageous bcyond all experience of Afghan
nature, and under the guidance of a leader who had some
conception of strategy, and who ccrtaiidy was no rncan
tactician.
I n the Afghan idiosyncrasy therc is a considerable
strain of practical philosophy. The blood of the massacred mission was not dry whcn it was recognised in
Cabul that stcrn retribution would inevitably follow.
Well, said the Afghans among themselves, what must
be must be, for they are all fatalists. The seniors rccalled the memory of thc retribution Polloclr exactedhow he c a m , destroyed Islalif, sct a ' m a r k ' on Cabul
by sending thc great bazaar in fragments into thc air, and
tlicn departed, This time Istalif was not compromised ;
if 1Zobcrts Sahib should be cletermined to blow up thc
Char Chowk again, why, that infliction must be endurcd.
I t had bcen rebuilt aftcr Pollock Sahib's engineers had
worked their will on i t ; it could be rebuilt a second time
when Roberts Sahib shoulcl have turncd his b, 1c on
the city, as pray God and thc Prophct he might do with
CLC

no more delay than Polloclc Sahib had made out yonder
on the Logur plain. S o after a trial of Roberts' mettle
at Charasiah, and finding the testing sample not quite to
their taste, the Afghans fell into an attitude of cxpectancy,
and were mightily relicved by his proclamation read at
the Balla Hissar durbar of October 12th. After a rcasonable amount of hanging and the exaction of the fine laid
on the city, it was assumed that he would no doubt clepart so as to get home to India before the winter snows
should block the passes.
it the cspected did not happen. Thc British Gcneral established a British Governor
in Cabul who had a heavy hand, ancl policcd the place
in a fashion that stirred a lurid fury in the bosorns of
haughty Sirdars who had been wont to d o what seemed
good in their own eyes. H e engaged in the sacrilegious
work of dismantling the Balla Hissar, the historic fortrcss
of the nation, within whose walls wcrc the royal palace
and the residences of the principal noblcs. Those were
bitter things, but they could be borne if they were mere
temporary inflictions, and if the hated Feringhees would
but take thcrnselves away soon. But that hope was
shattcrcd by the' proclamation of Octobcr zSth, when the
abdication of the Ameer was intimated and the British
mj in Afghanistan was announced. Ycs, that pestilent
zcz6nr~instilittle Gene:al, who would not follow the exa n ~ p l eof good old Pollock Sahib, ancl who hkld Yalcoub
Khan and sundry of his Sirdars in closc imprisonment
in his camp, had now the insolence to proclaim himself
virtually the Atneer of Afghanistan ! Far from showing symptom of budging, Re was sending out his governors
into the provinces, he was gathering tribute in kind, and
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he had taken possession of Shere Ali's monumental cantonment, under the shadow of the Behmaroo heights
on which Afghan warriors of a past generation had
slaughtered the Feringhee soldiers as if they had been
shecp ; and it was the Feringhee General's cantonment
now, which hc was cunningly strengthening as if hc
meant to make it his permanent fortress.
Yakoub Khan had gaincd little personal popularity
during his brief and troubled reign, but he was an Afghan
and a Mahomedan ; and his deportation to India, followed shortly afterwards by that of his three Ministers,
intensified the rancour of his countrymen and co-religionists against thc handful of presumptuous foreigncrs
who arrogantly claimed to sway the destinies of Afghanistan. Cherchez In f;?vzlm is thc keynote among Western
peoples of an investigation into the origin of most
troubles and strifes; thc watchword of the student of
the springs of great popular outbursts anlong Eastern
nations must be Che?dw Ies #I&YES.
T h e Pcter the
Hermit of Afghanistan was the old Mushk-i-Alum, the
fanatic Chicf Moulla of Ghuznee. This aged enthusiast
went to and fro among the tribes proclaiming the sacred
duty of a Jchnd or religious war against the unbelieving
invaders, stinlulating the pious passions of the follolvers
of the Prophet by fervent appeals, enjoining the chiefs t o
merge their intestine strifes in the common universal
effort to crush the foreign invaders of the Afghan soil.
T h e female relatives of the abdicated Ameer fomentcd
the rising by appeals to popular sympathy, and by the
more practical argument of lavish clistribution of treasure.
T h e flame spread, tribesmen and disbandccl soldiers sprang

to arms, the banner of the Prophet was unfurled, ancl thc
nation hcaved with the impulse of fanaticism. Musa
Khan, the boy heir of Yakoub, was in thc hands of the
R~ushlt-i-Alum, and the combination of fighting tribes
found a compctent leader in Mahomed Jan, a Warduk
general of proved courage and capacity. The plan of
campaign was comprehcnsive and well deviscd. T h e
contingent from the country to the south of the capital,
from Logur, Zurrnat, and the Mangal and Jadran districts, was to seize that section of thc Cabul ridge
cstcnding from Charasiah northward to the cleft through
which f l o w the Cabul river. Thc northcrn contingent from the ICohistan and I<ohclaman was to occupy
the Asrnai heights and thc hills furthcr to the north-west;
while the troops from the Maidan and Wardulc territories,
lcd by Mahomed Jan in person, were to cornc in from thc
westward across the Chardch valley, take possession of
Cabul, and rally to their banners the disaffected population of the capital and thc surrounding villages. T h e
concentration of thc three bodies cfrected, the capital
and the ridge against which it leans occupied, the next
step would be the invcstrnent of the Sherpur cantonment, preparatory to an assault upon it in force.
The British gcncral through his spics had information
of those projects. T o allow the projected concentration
t o be effected would involve scrious disadvantages, ancl
both experience and ternpcrament enjoined on Roberts
the offensive. The Logur contingent was regarded as
not of much account, and might be headcd back by a
threat. Mahorncd Jan's force, which was reclconccl soinc
5000 strong, neecled to bc handlcd with greater vigour.
P

Mcer Butcha and his ICohistances werc less formidable,
and might be dealt with incidentally. Roberts took a
measure o f wise precaution in telegraphing to Coloncl
Jenkins on the 7th Deccmbcr to march his Guiclcs
(cavalry and infantry) from Jugdulluk to Sherpur.
On the 8th General Macpherson was sent out toward
the west with a column consisting of 1300 bayoncls,
three squadrons, and cight guns. Following thc Ghuznec
road across the Chardeh vallcy, hc was to march to
Urgundeh, in the vicinity of which place it was espectcd
that he would find Mahomed Jan's lcvies, which he was
to attack and drive backward on Maidan, taking care t o
prevent their retreat to the westward in the direction of
Bamian. 011the iollowing day General Balcer marched
out with a force made up of goo infantrymen, two and a
half squadrons, a n d four guns, with instructions to march
southward toward the Logur vallcy, deal with the tribal
gathering there, then bend sharply in a south-westerly
direction and talzc up a position across the Ghuznee
road in the Maidan valley on the line of retreat which it
was hoped that Macphcrson would succeed in enforcing
on Mahomcd Jan. I n that casc thc Afghan leadcr would
find himself between two fircs, and would bc punished s o
severely a s to rendcr it unlilccly that he would give
fiirthcr trouble. T o afford timc for Balcer to reach the
position assigned to him lWacpherson remained halted
during the 9th a t Aushar, a village just bcyond the
debouche of the Nan~ichee Pass, a t the north-western
estremity of the Asmai heights. On that day a cavalry
recoimaissance discovered that the Kohistanee levics in
considerable strength had already gathcred about Karcz

Meer, some ten miles north-west of Cabul, and that
masses of Afghans presumably belonging to the force of
Mahomed Jan were moving northward in the Kohistan
direction, apparently with the object of joining Meer
Butcha's gathering a t Karcz. I t was imperative that thc
latter should be dispersed before the junction could be
effected, and Sir Frederick Roberts 11ad IIO option but to
order Macpherson to alter his line of advance and move
against the Kohistanees. Necessary as was this clivergence from the original plan of operation, it had the effect
of sending to wreck the combined movement from which
so much was hoped, and of bringing about a very critical
situation. If Lockhart's reconnaissancc had been made
a day earlier, Macpherson might probably have utilised
to good purpose b y dispersing the I<ohistanees, the day
which as it was he spent halted a t Aushar. H e might
have accomplished that object equally well if, instead of
the cavalry reconnaissance made by Lockhart, Macpherson himself had bccn instructcd to devote the 9th to a
reconnaissancc in force in the direction of Karez Meer.
The country being held unsuited for the action of
wheeled artillery and cavalry, Macpherson left his cletails
of those arms a t Aushar, and marched on thc morning
of the 10th o n Karez with his infantry and mountain
guns. A s his troops crowned the Surkli Kotul they saw
before them an imposing spectacle. T h e whole terrain
around Karez swarmed with masses of armed tribesmen,
whose banncrs were flying on every hillocl~. Down in the
Pughman valley to the Ieft rear, were discerned bodies of
the hostile contingent from thc mcst, between which and
the Kohistanees no junction had fortunately as yet

been made.
Macpherson's disposit~ons werc simple.
His mountain guns shelled with effect the Kohistanee
tribesmen, and then he moved forward from the Surkh
Kotul in three columns. His skirmishers drove back
the forward stragglcrs, and then the main columns
advancing a t the double swept the disordered masscs
before them, and forced them rearward into their intrenched position in front of thc I<arcz village. There
thc resistance was half-hearted. After a brief artillery
preparation the columns carried the position with a rush,
and thc Kohistanees were routed with heavy loss. Meer
Butcha and his Kohistances well beaten, Macpherson
camped for the night near Karez. Baker had reaclicd
his assigned position in the Maidan vallcy, and there
seemed a fair prospect that the opcrntion against
Mahomed Jan as originally designed might be carried
out notwithstanding the interruption to its prosecution
which had been found necessary. For therc was good
reason t o believe that the Afghan commander and his
force, whose strength was estimated a t about 5000 men,
werc in the vicinity of Urgundeh, about midway betwcen
Macpherson at Karez and Rakcr in the Maidan valley.
If Mahomed Jan would be so con~plaisantas to remain
where he was until h4acpherson could reach him, then
Roberts' strategy would have a triumphant issue, and
the Warclul; general and his followers might be relegated
to t h e category of negligable quantities.
Ordcrs wcrc sent to Macpherson to march as early as
possible on the morning of thc I rth, follow up the enemy
who had been observed retiring toward the west and
south, and endeavour to drive them down toward General

Ralcer. H e was furthcr informed that the cavalry and
horse-artillery which he had left a t Aushar would leave
that village at nine A.M. under the command of BrigadierGeneral Massy, and would cross the Chardeh valley by
the Urgundeh road, on which he was directed to join
them on his march. T h e specific instructions given to
General Massy were as follows : ' T o advance from Aushar
by the road leading directly from the city of Cabul
toward Urgunclell and Ghuznee ' (the main Ghuznee
road), ' t o proceed cautiously and quietly feeling for
the enemy, to communicate with General Macpherson,
and to act in conformity ~ i t hthat officer's movements,
but on no account to commit himself to a n action until
General Macpherson had engaged the enemy.'
Macpherson marched a t eight A.&I.,moving in a southwesterly direction toward Urgundeh by a direct track in
rear of the range of hills bounding the western edge of
the Chardeh valley. T o the point a t which it was probable that he and Massy should meet he had considerably
further to travel than had the latter from t h c Aushar
camp, and Macpherson's force consisted of infantry while
that of Massy was cavalry and horse-artillery. Massy left
Aushar a t nine A.M. in consideration of the shorter distancc he had t o traverse, and he headed for Killa Kazee,
a village near thc foothills of the western ridge about
four miles from Aushar as the crow flies. We did not
coinply with the letter of his instructions to follow the
Ghuznee road because of the wide detour marching by it
would have involved, but instead made his way straight
across country. T h a t he should have done this was unfortunate, since the time he thus gained threw him forward

into a position involving danger in advance of any possible
co-operation on the part of Macpherson, who was still far
away from the point of intended junction while Massy
was comparatively near it. Massy's force consisted of
two squadrons 9th Lancers and a troop of 14th Bengal
Lancers, escorting four horse-artillery guns. Me had
detached a troop of 9th Lancers to endcavour to open
communication with Macpherson, in compliance with his
instructions. As he approached Killa Kazee, Captain
Gough commanding the troop of 9th Lancers forming
the advance guard, sent back word that the hills on
either side of the Ghuznee road some distance beyond
the village were occupied by the enemy in considerable
force. Massy, in his unsupported condition and destitute
of any information as to Macpherson's whereabouts, would
have shown discretion by halting on receipt of this intelligence pending further devclopmcnts. But he probably
believed that the Afghans flanking the road were casual
tribesmen from the adjacent villages who were unlikely
to make any stand, and he determined to move on.
W h a t he presently saw gavc him pause. A great
mass of Afghans some zoo0 strong were forming across
thc Ghuznee road. From the hills to right and left
broad streams of armed men were pouring down the hillslopes and forming on the plain. The surprise was
complete, the situation full of perplexity. That gathering host in Massy's front could be none other than
Mahomed Jan's entire force. S o far from being in retreat soutliward and westward, so far from waiting
supinely about Urgundeh until Macpherson as per programme should drive it on to thc muzzles of Baker's

Martinis, here it was inside our guard, in possession of
the interior line, its front facing toward turbulent Cabul
and depleted Sherpur, with no obstruction in its path
save this handful of lancers and these four guns ! Massy's
orders, it was true, were to act in conformity with Macpherson's movements, and on no account to commit himself to an action until that officer had engaged the enemy.
Yes, but could the framer of those orders have anticipated
the possibility of such a position as that in which Massy
now found himself? There was no Macpherson within ken
of the perpkxed cavalryman, nor the vaguest indication of
his movements. T h e enemy had doubled on that stout
and shrewd soldier ; it was clear that for the moment he
was not within striking distance of his foe, whether on
flank or on rear. No course of action presented itself to
Massy that was not fraught with grave contingencies.
If he should keep to the letter of his orders, the Afghan
host might be in Cabul in a couple of hours. Should he
retire slowly, striving to retard the Afghan advance by
his cannon fire and by the threatening demonstrations of
his cavalry, the enemy might follow him up so vigorously as t o be beyond Macpherson's reach when that
oficer should make good his point in the direction of
Urgundeh. If on the other hand he should show a bolcl
front, and departing from his orders in the urgent crisis
face to face with which hc found himself should strain
every nerve to 'hold ' the Afghan masses in their present
position, there was the possibility that, at whatever sacrifice to himself and his little force, he might save the
situation and gain time for Macpherson to come up and
strike Mahomed Jan on flank and in rear.

F o r better or for worse Massy committed himself to
the rasher enterprise, and opened fire on the swiftly
growing Afghan masses. The first range was held
not sufficiently effective, and in the hope by closer fire
of deterring the enemy from effecting the formation
they were attempting, the guns were advanced to the
shorter ranges of 2500 and zoo0 yards. The shells did
csecution, but contrary t o precedent clid not daunt the
Afghans. They made good their formation under the
shell fire. Mahomed Jan's force had been estimated of
about 5000 strong; according to Massy's estimate it
proved to be double that number. The array was well
led ; it never wavered, but came steadily on with waving
banners and loud shouts. Thc guns had to be retired ;
tllcy came into action again, but owing to the rapidity of
thc Afghan advance at shorter range than before. The
carbine fire of thirty clismounted lancers 'had no appreciable effect.' The outlook was already ominous when at
this moment Sir Frederick Roberts came on the scene.
As was his wont, he acted with decision. The action, it
was clear to him, could not be maintained against odds
so overwhelming and in ground so unfavourable. H e
immediately ordered Massy to retire slo\vly, to search for
a ' r o a d by which the guns could be withdrawn, and to
watch for an opportunity to execute a charge under cover
of which the guns might be extricated. I-Ie despatched
an aide-de-camp in quest of Macpherson, with an order
directing that officer to wheel to his left into the Chardeh
valley and hurry to Massy's assistance ; and he ordered
General Hills to gallop to Sherpur and warn General
I-Iugh Gough, who had charge in the cantonment, to be

on the alcrt, and also to send out at spced a wing of the
72d to the villagc of Dell Mazung, in the throat of
thc gorge of the Cabul river, which the I-Iighlanders were
to hold to extremity.
Thc enemy mcre coming on, the guns were in imminent dangei; ancl the moment had come for the action of
thc cavalry. The gallant Cleland gave the word to his
lancers and led them straight for the centre of the Afghan
line, the troop of Bengal Lancers following in support.
Gough, away on the Afghan left, saw his chief charging
ancl hc eagerly 'conformed,' crushing in on the cnemy's
flank at thc head of his troop. ' Self-sacrifice ' the
Germans hold the duty of cavalry; and there have been
few forlorner hopes than the errand on which on this illstarred day our zoo troopers rode into the heart of
10,000Afghans flushed with unwonted good fortune.
Through the dust-cloud of the charge werc visible the
flashes of the Afghan vollcys and the sheen of the British
lance heads as they came clo\vn to the 'engage.' There
was a short intesval of suspense, the stour and bicker of
the nttlke faintly heard, but invisible bchind the bank of
smolte and dust. Then from out the cloud of battle
riderless horscs came galloping back, followed by
brolten groups of troopcrs. Gallantly lcd home, the
charge had failed-what
other result could have been
cxpccted ? Its career had becn blocked by sheer weight
of opposing numbers. Sisteen troopers had been Itillecl,
seven were wounded, two officers hacl been slain in the
hand-to-hand strife. Cleland came out with a sword cut
and a bullet wound. Captain Stewart Macltenzie had
been crushed undcr his fallen horsc, but distinguishecl
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himself greatly, and brought the regiment out of action.
As the-dust settled it was apparent that the charge had
merely encouraged the enemy, who as they steadily
presscd on in good order, were waving their banners in
triumph and brandishing their tulwars and knives. The
fire from the Sniders and Enfields of their marksmen was
well directed and deliberate. While Cleland's broken
troopers mere being rallied two guns were brought into
action, protccted in a measure by Gough's troop and the
detachment of Bengal Lancers, which had not suffered
much in the charge. But the Afghans came on so
ardently that there was no alternative but prompt retreat.
One gun had to be spiked and abandoned, Lieutenant
H a r d y of t h e Horse-Artillery remaining by it until surrounded and killed. Some 500 yards further back, near
the village of Baghwana, the three remaining guns stuck
fast in a deep watercourse. At General Roberts' instance
a second charge was attempted, to give time for their
extrication ; but it made no head, so that thc guns had
to be abandoned, and the gunners and drivers with their
tcalns accompanied the retirement of the cavalry. Some
fugitives both of cavalry and artillery hurried to the
shelter of t h e cantonlncnt somewhat precipitately; but
the grcat majority of Massy's people behaved well, rallying without hesitation and constituting the steady and
soldierly little body with which Roberts, retiring on Deh
Mazung as slowly as possible to give time for the
Highlanders from Shcrpur to reach that all-important
point, strove t o delay the Afghan advance. This in
a measure was accomplished by the dismounted fire of
the troopers, and the retirement was distinguished by the

steady coolness displayed by Gough's men and Neville's
Bcngal Lancers. Deh Mazung was reached, but no
Highlanders had as yet reached that place.
The
carbines of the cavalrymen were promptly utilised fi-om
the cover the village afforded ; but they could not have
availed to stay the Afghan rush. There was a short
interval of extreme anxiety until the 200 incn of the
72d, Bro~vnlo\v leading them, became visible advancing
at the double through the gorge. ' I t was litcrally touch
and go who should reach the village first, the I-Iighlandcrs
or the Afgl~ans,'who were streaming toward i t ' liltc ants
on a hill,' but the men of the 72d swept in, and swarming
to the house tops soon checl<ecl with thcir breechloaders
the advancing tide. After half-an-hour of futile effort
the Afghans saw fit to abandon the attempt to force the
gorge, and inclining to their right they occupicd the
Taliht-i-Shah summit, the slopes of the Sher Derwaza
heights, and the villages in the south-eastern section of
the Chardeh valley.
Macpherson, marching from the Surlih Kotul toward
Urgundeh, had observed parties of Afghans crossing his
front in the direction of the Chardeh valley, and when
the sound reached him of Massy's artillcry fire h e
wheeled to his left through a break in the hills opening
into the Cliardeh valley, and approached the scene of the
discomfiturc of Massy's force. This he did a t 12.30 P.M.,
four and a half hours after leaving the Surkh Kotul. A s
the length of his march was about ten miles, it may be
assumed that hc encountered difficulties in the rugged
track by which h e moved, for Macpherson was not the
man to linger by the way when there was the prospect of

a fight. H a d it becn possible for him to havc marched
two hours earlier than h e did-and his orders were to
march as early as possible-his doing so would have madc
all t h e cliKerence in the world to Massy, and could
scarcely havc failed to change the face of the day. H'c
did not discover t h e lost guns, but he struck the Afghan
rear, which was speedily brolten and dispcrscd by the
67th and gd Sikhs. Macpherson's intention to spend the
night a t Icilla Kazee was changed by the reccipt of an
order from Gencral Roberts calling him in to Dch
Mazung, where he arrived about nightfall. Sir Frederick
Roberts then returned t o Sherpur, for thc defence of
which General Iiug11 Gough had maclc thc best dispositions in his power, and t h c slendcr garrison of which was
to receive in thc course of thc night an invaluable accession in the shapc of the Guides, goo strong, whom
Jenkins had brought u p by forced marches from Jugdulluk.
T h e misfortunes of t h e clay were in a measure retrieved
by a well-timed, ready-wittccl, and gallant action on the
part of that brilliant and lamented soldier Colonel Macgregor. A wing of the 72d had been called out to hold
the gorge of the Cabul rivcr, but thc Nanuchcc Pass,
through which led the direct road from the scene of the
combat to Sherpur, remained open ; and there was a time
when the Afghan army was heading in its direction.
Macgregor had hurried t o the open pass in timc to rally
about him a number of Massy's people, who had lost their
officers and were malting their way confi~sedlytou,arcI
the r c f ~ ~ of
g e Sherpur. Remaining in possession of this
important point until all danger was over, he noticed that

the ground about Bagwana, wherc the guns had been
abandoned, was not held by the enemy, and there seemed
to him that the opportunity to recover them presented
itself. Taking with hirn a detachment of lancers and
artillcrymen, he rode out and met with no molestation
beyond a few shots from villagers. From Macpherson's
baggage guard, mct as it crossed tllc valley toward
Sherpur, he requisitionecl sixty infantrymen who entered
and held nagwana, and covered him and the gunners
during the long and arduous struggle to extricate the
guns from their lair in the deep and rugged watcrcoursc.
This was at length accomplished, scratch teams were improvised, and thc guns, which were uninjured although
the ammunition boxes had been cmptied, were brought
into the cantonment to the general joy.
The result of the day's operations left General Balter
momentarily belated. 13ut on the morning of thc I 1t1-1
that officer, finding that no Afghans wcre being driven
down upon him i n accordance with the programmc,
quitted the Maidan country and rnarchcd nortlnvarcl
toward Urgundch. A11 attack on his baggage and rearguard was foiled ; but as he reached his camping ground
for the night at Urgundeh the Afghans were found in
possession of the gorge opening into the Chardeh valley,
through which ran his road Lo Cabul. They were dislodged by a dashing attack of part of the 92cl Highlanders
led by Lieutcnant Scott Napier. I t was not until the
morning of the 12th that Balter was informed by hcliograph from Shcrpur of the occurrences of the previous
day, and received directions to return to the cantonment
without delay. In thc course of a few hours hc was insidc

Sherpur, notwithstanding that his march had becn constantly molested by attaclcs on his rear-guard.
T h e casualties of the I rth had been after all not very
serious. All told they amounted t o thirty men lcilled and
forty-four wounded ; fifty-one horses lcilled and sixteen
wounclcd. But the Afghans were naturally elated by thc
success they had unqucstionably achieved ; the national
rising had been inaugurated by a distinct triumph, the
news of which would bring into thc field incalculablc
swarms of fierce and fanatical partisans. I t was clear
that Mahomed Jan had a quick eye for opportunities, and
some skill in handling men. That he could recognise the
keypoint of a position and act boldly and promptly on
that recognition, his tactics of the I 1t11 made abundantly
obvious, and his coimnanding position on thc morning of
the 12th still further demonstrated his tactical ability.
L'auu'ace, etrcore I'mu'nce, e l lotljows I'uudrrcc is the game
to be played by the commander of disciplined troops
against Asiatic levies, and no man was more sensible of
this than the gallant soldier who now from the bastion
of Sherpur could see the Afghan standards waving on the
summit of the Talcht-i-Shah. Indeed he was i~npressed
so thoroughly by the force of the maxim as to allow himself to hope that some 560 soldiers, of whom about oncthird were Europeans, backed by a couple of mountain guns,
would bc able to carry by assault the lofty peal;, strongly
held b y resolute Afghans in protected positions, supported
by several thousands of thcir fcllows lying out of sight until
an attack should devclop itself, t o meet which they were
a t hand to reinforce the garrison of the Takht-i-Shah.
From thc gorge of the Cabul river there runs due south

t o near Charasiah a lofty and rugged range, the highest
point of which, the Takht-i-Shah, is about midway from
either extremity. From this main ridge there project
eastward at right angles two lateral spurs. The shorter
ancl more northerly of those runs down to the Balla
Hissar, the longer and more southerly obtruding itself
into the plain as far as the village of Beni Hissar. This
latter spur quits the main ridge no great distance south
of the Takht-i-Shah peak, and on the 12th the Afghan
reserves were nlasscd in rear of the peal;, both on the
main ridge and on this spur. The steep faces of the
mountain were strewn with great smooth boulders ancl
jagged masses of roclc ; the ascent, everynrherc laborious,
was complicated in places by sheer scarps, and those
formidable impediments were made still more difficult by
frequent sungahs, strong stone curtains behind which the
defenders lay safe or fired with a minimum of esposure.
On the summit was a great natural cavity which had
been made bomb proof by art, and f ~ ~ r t h ecover
r
was
afforded by caves and lines of roclc. The most northerly
portion of the ridge described is known as the Sher
Derwaza heights, which Macpherson had occupied on
the morning of the rzth, ancl his brigade it was which
furnished the little force already mentioned as charged
to attempt the task of storming the Talcht-i-Shah.
F o r several hours Morgan's two mountain guns industriously shelled that peak, and then the infantry made
their effort. T h e Afgllans fought stubbornly in defence
of a lower hill thcy held in advance of the Takht-i-Shah,
but after a hard struggle they had to abandon it to
Macpherson's resolute men. But the esertions of thc
0,

latter t o ascend the peak were baulkcd by its rugged
steepness and the fire of the Afghans holding the sungahs
on its face. Sir Frederick Roberts had to recognise that
the direct attack b y s o weak a force unaided by a diversion, could not succeed, and hc ordered further efforts to
be deferred. T h c casualties of the abortive attempt included three officers, onc of whom, Major Cook, V.C.
of the Goorkhas, than whom the British army contained
no better solclier, died of his wound. Nlacpherson was
directed to hold t h e ground he had won, including the
lower advanced hill, and was informed that on the following morning he was to expect the co-operation of General
Baker from t h e direction of Beni I-Iissar.
T h e lesson of the result of attempting impossibilities
had been talcen to heart, and the force which Baker led
out on thc morning of the 13th was exceptionally strong,
consisting as it clicl of the gzd I-Iighlanders and Guides
infantry, a wing of the 3cl Sikhs, a cavalry regiment, and
eight 'guns. Marching in the direction of the lateral spur
extending from the main ridge eastward to Beni Ilissar,
Baker observed that large masses of the enemy were
quitting the plain villages about Ueni Hissar in which
they h a d taken shelter for the night, and were hurrying
t o gain the summit of the spur which constituted the
defensive position of the Afghan reserve. Baker's cot@
d'ct.2 was quick and true, By gaining the centre of the
spur h e would cut in two the Afghan line along its
summit, and so isolate and neutralise the section of it
from the centre t o the Beni Ilissar extremity, toward
which section the reinforcements from the plain villages
were climbing. But to accomplish this shrewd stroke it

was necessary that he should act with promptitiide and
energy. His guns opcncd fire on the summit. Tlic
Sikhs, extended athwart the plain, protected his right
flank. His cavalry on the left cut into the bodies of
Afghans hurrying t o ascend the eastern extremity of the
spur. With noble emulation the I-Iighlanders and the
Guides sprang 11p the rugged slope, their faces set towarcls
the centre of the summit line. Major White, who alrcady
had earned many laurels in thc campaign, led on his
I-Iighlanclers ; the Gtiidcs, burning to Inale the most of
their first opportunity to distinguish themselves, followed
eagerly the gallant chief who had so often led them to
victory on other fields. Licutenant Forbes, a young
officer of the 92d heading the advancc of his regiment,
reached the summit accompanied only by his coloursergeant. A band of ghazees rushed on the pair and
thc sergeant fell. As Forbes stood covcring his body
he was overpo\verecl and slain. T h e sudden catastrophe
staggered for a moment the soldiers following their officel;
but Lieutenant Dick Cunyngharn rallied them iminecliately and led them forward at speed. For his conduct
on this occasion Cunyngham received the Victoria Cross.
With rolling volleys Highlanders and Guides reachccl
and won the summit. T h e Afghans momentarily clung
to the position, but the British fire swept them away and
the bayonets clisposecl of the ghazees, who fought and
died in defence of their standards. Thc scverance of the
Afghan line was complete. A detachment was left t o
maintain the isolation of some 2000 of the enemy who
had been cut off; and then swinging to their right.
Baker's regiments swept along the summit of the spur

to\v,lrcI the main ridgc and thc Taltht-i-Shah, thc Highlanders leading. As they advanced they rolled up the
Afghan linc and a panic set in among the enemy, who
sought safety in flight. Assailed from both sides, for
Macpherson's men from the conical hill were passing up
the north sidc of thc peak, and shaken by the steady fire
of the mountain guns, the garrison of the Takht-i-Shah
evacuated the position. Balier's soldiers toiled vigorously
upward toward the peak, lieen for the honour of winning
i t ; but the credit of that achievement justly fell to their
co~nradesof Macpherson's command, \\rho had striven so
valiantly to carn it the day before, and who had gained
possession of the pcalc and the Afghan standards flying
o n its summit, a few minules before the arrival of White's
Mighlanclers and Jenlcins' Guides. As the midclay gun
was fired in the canton~ncntthc flash of the heliograph
from the peak told that the Taliht-i-Shah was won.
While I3alier was sweeping thc spur and climbing the
lofty peak of the main ridge, his reserve, which remained
in the plain, was in sharp action against masses of assailants from the city and otl~cr bodics from the villages
about Beni Hissar. Those were beaten off by the 3cl
Sikhs and Uakcr's flanks were thus cleared, but the
rcsolute Afghans, bent on interfering with his return
march, surged away in thc direction of thc Siah Sung
ridge and gatliered thereon in considerable stre~~gtll.
T h e guns of Sherpur shellecl them smartly, but they held
their ground ; and Massy went out to disperse thcm \\rith
the cavalry. The Afghans showed unwonted resolution,
confronting the cavalry with cstraordinary steadiness in
cegulnr formation and withholding their firc ulltil the

troopers wcrc close upon them. But the horseinen were
not to be denied. Captains Butson and Chisholme led
their squadrons against the Afghan fianlts, and the
troopers of the 9th avenged the mishap which had befallen that gallant regiment two days before, riding
through and through the hostile masses and scattcring
them over the plain, Rut in the charge Butson was killed,
Chisholme and Trower were mounded; the sergeantmajor and three men were Idled and seven were wounded.
Brilliant charges were delivered by t h e other cavalry
detachments, ancl the Siali Sung heights werc ultimately
cleared. The Guides' cavalry attacked, defeated, and
pursued for a long distance a body of Kohistanees marching from the north-east apparently with intent to join
Maliomed Jan. T h e casualties of the day were sixteen
lcilled and forty-five wounded ; not a heavy loss considering the amount of hard fighting. T h e Afghans
were estimated to have lost in killed alone from 200 to
300 men.
The operations of the clay werc unquestionably successful so far as thcy went, but the actual rcsults attaincd
scarcely warrantecl the anticipation that the Afghans
would acltnowledge themselves defcatecl by breaking up
their combination ancl dispersing to their homes. I t was
true that they had been defeated, but they had fought
with unprecedentecl stubbornness and gave little evidence
of being cowed. Throughout the day the villages around
Cabul had evinced a rancorous hostility which had a
marlced significance. Not less significant was the participation in the fighting of the day o n thc part of thc
population of Cabul. As Raker was returning to Sherpur
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in t h e evening he had been fircd upon from the Balla
Hissar, and his flanking parties had found ambushes of
armed Afghans among the willows between the city and
the cantonrncnt. But for the sltill and couragc of the
non-commissioned officer in charge a convoy of wouncled
on its way to Sherpur would certainly havc been
destroyed. But there was a stronger argument than any
of those indications, significant as they werc of thc unbroken spirit of the Afghans, telling against the probability that the operations of the day would havc the
cffect of putting down t h e national rising. Thc hordes
which had gathcred to the banners of the Mushk-i-Alum
and Mahorned Jan cornbincd with thc fanaticism of thc
jthnd a fine secular greed for plundcr. Was it likely that
they would scatter resignedly, leaving untouched the rich
booty of the city that had been almost within arm'slength as they looked down on it from the peak of the
Taliht-i-Shah, and whose minarets thcy werc within
sight of on thc spur and in the villages of Bcni-Hissar?
W a s that ever likely? A n d was it not made more and
yet morc unlikely when on the afternoon of the 13th
Macphcrson, acting on orders, moved his camp to the
Balla Hissar heights, evacuating Deh Mazung and leaving
open t o the enciny thc road into the city through the
Cahul 'gorge? The following morning \VRS to sho\v how
promptly and how frcely the Afghans had taken advanlage of the access to the capital thus afforded them. I t
must never be forgottcn that a t this time our people in
Afghanistan held no n o r e territory than thc actual
ground thcy stood upon and the terrain swept by their
firc. N o trustwortl~yintelligence from outside that region

was procurable; and of this thcrc can bc no clearcr
cvidence than that thc General was under the belief that
the enemy had bcen ' foiled in their western and southern
operations.'
T h e morning of the 14th effectually dispelled the
optimistic anticipations indulged in overnight. A t daybreak a large body of Afghans, with many standards,
were discerned on a hill about a mile northward of the
Asmai ridge, from which and from the Kohistan road
they were moving on to the crest of that ridge. They
were joincd there by sevcral thousa~~cls
coming u p the
slopes from out thc village of Deh Afghan, the northern
suburb of Cabul. It was estimated that there were about
Sooo men in position along the summit of thc ridge, and
occupying also a low conical hill beyond its north-western
termination. T h c array of Afghans displayed itself
within a mile of the west facc of thc Shcrpur cantonment, ancl formed a menace which could not be broolcccl.
To Gcncral Baker was entrusted thc task of dislodging
the enemy from the threatening position, ancl the1 c was
assigned t o him for this purpose a force consisting of
about 1200 bayonets, eight guns, and a regiment of native
cavalry. His first object was t o gain possession of the
conical hill alrcady rnentioncd, and thus debar th6 Afghan
force on thc Asmai heights from receiving accessions
cither from the masses on the hill further north or by
thc Kohistan road. Undcr cover of the artillery fire the
Highlanders and Guides occupied this conical hill aftcr a
short conflict. A detachment was left to hold it and then
Colonel Jcnkins, who commanclecl the attack, set about
the arduous task of storming from thc northmarcl the

formidable position of the Asmai heights. The assault
was led by Brownlow's staunch Highlanders, supported
011 the right by the Guidcs operating on the enemy's
flank ; and the fifghan position was heavily shclled by
four of Baker's guns, and by four more in action ncar
thc south-western corncr of the Sherpur cantonment.
Macphcrson from his position on thc 13alla I-Iissar
hill aidcd the attack by the fire of his guns, and
also by despatching two companies of the 67th to
cross the Cabul gorge and opcrate against thc cncmy's
lcft rcar.
I n the face of a hcavy firc thc I-Iighlanders and Guides
climbed with great speed and steadiness thc ruggcd hillside leading upward to the Afghan breastwork on the
northcrn cdgc of the summit. Their approach and the
crushing shrapncl fire from thc guns near Shcrpur had
caused nun~erous Afghans to m o w donrnward from thc
position toward Dell Afghan, hcavily smitten as thcy
went ; but the ghazees in the breastworlcs made a strcnuous resistance and died under thcir banncrs as the
Highlanders carried the defences with a rush. T h e crest,
about a quarter of a mile long, was travcrscd under heavy
fire and the southern breastwork on the peak was approached. I t was strong and strongly held, but a cross
fire was brought to bear on its garrison, and then the
frontal attack led by a lance-corporal of the 72d was
delivcrcd.
After a hand-to-hand grapplc in ~vhich
Highlanders and Guides were freely cut and slashed by
the knives of the ghazccs, the position, which mas found
full of dead, was carricd, but with considcrable loss. Thc
whole summit of thc Asmai heights was now in Britisli

possession, and everything seemcd auspicious. The
Afghans streaming clown from the heights toward the
city werc being lacerated by shell fire and musketry firc
as thcy descended. When they took refuge in Deh
Afghan that suburb was heavily shelled, and it was
gradually evacuated.
Scarcely had Jenkins won the summit of the Asmai
ridge when the fortunc of the day was suddenly overcast ; indeed while he was still engagcd in the attainment of that object premonitory indications of serious
mischief were unexpectedly prcsenting themselves. A
vast host of Afghans described as numbering from
15,mto 20,000, debouchcd into thc Chardeh valley
from the direction of Indilee, and were moving northwards, apparently with the object of forming a junction
with the masscs occupying thc hills to the north-west of
the Asmai heights. About the samc time cavalry scouting in the Chardeh vallcy brought in the information that
large parties of hostile infantry and cavalry werc hurrying
across the vallcy in thc direction of thc conical hi11 the
defencc of which had been entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel
Clark with I 20 I-Iighlandcrs and Guidcs. Kccognising
Clark's wealmess, General B a l e r had judiciously reinforced
that officer with four mountain guns and roo bayonets.
TI,^ guns opcned fire on the Afghan boclies marching
from the IWla Kazee direction, and drovc thcm out of
range. But they coalesced with the host advancing froin
Indiltee, and the vast mass of Afghans, facing to thc
right, struck the whole range of the British position from
near the Cabul gorge on the south to and beyond the
conical hill on thc north. T h e most vulnerable point was
C

the section a t and about that eminence, and thc necessity
for supplying Clark with further reinforcements became
urgentlymanifest. Baker sent up a second dctachment, and
200 Sikhs came out from Sherpur at the double. Rut the
Afghans, crceping stealthily in great numbers up the slope
from out the Chardeh valley, had the shorter distance to
travel, ancl were beforehand with the reinforcements.
Their tactics werc on a par with their resolution. The
left of their attack grasped and held a I<noll north of the
conical hill, and from this position of vantage brought a
cross fire to bear o n Clark's detachment. As their direct
attaclc developed itself i t cncountercd from the conical
hill a heavy rifle fire, ancl shells at short range tore
through the loosc rush of ghazces, but thc fanatics spcd
on a n d up without wavering. A s they gathered behind a
mound for the final onslaught, Captain Spens of the 72d
with a handful of his Highlanders went out on the forlorn
hope of dislodging them. A rush was madc on him ; he
was overpowerecl and slaughtered after a desperate resistance, and t h e Afghan charge swept up the hill-side. In
momentary panic the dcfenders gave ground, carrying
d o ~ v r ~ h i lwith
l
thcm the reinforcement of Punjaubccs
which Captain Ilall was bringing up. Two of the
mountain guns were lost, but there was a rally at the foot
of t h e hill undcr cover of which thc other two n7crc extricated. T h c Afghans refrained from descending into
the plain, and directed their cfforts toward cutting off the
occupants of the position on the Asmai summit. They
ascended by two distinct directions. One body from
the conical hill followcd t h e route takcn by Jcnkins in the
morning; another scaled a spur trending clowt~~va~-d
to

the Chardeh valley from the southern estrcmity of the
Asmai ridge.
I t was estimatcd that the Afghan strength disclosed
this day did not fall short of 40,000 men ; and General
Roberts was reluctantly compelled to abandon for the
time any further offensive efforts. His reasons, stated
with perfect frankness, may best be given i n his own
words. ' U p to this time,' he wrote, ' I had no reason to
apprehend that the Afghans were in sufficient force to
cope successfully with disciplined troops, but the resolute
and determined rnanncr in which the conical hill had
bccn recaptured, and thc information sent t o me by
Brigadier-General Macpherson that large masses of the
enemy were still advancing from the north, south, and
west, made it evident that the numbers combined against
us were too overwhelming to admit of my comparatively
small force meeting thcm. I therefore determined to
withdraw from all isolatcd positions, and to concentrate
the whole force at Sherpur, thus securing thc safety of
our large cantonment, and avoiding what had now bccome a useless sacrifice of life.' The orders issued to
Generals Balm- and Macphcrson to retirc into the cantonment were eexecutcd with skill and steadiness.
Jenkins' evacuation of thc Asmai position was conspicuously adroit. When thc order to quit reachcd that able
officer, Major Stockwell of the 72d was out with R small
dctachrnent, maintaining a hot fire on the Afghari boclics
ascending by the southcrn spur from the Chardeh valley.
I-Ie fell back with great deliberation, and whcn hc rejoined the retirement down thc hill face looking toward
Sherpur mas leisurely procecdcd with, thc hostile advance
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from the northern sidc being held in check by thc fire of
covering partics from Jenkins' left flank. Gcneral Macpherson's retirement mas rnastcrly. Flanlting his march
through the Cabul gorgc with two cornpanics of the 67th
who stallcd off a rush of ghazccs from thc Asmai crest,
hc continued his march through thc suburb of Dell
Afghan, his baggage in front undcr a strong guard.
Some few shots were exchanged before thc suburb was
cleared, but the casualtics werc few and presently thc
brigade cntercd thc cantonment. General Baker continued to hold a covcring position with part of his force,
until the troops from thc heights and Macpherson's command had rnadc good their retiremcnt, and he was thc
last t o withdraw. By duslc the wholc forcc was safely
concentrated within the cantonment, and thc period of
the defensive had begun. The casualtics of thc day werc
serious ; thil-ty-five Icilled, and 107 woundcd. T h i n g
the week of fighting the little forcc had lost somewhat
hcavily ; thc killed numbered eighty-three, the wounded
192. Eight officers were killed, twelve wcre wounded.

CHAPTER V
ON T H E DEFENSIVE I N SIIERPUR

ALTI-IOUGII
overlarge for its garrison, thc Sherpur cantonment had many of the fcaturcs of a strong cleknsive
position. On the southern and western faccs thc massive
and continuous cncientc rnadc it impregnable against any
force unprovided with siege artillery. But on thc eastern
face the wall had been built to the elevation only of sevcn
feet, and at eithcr end or the Behmaroo heights, which
constituted the northern line of defence, there were open
gaps which had to be rnadc good. Thc space between
thc north.western bastion and the heights was closed by
an entrenchment supported by a ' laager ' of Afghan guncarriages and limbers, thc ground in front strengthened
by abattis and wirc entanglements, beyond which a
village flanking the northern ancl western faces was
occupied as a dctached post. The open space on the
north-eastern angle was similarly fortified ; the villagc of
Rchmaroo was loopholec1, ancl outlying buildings to the
front were placed in a state of dcfcnce. The unfinishccl
eastern wall was heightcncd by logs built up in ticrs, and
its front was covered with abattis, a tower and garden
outside bcing occupied by a dctachmcnt. A series of
block houses had been built along the crcst of the
Bchmaroo heights supporting a continuous entrenchment,

gun emplacements made in the linc of clefencc, ancl thc
gorge clividing the heights strongly fortificd against an
attack from the northcrn plain. The enciente was
clividecl into sections to each of which was assignecl a
commanding officcr with a specified detail of troops ; and
a strong reserve of Europcan infantry was uncler the
command of Brigadier-Gcncral Balm-, ready a t short
notice to reinforce any threatened point. It was presumably owing to the absorption of the troops in fighting,
collecting supplies, and providing winter shelter, that
when the concentration within Shcrpur bccamc suddenly
necessary the clefenccs of the position were still seriously
dcfective; and throughout thc period of investment the
force was unrcrnittingly engagccl in the task of strengthening them. Nor had thc military precaution becn taken of
razing the villages and enclosures within the fire zone of
the enciente, and they remained to afford cover to the
encnly during the period of investment.
Before the enemy cut the telegraph wire in thc early
morning of the 15th Sir Fredcricl< Roberts hacl informed
the authorities in India of his situation and of his need for
rcinforcements; and he had also ordcred up Gcneral
Charles Gough's brigade without loss of time. Gough
was already at Jugdulluk when he rcceived the order
calling him to Cabul, but hc had to wait for reinforcements
and supplies, and the tribesmen were threatening his
position and the line of communication in rear of it. H e
did not move forward until the ~ 1 s t . On the following
day he reached Luttabund, whence he took on with him
the garrison of that post, but although his march was
unmolested it was not until the 24th that 115 reached
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Sherpur, a day too late to participate in repelling the
assault on the cantonment.
While General Roberts' force was busily engaged in
making good the defences of Sherpur, the Afghans refrained from attempting to back their success on the
Asmai heights by an assault on the defensive position
which seemed to invite an attack. During the first two
days of their possession of the city they were enjoying the
fruits of their occupation i n thcir own turbulent manner.
Roberts' spics reported thcm busily engaged in sacking
the I-Iindoo and Kuzzilbash quarters, in looting and
wrecking the houscs of chiefs and townsfolk who had
shown friendliness to the British, and in quarrelling among
themselves over the spoils. Requisitioning was in fill1
force. Thc old Moulla Mushk-i-Alum was the temporary
successor of General Hills in the office of Governor of
Cabul; and spite of his ninety years he threw extraordinary energy into the work of arousing fanaticism and
rallying to Cabul thc fighting men of the surrounding
country. T h e jtllnd of which he had been the chief
instigator had certainly attained unexampled dimensions,
and although it was not in the nature of things that
every Afghan who carried arms should be inspired with
religious fanaticism to such a pitch as to be utterly reckless of his life, swarms of fierce ghazees made formidable
the levies which Mahomed J a n commanded.
On the 17th and 18th the Afghans made ostentatious
demonstrations against Sherpur, but those were never
formidable, although they made themselves troublesome
with some perseverance during thc daytime, consistently
refraining from night attacks, which was remarkable

since ordinarily they are much addicted to the chnflo.
There never was any invcstrnent of Sherpur, or indeed
any approximation to invcstrnent. Cavalry reconnaissances constantly went out, and piquets and videttes
were habitually on external d u t y ; infantry detachments
sallied forth whenever occasion demanded to dislodge
the assailants from points occupied by them in inconvenient proximity to the defences. T h e Afghan offensivc
was not dangerous, but annoying and wearying. It was
indeed pushed with some rcsolution on the 18th) when
several thousand men poured out of the city, and skirmished forward under cover of the gardens and enclosures
on the plain bctween Cabul and Sherpur, in the direction
of thc southern front and the south-western bastions.
The Afighans are admirable skirmishers, and from thcir
close cover kept up for hours a brisk fire on the soldiers
lining the Sherpur dcfcnces, but with singularly little
cffcct. T h e return rifle firc was for the most part
restricted to volleys directed on those of the enemy who
offered a sure mark by exposing themselves; and shell
fire was chiefly used to drive the Afghan sliirmishers
from their cover in the gardens and enclosures. S o m e of
those, notwithstanding, were able to get within 400 yards
of the enciente, but could make no furthcr headway. On
the morning of the 19th it was found that in the night t h c
enemy had occupicd the Meer Alihor fort, a fcw hundred
yards beyond the eastern face, and close to the Rcsidcncy
compound of the old cantonments of 1839-42. T h e firc
from this fort was annoying, and General Baker went o u t
on the errand of destroying it, with 800 bayonets, two
mountain guns, and a party of sappers. As the fort was

-

being approached through the dense mist a suddcn volley
from it struck down several men, and Lieutenant Montenaro of the mountain battery was mortally wounded.
T h e fort was heavily shclled from the south-eastcrn
bastion ; its garrison evacuated it, and it was blown up.
Mahomed Jan and his coadjutors could hardly flatter
themselves that as yet thcy had made any imprcssion on
the steadfast defcncc which the British forcc was maintaining in tlie Sherpur cantonment. T h e Afg-llan lcader
had tried force in vain ; lie knew thc history of that
strange period in the winter of 1841 during which Afghan
truculence and audacity had withcrcd the spirit of a
British force not much less numerically strong than the
little army now calmly withstanding him. Things had
not gone very well with that little army of late, possibly
its constancy might have been impaired, and its chief
might be willing, as had been Elphinstonc and the Eltchi,
to listen t o terms. Anyhow there could b c no harm in
malcilig a proffcr based on thc old lines. S o thc Afghan
leader proposed to Gencral Roberts, apparently in all
seriousness, that thc British army should forthwith
evacuate Afghanistan, encountering no molestation in
its march; that the British General before departing
should engage that Yakoub Khan slioukl return to
Afghanistan as its Anlecr ; and that thcrc should bc left
behind tkvo officers of distinction as hostages for the
faithful f~~lfilment
of tlie contract. ' W e have a lalth of
men ; they are like wolves eager to rush on thcir prey!
W e cannot much longcr control thcm !'-such were said
to have becn the terms of a message intended to disturb
the equanimity of thc British commandcr. Meer B u t c h
R
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and his Kohistanees, again, were not to all appearance
anxious for [he restoration of Yakoub. They professed
themselves content to accept our staunch friend Wali
Mahomed as Amcer, if only the British army would
be good enough to march home promptly and leave to
Afghans thc administration of Afghan affairs. I t was
not likely that a man of Roberts' nature would demean
himself to take any notice of such overtures. For thc
moment circumstances had enforced on him the wisdom
of accepting the defcnsive attitude, but he knew himself,
nevertheless, the virtual master of thc situation. I-Ie
had but one serious anxiety-the apprehension lcst the
Afghans should not harden their hearts to deliver an
assault on his position.
T h a t apprehension was not long to give him concern.
On the zot11, as a menace against the southern face of
Sherpul; the enemy took strong possession of the
Mahomed Shereef fort, stormcd so gallantly by Colonel
Grifliths o n 6th Novembcr 1841 ; and thcy maintaincd
thernselvcs thcre during the two following days in facc
of the fire of siege guns mounted on the bastions of
the enciente. On thc 21st and 22d large numbers of
Afghans quitted the city, and passing eastward behind
the Siah Sung heights, took possession in great force
of the forts and villages outside the eastern face of
Sherpur. On thc zzd a spy brought in the intelligence
that Mahomed Jan and his brother-chiefs had resolvcd to
assault the cantonment early on the following morning,
and the spy was able to communicate thc plan of attack.
The zoo0 men holding the King's Garden and thc
Mahomccl Shereef fort had bccn cquippcd with scaling

ladders, and were to malie a false attack which might
become a real one, against the western section of the
southern front. T h e principal assault, however, was t o
be made against the eastern face of the Behmaroo village
-unquestionably the weakest part of thc defensive position. The 23d was the last day of the Mohurrum-the
great Mahomedan religious festival, when fanaticism
woulcl be a t its height ; and further to stimulate that
incentive to valour, the Mushli-i-Alum would hirnsclf
kindle the bcacon fire on the Asrnai height which
was to be the signal to the faithful to rush to the
assault.
T h e information provcd perfectly accurate. All night
long the shouts and chants of the Afghans filled the air.
Purposeful silence reigned throughout the cantonment.
In the darkness the soldiers mustered and quictly fell
into thcir places ; the oficcrs commanding sections of the
defence made thcir dispositions ; the reserves were silently
standing to their arms. Every eye mas toward the
Asmai heights, shrouded still in the gloom of the night.
A long tongue of flame shot up into the air, blazed
brilliantly for a few moments, and then \vaned. A t thc
signal a fierce fire opened from the broken ground before
one of the gateways of the southern face, the flashcs
indicating that the marl<smcn wcrc plying their rifles
within 200 yards of the enciente. The bullets sped harmlessly over the defenders sheltercd behind the parapet,
and in the dusk of the dawn reprisals were not attempted.
But this outburst of powder-burning against the southern
race was a rnerc incident ; what mcn listened and watched
for was the development of the true assault on the

castern end of the great parallelogram. The scction cornlnancIers there were General Hugh Gough in charge of
tllc eastern end of thc Behmaroo heights, and Coloncl
Jen1;ins from the village clown to the Native I-Iospital
and beyond to thc bastion at the south-eastern corner.
The troops cngaged were the Guicles from thc ridge clown
to Behmaroo village and beyond to the Native I-Iospital,
in which were 100 men of the 28th Punjaub Infantry, and
bctwcen the Hospital and the corner bastion the 67tl1,
rcinforcecl by two companies of 92d I-Iighlanders from
thc reserve, which later sent to the clcfence of the eastern
facc aclclitional contributions of rncn and guns. 'From
beyond Behmaroo and the castern trenches and walls,'
\\.rites Mr IIensman, ' came a roar of voices so loud and
~ncnacingthat it scemecl as if an army fifty thousand
strong was charging clo\vn on our thin line of men. Lcd
by thcir ghazccs, thc main body of Afghans hidden in t11c
villages ant1 orchards on thc cast siclc of Sherpur had
rushed out in one clcnse mob, and were filling the air wit11
their shouts of " Allah-il-Allah." The roar surged forward as their linc advanced, but it was answered by such
a roll of musketry that it was drowned for thc moment,
and then merged into the general din which told us that
our rncn with Martinis and Sniclers werc holding their
own against thc attacking force.' Whcn the first attack
thus graphically described was made the morning was
still so dark and misty that the outlook from the trenchcs
was restricted, and the order to the troops was to hold
their fire till the assailants should bc distinctly visiblc.
The detachment of the 28th opcned fire somcwhat prcmaturely, and prescntly thc Guides holding Behmaroo
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and thc trenches on the slopes followed the example, and
sweeping with their fire the terrain in front of then1 broke
the force of the attack while its leaders were still several
hrmdred yards away. Between the Hospital and the
corner bastion the men of the 67th and 92d awaited wit11
impassive discipline the word of permission to begin firing.
From out the mist at length emerged dense masses of
men, some of whom were brandishing swords and knives,
while others loaded and fired while hurrying forward. The
order to fire was not givcn until the leading ghazees wcre
within eighty yards, and the mass of assailants not more
distant than zoo yards. Heavily struck then by volley
on volley, they recoiled but soon gathered courage to
come on again ; and for several hours there was sharp
fighting, repeated efforts being made to carry the low
eastern wall. S o resolute mere the Afghans that rnore
than once they rcached the abattis, but each time were
driven back with heavy loss. About- ten o'clock there
was a lull and it: seemed that the attacking force was
owning the frustration of its attempts, but a n hour later
there mas a partial recrudescence of the fighting and the
assailants once rnore came on. The attack, ho~vever,was
not pushed with much vigour and was soon beaten down,
but the Afghans still maintained a threatening attitude
and the fire from the defenccs was ineffectual to dislodge
them. The General resolved to take their positions in
flank, and with this intent sent out into the open through
the gorge in the Bellmaroo heights, four field guns
escorted by a cavalry regiment. Rending to the right,
the guns camc into action on the right flank of the
Afghans, and the countcr-strole had immediate effect.
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The enemy wavered and soon were in full retreat. The
Kohistanee contingent, some 5000 strong, cut loose a n d
marched away northward, with obvious recognition t h a t
the game was up. The fugitives were scourged w i t h
artillery and rifle fire, and Massy led out the cavalry,
swept thc plain, and drove the lingering Afghans f r o m
the slopes of Siah Sung. The false attack on t h e
southern face from the King's Garden and the Mahomed
Shereef fort never made any head. Those positions w e r e
steadily shelled until late in the afternoon, when t h e y
were finally evacuated, and by nightfall all the villages
and enclosures between Sherpur and Cabul were entirely
deserted. Some of those had been destroyed by sappers
from the garrison during the afternoon, in the course of
which .operation two gallant engineer officers, Captain
Dundas and Lieutenant Nugent, were unfortunately
killed by the premature explosion of a mine.
Mahomed Jan had becn as good as his word ; he h a d
delivered his strolte against Sherpur, and that strolte h a d
utterly failed. With its failure came promptly the collapse of the national rising. Bcfore daybreak of the 24th
the formidable combination which had included all the
fighting elements of North-Eastern Afghanistan, a n d
under whose banners it was believed that more t h a n
I O O , ~armed men had mustered, was no more. Not
only had it broken up ; it had disappeared. Neither i n
the city, nor in the adjaccnt villages, nor on the surrounding heights, mas a man to be scen. So hurried had b e e n
the Afghan dispersal that the dead lay unburied where
they had fallen. His ninc days on the dcfcnsive h a d
cost General Roberts singularly little in casualties; h i s

losses were eighteen Idled and sixty-cight wounded. The
cnerny's loss from first to last of the rising was reckoned
to be not under 3000.
On the 24th the cavalry rodc far and fast in pursuit of
the fugitives, but they overtook none, such haste had the
fleeing Afghans made. On the same day Cabul and the
Balla Hissar were reoccupied, and General Hills resumed
his functions as military governor of the city. Cabul had
the aspect of having undcrgonc a sack at the hands of
the enemy ; the bazaars were broken up and dcserted and
the Hindoo and Ihzzilbash quarters had been relentlessly
wrecked. Sir Frederick Roberts lost no timc in dcspatching a column to the Kohistan to punish Meer Butcha
by destroying that chief's forts and villages, and to ascertain whether the tribesmen of the district had dispersed
to their homes. This was found to be the case, and the
column returned aftcr having been out five days. After
making a few examples the General issued a proclamation
of amnesty, excluding therefrom only five of the principal
leaders and fomentors of the recent rising, and stipulating
that thc tribesmen should send representatives to Sherpur
to receive explanations regarding the dispositions contemplated for the government of thc country. This
policy of conciliation bore good fruit ; and a durbar was
held on January gth, 1880, at which were present about
200 sirdars, chiefs, and headmen from the Kohistan,
Logur, and the Ghilzai country. Rewards were presented to those chiefs who had remained friendly; the
General receivcd thc salaams of the assembled sirclars
and then addressed them in a firm but conciliatory
speech.

The country rclnained still in a disturbed state, but
there was little likelihood of a second general rising.
General Roberts was resolved, however, to be thoroughly
preparcd to cope with that contingency should it occur.
Sherpur was encircled by a military road, and all cover
and obstructions for the space of 1000 yards outside
the encicnte were swept away. Another road was constructed from Behmaroo village to the Siah Sung hcights
and yet another from the south-eastern gateway direct to
the Balla Hissar, on both of which there were bridges
across thc Cabul rivcr. Along the northern face of Cabul
from Deh Afghan to the Balla Hissar, a road broad
enough for guns was made, and another broad road cut
through the lower Ralla Hissar. Anothcr military road
was built through the Cabul gorge to the main Ghuznee
and Bamian road in the Chardeh valley. Strong forts
were built on the A s ~ n a iand Sher Derwaza heights and on
the spur above the Ralla Hissar, which, well garrisoned
and supplicd adequately with provisions, water, and
ammunition, would enable Cabul as well as Sherpur to be
hcld. T h e latter was greatly strengthened, the eastern
point of the Rehmaroo heights being converted into something like a regular fortress. Later, in March, when the
Cabul force had increased to a strength of about I 1,500
men and twenty-six guns, the command was formed into
two divisions, of which thc first remained under the
Lieutenant-General, the second bcing commanded by
Major-General John Ross. T h e line of comrnunications
was in charge of Major-Gcneral Bright, and BrigadicrGeneral Hugh Gough was the cavalry commander in succession to Brigadier-General Massy. On the zd of .Ifla!,,

Sir Donald Stewart arriving a t Cabul from Candahar,
took over the chief command in North-Eastern Afghanistan
from Sir Frederick Roberts. Sir Donald's march from
Candahar, which was an eventful one, is dealt with in the
next chapter.

C H A P T E R VI

WHILESir Frederick Roberts had been fighting hard in
North-Eastern Afghanistan, Sir Donald Stewart had been
experiencing comparative tranquillityin his Candahar command. As soon as the news reached him of the destruction of Cavagnari's mission he had promptly concentrated
his troops, and so early as the third week of September
(1879) he was in a position to carry out his orders to
create a diversion in aid of Roberts' advance on Cabul by
making a demonstration in the direction of Ghuznee and
placing a garrison in Khelat-i-Ghilzai. NO subsequent
movements of importance were undertaken in Southern
Afghanistan during the winter, and the province enjoyed almost unbroken quietude. In Herat, however,
disturbance was rife. Ayoub Khan, the brother of
Yakoub Khan, had returned from exile and made good
his footing in Herat, of which formerly he had been
conjoint governor with Yakoub. In December he began
a hostile advance on Candahar, but a conflict broke out
between the Cabul and Herat troops under his command,
and he abandoned for the time his projected expedition.
In the end of March Sir Donald Stewart began the
march towardcabul which orders from India had prescribed.

He left behind him in Candahar the Bombay division of
his force under t h e command of Major-General Primrose,
whose line of communication with the Indus valley was to
be kept open by Phayre's brigade, and took with him on
the northward march the Bengal division, consisting of
two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade. T h e first
infantry brigade was commanded by Brigadier-Gencral
Barter, thc second by Brigadier-General Hughes, and the
cavalry brigade, which divisional hcadquartcrs accompanied, by Brigadier-General Palliser. Khelat-i-Ghilzai
was reached on 6th April ; the Bengal portion of its
garrison joined the division and the advance was resumed
on the following day. Until Shahjui, the limit of thc
Candahar province, the march was uneventful ; but beyond
that place extreme difficulties were experienced in procuring supplies, for the villages were found descrtecl and
the inhabitants had carried off, destroyed, or l~iddentheir
storcs of grain. The force was embarrassed by a horde
of Ilazaras, who swarmed in wild irregularity on its
flanl;s, plundering and burning with great vindictivcness, eagcr to w e a k vengcance on their Afghan focs.
And it had another although more distant companionship, in the shape of several thousand hostile tribesmen
and ghazees, whose fanaticism their moullas had been
assiduously inciting, and who marched day by day
parallel with the British right flank along the foothills at
a distance of about eight miles, Their attitude was
threatening but it was not thought wise t o meddle with
thcm, since their retrcat ovcr the hills could not well bc
cut OH; and sincc the policy of non-interference would
tend to encourage them t o venture on a battle. The

soundness of this reasoning was soon to be made
manifest.
On the night of April 18th the division was cncamped
a t Mushaki, about thirty miles south of Ghuznee. T h e
spies that cvening brought in the information that the
enemy had resolved on fighting on the following morning,
and that the position thcy intended to take up was the
summit of a low spur of the Gul Kol1 mountain ridgc,
bounding on thc [vest the valley followed by the road.
T h i s spur was said to project in a north-easterly
direction toward the Ghuznee river, gradually sinking into
the plain. During a great part of its length it flanked
and overhung the road, but near where it mcrgecl into the
plain the road passed over it by a low saddle at a point
about six miles beyond Mushaki. A t dawn of the 19th
the column moved off, Yalliser leading the advance, which
Sir Donald Stewart accompanied, Hughes commanding
the centre, Barter bringing up the rear and protecting the
baggage. An hour later the encmy were visible in great
strength about three miles in advance, presenting the
aspect of a vast body formed up on the spur and on the
saddle crossed by the road, and thus threatening Stewart
a t once in front and on both flanks. Thc British general
a t once made his dispositions. His guns were on the
road in column of route. T h e three infantry regiments
of Hughes' brigade came up to the left of and in line
with the leading battery, thc cavalry took ground on the
plain on its right, and a reserve was formed consisting of
an infantry regiment, two companies sappers and miners,
and the General's escort of a troop and two companies.
Orders were sent back to Barter to send forward without

delay half the infantry of his brigade. In the formation
clescribcd the force resumed its advance until within
striking distance. Then the two batteries came into
action on either side of the road ; thc horse-battery on
the right, the flat ground to its right being covered by
the zd Punjaub Cavalry; the field-battery on the left.
Sir Donald Stewart's proper front thus consisted of thc
field and horse-batteries with their supports, but since it
was apparcnt that thc greatest strength of the enemy was
on the higher ground Ranking his left, it behoved him to
show a front in that direction also, and for this purpose he
utilised Hughcs' three infantry regiments, of which the
59th was on the right, the ad Sikhs in the centre, and
the 3d Goorkhas on the left. Part of the reserve infantry
was sent to make good the interval between the left of
the artillery and the right of the infantry.
T h e guns had no sooner come into action than thc
enemy in great inasses showed themselves on spur and
saddle and plain, bent seemingly on an attempt to
envelop the position hclcl by, the British. 'Suddenly,'
writes Henstnen, ' a commotion was observed in thc most
advanced lines of the opposing army ; the rnoullas coulcl
be secn haranguing the irregular host with frantic energy,
thc beating of the tom-toms was redoubled, and then as
if by magic wavcs on waves of men-ghazees of the most
desperate type-poured down upon the plain, and rusl~ed
upon Gcneral Stewart's force. T h e main body of the
Afghan army remained upon the hill to watch the ghazees
in their reclcless onslaught, and take advantage of any
success they might gain. T h e fanaticism of the 3000 or
4000 men who made this desperate charge has pcrhaps
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never been equalled ; they had 500 or 600 yards t o cover
before they could come to close quarters, and y c t they
made nothing of the distance. N e a r l ~ a l were
l
well armed
with tulwars, knives, and pistols. Some carried rifles and
matchlocks, while a few-and those must have bcen
resolute fanatics indeed-had
simply pikes m a d e of
bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened on long
shafts. Their attack brolcc with greatest violcnce on our
flanks. 011 our left flank thc 19th Bengal Lancers were
still moving into position when the ghazecs rushed in
among them. In an instant they werc hidden in t h e cloud
of dust and smoke, and then they galloped toward t h e right
rear, and struck into the reserve in rear of the LieutenantGeneral and his staK All was confusion for a moment ;
the ammunition mules were stampeded, and wit11 the
riderless horses of the lancers ltillecl or wounded in the
m W e , dashed into the headquartcr staff. T h e ghazecs
had continued their onward rush, and were cngaged in
hand-to-hand fighting with our infantry. Some of them
penetrated to within twenty yards of the knoll on which
thc staff were watching the action, and so critical was the
moment that Sir Donald Stewart and evcry man of his
staff drew their swords and prepared for self-defence.'
T h e hurried retirement of the lancers had left the left flank
bare. It was turned by thc fierce rush of thc fanatics, who
were actually in rear of the leftward infantry regiment
and in the heart of the British position. The Goorkhas had
been thrown into momentary confusion, but their colonel
promptly formed them into rallying squarcs, whose firc
mowed down the ghazces and arrested the headlong
vehemence of their turning movement. But it was not

the British left only which was temporarily compromiscd
by the furious onslaught of the fanatics. Their enveloping
chargc broke down the defence of the weakly-manned
interval between the left of the artillery and the right of
the infantry. T h e cletach~nentsholding that interval
were forced back, fighting hand-to-hand as the sheer
weight of the assault compelled them to give ground ;
the Sgth, in its effort to throw back its right to cover
tlic interval and protect the guns, was thrown into
confusion and gave ground; and thc guns, their case
shot exhausted ancl the Afghans within a few yards
of their muzzles, had to be retircd. The onslaught
on t h e right front of the horse-battery was clelivcred
with great determination, but was held a t bay and
finally crushed by the repeated charges- of the zd Punjaub cavalry.
Every man of the reserves was hurricd into the fighting line ; thc soldiers were steadied by the energctic
efforts of their oficers and settled down to a steady and
continuous fire from their breechloaders; thc guns
poured their shells into the hostile masses ; and the fire
of the forty-pounders on the left effectually arrested the
attempt of the Afghan horse to move rouncl that flank.
The hard-fought combat lasted for an hour; at ten
oJcloc1<the 'cease fire' sounded, and 'the British victory
was signal. The enemy Iiras dispersing in full flight, ancl
the cavalry was chasing the fugitives across the plain on
the right. How reclclcss had been the whirlwind charges
of t h e ghazees was evidenced by the extraordinary
number of their dead whose corpses streived the battlcfield. In no previous conflict between our troops and thc
S

Afghans had the latter suffered nearly so hcavil~. More
than 1000 dead were countcd on tile field, and many
bodies wcrc carried away; on a inoderate computation
their total loss must have bccn between 2000 and 3000,
and that in an estimatcd strength of from I~,OOO
to
r5,ooo. Tlle casualties of the British force werc
scventeen ltilled and 124 woundccl, of whom four d'icd of
their wounds. T h e injuries consisted almost wholly of
sword slashes and knife stabs received in hand-to-hand
encounters. The pursuit was soon recalled, but the
I-Iazaras took up the chase with ardour and in the rancour
of vengeance slew and spared not.
Sir Donald Stcwart tarried on the field only long
enough to bury his dead and have his wounded attended
t o ; and soon aftcr noon his force resumed its march.
Ghuznce was reached on the z ~ s t where
,
there was a halt
of three clays. I t hat1 bcen reported that the indomitable
Mushk-i-Alum was raising the tribesmen of Zurmut and
Shilgur to avcnge the defeat of Ahmed Khel, and a
cavalry reconnaissance made on the zzd had found a
gathcring of 2000 or 3000 mcn about the villages of
Urzoo and Shalez, six miles south-east of Ghuznee. On
the morning of the zgd a strong column commanded by
Brigadier-General Palliser moved on thc villages, which
were found occupied in considerable force. They were
too solidly built to bc much injured by artillery fire, and
the Afghans lay close in t h e shelter they afforded.
Palliser hesitated to commit his infantry to an attack.
Sir Donald Stewart having arrived, ordered the infantry
to carry the villages without delay, and the affair was
soon over, the tribesmen suffering severely from the rifle

fire as they evacuated the villages, and later in the
pursuit made by the cavalry and horse-artillery. On
the following d a y the march toward Cabul was resumed.
On the 16th April Major-General Ross had been
despatched from Cabul by Sir Frederick Roberts on the
mission of joining hands with Stewart's division. On
the 20th Ross opcned heliographic communication
with Sir Donald, and was informed of the latter's victory at Al~med Khcl. But thc junction of the two
forces was not accomplished until the 27th ; and in the
interval the force commanded by General Ross had
received considerable annoyance at the hands of tribal
levies gathered by local chiefs. The tribesmen interfered
with the roadmalting opcrations of his sappers i n the
vicinity of Sheikabad, and some fighting occurrcd in very
rugged country on the 23d. Trivial loss was esperienced by his command, but the de~nonstrationsof the
tribesmen evinced with what inveterate determination,
notwithstanding so Inany severe lessons, the Afghans
persisted in their refusal to admit thernsclves conquered.
Driven away with sevcrc loss on the 25th, those indomitable hillmen and villagers were back again on thc follo\ving morning on the overhanging ridges ; nor were they
disperscd by the ' resources of civilised warfare until
more of them had paid with their lives the penalty of
their obstinate hostility. On the 28th, at Sheikabad, Sir
Donald Stewart took leave of the division which he had
lcd from Candahar, and proceeded to Cabul with General
Ross' force to assume the chief command in NorthEastern Afghanistan, His division turned aside into

the Logur valley, where i t remained at until the final
concentration about Cabul in anticipation of the evacuation. By the reinforcement brought by Stewart the
Cabul field force was increased to a strength of. about
18,ooo men.

CI-IAPTER V l I
T H E AMEER AUDURRAI-IMAN

THEoccupation of Afghanistan by the British troops had
been prolonged far beyond the period originally intended
by thc authorities. But the strain of that occupation was
great, and although it had to be maintained until there
should be found a ruler strong enough to hold his own
after the evacuation, the decision was definitely arrived
at to withdraw from the country before the setting in
of another winter. Mr Lepel Griffin, a distinguished
member of the political 'departmcnt of the Indian Civil
Service, reached Cabul on aoth March, his mission being
to further the selection and acceptance of a capable ruler
to be left in possession. T h e task was no easy one.
There was little promise in a n y of the Raralczai pretenders
who were in Afghanistan, and in the address which Mr
Grifin addressed in Durbar t o a number of sirdars and
chiefs in the middle of April, he preserved a tonc at once
haughty and cnigmatical. One thing he definitely announced, the Viceroy's decision that Yaltoub Khan was
not to return to Afghanistan. The State was to be dismembered. As to the future of I-Ierat the speaker maclc
no allusion; but the province of Candahar was to be
separated from Cabul and placcd under an independent
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Barakzai prince. N o decision could for the present be
given in regard to thc choice of an Ameer to rule over
Cabul. Thc Government desired to nominate an Ameer
strong enough to govcrn his pcople and steadfast in his
friendship to thc British ; if those qualifications could be
secured the Government was willing and anxious to
recognise the wish of the Afghan peoplc, and nominate
an Ameer of their choice.
Bu t in effect the choice, so far as the English were concerned, had been already virtually made. On the 14th of
March Lord Lytton had telegraphed to the Secretary of
State advocating the ' early public recognition of Abdurrahman as legitimate heir of Dost Mahomed, and the
despatch of a deputation of sirdars, with British concurrcnce, to offer him the thronc, as sole means of saving
thc country from anarchy'; and the Minister had
promptly replied authorising the nomination of Abdurrahman, should he be found 'acceptable to the country
and would bc contented with Northern Afghanistan.'
Abdurrahman had ltnown stra~lgevicissitudes. H e was
the eldest grandson of the old Dost; his father was
Afzul Khan, the elder brother of Shere Ali. After the
death of the Dost he had becn an exile in Bokhara, but
he returned to Ballih, of which province his father had
bcen Governor until removcd by Sherc Ali, made good
his footing there, and having clone so adva~lcedon Cabul,
taliing advantage of Shere Ali's ahsencc a t Candahar.
The capital opened its gates to him in March 1866; he
f o ~ ~ g ha t successf~~l
battle with Shere Ali a t Sheiliabad,
occupicd Ghuznee, and p~~oclaimcclhis father Amcer.
Those were triumphs, but soon the wheel came ro~~ncl
f~~ll

circle. Afzul had but a short life as Amccr, and Abdurrahman had to rctirc to Afghan Turlcestan. Yakoub,
then full of vigour and enterprise, defeated him a t Bamian
and restored his father Shere Ali to the throne in the
winter of 1868. Abclurrahman then once more found
himself an exile. In 1870, after much wandering, he
reached Tashlzend, where General Kaufmann gave him
permission to reside, and obtained for him from the Czar
a pension of 25,000 roubles per annum. Petrosvky, a
Russian writer who professed t o be intimate with him cluring his period of exile, wrote of him that, ' T o get squarc
some day with the English ancl Shere Ali was Abdurrahman's most cherished thought, his dominant, ncverfailing passion.' His hatred of Shere Ali, his family,
and supporters, was intelligible and natural enough, but
why he should have entertained a bitter grudge against the
English is not very apparent; and there has been no overt
manifestation of its cxistence since he becamc Ameer.
To Mr Eugene Schuyler, who had an interview with him
at Tashl~encl,he expressed his conviction that with
It;50,000 wherewith to raise and equip an army he could
attain his legitimate position as Ameer of Afghanistan.
Resolutely bent on an effort t o accomplish this purposc,
he was living penuriously and saving the greater part of
his pension, and he hinted that he might have Russian
assistance in the prosecution of his endeavour. T h e
selection of a man of such antecedents and associations
as the ruler of a ' buKer ' state in friendly relations with
British India was perhaps thc greatest leap in the dark
on record. Abdurrahrnan came straight from the position
of a Russian pensionary ; in moving on Afghanistan he

obeycd Russian instructions ; his Tashlcend patrons had
furnished Aim with a modest equipment of arms and
money, the valuc of which hc undertook to repay if
succcssfi~l. It is of course possible that those functionaries of a notoriously simple and ingenuous government
started and cq~lippedhi111 in pure friendly good nature,
although thcy had previously consistently deterred him.
I3ut there was not a circumstance in connection with
Abdurrahman that was not suspicious. Three distinct
hypotheses seem t o present themselves in relation to this
selection as our nominee ; that Lord Lytton had extraord inary, almost indeed preternatural foresight and
sagacity ; that he was estremely fortunate in his leap in
the dark ; that h e clesircd to bring to thc nakecl redzictio
ad n(lszwci'ci~isthc ' buffer state ' policy. When Abdurrahman began his movcmcnt is uncertain. S o early as
the middle of January it was rcported a t Sherpur that
he had left Taslikcnd, and was probably already on the
Afghan sidc of the Oxus. In a letter of February 17th
Mr Hensman speaks of him as being in Badaltshan,
where his wife's lcinsmen were in power, and describes
him a s having a following of 2000 or 3000 Turcoinan
horsemen and posscssed according to native report of
twelve lakhs of rupees.
On thc 17th of March Lord
Lytton telegraphed t o the Secretary of State that he
was in possession of ' authentic intelligence that the
Sirdar was in Afghan Turlccstan, having lately arrived
there from Badalcshan.'
I t was regarded of urgcnt importance to ascertain
definitely t h e disposition of Abdurrahman, and whethcr hc
was disposed to throw in his lot with thc British Goi~ern-

ment, and accept the position of its nominee in Northern
Afghanistan. T h c agent selected by Mr Griffin to open
preliminary negotiations was a certain Mohamed S u n ~ a r ,
Ghilzai, who had bcen all his life in the confidential
service of the Sirdar's family. Surwar was the bearer of
a formal and colourless letter by way simply of authentication; but he also carried full and explicit verbal instructions. H e was directed t o inform the Sirdar that
since he had cnterccl Afghan Turkestan and occupicd
places thcrc by force of arms, it was essential for him t o
dcclare with what object he had 'come, and whethcr
actuated by friendly or hostile feelings toward the British
Government, which for its part hacl no ill-feeling toward
him because of his long residence within the Russian
Empire and his notoriously close relations with that
power. That the British Government was able t o benefit
him very largely in comparison with that of Russia; and
that wisdom and self interest alike suggcstecl that he
should at once open a friendly correspondence with the
British officers in Cabul. That his opportunity was now
come, and that the British Government was disposed to
treat him with cvery consideration and to consider most
favourably any representations he might make. I t had
no intention of annexing the country, and only desired to
see a strong and friendly chicf established a t Cabul ; and
that conscquently the present communication was made
solely in Abdurraliman's own interest, and not in that of
thc British Government. H e was desired to send a reply
by Surwar, and later to repair to Cabul, whcre he should
be honourably received.
Sunvar returned to Cabul on nrst April, bringing a
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reply from Abdurrahman to Mr Griffin's letter. The
tone of the reply was friendly enough, but somewhat indefinite. In conversation with Surwar as reported by
the latter, Abclw-ahman was perfectly frank as to his
relations with the Russians and his sentiments i n regard
to them. I t had been reported that he had made his
escape clandestinely from Tashlcend. I-1x1 he cared to
stand well with us a t the expensc of truth, it would have
been his cue to disclaim all authority or assistance from
the Russian Government, to confirm the current story
of his escape, and to profess his anxiety t o cultivate
friendly relations with the British in a spirit of opposition
to the power in whose territory he had lived so long
virtually as a prisoner. But neither in writing nor in
conversation did he make any conccalment of his friendliness toward the Russians, a fecling which he clearly
regarded as nowise incompatible with friendly relations
with the British Government. ' If,' said he to Surwar,
' the English will in sinccrity befriend me, I have no wish
to hide anything from them '; and he went on to tell how
the Russians had forbidden him for years to make any
effort t o interfere in Afghan affairs. This prohibition
stood until information reached Tashlend of the deportation of Yalcoub Khan to India. Then it was that
General Kaufmann's representative said to him : ' You
have always been anxious to return to your country ; the
English have removed Yakoub Khan ; the opportunity is
favourable ; if you wish you are a t liberty to go.' The
Russians, continued Abdurrahman, pressed him most
strongly to set out on the enterprise which lay before
him. They lcnt him 33,000 rupees, and arms, ammuni-

tion, and supplies ; he was bound to the Russians by no
oath or promise, but simply by feelings of gratitude. ' I
shoulcl never like,' said hc, ' to be obliged to fight them.
I have eaten their salt, and was for twelve years clependent on their hospitality.'
Surwar reported Abdurrahman as in fine health ancl
possessed of great energy. He had with him a force of
about 3000 men, consisting of four infantry and two
cavalry regiments, with twelve guns ancl some irregulars.
He professed his reacliness, in preference to conducting
negotiations through agents, to go himself to Charikar in
the Kohistan with an escort, and there discuss matters
with the English officers in person. Surwar testified that
the Sirdar had with him in Turltestan no Russian or
Russian agent, and this was confirmed through other
sources. He had sent forward to ascertain which was the
easiest pass across the Hindoo Koosh, but meanwhile he
was to remain at Kondooz until he should hear again
from Mr Griffin.
While the wary Sirdar waited on events beyond the
I-Iincloo Koosh hc was sending letters to the leading
chiefs of the Kohistan and the Cabul province, desiring
them to be ready to support his cause. That he had an
influential party was made clcar a t a durbar held by Mr
Grifiin on April arst, when a considerable gathering of
important chiefs united in the request that Abdurrahman's
claim to the Anleership should be favourablyrcgarded by
the British authorities. In pursuance of the negotiations
a mission consisting of thrce Afghan gentlemen, two of
whom belongecl to Mr Griffin's political staff, left Cabul
on May znd carrying to Abdurrahman a letter from Mr

&ifill ir;timating that' it had been decided to withdraw
the British army from Afghanistan in the course of a f e ~
months, and that the British authorities desired to leave
the rulcrship in capable and frierldly hands; that they
were therefore willing to transfer the Government to him,
recognisc him as the head of the State, and afford him
f;lci]ities and even support in reorganising the Government
and establishing himself in the sovereignty. The mission
found tl<e attitude o f Abdurrahman scarcely so satisfactory as had becn reported by Surwar, and its mcmbcrs
were virtual prisoners, their tents surrounded by sentries.
Abdurrahman's explanation of this rigour of is01a t'Ion
was that he could not otherwise ensure the safety of the
envoys ; but another construction conveyed to them was
that they were kept prisoners that they might not, b y
mising with the people, learn of the presence on the
right bank of the O s u s of a Russian officer with whom
Abdurrahman was saicl to be in constant communication
and on whosc advice he acted. Their belief was that
Abdurrnhman was entirely under Russian influence ; that
Mr Griffin's letter after it had been read in Durbar in the
camp was immediately despatched across the Oxus by
means of mounted relays; and that Russian instructions as
t o a reply had not been received when they left Turlcestan
to return to Cabul. They expressed their belief that the
Sirdar mould not accept from British hands Cabul shorn of
Candahar. They had urged him to repeat in the letter they
were t o carry back t o Cabul the expression of his willingness to meet the British representative at Charikar which
had been contained in his Ictter sent by Surwar ; but he
demurred to committing himself cven to this slight

~ s t e n t . T h e letter which h e sent by 1iray of reply to the
weighty ~ ~ m ~ n u n i c a t Mr
i o nGrifin had addressed to him
on the part of the Government of India that official
characterised as ' frivolous and cmpty, and only saved by
its special courtesy of tone from being an impertinence.'
An Afghan who had sat a t Kaufmann's feet, Abdurrahman was not wholly a guileless man ; and the truth probably was that he mistrusted the Greeks of Simla and the
gifts they tcndered him with so lavish protestation that
they were entirely for his own interest. There was very
little finesse about the importunity of the British that hc
should constitute himself their bridge of extrication, so
that they might get out of Afghanistan without thc
dangers and discredit of leaving chaos behind them. But
Aburrahaman had come t o Imow himself strong enough
t o reduce to order that legacy of chaos if it should be
left; and in view of his future relations with his fello\v
Afghans he was not solicitous to be beholden to the
foreigners to any embarrassing extent. H e knew, too,
the wisdom of 'masterly inactivity' in clelicatc conditions. And, again, he had no confidence in our pledges.
On the 4 t h of August, the day after the meeting between
him and Mr Griffin a t Zimma, the latter wrote: 'They
(Abdurrahman and his advisers) feared greatly our intcntion was to rid ourselves of a formidable opponent,
and dreaded that if he had come straight into Cabul hc
would have been arrested, and deported to India.'
A Liberal Government was now in office in England,
and was urgent for the speedy evacuation of Afghanistan.
Lord Lytton had resigned and had been succeeded as
Viceroy by' the Marquis of Ripon. 1.ieutenant-General
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Sir Donald Stewart was in chief command a t Cabul.
A great number of letters from Abdurrahman to chiefs
and influential persons throughout Afghanistan were
being intercepted, the tone of which was considered
objectionable. H e was reported to be in close correspondence with Mahomed Jan, who had never ceased to
be our bitter enemy. T h e fact that negotiations werc in
progress between the British Government ancl Abdurrahman had beconle matter of general I<nowledgc throughout the country, and was occasioning disquietude and
excitement. So clear were held the evidences of what
was termed Abdurrahman's bad faith, but was probably
a combination of genuine mistrust, astute passivity, and
shrewd playing for his own hand, that it became a serious
question with the Indian Government on the arrival of
the new Viceroy, whcther it was good policy to have
anything more to clo with him. I t was resolved that
before breaking off intercourse the suggestion of Sir
Donald Stewart ancl Mr Griffin should be adopted,
that: a peremptory although still friendly letter, demanding
a definite acceptance or refusal of the proffers made,
within four clays after the receipt, should be sent to
Abdurrahman, with a detailed explanation of the arrangements into which we were prepared to enter with
regard to him and the future of Afghanistan. A letter
was forwarded from Cabul on 14th June, in which Mr
Griffin informed the Sirdar that since the British Govern~ n e n tadmitted no right of interference by foreign powers
in Afghanistan, it was plain that the Cabul ruler could
have no political relations with any foreign power except:
the English ; and if any foreign power should attempt to

interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should
lead to unprovoked aggrcssion on the Cabul ruler, then
the British Government would be prepared to aid him,
if necessary, to repel it. As regarded limits of the territory, the latter stated that the whole province of Candahar
had been placed under a separate ruler, except Sibi and
Pisheen, which were retained in British possession. Consequently the British Government was unable to enter
into any negotiations on those points, or in respect to
arrangements in regard to the north-western frontier
which were settled by the treaty of Gundamuk. Subject
to those reservations, thc British Government was willing
that Abdurrahman should establish over Afghanistanincluding Herat when he should have conquered it-as
complete and extensive authority as was swayed by any
previous Ameer. T h e British Government would exercise no interference in the internal government of those
territories nor woulcl it demand the acceptance of an
English Resident anynrherc within Afghanistan, although
for convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse it might
be agreed upon that a Mahommedan Agent of thc British
Government should be stationed at Cabul.
Abdurrahman's reply to this communication was vague
and evasive, and was regarded by Sir Donald Stewart
and Mr Griffin as so unsatisfactory that they represented
to the Government of India, not for the first time, their
conviction of the danger of trusting Abdurrahman, the
imprudence of delaying immediate action, and the necessity of breaking off with him and adopting other means of
establishing a government in Cabul before the impending
evacuation. Lord Ripon, however, considcred that ' a s

matters stood an arrangerncnt with Abdurrahman offered
the most advisable solution, while he doubted whether it
wauld hot be found very difficult to enter into any alternative arrangement.'
I-Iis Excellency's decision was
justified by the event. Mcanwhile, indeed, Abdurrahman
had started on June nSth for the Kohistan. I l e crosscd
the I-Iindod Koosh and arrived on July 20th at Charilcar,
where he was welcomed by a deputation of leading chiefs,
while the old Mushlc-i-Alum, who for some time, thanl<s
to Mr Griffin's influence, had been working in the interests
of 'peace, intimated on behalf of a number of chiefs
assembled in Maidan that they were ready to accept as
Ameer the nominee of the British Government.
S o propitious see~nccltlie situation that it was considered the time had cmnc for formally acknowledging
Abdurrahman as thc ncw Ameer, and also for fixing
approximately thc date of the evacuation of Cabul by the
British troops. The ceremony of recognition was enacted
in a great durbar tent within thc Sherpur cantonment on
the afternoon of July 22d. The absence of Abdurrahman,
and the notorious cause of that absence, detracted from
thc intrinsic dignity of thc occasion so far as concerned
the British . participation in it ; nor was the balance
restored by the presence of three mcmbers of his suite
whom he had deleg,~ted to represent him. A large
number of sirdars, chief-5, and ~nalilcswere present, some
of whom had fought stoutly against us in December. Sir
.Donald Stewart, who presided, explained to the assenlb1e.d
-Afghans that their presencc ancl that of thc ~ f f i c e rof
s the
.British force had been called for in order that the public
recognition by the British Government of thc Sirdar

Abdurrahman Khan as Arneer of Cabul should be madc
known with as much honour as possible. Then Mr
Griffin addressed in Persian a short speech to the
'sirdars, chiefs, and gcntlemcn' who constituted his
audience. Having announccd the recognition of Abdurrahman by ' the Viceroy of India and the Government of
Hcr Most Gracious Majesty the Quecn Empress,' hc
proceecled : ' I t is to the Govcrnmcnt a source of satisfaction that the tribcs and chicfs have preferred as Amccr a
distinguished member of the Barakzai family, who is a
renowned soldier, wise, and experienced. His senti~ncnts
towards the British Government are most fi-icndly; and
so long as his rule shows that hc is anirnatcd by thesc
sentiments, he cannot fail to receive the support of the
British Government.' Mr Griffin then intimated that the
British armies would shortly withdraw from Afghanistan;
and in his formal farewcll thcrc was a certain appropriate
dignily, and a wcll-earned tributc to thc conduct of our
soldiers during their service within thc Afghan borders.
' We trust and firmly bclicvc,' said Mr Griffin, 'that your
rcmcmbrance of the English will not bc unkindly. W e
have fought you in the field whencver you have opposed
us ; but your religion has in no way bcen intcrfcred with ;
thc honour of your women has becn respected, and cvery
one has been secure in possession of his property. Wliatever has bcen necessary for the support of Ihe army has
bccn liberally paid for. Sincc I came to Cabul I have
been in daily intercourse with you, but I have ncvcr
heard an Afghan make a complaint of the conduct of any
soldier, English or native, belonging t o Her Majesty's
army.' The durbar was closed by an earnest appeal by
T

Sir Donald Stewart to all thc sirdars and chiefs that
thcy should put asidc their private feuds and unite to
support thc ncw A~neer.
On August 3cl Abdi~rrahman and Mr Griffin a t
length met, about sixteen miles north of Cabul. His
adherents were still full of excitement and suspicion ;
but thc Arneer himself was calm, cheerful, ancl dignified.
The conference between him and M r Griffin lastcd for
three hours and was renewed on the following day.
' H e appeared,' wrote Mr Griffin, 'animated by a sincerc
desire to bc on cordial terms with the British Governmcnt, and although his expectations were larger than
the Government was prepared to satisfy, yet he did
not press them with any discourteous insistcncc, ancl the
rcsult of the interview may bc considered on the whole to
be highlysatisfactory.' T h c tidings of thc Maiwand disaster
had reached Sherpur by telegraph, and the Arneer was
informed that it necessity might occur for marching a
force from Cabul to Candahar. His reply was that the
tribes might be hostile, but that if no long halts were
made by thc way he would have no objections to such a
march. I11 this hc showed his astuteness, since the defeat
of Ayoub Khan by a British army would obviously save
him a contcst. So willing to be of service on this mattcr
was he that when the march was decided on he sent
influential pcrsons of his party in aclvancc to arrange
with the local ~naliltsto have supplies collected for the
column. Thc arrangements made with him wcre that
he was to fall heir to the thirty guns of Shere Ali's
manufacture which thc out-marching army was to leavc
in Shcrpur, and was to reccivc ~ g +lakhs of rupccs

(£rgo,5oo) ; ten lalths of which were given as an earnest
of British friendship, and the balance was money belonging to the Afghan State, which had gone into thc commissariat chest and was now restored. A t the Ameer's
carnest and repeated request the forts which had becn
built around Cabul by the British army, were not
destroyed as had becn intended, but were handed over
intact to the new Ameer.
It seemed that Sir Donald Stewart, who was to
h
would lcave Cabul
evacuate Sherpur on the I ~ t August,
without seeing Abdurrahman. But a t the last moment
Mr Grifin succeeded in arranging an interview. I t was
held early in the morning of the evacuation, in a tent
just outside the Sherpur cantonment, was quite public.
and lasted only for quarter of an hour. Abdurrahman
was frank ancl cordial. He said that his heart was full
of gratitude to the British, and desired that his best
thanlts should be communicatcd t o the Viceroy. At thc
close of the interview he shook hands with all 'who
cared t o wish him good-bye and good luclc,' and sent
his principal officer to accompany the General on his
first clay's march, which bcgan immediately after thc
parting with Abdurrahman. Sir Donald Stewart's march
down the passes was accomplished without incident,
quite unmolested by the tribes. S ~ n a l lgarrisons were
temporarily left in the Khyber posts, ancl the war-worn
regiments wcrc dispersed through the stations of NorthWestern India.

.

CHAPTER VIII
iLIAIWANT) ANT) THE G R E A T hlARC1-I

WIIEN in the early spring of 1880 Sir Donald Stewart
quittcd Candahar with the Bcngal division of his force, he
left there the Bornbay division, t o the command of which
Gcneral Primrose acceded, General Phayre assuming
charge of the communications. The provincc during thc
carly summer was fairly quiet, but it was known that
Ayoub I(11an was making hostilc preparations at Herat,
although the reports as to his intentions and movements
were long uncertain and conflicting. Shere Ali Khan,
who had been Governor of Candahar during Stewart's
residence there, had been nominated hercditary ruler of
the province with thc titlc of ' Wali,' when it was cletcrmined to separate Canclahar from Noi-th-Eastcrn
Afghanistan. On Junc zrst the Wali, who had somc
days earlier crossed the Helmund and occupied Girishk
with his troops, reported that Ayoub was actually on thc
march toward the Canclahar frontier, and asked for the
support of a British brigade to enablc him to cope with
the hostile advance. Thcre was reason to believe that
the Wali's troops were disaffectcd, and that he was in no
condition to meet Ayoub's army with any likelihood of
success. After Stcwart's departure the strength of the
British forces at Canclahar was dangerously low-only

4700 of all ranks; but it was important to thwart
Ayoub's offensive moverncnt, ancl a brigade consisting of
a troop of horse-artillcry, six companics of the 66t11, two
Bombay nativc infantry regiments, and 500 native
troopcrs, in all about 2300 strong, under the command of
Brigadier-General Burrows, reachcd the lcft bank of tlic
Helmund on July I ~ t h . On the 13th the Wali's infantry,
2000 strong, mutinied en m u s e and marched away up
the right bank of the river, taking with them a battery of
smooth bore guns, a prcsent t o Sherc Ali Khan from the
British Government. His cavalry did not behave quile so
badly, but, not to g o into detail, his army no longer
existed, and Burrows' brigade was the only force in the
field to resist the advance of Ayoub Khan, ~vhoscregular
troops werc reported to number 4000 cavalry, and from
4000 to 5000 infantry exclusive of the zoo0 deserters
from the Wali, with thirty guns and an irregular force of
uncertain strength.
Burrows promptly recaptured from the GValils infantry
the battcry thcy wcre carrying 0% and punished them
sevcrely. The mutineers had rcmoved o r destroyed thc
supplies which the Wali had accumulatcc1 for the use of
the brigade, and General Burrows therefore could no
longer remain in thc vicinity of Girishlc. The Helmund
owing to the dry scason was passable cverywhere, so that
nothing was to be gained by watching the fords. I t was
determined to fall back to Khushk-i-Nalthud, a point
distant thirty miles from Girishlc and forty-five from
Candahar, where several roads from thc Helmund converged ancl where supplies mere plentif~~l.At and near
Khushk-i-Nakhud thc brigade remained from the 16th
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until the morning of the 27th July. While waiting and
watching thcre a despatch from army headquarters at
Simla was communicated to General Burrows from
Candahar, autliorising him to attack Ayoub if he thought
l~imsclfstrong enough to beat him, and informing him
that it was considered of the greatcst political importance
that the forcc from Herat should be disperscd and prevcntecl from moving on toward Ghuznee. Spies brought
in news that A p u b had reachcd Girishk, and was distributing his force along the riglit bank between that
place and Hydrabad. Cavalry patrols failed to find the
enemy until the zrst, when a delachment was encountered
in thc village of Sangbur on the northern road about
midway betwccn tbc Helmund and I<hushk-i-Nalthud.
N e s t day that village was found morc strongly occupied,
and on thc 23d a reconnaissance in force came upon a
body of Ayoub's horscmen in the plain bclow the Garmao
hills, about midway between Sangbur and Maiwand.
Those discoveries were tolerably clear indications of
Ayoub's inlcntion to turn Burrows' position by moving
along thc northern road to Maiwand and thence pressing
on tlirougli the Maiwand pass, until at Singiri Ayoub's
army should have interposed itself between the brigade
and Candahar. There was certainly nothing impossible
in such an endeavour, since Maiwand is ncarer Candahar
than is Khushk-i-Nakhud. Why, in the facc of the informat~onat his disposal and of tlic precautions enjoined
on him to hindcr Ayoub from slipping by him toward
Ghuznee through Mainland and up the Khaluez valley,
General Burrows should have renlained so long at I<husl~ki-Nakhud, is not intelligible. H e was stirred at Icngth on

the afternoon of the 26th, by the report that zooo of
Yakoub's cavalry and a large body of his ghazces were
in possession of Garmao and Maiwand, and were to be
promptly followed by Ayoub himself with the main body
of his army, his reported intention being to push on
through the Maiwand pass and reach the Urgundab
valley in rear of the British brigade. Later in thc day
Colonel S t John, the political officer, reported to General
13urrows the intelligence which had reached him that thc
whole of Ayoub's army was a t Sangbur; but credence
was not given to the information.
T h e somewhat tardy resolution was talcen to march
to Maiwand on the morning of the 27th. There was the
expectation that the brigade would arrive a t that place
before the enemy should have occupied it in force, and
this point made good there might be the opportunity t o
drive out of Garmao the body of Yakoub's cavalry reported
in possession there. There was a further reason why
Maiwand should be promptly occupied ; the brigade had
been obtaining its supplies from that village, and there
was still a quantity of grain in its vicinity t o lose which
would be unfortunate. The brigade, now 2Goo strong,
strucl<.camp on the morning of the 27th. T h e march to
Maiwand was twelve miles long, and an earlier start than
6 3 0 would have been judicious. The soldiers marched
fast, but halts from time to time were necessary to allow
the baggage to come up ; the hostile state of the country
did not admit of anything being left behind and the
column was encumbered by a great quantity of stores
and baggage. A t Karezah, eight miles from I<h~~shlc-iNal<l~ucland four miles south-west of Maiwand, inforrna-

tion was brought in that the whole of Yalcoub's army was
closc by on the left front of the brigade, and marching
toward Maiwand. The spies had previously proved themselves so untrustworthy that small heed was talcen of
this report; but a little latcr a cavalry reconnaissance
found large bodics bf cavalry moving in the direction
indicated and inclining away toward Garmao ' as the
brigade advanced. A thick haze made it impossible to
discern what force, if any, was being covered by the
cavalry. About ten A.M. the advance guard occupied the
village of Mundabad, about three miles south-west of
Maiwand. 'West of Mundabad, close to the village, was
a broad and deep ravine running north and south.
Beyond this ravine was a wide expanse of level and
partially cultivated plain across which, almost entirely
concealed by the haze, Ayoub's army was marching eastward toward Maiwand village, which covers the western
entrance to the pass of the same name. If General
Burrows' eye could have penetrated that haze, probably
he would have considered it prudent to take up a defensive position, for which Mundabad presented many advantages. But he was firm in the conviction that the encmy's
guns were not up, notwithstanding the raports of spies to
the contrary; he believed that a favourable opportunity
presented itself for taking the initiative, and he resolved
to attack with all possible speed.
Lieutenant Machine of the Horse-Artillery, a gallant
young oficer who was soon to mcct a melancholy fate,
precipitated events in a somewhat recI<lcss fashion. With
the two guns he commandcd he crossed the ravine,
galloped across the plain, and opened fire on a body of

Afghan ca\.alry which had just come within view. General
Nuttall, commanding the cavalry and horse-artillery, failing t o recall Maclaine, sent forward in support of
him the four remaining guns of the battery. Those
approached to within 800 yards of the two advanced
pieces, and Maclaine was directed to fall baclc upon the
battery pending the arrival of the brigade, which General
Burrows was now sending forward. It crossed the ravine
near Mundabad, advanced on the plain about a mile in a
north-westerly direction, and then formed up. There
were several changes in the dispositions ; when the engagement became warm about noon the formation was
as follows :-The 66th foot was on thc right, its right
flank thrown baclc to check a n attempt made to turn it
by a rush of ghazees springing out of the ravinc in the
British front ; on the left of t h e 66th were four companies
of Jacob's Rifles (30th Native Infantry) and a company
of sappers, the centre was occupied by the horse-artillcry
and smooth bore guns, of which latter, however, two had
been moved to the right flank; on the left of the guns
were the 1st Grenadiers somewhat refused, and on the
extreme left two coinpanics of Jacob's Rifles. T h e cavalry
was in the rear, engagcd in efforts to prevent the Afghans
from taking the British infantry in reverse. T h e position
was radically faulty, and indeed invited disaster. Both
flanks were cn lair in face of an enemy of greatly superior
strength; almost from the first cvery rifle was in the
fighting line, and the sole rcserve consisted of the two
cavalry rcgirnents. The baggage had followed the brigade
across the ravine and was halted about 1000yards in rear
of the right, inadequately gnarded by cavalry detachment..

For half-an-hour no rcply was made to the British
shell fire, and an offensive movemcnt at this timc might
have resulted in success. But presently battery aftcr
battery was brought into action by the Afghans, until
half-an-hour after noon the fire of thirty guns was concentrated on the brigade. Undercover of this artillery fire
the ghazees from the ravine charged forward to within
500 yards of the 66th, but thc rifle lire of thc British regiment drovc them back with heavy loss, and they recoiled
as far as the ravine, whence they maintained a desultory
fire. The enemy's artillery fire was well sustained and
cffective; the infantry found some protection from it in
lying down, but the artillery and cavalry remained exposed and suffercd scvcrely. An artillery duel was maintained for two hours, greatly to thc disadvantage of the
brigade, which had but twclve guns in action against
thirty well-served Afghan pieces. The prostrate infantry
had escaped serious punishment, but by two P.M. the
cavalry had lost fourteen per cent, of thc men in the front
linc, and 149 horses ; the Afghan horsemen had turned
both flanks and the brigade was all but surrouncled, while
a separate attack was being made on the baggage. Heat
and want of watcr mere telling heavily on the sepoys, who
were further demoralisecl by t l ~ cAfghan artillery fire.
A little later thc smooth borc guns had to bc withdrawn for want of ammunition. This was thc signal for a
general advance of the Afghans. Thcir guns merc pushed
forward with great boldness ; their cavalry strea~nedround
thc British left; in the right rear were masses of mounted
and dismounted irregulars who had seized the villages on
thc British line of retreat. Swarms of ghazecs soon

showed themselves threatening the centre and left ; those
in front of the 66th were still held in check by the steady
volleys fired by that regiment. A t sight of the ghazees,
and cowed by the heavy artillery fire and the loss of thcir
officers, the two companies of Jacob's Rifles on the left
suddenly fell into confusion, and broke into the ranks of
the Grenadiers. That reginlent had behaved well but it
caught the infection of dcmoralisation, the whole left
collapsed, and the sepoys in uttcr panic, surrounded by
and intermingled with the ghazees, rollcd in a grcat wave
upon the right. The artillerymen and sappcrs madc a
gallant stand, fighting thc ghazecs hand-to-hand with
handspikes and rammers, while the guns poured canister
into the advancing masses, Slade reluctantly limbcrecl
up and toolc his four guns out of action ; Machine remained in action until t11c ghazees wcrc at the muzzles of
his two guns, which fell into the enemy's hands. T h e
torrent of mingled sepoys and ghazces broke in upon
the GGth, and overwhelmed that regiment. T h e slaughter
of t l ~ esepoys was appalling-so uttcrly co\ved werc they
that they scarcely attemptcd to defend themselves, and
allowed themselves without resistance to be dragged out
of thc ranks and killed. A cavalry charge mas ordered
in the direction of the captured guns, but it failed and
the troopers retired i n disorder. T h e infantry, assailed
by hordes of fierce and triumphant ghazees, staggered
away to the right, the GGth alone maintaining- any show
of formation, until the ravine was crossed, when the
broken remnants of the sepoy regiments toolc to flight
toward the east and the General's efforts to rally them
were wholly unavailing. T h e 66th with some of the
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sappers and grenadiers, made a gallant stand round its
colours in an enclosure near the village of Khig. There
Colonel Galbraith and sevcral of his officers were killed,
a n d the little body of brave rncn becoming outflanlced,
continued its retreat, making stand after stand until most
were slain. The Afghans pursued for about four miles,
but were checlccd by a detachment of rallied cavalry,
and desisted. The fugitives, forming with wounded and
baggage a straggling column upwards of six miles long,
crossed the waterless desert sixteen miles wide, to Ilanz-iMadat, which was reaclicd about midnight and where
watcr was found. From Asu Khan, where cultivation
began, to Koltoran near Candahar, the retreat was
harassed by armed villagers and the troops had to figlit
morc or lcss all the way. Officcrs and rncn were Itilled,
Lieutenant Maclaine was taken prisoner, and five of thc
smooth bore guns had to be abandoned because of
the exhaustion of the teams. About rnidclay of the 28th
t h e broken remnants of the brigadc reached Candahar.
When the casualties were ascertained it became evident
how disastrous to the British arms had been the combat
of Maiwand. Out of a total of 2476 engaged no
fewer than 964 were Idled. T h e wounded numbered
167; 331 followers and 201 horses were ltilled and
seven followers and sixty-eight horses wounded. Since
Chillian~vallahthe British arms in Asia had not suffered
loss so severc.
The spirit of the Candaliar force suffered materially
from the Maiwand disaster, and it was held that there
was no alternative but to accept the humiliation of a
siege within the fortified city. T h e cantonments were

abandoncd, the whole force was withdrawn into Candahar,
and was detailed for duty on the city walls. T h e effective
garrison on the night of the 28th numbered 4360, including the survivors of the Maiwand brigade. S o alert were
the Afghans that a cavalry reconnaissance made on thc
morning of the zgth, found the cantonments plundered
and partly burned and the vicinity of Candahar swarming with armed men. The whole Afghan population
amounting to about 12,000pcrsons, were compelled to
leave the city, and then the work of placing it in a state
of defcnce was energetically undertaken. Buildings and
enclosures affording cover too close to the enciente were
razed, communication along the walls was opened up, and
gun platforms were constructed in the more commanding
positions. The walls were both high and thick, but they
werc considerably dilapidated and there were gaps and
breaks in the bastions and parapct. The weak places as
well as the gates were fronted with abattis, the defects were
made good with sandbags, and wire entanglements and
other obstructions werc laid down outside the walls.
While this work was in progress the covering parties
werc in daily collision with t h e enemy, and occasional
sharp skirmishes occurred.
On the 8th August Ayoub opened fire on the citadel
from Picquet hill, an elevation north-westward of the
city, and a few days later he brought guns into action
from the villages of Dch Khoja and Deh Khati on the
east and south. This fire, steadily maintained though it
was day after day, had little cffcct, and the return fire gave
good results. I t was not casy t o invest the city since on
thc west and north there was no cover for the besiegers,

but in Dell IChoja on the east there was ample protection
for batteries, and the ground on the south-west was very
favourable. Its advantages were improved SO slcilfully
that it was at one time believed there was a European
engineer in Ayoub's camp. Dell IChoja was inconveniently near the Cabul gate, and was always full of men.
S o menacing was the attitude of the Afghans that a sortie
was resolved on against the villagc, which was conducted
with resolution but resulted in utter failure. The attempt
was made on the morning of the 16th. T h e cavalry went
out to hinder reinforce~nents from entering the village
from the eastward. An infantry force Soo strong commanded by Brigadier-General Brooke and divided into
three parties, moved out later covered by a heavy artillcry
fire from the city walls. Thc village was reached, but was
s o full of enemies in occupation of the fortress-like houses
that it was found untenable, and the three detachments
extricated themselves separately. In the course of the
retirement General Brooke and Captain Cruicl<shankwerc
killed. The casualties were very heavy ; IOG werc killed
and I r 7 were wounded.
The tidings of the Maiwand disaster reached Cabul on
the 29th July by telegram from Simla. The intention
of the military authorities had already been intimated
t h a t the Cabul force should evacuate Afghanistan in two
separate bodics and by two distinct routes. Sir Donald
Stewart lvas to march one portion by the Khyber route ;
the other under Sir Frederick Robcrts was to retire by
the ICuram valley, which Watson's division had been garrisoning since Roberts had crossed the Shutargurdan
in September 1879. But the Maiwand news interfered

with those arrangements. Stewart and Roberts concurred
in the necessity of retrieving thc Maiwand disaster by the
despatch of a division from Cabul. Roberts. promptly
offered to lead that division, and as promptly the offcr
was accepted by Stewart. B y arrangement with the
latter Roberts telegraphed to Simla urging that a force
should be despatched from Cabul without delay ; and rccognising that the authorities might hesitate to send on
this crrand troops already under ordcrs to rcturn to India,
he took it on himself to guarantee that none of the soldiers
~ o u l ddcmur, providing he was authorised to give the
assurance that after the work in the field was over they
would not be detained in garrison a t Candahar. T h e
Viceroy's sanction came on the 3d. August. T h e constitution and equipment of the force were entrusted to the two
generals; and in reply to questions His Excellency was
informed that Roberts would march on the 8th and
expected to reach Candahar on ad September. Sir
Donald Stewart gave his junior full freedom t o select the
troops to accompany him, and placed a t his disposal the
entire resources of the army in transport and equipment.
I t cannot truly bc said that it: was the dite of the Cabul
field force which constituted the column led by Roberts
in his famous march to Candihar. Of the native infantry
regiments of his own original force which he had mustered
eleven months previously in the Kurarn only two followed
him t o Candahar, the 5th Goorlchas and 23d Pioneers,
and the second mountain battery adllered to him staunchly,
Of his original white troops the 9th Lancers, as ever, were
ready for the march. I-Iis senior infantry regiment, the
67th; would fain have gone, but the good old corps was
'
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weak from casualties and siclzness, and the gallant Knowles
denied himself in the interests of his men. T h e two
I-Iighland regiments, the 72d and gzd, had done an
infinity of fighting and marching, but both had received
strong drafts, were in fine condition, and were not to be
hindered from following thc chief \vhom, though not
of their northern blood, the stalwart sons of the mist
swore by as one man.
Sir Frederick Roberts had already represented that it
would be impolitic to requirc the native regiments to
remain absent from India and their homes for a longer
period than two ycars. In the case of many of the regimenls that term was closely approacl~cd, and the men
aftcr prolonged absence ancl arduous toil needed rest and
were longing to rcjoin thcir families. ' It was not,' in the
words of General Chapman, 'with eager desire that the
honour of marching to Candahar was sought for, and somc
commanding officers of experience judged righlly the
tempers of their men when they represented for the
General's consicleration the claims of the regiments they
commanded to be relieved as soon as possiblc from field
service. . . . T h e enthusiasm which carried Sir Frederick
Roberts' force with exceptional rapidity to Candahar was
an after-growth evolved by the enterprise itself, and came
as a response to the unfailing spirit which animated the
leader himself! The constitution of the force was made
known by the general orders published on gd August.
I t consisted of three batteries of artillery commanded by
Colonel Alurecl Johnson; of a cavalry brigade of four
regiments commanded by Brigadier - Gcneral Hugh
Gough i and of an infantry division of three brigades

commanded by Major-Gcncral John Ross. The first
brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Herbert
Macpherson, the second by Brigadier-General T. D.
Baker, and the third by Brigadier-General Charles
Macgrcgor. Colonel Chapman, R.A., who had served in
the same capacity with Sir Donald Stewart, was now
RobertsJ chief of stafC The marching out strength of the
column was about 10,000 men, of \vhom 2835 were
Europeans. Speed being an object and since the column
might have to traverse rough ground, no ~vl~eclecl
artillely
or transport accompanied i t ; the guns were carried on
mules, llx baggage was sevcrely cut down, the supplics
carried were reduced to a minimum, and the transport
animals, numbering 8590, consisted of mules, ponies, and
donleys. It was known that the country could supply
flour, sheep, and forage.
Thc time specificcl for the departure of the force fi'om
Sherpur was kept to thc day. On the St11 the brigadcs
moved out a short distance into camp, and on the following morning the ~nnrchbegun in earnest. The distance
from Cabul to Candahar is about 320 miles, ancl the
march naturally clivides itself into three parts; from
Cabul to Ghuznec, ninety-eight miles ; from Ghuznec to
IChelat-i-Ghilzai, one hundred and thirty-four miles ; and
from Khelat-i-Ghilzai to Candahar, eighty-eight miles.
Ghuznee was rcachecl on the scventh clay, the daily
average bcing fourteen miles-excellent work for troops
unseasoned to long continuous travel, traml~ingsteadily
in a temperature of from SqO t o p0in the sllaclc. When
possible the force moved on a broad front, the brigades
and regiments leading by rotation, ancl halts mere made

a t specified intervals. The ' rouse ' sounded a t 2.45 A . N .
and the march began at four; the troops were gcncrally
in camp by two P.M. and tlie baggage was usually reported all in by five; but the rearguard had both hard
work and long hours. Thcrc was no sign of opposition
anywhere, not a single load of baggage was left behind,
comparatively few men fell out foot-sore, and the troops
were steadily increasing in endurance and capacity of
rapid and continuous marching.
At Ghuznee there was no rest day, and the steadfast
dogged march was resumed on thc morning of the 16th.
T h e strain of this day's long tramp of twenty miles to
Yergati was sevcre, but the men rallicd gamely, and the
General by dint of care and expedient was able to keep
up the high prcssurc. ' T h e method,' writes Gencral
Chapman, 'of such marching as was now put in practicc
is not easy to describe; it combined the extreme of
freedom in move~nentwith carcfully regulated halts, and
tlic closest control in every portion of the column ; it
employed the individual intelligence of each man cornposing the masses in motiop, and called on all for exertion
in overcoming thc difficulties of thc march, in bearing
its extraordinary toil, and in aiding the accomplishtncnt
of the object in view.' On the 20th a distance of twentyone miles was covered-the longest day's march made ;
thc effort was distressing owing to thc heat and the lack
of shade, but it was enforced by the absence of watcr.
Therc mas no relaxation in the rate of marching, and
Khelat-i-Ghilzai was reachcd on the eighth clay from Ghuznce, showing a daily average of nearly seventeen miles.
The 24th mas a halt day at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, where

Sir Frederick Roberts received a lctter from Gencral
Primrose in Candahar, describing the sortie made on the
village of Dell Khoja and giving details of his situation.
I t was resolved to evacuate Khelat-i-Ghileai and take on
its garrison with the column, which on the 25th resumed
its march to Candahar. On his arrival at Tir Andaz
on thc following day the General found a lctter from
Candahar, informing him that at thc news of the approach
of the Cabul force Ayoub Khan had withdrawn from his
investment of Candahar, and had shifted his camp to the
village of Mazra in the Urgundab valley, nearly due
north of Candahar. On the morning of the 27th General
Hugh Gough was sent forward with two cavalry regiments
a distance of thirty- four miles to Robat, the main
column moving on to Khel Akhund, half way to the
former place. Gough was accompanied by Captain
Straton the principal signalling officer of thc force, who
was successf~~l
in communicating with Candahar, and in
the afternoon Colonel S t John, Major Leach, and Major
Adam rode out to Robat, bringing the information that
Ayoub Khan was cnga~cclin strengthening his position
in the Urgundab vallcy, and apparently had the intention
to risk t41e issue of a battle. O n the 2Sth the whole forcc
was concentrated a t Robat ; and as it was desirable that
the troops should reach Candahar frcsh and ready for
prompt action, the General decided to make the 29th a
rest day and divide the nineteen miles from Robat to
Candahar into two short marches.
The long forccd march from Cabul may be regarded
as having ended at Robat. T h e distance between those
two places, 303 miles, had been covered in twenty days.
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It is customary in a long march to allow two rcst days
in each meek, but Roberts had grantcd his force but a
single rest day in the tmcnty days of its strenuous march.
Including this rest day, thc avcrage daily march was a
fraction over fifteen miles. As a feat of marching by a
regular force of 10,000 men encumbered with baggage
and followers, this achievement is unique, and it could
have bcen accomplished only by thorough organisation
and steady vigorous energy. Sir Frederick Roberts was
so fortunate as to encounter no opposition. For this
immunity he was indebted mainly to the stern lessons
given to the tribesmen by Sir Donald Stewart a t Ahmed
I(he1 and Urzoo while that resolute soldier was marching
from Candahar to Cabul, and in a measurc also to thc
good offices of the new Ameer. But it must be remembered that Robcrts had no assurance of exemption
from hostile efforts to block his path, and that he marched
ever ready to fight. It will long be remembered how
when Roberts had started on the long swift march, the
suspense as to its issuc grew and swelled until the strain
became intense. The safety of the garrison of Candahar
was in grave hazard ; the British prestige, irnpaircd by
thc disaster of Maiwand, was trembling in the balance.
T h e days passed, and there came no news of Roberts
and of the 10,000 men with whom the wise, daring littlc
chief had cut loosc from any basc and struck for his goal
through a region of ill repute for fanaticism and bittcr
hostility. The pessiinists among us held him to be
rushing on his ruin. But Robcrts marched light ; hc
lived on \\hat the country suppliccl ; hc gave the tribesincn no time to concentrate against hiin ; and two days
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in advance of thc time he had set himself he rcached
Candahar at the head of a force in full freshness of vigour
and burning with zeal for immediate battle.
While halted at Robat on the 29th Sir Frederick
heard from General Phayre that his division had been
retarded in its march by lack of transport, but that he
hoped to have it assembled a t Killa Abdoolla on the 28th,
and would be able to movc toward Candahar on the 30th.
But as Killa Abdoolla is distant some eight marches from
Candahar, it was obvious that General Phayre could not
arrive in time to share in the impending battle. On the
morning of the 31st the Cabul force rcached Candahar.
Sir Frederick Roberts, who had been suffering from fever
for some days, was able to leave his dliooly and mount
his horse in time to meet Gencral Primrose and his
officers to the east of Deh Khoja. T h e troops halted and
breakfasted outside the Shikapore gate, while General
Roberts entered the city and paid a visit to the Wali
Shere Ali Khan. On his arrival he assulncd command of
the troops in Southern Afghanistan ; and he remained
resting in thc city while the Cabul force marched to its
selected camping ground ncar the destroyed cantonments on the north-west of Candahar. A few shots were
fired, but the ground was occupied without opposition.
Baker's brigade was on the right, camped in rear of
Picquet hill, in the centre was Macpherson's brigade
sheltered in its front by Icarez hill, and on the left among
orchards and enclosures was Macgregor's brigade, in rear
of which was the cavalry.

CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE O F CANDAI-IAR

ALTHOUGH
Yakoub Khan llad ceased to beleaguer
Candahar, he had withdra~vnfrom that fortress but a very
short distance, and the position he had taken up was of
considerable strength. Thc Urgundab valley is separated
on the north-west from the Candahar plain by a long
precipitous spur trending south-wcst from the mountainous inass forming the eastern bounclary of thc valley
further north. Where the spur quits the main range,
due north of the city, thc Murcha Pass affords communication between the Candahar plain and the Urgundab
valley. The spur, its summit serrated by alternate
hcights and depressions, is again crosscd lower down by
an easy pass known as thc Babawali Kotul. I t is continued beyond this saddle for about a mile, still maintaini n g its south-westerly trend, never losing its precipitous
character, and steeply scarped on its eastern face ; and it
finally cnds in the plain in a steep descent of several
hundred fect. T h e section of it from the Babawali Kotul
to its south-western termination is known as the Pir
Paimal hill, from a village of that name in the vallcy near
its extremity. Ayoub Khan had made his camp near
the village of Mazra, behind the curtain formcd by thc
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spur described, and about a mile higher up in thc valley
than the point a t which the spur is crossed by the road
over the Babawali Kotul. H e was thus, with that point
artificially strengthened and defended by artillery, well
protected against a direct attack from the direction of
Candahar, and was exposed only to the risk of a turning
movement round the extremity of the Fir Paimal hill.
Such a movement might b c made the reverse of easy.
A force advancing to attempt it must do so exposed to
fire from the ,commanding summit of the Pir Paimal ;
around the base of that elevation there were several plain
villages, and an expanse of enclosed orchards and gardens
which strongly held were capable of stubborn defence.
In the valley behind the Pir Paimal hill there was the
lofty detached Kharoti hill, the fire from which would
mcet in the teeth a force essaying the turning movement ; and the interval behveen the two hills, through
which was the access to the Mazra camps, mas obstructed
by decp irrigation c h a ~ ~ n e lwhose
s
banks afforded cover
for defensive fire, and could be swept by a cross fire from
thc hills 011 cither flank.
Sir Frederick Roberts 'at a glance had pcrceived that
a direct attack by the Babawali Kotul must involve very
heavy loss, and he resolved on the alternative of turning
thc Afghan position. A reconnaissance was made on thc
afternoon of the jrst by Gcneral Gough, accompanied by
Coloilel Chapman. H e penetrated to within a short distance of the village of Pir Paimal, where it mas ascertained
that the enemy were strongly entrenched, and where several
guns were unmaslted. A great dcal of valuable information was obtaincd bcforc the cnemy began to intcrfcre
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with thc leisurely withdrawal. T h e cavalry suffered little,
but t h e Sikh infantry covering the retirement of the
reconnaissance were hard pressed by great masses of
Afghan reg~darsand irregulars. S o boldly did the cnemy
come on that the thircl and part of thc first brigade came
into action, and the firing did not ccasc until thc evening.
T h c enemy were clearly in the belief that the reconnaissance was an advance in force which thcy had been able
to chcclc and indeed drive in, and they were opportunely
audacious in thc misapprehension that they had gained
a succcss. T h e information brought in decided the
General to attack on the following morning; and having
matured his dispositions, hc explained them personally to
the commanding officers in the early morning of September
1st. T h e plan of attaclc was perfectly simple. T h c
Babawali Kotul was to be plied with a brisk cannonade
and threatened by demonstrations both of cavalry and
infantry ; while the first and second brigades, with the third
in 1-cserve,were to turn the extremity of the Pir Paimal hill,
force the enemy's right in the interval between that hill
and the Kharoti eminence, take in reverse the Babawali
Kotul, and pressing on up the Urgundab valley, carry
Ayoub Khan's principal camp a t Mazra. The Bombay
cavalry brigade was to watch the roads ovcr the Murcha
and Babamali Kotuls, supported by infantry and artillery
belonging to Gencral Primrose's command, part of whicll
was also detailed for the protection of the city; and to
hold thc ground from which the Cabul brigades were to
advance. General Gough was to take the cavalry of thc
Cabul column across the Urgundab, so as to reach by
a wide circuit thc anticipated line of the Afghan rctrcat.

Soon after nine mf.the forty-pounders on the right of
Picquet hill began a vigorous cannonade of the Babawali
I<otul, which was sturdily replied to by thc three fieldg u n s the enemy had in battery on that clevation. It had
becn early apparent that the Ayoub's army was in great
heart, and apparently mcclitating an offensive movement
had moved out s o far into thc plain as to occupy the
villages of Mulla Sahibdad oppositc thc British right,
a n d Gundigan on the left front of the British left. Botll
villages were right in the fair way of Roberts' inte~lded
linc of advance; thcy, the adjacent enclosures, and the
interval between t1.w villages were strongly held, and
manifestly the first thing to be done was to force the
enclny back from those advanced positions, Two
batteries opened a hcavy shcll fire on the Sahibdad
village, under cover of which Macpherson advancecl his
brigade against it, the 2cl Goorkhas and 92d 1-Iighlanders
in his first line. Simultanco~~sly
Balcer moved out to the
assault of Gundigan, clearing the gardens and orchards
betwcen him and that village, and keeping touch as he
advanced with the first brigadc.
T h e shell ,fire compelled the Afghan occupants of
Sahibdad to lic close, and it was not until they were near
t h e village that Macpherson's two leacling regiments encountered much opposition. I t was carried at the
bayonet point after a very stubborn resistance ; the place
was full of ghazees who threw their lives away reclclessly,
a n d continued t o fire on the British soldiers from houscs
a n d cellars aftcr the strcets had been cleared. The 92d
lost several men, b u t tllc Mqhans were severely pmished ;
it was reported that 300 were killed in this village alone,
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Whilc a detachment remained to clear out the village,
the brigade under a heavy fire from the slopes and crest
of the Pir Paimal hill moved on in the direction of that
hill's south-westcrn estremity, the progress of the troops
impeded by obstaclcs in the shapc of dry water-cuts,
orchards, and wallccl enclosures, every yard of which was
infcstcd by enemies and had to bc made good by stcady
fighting.
While Macpherson was advancing on Sahibdad, Bakcr's
brigade had been pushing on through complicated lanes
and wallcd enclosures toward thc village of Gundigan.
The opposition experienced was very resolute. T h e
Afghans held their ground behind loopholed walls which
had to be carried by stonn, and they did not hesitate to
t a l e the offensive by making vigorous counter-rushes.
Ualter's two leading regiments were the 72d and the acl
Sikhs. T h e left wing of thc former supported by thc
5th Goorkhas, thc old and tried comrades of the 72d,
assailed and took tllc village. Its right wing fought its
way through thc orchards between it and Sahibdad, in
the course of \vhich work it came under a severe enfilading
fire from a loopholed wall which the Silths on the right
were attempting to turn. Captain Frome and several
mcn had bcen strucl< down and thc hot firc had staggered
the Highlanders, when their chief, Colonel Brownlow,
came up on foot. T h a t gallant soldier gave t h e word for
a rush, but immediately fell mortally wounded. Aftcr
much hard fighting Baker's brigade got forward into
opener country, but was then exposed to the fire of an
Afghan battery near the extremity of the Pir Paimal spur,
and to the attacks of great bodies of ghazees, which were
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withstood sloutly by the Silths and driven off by a
bayonet attack delivered by the I-Iighlanders.
The two brigades had acco~nplishedthe first part of
their task. They were now in alignment with each
o t h e r ; and the work bcfore them was to accomplish
t h e turning movement round the steep extremity of the
P i r Paimal ridge. Macpherson's brigade, hugging the
face of the elevation, brought: up the left shoulder
a n d having accomplished thc turning movement, suicpt
up the vallcy and carried the village of Pir Pairnal
b y a series of rushes. Here, however, Major White
comrnancling the advancc of the gzd, found hirnself
confronted by grcat masses of the enemy, who appeared
determined to make a resolute stand about tllcir guns
which were in position south -west of the Babawali
Kotul. Reinforcements were observed hurrying up from
Ayoub's standing camp a t Mazra, and the Afghan
guns on the Kotul had bcen reversed so that their fire
should enfilade the British advance. Discerning that
in such circurnstances prompt action was imperative,
Macpherson determined to storm the position without
waitiug for reinforcements. T h e 92d under Major White
lcd the way, covered by the fire of a field battery
a n d supported by the 5th Goorlthas and the 23d Pioneers.
Springing out of a watercourse at the challenge of their
leader, the Highlanders rushcd across the open ground.
T h e Afghans, sheltered by high banks, fired steadily and
well ; their riflemen from the Fir Paimal slopes poured in
a sharp cross fire; thcir guns wcre wcll servcd. But: the
Scottish soldiers were not t o be denied. Their losses
Iverc severe, but they took the guns at the point of the
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bayonct, and valiantly supported by the Goorlchas and
pioneers, shattered and dispcrscd the Inass of Afghans,
which was reckoncd to have numbered some 8000 men.
No chancc was given thc cncmy to rally. They were
headed off from the Pir Pairnd slopes by Macpherson.
Halcer hustled them out of cover in thc watercourses in
the basin on thc left, and whilc one stream of fugitives
poured away across thc rivcr, another rolled backward
into and through Ayoub's camp at hlazra.
While hlacphcrson had effected his turning movement
closc under the ridge, Baker's troops on the left had t o
makc a wider swecl) bcfore bringing up the left shoulder
and whecling into the hollow between the Fir Paimal and
the Kharoti I ~ i l l . Thcy swept out of their path what
opposition they encountcrcd, and moved up thc centre of
thc hollo\v, where thcir commander halted thcm until
Macphcrson's brigade on the right, having accomplished
its more arduous work, should come up and restore the
alignment. Baker had sent Colonel Moncy with a half
battalion away to the lcft to t a l e possession of the
Kharoti hill, \vhcre he found and capturcd threc Afghan
guns. Prcssing toward thc northern end of the hill,
Money to his surprise found himself in Full view of
Ayoub's camp, which was then full of men and in rear
of which a line of cavalry was drawn up. Money was too
weak to attack alonc and seht to General Balccr for
reinforcements \vhich, however, could not be spared him,
and the gallant Moncy had perforce to rcmain loolcing
on while the advance of Macpherson and Bakcr caused
the evacuation of Ayoub's camp and the flight of his
cavalry and infantry toward the Urgondab. Rut thc

discovery and capture of five more Afghan cannon ncar
Babawali village was some consolation for the enforcccl
inaction.
Considerable numbers of Ayoub's troops had earlicr
pushed through the Babawali Pass, and moved down
toward the right front of General Burrows' Bombay
brigade in position about Picquct hill. Having assured
himsclf that Burrows mas ablc to hold his own, Sir
Frederick Roberts ordered Macgrcgor t o move the third
brigade forward toward Fir Pairnal village, whithcr he
himself rode. On his arrival there he found that the first
and sccond brigades werc already quite a mile in aclvancc.
The battle rcally had already been won but there being
no open view to the front General Ross, who commanded
thc whole infantry division, had no means of discerning this result ; and anticipating the likelihood that
Ayoub's camp at Mazra would have to be talcen by storm,
he halted the brigacles to replenish ammunition. This
clclay gave opportunity for the entire evacuation of tllc
Afghan camp, which whcn reached without a n y furthcr
opposition and entered a t one P.M. was found t o he deserted. The tents had bcen left standing ; ' all the rudc
equipage of a half barbarous army had bcen abandoned
-the meat in the cooking pots, the bread half ltneadccl
in thc earthen vesscls, the bazaar with its ghee pots, dried
fruits, flour, and corn! Ayoub's great marquee had bccn
precipitately abandoned, and thc fine carpets covering its
floor were left. But in the hurry of their flight tlic
Afghans had found time to illustrate their ba~barityby
murdering thcir prisoner Lieutenant Machine, whosc
body was found near Ayoub's tent \ v i h the throat cut.
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T o this decd Ayoub does not seem to have been privy.
T h e sepoys who were prisoners with Machine testified
that Ayoub fled about eleven o'clock, leaving the prisoners
in charge of the guard with no instructions beyond a verbal
order that they were not to be killed. It was more than
a n hour later when the guard ordered thc unfortunate
officer out of his tent and took his life.
The victory was complete and Ayoub's army was in
full rout. Unfortunately no cavalry were in hand for a
pursuit from the Mazra camp. Thc scheme for interccpting thc fugitive Afghans by sending the cavalry
brigade on a wide movement across the Urgundab, and
striking the line of their probable retreat toward the
Khakrez valley, may have been ingenious in conception,
b u t in practice did not have the dcsircd effect. But
Ayoub had been decisivcly beaten. H e had lost the
wholc of his artillery numbering thirty-two pieces, his
camp, an immensc quantity of ammunition, about 1000
rncn killcd ; his army was dispersed, and he himself was a
fugitive with a mere handful along with him of thc army
of 12,000 rncn whom he had commanded in the morning.
The battle of Candahar was an effective finale to thc
latest of our Afghan wars, and it is in this sense that it
is chiefly memorable. The gallant rncn who participated
in the winning of it must have becn thc first to smile a t the
epithets of 'glorious and 'brilliant ' which werc lavished
o n the victory. In truth, if it had not been a victory our
arms would have sustained a grave discredit. T h e
soldicrs of Roberts and Stcwart had becn accustomed
t o fight and to conquer against heavy numerical odds,
which werc fairly balanced by thcir discipline and the

superiority of thcir armament. But in the battle of
Candahar thc numerical disparity was non-existent, and
Ayoub had immensely the disadvantage as regarded
trained strength. His force according to the reckoning
ascertained by the British general, amounted all told to
12,800 men. The strength of the British force, not including the detail of Bombay troops garrisoning Candahar, was over ra,ooo. But this army 12,000 strong,
consisted entirely of disciplined soldiers of whom over
one-fifth were Europeans. T h e accepted analysis of
Ayoub's army shows it t o have consisted of 4000 regular
infantry, Soo regular cavalry, 5000 tribal irregular infantry of whom an indefinite proportion was no doubt
In artillery
ghazees, and 3000 irregular horsemen.
strength the two forces were nearly equal. When it is
remembercd that Charasiah was won by some 2500
soldiers of whom only about 800 were Europeans, contending against ro,ooo Afghans in an cxceptionally
strong position and well provided with artillery, Sir
Frederick Roberts' wise dccision to make assurance
doubly sure in dealing with Ayoub a t Candahar stands
out very strikingly.
Perforce in his battles around
Cabul he had taken risks, but becausc those adventures
had for the most part been successful he was not the man
to weaken the certainty of an all-important issue by
refraining from putting into the field every soldier a t his
disposal. And he was wisely cautious in his tactics.
That he was strong enough t o make a direct attack by
storming the Babawali Kotul and the Pir Paimal hill
was clear in the light of prcvious experience. But if therc
was more ' brilliancy' in a direct attack, thcre was certain

to bc hcavicr loss than would be incurred in the lcss
dashing turning movement, and Sir Frederick with thc
true spirit of a commander chose the more artistic and less
bloody mcthod of earning his victory. I t did not cost
him clear. His casualties of the clay \yere thirty-six
killed including three officers, and 218 wounded among
whom were nine officers.
T h c battle of Canclahar brought to a close the latest
of our Afghan wars. Sir Frederick Roberts quittcd
Candahar on the 9th September, and marched to Quetta
with part of his division. On the 15th October, at Sibi,
he resigned his command, and taking sick leave to
England sailed from ~ o m b aon~ the 30th October.
I-Iis year of hard and successful service i n Afghanistan
greatly enhanced his reputation as a prompt, sl<ilful,and
.,
enterprising soldier.
The Pisheen and Sibi valleys arc the sole tangible
results remaining to us of the two campaigns in Afghanistan sketched in the second part of this volume-campaigns which cost the livcs of many gallant men slain in
action or dead of disease, and involved the expenditure
of about twenty lnillions sterling. Lord Beaconsfielcl's
vaunted 'scientific frontier,' condcmned by a consensus
of the bcst military opinions, was rejected by the Liberal
Government which had recently acceded to power, whose
decision was that both the Khyber Pass and the Kuram
valley should be abandoned.
On this subject Sir
Frederick Roberts wrote with great shrewdness : ' W e
have nothing to fear from Afghanistan, and the best
thing to do is to leave it as much as possible to itself,

I t may not bc very flattcring to our a?mw-p o p e , but I
feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans
sec of us the less they will dislike us. Should Russia in
future years attempt t o conquer Afghanistan, or invade
India through it, we should have a better chance of
attaching the Afghans to our interest if wc avoid all
interfcrcnce with them in the meantime.' During the
winter of 1880-1 the Khybcr and the Icuram were evacuatcd by the British troops, the charge of keeping opcn
and quiet thc former being entrusted to tribal levies
paid by the Indian Governmcnt.
So far, then, as regarded the north-wcstern frontier, the
stntus quo nntt had been fallen back upon. But there
mas a keen difference of opinion in regard to the disposition of the salient angle furnished by Candahar.
Throughout the British occupation and the negotiations
with Abclurrahman, the annexation of Candahar had
been consistently repudiated. The intention on our part
announced was to separate it from Cabul, and to place it
under the independent rule of a Baralrzai prince. Such a
prince had actually been appointed in Shere Ali Khan,
and altl~oughthat incompetent Sirdar was wise enough
to abdicate a position for which he was not strong enough,
this action did not relieve us from our pledges against
annexation. Nevertheless many distinguished men whose
opinions were abstractly entitled to weight, were strongly
in favour of our retention of Candahar. Among thosc
werc the late Lord Napier of Magdala, Sir Henry
Rawlinson, Sir Edward I-Iarnley, Sir Donald Stewart, and
Sir Frederick Roberts. Among the authorities opposed
to the occupation of Candahar were such men as the late

Lord Lawrence and General Charles Gordon, Sir Robert
Montgomery, Lord Wolseley, Sir Henry Norman, Sir
John Adye, and Sir Archibald Alison.
While the professional cxperts differed and while the
'Candahar debates' in Parliament wcre vehement and
prolonged, the issue, assuming that fidelity to pledges was
still regarded as a national virtue, was perfectly clear and
simple. In the franlc words of Sir Lepel Griffin : ' W e
could not have remained in Candahar without a breach of
faith.' And he added with unanswerable forcc : ' Our
withdrawal was in direct accordance with the reitcrated
and solemn professions which I had been instructed to
malte, and the assurances of the Government of India to
the chiefs and people of Cabul.
The wisdom of the
policy of retiring from Candahar may be a fair matter for
argument, but it was one on which both Governments
were agreed. I am convinced that withdrawal, after our
public assurances, was the only practicable policy.'
Lord Ripon acted on his instructions ' to kcep in view
the paramount importance of effecting a withdrawal from
Candahar on the earliest suitable occasion.' T h e abdication of the Wali Shere Ali Khan cleared thc air t o some
extent. A British garrison under the comrnancl of General
Hume wintered in Candahar. Ayoub Khan was a competitor for the rulership of the southern province, but he
reccived no encouragement, and after some negotiation
the Amccr Abdurrahman was informed that Candahar
was reincorporated with the kingdom of Afghanistan,
and it was intimated to him that the capital would be
given over to the Governor, accompanied by a suitable
military force, whom he should send. On thc 1st of April

...

an Afghan force entered Candahar, followed presently by
Mahomed Hassan Khan, the Governor nominated by the
Ameer. General - Hume soon after marched out, and
after halting for a time in the Pisheen valley to watch
the course of events in Candahar, he continued his march
toward India. The restless Ayoub did not tamely submit
to the arrangement which gave Candahar to Abdurrahman.
Spite of many arduous difficulties, spite of lack of money
and of mutinous troops, he set out toward Candahar in
July 1881. Mahomed Hassan marched against him from
Candahar, ancl a battle was fought a t Maiwand on thc
aimiversary of the defcat of Gencral Burrows on the same
field. Ayoub was the conqueror, and he straightway
took possession of the capital and was for the time ruler
of the province. But Abdurrahman, subsidisecl with
English money and English arms, hurried from Cabal,
encountered Ayoub outside the walls of Candaliar, and
inflicted on him a decisive defeat. His flight to Herat
was followed up, he sustained a second reverse there,
and took refuge in Persia. Abdurrahman's tenure of thc
Cabul sovereignty had been a t first extremely precarious;
but he proved a man a t once strong, resolute, and
politic, In little more than a year after his accession he
was ruler of Shere Ali's Afghanistan ; Candahar ancl
Herat had both come to him, and that without very
serious exertion. H e continues to reign quietly, steaclfastly, and firmly ; and there never has been any serious
friction between him and the Government of India, whose
wise policy is a studied abstincnce from interference in
the internal affairs of the Afghan lringdom,
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CKVICYSIIANK,
Cn&in, killcd a t the attack on
Deh Kboja, 304.
CUNVPIGMALI,
Lieutenant M c k , V.C., gallnnt
c o ~ ~ d uact the Tnkl~t-i.Slln11,213.

.

~ I I c , 52, 58, 60, I.~o.
)OST ~ ~ I A I ~ oorigin,
~ I I ~ 5D;, early cnrecr, G ;
asks for terms, 28 ; foranken by h ~ troops,
s
29
n fugitive, $3, 36; in I%okl~nrn
and ~liooloo111'
43 ; at D n m m nncl Kolktnn, 44-6;surrc~~der;
lo Al:~cnnglitcn, 47 ; senr into Ilr1tisl1 Indin,
49 ; l o bc allowed to return to Akhanistnn
93, lor, IS.+; his return t o his sovcrcigtity:
156 ;dies 1863, 162.
)REIV Colonel e n t c n the Peiwnr Kot111,1 7 5
) u x c ~ u~ c u e ' r n ~15.
)UNDA'S: ~nptnin,'killedat Sherpur -62
) U N H A ~ I - ~ ~ A S S~
Yr, i g a d i e r - ~ e n r m l , - 1 8 ~ .
)uu,\Nn, on tlic stege of Hcrat. 3 ; on Lord
At~ckland's~nnnircato 12 . on hlacnaghten's
nppointmcnt 18. nt s:eyc'of Ght~znec 25-6 :
on the rastdrnti& of s'11n11 soojnl~,& ; on
Dost Mnhomed's s ~ ~ r r e n d e48
r , ; on the rctreat on Jcllnlnbnd,70 ; on hlncn:~ghten's illfaith, 92.
)OOKANEYS,

.

i o w ~ ~ o a Sir
s , I-icnry, on Lord At~ckland's
~nnnifcsto,12.
~ I . L E N U O R O U G I ~Lon], on Sale's brignde, 134 ;
first nlnnifcsio 1.13 ; vacillntions, 144 ;
orders the rclndvn~01 the antes of Somnntl~
from S u l m Rlah~noud'stomb, 148; reception
of the r c t t ~ r n i narsiies,
~
156.
EI.LIS, h1r uritish El~voyto Pcrsin, 2.
~ I . I W I N S T ~ N BGeneral
I ; succceds Cotton
in chief col(lmnnd, Gj his cliancter and
infirniitier, Gq5. orders Sale to return LO
Cnbul, 69. n b o d to leave Indin, 70,73,73 ;
orders thc)abandonment of the C o ~ n r n ~ s s a r ~ a t
fort, 77; the Duke of \Vrllington's verdict
on his position, 78; hopaless, 83, 88, 89;
'scents trenchor).,' 96 ; calls upon I'utunger 10
open ~~egotialions,
m; in the retffint, 19;
consents to liancl over the Indies, 113; m d
thcir I~usl~nndsI 14 ; rcft~sesA k h r ' s proposal that the kuropeans s h o ~ ~ Iny
l d down
thcir nrrns, rrS ; conference, 3x7. made n
I~ostnac,118: at Jocclullnk.. 121.. ,.lo:
, . dcnth,
152,i5j.
'
EI.I~IIINSCOSE,
Mr, on the Afglinn expedition,

5

-

12.

E N G L A N DIlrigadicr,
,
dcfented at the K o j ~ ~ k
D A D U Rrg,
, 30, 43.
pass, 1~i2.3 147.
168-70.
Death
U A O U D ' S I I AYnkoub
I~,
K h n d s gcnernl 178, E V A ~ W ~;rgaon-hl:~jor, on the
hlnrch ' 181.
185 ; accompanies the A ~ n c c r to ~ o L c r l s
E Y I ~ E~,h e c t i t ,o p i n i o ~on
~ Shclton's defcnt at
Bch~nnroo,88 ; descriptio~lo[ the suli'eriogs
of the retrcnt, 1x0; 1115 'Elptlvity,' 150, 152.

n~wun

U e r r s n w n ~ 58.
,
DFIC 13.5.
D&IE, Colonel or the 13111, a t the taking o
Ghaniee, a+.$; in conunnnd nt Ihrnian, 4)
replaces Sale in comnmnd, 65, 66 ; hcnds ;
sortie fro111 Jellalalad, 123 ; in the counci
s centr,
of war, 127, 1zS~.r3r; ~ o m n ~ a n dthe
a t the great mrtw a n d IS killed, 133. 1.52.
DESKIS,Colonrl, 14.
DOUGIN,
Captain, wloor in the retreat, 119.

FANE, Sir Harry, Conirnnnder-in-Chief, 12 ;
hends the especlition to Cahal, 14, 15.
F A I ~ R I X W ~ routs
O N , Uktar Khan at Zemin.
dnwxi-, 53.
F l i ~ o z r r s o ~ t1)-18,156.
i,
FORUES,Licutel~ant of tlic gzd Highlanders,
killcd at the Takl;t-i-shah 243.
YRASIIR'S RIWCAL C A V A ~ Y a t Purwau
Durrnh, 46, 47.

,

-

F U T I E l l A B A D 121.
l i u roll
~
A L I ' S I ~of~ Persia,
~I
o.
P v ~ r ~ JU&,
r r
second sun nnd successor of
S l ~ a Sooiah,
l~
139, 152 ' abdicates, I j5.
F U T T E I ~KHAX, c l d c ~ t I)rotlicr of D o d
Alahomed, his fate, 5.

G A L I I K A I . IColonel,
.~I,
killed at hlniannd, 302.
G,\nr~.\o H I L L S . the. 106.8,

62 ; g i n term horn BIacgrcgor,G6.~8;:~itnck
Snlc's force 68, 70; slnu lhter by, 111 thc
I<huord cadtr~,111, 11s; t a n g on t l ~ erear
~ ~ ea rt Jog;
of the retrent 117-19 ; s l ; ~ i ~ g l by,
dulluk, 1rg;'ntlack Pollock, 146; harass
,
filoucy nor, 263.
~ ~ t ~ n ~ -.1,12,
s t t l 294-6.
,
G l l u z n m 17 20; sicge of, 23-7 ; occt~picdby
British ;rndps, 32, 3.1, 36; snrrendered to the
A b h m s , 141, I.I?, 144 ; retaken Iry Notr,
146, 153, 190, zr6, 231, 5268, 270, 27.1, 278,

-

...

.

.

- .

,

z m , 271, 272, 30.7: jr{-,zo.
Goimoo; the C ; ~ Ila1 c?der, 56.8.
GORUON,
Colo~~el,
his co~nmnnd in the attack
on the Spi~~gmvai
and I'eiwar K o t ~ ~ l172.
s,
Goauos. General Cliarles, ngninst keepina
Candnl~ar,326.
G o a m u n u R1wa. the, 46.
C ; U I ~ ~ S C I I A I ~&G.
OPF '
GOUGH,~ a p t a i ; , with the 9th I.niicers, 2 3 ~ ;
in the chnrge nf Dccwnber 11111, 235-7.
GOUGHGenernl Charles. 213,214, ~5.1.
COUGH:General Hngh, 901, 231, ~ 3 8 ~ ~ 264,
60,
306 ~ ~ 3 1 5 , 3 1 6
GNA$T, Dr, zall;~ntcondt~ctat Chnriknr, 82.
GREEN,in the Xe~reat,108.
GRESADIERS
1st tile 299 301.
GRIFFIN,~ i r ' ~ e ; e;is
~ , nilpsion to nrrnngc for
the succession to Ynkoul~Khan, 277-91 ; OII
the relcntion of Cnndnlrar, 326.
G R I P P I T I I S , Major, gallnnt rnarch fro111
Kubbnr-i-Jul~bnr, 75 ; s t o r m hlnhomcd
Slrcrcef's fort, 77, 120 258.
G u t n s s the, 183, rlgl 203 213, 238. in the
attncl; on the em-ti&, 2)o-5,,
249,
so, 260.
G U L KOH RIDGE Lbe, 270.
G U X I ) A N U KSale's
,
cou~tcilof war at, 68-70 ;
final tragedy of the Rrtrmt near 120 121 ;
evncualed, 13. ; Pollock's troops Aoncdntrate
at, 145, 147,. 176, 21.1, 219; trmty of 1879,
161 ; conclus~onof, 178-Bu, 182, 183, 287.
GIIXDIGAS,317,318.
GWAGAFASS, the, 175.

A m l n KII,I.A, 171.
HADJI KIIAHKHAKUR,
=I, 99, 30..
HACXESSir F., Co~~ima~~cIer-~~~-Cl~tef,
166.
HAI.~., &ptntn 250,
I i a s l m ~ o x ,1,ihcnant
~
W.R. P., V.C., wit11
Cnvagnarr nt C ; h l 1825 ' killed 186 199
H n r r r . ~ ~Sir
, ~ d w d d ,111 iavollr br k&ml:
Canclnhnr, 325,
H A ~ ' Z - I - ~ ~ ~ 302.
\U~\T,
HARI)Y,I.ic~~tcnant,
killed, 236.
HAWANAnnul., 168.
H n s s , ~KllAN,. goycr11or
of Maidan, killcd,
2?0.

H a u c ~ r o s , dcsperately wou~tdcd in thc
Chnrikar disaster, 81.
HAVELOCK,
Coplain 1.lcnr-y aide-dc-camp Lo
Sir \V. Cotton 16 ; on ~11;hSuoj:hls receptlon in ~ a n d a \ l n r22. description of Shnh
Soojah, 31 ;sta~dfficc;to Sale 67 ; authenticates Uroadfoot's account of ~Alr:s council of
war at Jcllalabnd, 126 127 130, 131 ; in the
g r m t sortie from ~ e l h i a b a d 133.
,
HAV,a t the siege of Ghuznec, 25.
HAZARAShorde of 2%. 274
Hrr~nltrnr;n r v m , tile, 11,53, 176, 27-6. ,
I~ENS>IANl\fr 217' 011 the def~llce0 Shelplll.,
-h; on'lhe h t l l d ofAllmed I<l~ul,271, 272 :
on Abd~irml!nia~~,
280.
HERAT, I'crs~n nnd 8 ; siege of, by the
Pcrs~nns,3, .I, lo, k5, 33, 3.1 ; i n d ~ p e ~ ~ d e n t ,
37 ; AIncnaghtcn presses for an cspcdition
ngainst, 40, 41, 176; Ayoub Khan 111 26.5
277 287, 29.1, 2y6' Ayoub drivcll h.ol;l, 11;
Al,$urrnllman. 997:

2% 23 , 55, 263, 276.
the 6, 15.{.983, 188.
H o n l t o u s ~ Sir J o b b 4 ~ a r n Lord B r o ~ ~ g h t o n
presidentof the Bmrd of kontrol, clnin~stlri
responsibility of the l i n t Afgl~anwar in
1851, contradictory statemant in I B ~ c r, r .
H U P T KOTUL,the, 66, 115 ; Inst stand of thc
Afghans nt 1 . 1 ~
I i u c ~ ~ r~s r,& a d i e r . ~ c n c r n lnt, At~nlrdKhel.
59-76.
e t i . Genernl. 126. 227.

HINDOO~&SH,

2i7,

I ~ u r n e a ,mntinous scpo)x captured in, 204,
940.

J ~ c o n ' sRtr:t.lrs (30th Nntive I n h n t r y ) nt the
Llniwand ~lisastcr,299%301.
J A D K A N225.
,
J A ~ I + :Anderson
,
encounters Ghilzais at, 38.
JEI.LA!.ADAD,
28; British troops quartered in,
34, 37, 38. 55 61 65 ; march on resolved
opinion
I ' ; of, 7q.78, 83, 84,
111,011,69 ; D U ~ I ~ C
99 lor 107 115 ; Akbar's condttlons lor
th; e v ~ c u n t t & of,
~ 117, 118 121 defencc
of, 121-34, 138 ; P o ~ ~ o81'c ~139 'l.l.l. 14.5,
150,. 157 ; I?llphi~~stoneb u r i h a; 152.53 ;
parually <Iestroyctl, 157 ; Sir S. 'nrownc's
C:IIIIV. nmr.. 170
, .: disaster to the ~ o t h-Hussnrs near, 171, 213, zr.l.
JIINKIXS,Col~nel,of the Guides, 213, 226,
238, a4.I ; storms thc Asnlai I~eights,' 2.1 g
'250 ; adroit evacuntion of Asmai hCicK;s:
25 I, 252, 260.
J U N K ~ N SWilliam,
,
Secretary t o Cnvagnari,
183-6.
J o t t ~ s o Captain,
~,
in charge of the Trcasl~ry
a t Cabul, 73; hostage, 117, 121. 151 ; i ~ r mnges the redett~p~ion
of tllc c;iptivcs, 154.
O l l N S O X , , Colonel A l ~ ~ r e dcommands
,
llle
nrtillcry ~n the Great March, 306.
J u t m ~ r i K H A N , brother to Dost Mahomerl,
28 ; in charge oC Dost Nahorned's Canlily
a t Khooloom, 43.
JIIGDULLUKV A L L E Y the, 68 ; retreati~lg
col~~tntl
harassed a;, 116-17 ; slaughter at.
118-20; caplivcs arrive at, 121 ; Pollock
?gaged wtth Gl~ilznis nt, 145-6, aI.1, 226,
-38, 25.1.
J I J L G X I I FORT, the, Sale fails to tnke, 45.
JUNROOD,
123, 137, 214.

.

~

~

Kttlo, 302.
'
K I I I V A34.
,
KHOUAUUSSII67.
KIIOOLOOM,
43'; A k l m at, 55, 62, rj.1.
K u o o ~ o o n r \, k d i of, 11.
K ~ t o s , VALI.EY,
~,
thc, 175.
K I I U S H K - I - N n l i t ~ uskirnlish
o,
a t , 176, 295-7.
KHVDER-Jellalabad-G~~t~dnm~tk
rolttc, the, 189,
2x2.

KHVUERPASS, the, 7, 34, 37, .+I ; the cl;ms of,
56, 58 ; Gllilmis intercept the cotn~n~tnica11011 by, 61,- 125. 132; Wild fails to force
136 ; 1ollocl marches through, 137 ~ a v a g !
nari turned back from 167-9 r70 ;7
189,
291, 304 ; question of tile retllltioll o(13z4 ;
cvacunred, 325.
KILLAADDOOLLA,
30
KILLAI<A%ER,
23, ; i k s ~ at,
y 232, 238, 249.
KING^ GARDEN,
the, a t Cabul, 258, 262.
K ~ o w t . a s . 106.
Ktton,\al.ih;, 225.
Kou-I-NOOR, the, taken by Runject Sing11
from Shah Soojah, 5, 30.
KOHISAN, Dost ~ I a h o ~ n eill,
d 4.1, 62, 80, 8r,
83. 107, '20, 225, 226, 219, 220, 258, zG2,
263 283 288.
the, 17, 20, zr ; I3rigadier BngKOJU;
land repulsed at, 1.12, 17j.
KOKORAN.
702.
KOLULI-U~L:KWAN
21.
KOTWALOP CADU;, the, lricd lor l l ~ cmassacre
of Cnvagn:~ri,etc., 203.
KONDOOZ,
283.
KOTTRRE,13.
K u ~ n , m - ~ - J u ~ n ,67,
i n ,75, 11.1, 116.
Kunaa! vnLLav, ~ h c ,168, 171, 174, 179, 186,
188.90, 201, 30,13 305, 324.
K U H D U R R A80.
II,
K u s ~ l r ,190; General Robcrts tnccts Yakotlb
K h a n at, rgr, ~ g ? ,-01.
K u ~ r St U N G67,
, 116, 214, 215.

.

.

PASS,

KATA KUSTIA,170,
LAHORE,hlr Clerk at, 12.
K A T I . I A ~ A1.18.
R,
LAKE, 135.
K x u ~ n t x h ' x Gcneral,
,
165-7 176 279 285.
Knve, bir John, g ; histoky o! 111: Afghan LANCIIIISthe gth, 201, a32, 305.
war, 32. opinion of Ihtrnes, 50 ; nccolmt ol L A N C E R S : Bcngal,.tlle, 232, 235-7, 272.
L A \ V I ~ E K CCaplnln,
B,
w a r n s i \ l ; ~ c ~ ~ a g l ~9l e6n; ,
b~acnagiltrn':; murder, 97.
mndc p~isoncr, 97 ; sends rncssages lrom
K U A N ~Sir
: John, C.01~1n1i1tldcr-in-CI1ief
o r tile
thc chick toElphtnstot~e,98 ; description pf
nornl:ay nrlny, 15 ; ~nnrchcs tow:trds Hythe rctrent, 107 ; mnde hostage, ~ c ;g 111
derabad 19. his chamctcr 2 0 . n~archcsO I I
captivity, 151, IS^^
Cab~tl,:z ;'siege of Gh;tzne:,
23-7, 29 ;
L x w ~ e ~ c t rLord
,
his ' masterly inacti\4ty,'
camp nc:w CaLol, 30, 33, 5.1, .{I, 51.
186 against kecbing Calldahar, 326.
KLLLY,l)r Amhrose, with Cnvagnari, 183.
nIJor, 309
Kriastt,\w, a t siegc of Gh~tzncc,27.
1 . 0 C t i t I ~ R ~229.
K H A I ~ I ZVALLEY the 296, 322.
L O G U RVALLEV,the, 153; plain, r p ; river,
I < ~ a t : o ~IIILI.,
t
d c , 3;5, 316, 320.
193, 225, 22q, 263 276
KIIELA K I I U N D309:
,
L O O D ~ A N AShnk
H hoojnh's refuge in 6, 7.
K ~ l a ~ a l , ,; occuplcd by h'olt, .lz-3.
Dr, 'politicnl oficer in 111; Uamiall
Lottu
KHRLA'P, ~ S I I of.
S
.yet h%~ERhn,
N~SS~l.:~.
I..
43, 4.); killed a t I'ur\r,an Durmh,
di.htllCt,
KIIELAT-I-GIIILZAI,
17 ; occ~~pi~lrl
by Nott,
38 ; gnrrisoacd, 56 ; garrison w i t l ~ d r a \ ~ , l ~ ,
14.1, 7.17, 176, ~ p 268
,
269 ; one of the
stages OII the Grent hlnrhl, 301-9.

.
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Index
~~,\Ho>IF:D
Nnssns KHAN. Abdurrnltnin~~'s
governor of Carrdahar, dcrcatrd by Ayoul,
327.
h l n n o r ~ e oJ A N , a Warduk general, d c k n d r
LuTTAIIL'xD,z14, 215, 254.
the Asmar heights, 197 ;allacked by hlnrsy
L v r r o s I.ord, Viceroy, 1876, 162 ' his instracand Mncphcrson, 225 - 40, z.15, 246, 255,
lions, '&p7; ra~ificsthe treat; of Gnndn2i7:
nltnck on the Sherpur cantonnteats.
muk, 178, 183, 184 ' prepares to revellge
258-62 286.
Camgnari 186.8 208; decides that Ynkotrb
I
\
I
A
I
I
~ > hI ~l sIm m , Shah of Persia, his
~, ;
Khnn doe: IIOI r & n to A k l ~ n n i s t a ~377
nmbilion, desians on Herat. 2,4.
MAIIO.\IEI>SIIAIIKHAN,Akbar's lientrnant,
15r
~ I A I I O A I ESHEREEI:
D
fort or, 76, 77, 92, 258,

---.

"6.7

~ ~ A H O A I E SVR\\'AK,
D
agetrt

hl.+ct;srxoa, kigndicr.Gcnernl Charles, C.Ij.,
chief OF Sir b'. Roberts' stnff, rpo recovers
the p t n s at hpl1\~:1nn,z38.9 ' III ;he Grcnt
Xlnrch, 307, 3" ; in 111ebnttli o i Cnnclnhnr,
3?'.
hl,\cmr;.cua, hlnjor, dcccivcd by the Gl~ilrni
chief of Tcreen, 66-7 ; S;l!c's ndviscr, lag-32
~~ACKENZ
Cnptain
I I ? , Coltn, a t the deienr of
Dort hlahomed near Rnniian ,I.! ; gnllnt~t
conduct of, 76 ; w i ~ hhlacnnglltcn, 96-7 ; n
I I U S I ? ~ ~ 1 q ; story of the 1Zetrmt 112.
h l a c ~ k i ~ rCaptain
r,
Stuart, ~ R I I ; I I ; I conc111ct
o(. 235.
h l ~ c n s s o s ,political onicer a t Peshnwurl 37.
h l a c ~ n l ; . ~Colonel,
~.
killed a t the stormlng or
the Rikabashee fort, 79.
h l . \ c ~ ~ t x l.ieutcoant,
~..
ofthe Horsc Artillery,
in the hlniwand disasler.. 208-0,
. . .301 :
. taken
prisoner, 302 ; rn~trdered,321.
h l n c ~ n n ~76,
x , 140.
~IACRAGIITLN,
L d y , 39; in the Retreat,

.

~

~

1s:.

OF Sir Lepel
Griffi~~,
281.4.
MAI-I~VZ
EK
D M A UK
NI I A N97,
, 1.56.
AIDAN AN PLAIN, 1110, 148, 216, 118, 220, 225,
226, a39 a88.
~~AIN\\~;\~IR
hlrs,
G , in the Relreat, 111, 11%
fi~,\ln~,!xr~,
2 0 ; d i ~ s t ~ r n296-304
t,
; Ih?tlIe a t ,
Ixtwccn hl??llomcd Haswn and Apoub, 327.
~ I A N D B R R, O
160.
N
.
<
~ ~ A N G A I .215.
,
~ ~ A H S H A L I .Colonrl,
.
routs Nusseer Khan,
h l n ~ % vBri~pdier-Genernl,186 ; occtlpics
Shuthgurdsn pass, 189 ; takes possession o i
the Sherpur cnntonmtn~s.197 ; tn thc attncli
on hrnhon~edJnrr, 231-8, 7,f.f; in thc ~lcfcnce
of the Sherpur ca~~tonments,
262, 264.
h l n u u ~ rGeneral, 168, 170.
Lientenant 80.
hlnzan, 309,314, 31; ;Ayouh'sca~npat,daring
bnttle of Candahar, 319-22.
W'CASKILL Brigadier-Gcnernl with Pollock,
136 135. 'in the last skirmishes 156.
M E E &OR
~
FORT. the blown
256-7.
h l m n BUTCHA,a chief Af l<ohistn~~,
226, 229,
230, ~57,263.
~ I P Y R Z AHLIED,
A
a Dooranee c h i d , 140-1.
hlrwR,\n. Khnn of Khelat. m, 7 4 , '$2.
h f l c ~ r PASS.
~ i the, 179 ' ' '.' '
AI'NYILI. Dritish Envoy to Persia
h l o ~ uJ h~ , agent for hlncnagh;e?s
blood
n~oney,'90-1,
roz 154.
b l o ~ ~C O. I~O I,X ? ~ ~ C ~td.
I hold the Shutnrgurdan
t by Gough, 201 ; in
pass, r p ; b r o ~ ~ g hout
the lmttle oFChndnhar, jao.
MONTEATH.Colonel. ~ c n t n e a i n s tthe Ghilmis.
63-5 ; in ihe council of,%;tr a t ~ellalnl~ncl;
127-30; at thc great sortie, 133.
h l o N ' r E ~ n r ~ oCaptain,
,
killed a t the h l ~ c r
A ~ I I Tort,
O ~ 2s7.
~IONTGOSIER
Sir
Y , r\obcrt, ngninst l i e ~ ~ l i l l p
Candahnr. 126.

nor.^:

&,

h I a c r r , \ ~ ~ ~ eSir
a . William H a y envo to
Shah Soojah, influence with ~ . o r dA u c k l h d ,
18 ; his use of bribery 21, 23 ; on the rrceplion of the Slnh a t ~ i n d n h n r22 28 cliten
Cnbul with Shah Soojnh, 30'; eb~ivibcec~o i
the Slrnh's populnrily, 33-4 ; real sovcroign
his mistnkes 16-7 :
or ATglrani~tnn
relations \\+h 1\1e~6;1ila1is.38 ; con&s lo
the nl~:~n~lon~nent
of the Bnlla Hissnr, 39;
relations \\tit11 Hcrat, .io.r; nervous rib0111
111c con~niunicntion, j z ; relntion willi, Dost
hlnhorned, 44 ; proposes to put n price on
his head 45 ; receives his surrcndcr 47, 4') ;
his pecd~iartcrnperanlcnt 50 ; his 'hnnllce,
5, ; diacovcrs the u n p a p u l h ) ' or the ,Shah,
55 ; his conduct to the Gooroo and
Ghilznis 56-8. appointed Governor of
~olnba;, 6 0 ; tilled npon to retrench, 61.2;
his condrrct to Elphinsto~~e,
64-5 :deqmtches
Snle, G6-7, 70; his qunrtcrs a t Cnbrll, 7 4,
35.
demands the reduction of the R&a- ~ ~ O O L T A N168.
k h e e fort 9 depression. 82-3 ;nrgotint~on MOORE,~ i ~ h i n s t o n eservant,
's
152.
a h a t the k!cttc;u.
88-96
~ ~ O N G A2.N
11.
. .: ~nnrdered., 07-0
-. - :. MULLA
15.5, 187 zoz 222.
dnllrnom. 91+3.
h l n c r m n ~ o s , ' Brigadier-General, 169, 189
ar -15 ; in the December o eratio~lsround
C : ~ u226-52
~ , ; im the Great Rarch, 307,311 ;
m the battle of Candnhnr, 317-320.
; \ l r l t > ~ o oK~H A N fort of, 76, 83.
h l n l l ~ t o u~~~ ~ . \ ~ t , ' b r oof
t h eShall
r
Soojah, a.

.

.

'

255 ; fires t h e
"59, 27.1.

con

o n t h e Asnlni IleiSllts,

~ ~ ~ U S T A I ~t h
I ~e ,I ,~11nisIlcd for

t h e Cnv;~gnnri

mnssncrr, 199.

N A G I I I . ~215.
~,
N n N u c ~ ~ l rI ~EA S Sthe,
,
226, 238.
N A I Y I ? ~L, i e u t e m n t Scott, of t h e g2d Hislllnnderaf39;
N A P I E R , o r d o f Magdala, in f a v o ~ l ror keepi n g C a n d a h n r , 325.
N E K hlAHONXD
Afghan c o n ~ r ~ m n dnt
cr
t h e b a t t l e o f ~ h a r a s i n l l ,194-5, 205.
N E I ~ A U I .135.
Nuvlr.l.e o f t h e Benjinl L n n c c r s 217
NICHOIL:
C a p t n i n , his heroibn~i; tbc'ltetrent.
120.
N I J R A O 8 1 83.
~ o n r l n h , 'sir H c n r s , against kcrping Cnnd a h n r , 326.
N0~~r111111001i,
L o r d , relnlior~swit11 Sllrre Ali,
162.
N o - r r , G c n r m l , 14 ; in c o m n ~ n n dnt Cnr~dnhnr,
3 4 , o c c u p e s Khelnr, 43 ; his ch;~ractcr 5 L .
d i s k p l i n r , 52-3,; d i s w e c s with hlacllagilterl:
58.9, 7 6 ' rccelvcs orders from Elpllinsione
t o evacu:itc Candnllnr, refuses to obey,
figbring w i t h h l c e r m A h n ~ e d 141 ; his letter
t o D r ~ g n d i e r Ensland, 142'. Lord Ellen1,orough r e p e n t s ordew t o ~ ( a c u n t c CandaIlnr, o b e y s , 143-5 ; marches towards CnbuI,
14 d r i v e s A f ~ h n n s01rt of G l ~ u z n e c 118;
r e k e s t o a i d in the rescue of the priioners,
119. 156-t.
NUGENT, l e u t e n a n t killed 262
N v s s ~ e t r K h n n o f k!hclnt,
N v w , \ d , G e n e r a l , 299.

303, 311, 317, 321.
? r o ~ l i u ~ <the,
s , 305 319 920.
3 r s H a r r ~ var.r.au, h e , ;68, 179, 287 ; ret:~ined
b y W 32 327
3 0 ~ L ~ ~8cneia1,
~ < .
3 0 ; arrives in Pes11ny11r.
131, 132; a t Jrllalabad, 134 ; h i s q ~ ~ n l i f i c a t ~ o l ~ s ,
135 ; his work. 136; the rcscue nrd rerribution, 137.57 ; contrast between Nott and,
1.17 : arrrves a t Cabul, 147 ; pu~~isllrncnt
of

dknstcr
nt Chnriknr. 81-2 ; conducts ncxotin- .tiolls for the rctrcnt, 99.103; a I~ostnge, log,
112, 123s I.(O, 152, 154, 155.
' O W ~ L L . C n p t n ~ n ,killed, 175.
?OYNUAHK I I A Kfather to Dost BIahonled, 5.
.'nlnnose, G c d r n l , 168. 269. 29.1, 3% 311 ;
in the battle of Candnhnr. 316.

&.'

O r u p r s r . ~ ,C a p t a i n , in t h e Coimcil of W a r at
Jellalnbad, 127-8
O R E N I I U I ~3.1.
G,
0 s . u ~K ~I I A N 89.
O w r a , \ a r p r s k s Dost h l n h o ~ n c d ,29, 30; raid
o n the G h i l l n i s , 38.

PALI.ISRIZ,
Urigndier-Gellenl, 269-70, 27.1.
I'AL>IEII, Colonel, tortured, 157.
I ' n l . r ~ u l w r o ~ ' s Lord,
,
u l t i m n t ~ mto Persia, 4 .
P A N J S HI<IVER,
I R l h ~ 215.
,
~ n s h - l e V 1 T c J 1Genernl,
,
1.
l ' n ' r m ~ s , 173.
P a , r r , C a p t a i n , a t siege o f Ghuznec 25-6.
I + ~ r v n r ~rBAss, ~ h c168 171, 172 17,;.
I'ELLV. S i r ~ C w i s nt
: t h e confehe
of P c s h a
wnr, 164-5.
P m t o r ; v s r ~ v .lo.
Pnltsli\, r e l i t i o n s betwecn Great Dritnin nnd

< A T T R A Y , 81.
~ a w ~ r ~ s So i xr Henry.
.
52 ' his rvilrnir~gs to
hlncnaghtcn, 53-.1; hlncn&htcll's prders to,
r c q x c t l n g U k t n r Khnn, 57, 141 ; III fnvour
o f retainins Cnndnhar, szs.
. [<A\\WI. I'INEI. 189.
l 2 1 1 o . r ~HEII;H,I.S,
~
the, 169.
I Z I K A U A ~ HrEoEw . the, 79.
R I P O N Marquis of V~ceroy,285 ; ill f a \ . o ~ ~ r
of tt:e settlcmcnt kit11 Abdurrni~mnn,287-8:
snnctions General Robcrts' March on Candnh;tr, 305, 326.
R O I I A T Great
,
hfnrch ends at, 39.10,
l i o n o n ~ r s ,Coloncl 15.
R o n e n n , Sir ~ r h e r i c k ,in comn~andof the
Kuram colun~n, IGB ; his s c l ~ c n ~ofc opcrnt ~ o n s , 171-2 ; bntllr of the P~.iwnr K o u ~ l ,
173-4, 1 5 178 ' his previolls career, 188;
wt11 thc A m y oi invnsio~i 183.92 ; b : ~ t ~o~c e
Chamsinh
193-6 ; nt, C & I I , 197-101 ; I C vcngc fo: Cnvngnnrl, 202.4 ; i n t e r c u ~ ~ r s ~
with Ynkoul) Khan, 205-8 ; ,ill the S l y p u r
210-20;
nctlve opeyitloy
cantonment,
round C i ~ l ~ n l211-52;
,
011 tlic d e f w l ~ ~ v 111
c
S h r r p ~ l r , 253.65, 275 ; the (:real Marc11 011

Cnndnhnr, 304-11 ; battle OF Candnhnr, 311
24 ; i n fnvour of keeping Cnndabnr, 325.
RORI:E. 1 7 ~19.
ROW, EIISISII,
in the retrent From Cl~nriknr,8
ROSS, hlnjor-Ge~~ernlJohn, 189 264. 27 I
the G r c n ~ 3lnrcl1, 307
~. ; ill ;hc lmtfe; I
Cnndnhnr. 321.
RUNJUI(.I.S l h ~ i l l Sikh rlller of the l'unjnul
lrcatlnerlt of Shah Sooinli. 5 : occtlnie

Russians, . r c f ~ ~ s cto
s receive Sir Neville
Clmmberlnin, 167, 16g ; dent11 nt IJnlkh, 176,
177 ; his mistakes, a q , 211, zrz, 22.1, 278,

..

192, 201, ?I], 304.
S I I I I ,179. 267 ; relairled 11). 115, 3zJ.
S l ~ n s 6,. 18, .+I ,125,
SlKll ~ ~ I ? u U I \ T O STI\TES
I~Y
CONTISCRNT, 37,
136, 138, 168.
S A F IT R I I I E . IIIC,ensngc hIncpl~crson,215.
SAI.E. L a d y , her journal. 73, 9 2 ; nccount o S I K H REGIMENTS,201, 238, TJVJ, 250, 271,
the Retreat, 19-11 ; Akbnr's kindncss to, 152
316 318, 319.
SALE,S i r 1Iol1~r1,I J, 22 ; nt siege of G1111mee SISGII:I ,-6.
24-27 ; in c o n ~ ~ n n nadt Cabul. 3.1 ' chasiiscl ~ n l K N a ; & n ~ l n i n , n I~ostnge,97, 113, 117.
S L A D I n~t, thc hla1w11nd dihaster, 301.
lhc I C o l ~ i ~ t ; ~ r ~ e,196
e s , ; his cha;ncter, 5
,
of, 1.18.
fighiinp ill he Khoord Cnbul a t 1Jootklm~ S O I I N X ~ Hgates
S ~ O J A I I - ~ ! , L - ? ~ ~ hhah,
O I . K ,2 ; early cnrccr,
I I ;~ o, c c ~ ~ p i eJcI
s
65, 66, 6 ; nt G I I I I ~ : I ~ I68
J
5 ; Inlrlgues, 6 ; Lord Auckl:u~d deter70, 75, 76 ; dcfcnce of Jell:~lxb:d
Iclnbnd,
1l;illcs to rebtore him, 12, 14, r g ; his share
122-34 ; tigli~ingw i ~ hthe Ghilzais n,t Jngdul
ill the c s p c d i t i o ~ ~16-24
,
; ~.aplnced on l h c
luk, 1 4 6 ; ordered lo rcscuc c;lpll\ws, r.19
; his position,
throne, cntry inro Cnbul,
31-38 ; wit11 h l n c n n g h l c ~ ~a t Cnbul, 39-.to ;
r c h ~ s c st o see Dort Alaho~ncrl, qp ; qous t o
J,cll:~lnbnd, 50 i his errors, 52, 53 ; d~snlTectlon townrds I I I ~ I 51 60 3-6 ; r e c o m m c ~ ~ d s
t h e occnpation aide u'da Hishnr, 88, go,
S c ~ s u t r .r7,-19, 43, 1.12.
gr stipulntions wilh regard to, 93-5 ; reS c o w , A h j o r 80.
nlnlns in Cnhul, 103 ; Icuer to balc nt
SCHUVI.EK,Alr E u r c n c , interviews ~\bdurrnh.
Jellnlnbnd, 126,127, 129; murdered, 138, 139,
110. 221.

&.

: O O K K I I A I ~ 120.

SICII~ I I A116.
,
SEISI-AN,province of. 2, 23.
SIIAIZTO,
Cnptnin, killed nt the Enlln Ilissnr,
200

S l l , \ ~ A lRIDGE, I ~ C169.
,
S I I A I I ~ A G IlIl ,~ e ,76.
S ~ r . m n . \ zK I I A N220.
,
SI!~\HJUI,269.
SIIAIII.KZ27J
SIIAKRSI&R,Sir Richmond, 1.19, 150, 155.
S111<ll<~\l31\ll.
29. 275. 278.
SHELTON.lirignd~er,;irrivcs a t Jell,alnlxxl, 55;
c l ~ : ~ m c ~73;
c r . nt Cnbul, 7.1 ; reccrres contradictory orders from hl;~conglrtcn,75 ; in' 111c
h l l n Hissnr, 76-8; takes t h e Rikabnshee
fort g ; opposes the rcn~ovnlof the troops
into' t b u ' II n Hishar, 83 ; :lltacks 13~11i:troo,
85.8 ; c o m n ~ n ~ ~IIICd s main body in Ihc Kctreat, 106, 19; his doggcd valow, 116 ; n
I~ostngc,117, 121.
S I I ~ I < - ~ ) E R W IIRIGIITS,
ALA
the, 198, 237, "JI,
264.
S n w a h1.1, tlic Amccr,son of Dosr BIahomcd,
ncce?sion and chnrncter, 162; r c h ~ s c s lo
recclvo n Resident, 163 ; n e g o t i ~ ~ t i o\villi
~~s
Lord L y l ~ o ~16.1-5
i . ; cordinl ~cccl)lionn i t h e

, o o ~ r ! ~ t&tnin,
escapes f r o n ~t l ~ cs l a u p h ~ e r
a t ~ u b d n r n u k 121.
;PENS, Ceptni; of the 72d Higl~landcrs,
killed, 25;
iutxcaw,\l Kwrul.., thc,. nunck on.. bv. Rohcrts.
172-3.
i ~ , \ x n o u e ,hIr, on lhc trcxly OF G u n d n n ~ u k ,
I 80.
; ~ n w n n . r , Sir Donald, 168 ; marches into
C ~ I I ~ : I I I175,
: I ~ 176,
, I ,265 : begins 11;srr~nrclr
t o C n b d , 268 ; b n t t c OF A h n ~ e d Khel nnd
Urzoo, 270.4 ; c o n t i n ~ i c d i i s1i,:1rc11to C n l n ~ l ,
275-6; relations with Abdurrnhmnn, 286.91,
294, ,30.(, 305, 307, 310, 322; in favour o i
k e e p ~ ~C:~ndnlinr,
~g
325.
;.I. JOHN,Colond -97, 309.
~ T O D U I M c0lodei,
,
; T O L I ~ ~ . ~ O defender
FII,
of the Schipkn pass,
received by S h r ~ Ali,
e
167.
~ O R N S,\YO S U N S I ~ I NOF
E '\ SOI.UII~:I<'S
Lrvrr,' by Colin Mnckcnzie, 150.
TRATON,Captain, 3 9 .
U K K U I 17.
I , 1.14, 147, 168.
uL1alah' L ~ O U W I ~ A ~ Nthe,
S , 38.
ULThN JAN, 97.
u~:rnu h l n ~ ~ s ~ rlomh
i u ~ ,of, 146.

-.,-.

T A S I Z K E NR~l ,n a i n ~ ~at,
s 165; Shcrc .4li nl,
at, 279, 280, 282.
176 ; Al~durrnl~mnn
TI:ZT.EN 66,67, 70, 1 9 , 115, 116, 146, 151, 155,
~H,\L-~;+srlAl.l. 116.
?'IIELWALL,
~riind'ier,171.3.
'I'bro.wo?.r, cngiwur to Kenne 23, q.
T l u o u a , Princc, son of ~ l k hSwjnh, sup
portcd by Kunjeet Sinfill, 17, 34, .+I ;
Soojnh'r viceroy at Cnndnl~nr,52-3 ; crucltg,

\ V ~ u e ,escorts I'rincc T i ~ n a u rby lhc KhyL~er
mute, 34, 37.
W A L I h l h ~ l o b l ~ governor
u,
desigrlntc of 'l'llrkcstan, 1x0, 258.
WARREN.~ V ~ I C I I ~ I the
C S Commissariat fort,
77.
WATSON Colo~lc!, in comlnnnd o r thc Sikh
~ e u d e / o cr o~~ ~ l ~ n j i c168,
n t ~ 7 5 304.
,
\Vm.l.es~rrv the ;\lnrq;li% c r ~ t ~ r i s lon
n Lord
~ucklnnd'kdccision, 13.
\VI{LLINCTON,Duke of, criticism 011 Lord
Aucklnnd's dccision, 13 ; on ~lphin.;kmc's
h
V.
nr Cnlrul, 78 ; on E r ~ g l ~ stroops
~?l%!138.
~
\VIIITE,b~njor,of he 2d Hi@landcrs, 195.6 ;
a t thc attack on l%ni H t s ~ x , 243-4; III
h c bntilc of Candnhar, 319.
C
\VILLI.Urimdicr, ilrtc~l~pts
to force I ~ Kl1ybrr

m~lrdcred,97.
TROUI',Cnpmn, 146.
' I ' ~ N G I I E E T A R gorge
I K I , of, sccneofslnughtcr,

UKTAUKnna. n discontented Doornllec chief,
53 ; hlacnnghten o(rers reward for his hcad,
57.

URGUNDA~,
297, 309, 314, 316, 320, 32%
U u s u a u ~ ~ 28,
: ~ ~226,
. 230.3, 237, 239.
Uazoo, n k i r of, 274, ~ I C .

VAKIIEI.. tbc. obnoxious minister o r Shnh

TON,

and ihc b l n ~ i

VAIIUJAKIIAX,190.
YAKOIJU
K H A N so11
, of Sherc Ali released and
s
Sir Sam
ma& r c g c ~ ~1t ,~ 6 i;n t e r c o t ~ r 'with
Hrowne, 177-9 ; ql~estionof his complicity in
thc Carngnnri mnssacrc. 183.5 ;takes refi~gc
Z O ~ : , Z O ~ - ?1 n
in the English cnmp, 191,
priwner, 2~3,214,257 ;tho Iceroy s d e c ~ s ~ o n
apninst his return to power. 277,179. ~ E z .
YARN ~ n o u l r u Shnh
,
Ka~nrnn'sn~iwstcr,41.

y,

EVENTS OF OUR OWN TIME.
A Series of Vo!utties

O ~ Jthe u i ~ I~j /f@ ~ l m f BZJPN~S
( f the lllst
ench ~0?hifl2hg
300 p q e s or vtort, h
8v0, ~ i t hPlnrrs, Portmiis, o r other III71sfrcrtions, 10 be

flag Cenhcry,

issued a t intervals, cloth, price 5s.
A limiltd hzrft p~z#c?-edition n/ sonte o/ t h ~ 6ooA.s
c
is firt6liJh1.d
with Pr-oo/s of fhc PZ~ztt~s,
Rox6rtrgkr 10s.6d. rret.
* Those marked with ( I star * Anvc no l c z ~ ~ q edition.
k r

TI-XE WAR I N THE CRIMEA.

By General Sir

EL~VAR
HAXILEY,
D
K.C.13. Fourth Edition. With Five
Maps and Plans, and Four Portraits on Copper.
' S i r Ed\r.ard Hamley has excepti0nd qun~ilicaliollsfor the task hc lras endertlkes
His, " War in tlis Crirrirn" is a \\'ell-kniitcd, historical narralive, written by a colnpetrnt
criilc, and well-inbrnied observer.'-Thcs.

THE INDIAN M U T I N Y O F 1857.

B y Colonel
MALLESON,C.S. 1. Second Edition. With Three Plans,
and Four Portraits on Copper.

I Eattles, s i e ~ e s ,and rapid laarchc.5 are clcscribcd ill a style spirited n~rdconcise.'S n l a r d a y Rrwrr7u.
' Color~cliCIallaso~i'sbook is a valunhlc onc, nnd sl~ouldbc ~ ~ r ~ i v e r srend.'--(;rnjhir.
nll~

* A C H I E V E M E N T S IN E N G I N E E R I N G . By Professor VERNONHARCOURT.With many Illustrations.
' W e llope this book will find its way into the hnnds of all youlrgengirrcers. All the in.
rormntion has hccn careftrlly gathered from all the best sources, a d is therefore
accunte.'-En~i~~e~crinfh'mir7u.

THE A F G H A N WARS. 13y ARCHII~ALD
FORIIES.
With Portraits on Copper, and Plans.

*THE D E V E L O P M E N T OF N A V I E S . By Captain
EARDLEY
WILBIOT,R.N.
-

With many Illustralions.
--- .

IN PREPARATION.

THE LIBERATION O F ITALY.

W i t h Portrnits

on Copper.

T I l E REFOUNDING O F TI-IE GERMAN EMPIRE.
With Portraits on Copper.

THE EXPLORATION O F AFRICA.

W i t h l'ortraits

on Copper.

T H E CIVIL WAR I N AMERICA. W i t h Portraits
on Copper.

THE O P E N I N G OF JAPAN. W i t h Illustrations.
Other Vuhrutes wi/IJo/la~cl.
LONDON: SEELEY A N D CO., I,Ih.IITISl3, ISSEX ST., STRl\ND.

RECENTL Y PUBLISHED.

PARIS. In Old and Prcsent Times. With especial
reference to ihangcs in its Architecture and Topography.
By P. G. I~AMEI~TON.With 70 Illustrations by A.
BRUNET-DPUAINES,
H. TOUSSAINT,
and Others. Cloth,
6s.

T H E RUINED ABBEYS O F YORKSHIRE. By
W. C H t i a r n ~ R S LEBROV. With many Illustrations, by
A. BRUNET-DEUMNES
and H. TOUSSAINT.
New Edition,
Price 6s.) cloth.

OXFORD. Chapters by A. LANG. Illustrated by
A. BRUNET-DE~AINES,
H. TOUSSAINT,
and R. IZPNT
THOMAS.New Edition, 6s., cloth.
CAMBRIDGE.

By J. W. CLARK,M.A. With IllusTOUSSAINT.

trations by A. BRUNET-DEDAINES
and H.
New Edition, 6s., cloth.

WINDSOR. By W. J. LOFTIE. Dedicated by pcrmission to Her Majesty the Queen. With many IlIustrations by HERBEKTRAILTON. Price 6s.) cloth.

STRATFORD-ON-AVON. In thc Middle Ages and
the time of the Shakespeares. By S. L. LEE. With Illustrations by EDWARD Ilur.~. New Edition, Gs., cloth.

EDINBURGH. Picturesque Notes. By ROBERT
LOUIS STEVENSON.
With many Illustrations. Cloth, 3s.
6d. Roxburgh, 5s.

LONDON : SI-:I,LISY AND CO.,

I.I?vlITED, ESSlIS ST., STRAND.

PICTURESQUE PARTS OF ENGLAND.
THE PEAK O F DERRYSHIRE. By J. LIWIAND. With
Etchings and other Illustrations I>y I-IERTIERT
RAILTONant1 Al.l~Rl~n
DAWSON.Cloth, 7s. 6d. L~rgc-PaperCopies (250 only), 12s. 6d.
'When Mr Leyland throws in Hadtlon Hall and Chntsworth, AshI>onrne,and the Dove, his " Pcnlc" 1x1s elements of interest soKcient for
three or font ordinary 11ool;s.
Altogelher bfr Leyland hns produced
and it is impossible to lay it d o w n
a delightful boob on n dclightfirl s~~bject,
withnut regret.'--Snlrrrhy A'minu.

...

AN EXPLORATlON O F EXMOOR.

By J. LL. W. PAGE.

With Mnp, Etchings, and other Ill~strations.
Cloth, 7s. 6d.

Second Eklitiorl.

By J. LL. W.

AN EXPLORATION O F DARTMOOR.

PAGE. Wit11 hfnp, Etchings, and olher Illustmtioos.
tion. Cloth, 7s. 6d.

Second Ecli-

.

NEW AND CHEAPER EDITION O F

WESTMINSTER ABBEY. By I\'. J. LOFTIE. With 7 4
Illustrntions by I - ~ E K ~ ERAILTON.
RT
Cloth, 7s. 6tl. An Edition is
puhlisherl, with Iz Coppcr-Plntcs, nt 21s.
'Though a dozen 11001;s l~avebcen writlen on \Veslminsler hbbcy, we
know of none at once inorc completc ant1 ndmirablc, h o ~ hfrom a litcrnry
i111t1 nn nrtistic point of view, thnn thc volr~n~c
beforc ns.'-hrblirlrc~,~'
Ci~ntlnr,

LADY MARY WORTLEY MONTAGU. By ARTIUJR R.
ROPES,M A . Wilh g Portraits after Sir GODFREY
Iix~,r.r.~w,k c .
7s. Gtl, Largc-Paper Copics (150 only), 21s. nett.

PREVIOUS VOLUMES OF THE SAME SERIES.

MRS THRALE,

afterwards M r s Piozzi.
By L. B.
SIIELEY,
M.A. Wilh 9 Illt~strnti~ns
after I-ioc,\wlr, RDYNOI-DS,
ZOIWANV,
nntl Others. Cloh, 7s. Gtl.

FANNEY BURNEY.

Uy I,. B. SEELEY, M.A.

With 9

Illustrations nftcr I<I<YNOI.~S,
G A I N ~ B O R O UCOI'LKY,
G H , snd WEST.
Cloth, 7s. Gtl.

HORACE WALTOLE.

By L. B. SEELEY,
M.A. W i t h 8

Illustrations nftcr Sir JOSIIUA
R~wsor.ns and Sir T~roar~isLAWI ~ E N C E . Cloth, 7s. 6cl.
LONDON: SEELEY A N D CO., LIMITED, I1SSIS ST., STRAND.

WOl<KS BY MKS MARSHAIL.
'

,-

JUST PUBLISHED.

\+'INCHESTER MEADS IN T H E DAYS OF BISHOP
KEN : a Story. By XIrs h~Innsrr,\~.~.Fourth Thousand. With
Eight Illustrntions. ss., cloth.
Marshall has done her worlc wcll, nncl produced an cxccllent
book.'-Clrrrrrlr B d s .
' hIrs Marshall has produced nnothcr of her plcasnnl stories of old timcs.'
-Snhr~dny A'mim.

' hIrs

UNDER SALISBURY SPIRE.

A Tale of the Times of

Georgc I-Ierhert. Sisth Thousancl. \\hh Illustrntions. 5s., cloih.
' Onc of tlic bcst works which have ever comc from Mrs Mnrshall's pcn.'
-A/he~~(nt~n~.

I N T H E CITY OF FLOWERS ; or, Adelaide's Awakening.
\JTi1h Illustmtions. 5s., cloth.
' Vcry wholcsonle reading.
C~mrdian.

tlic story is cscel1ent.'-

ON T H E BANKS OF T H E OUSE;

01;

. . . Altogctlier

Life in Olney a

IIundretl Years Ago. Fourtli Thousand. \\lit11 Illustmtions. 5s.)
cl0111.
' No hettcr story than this has Ixcn wriiten by hTrs hTarshall. T o any
admirer of Cowpcr, the \vootlcots represcnting the old hnunts of the poct
will bc of much intcrcst.'-C~tm.r/imr.

IN FOUR REIGNS. The Recollections of Al~heaAllingham, 1785-1842, Piftli Thousand.

With Illnstmtions.

~ s . ,cloth.

' The rcnder will closc tlic volume of hIrs Allingliam's ~.ecollcctio~~s
with
regret. Scldom does one meet with o book of socli n synipntlietic nnrl
'rhc particulars which it nllbrds of the enrlicr
touching chnrnctcr.
life of our belovcd soverciqn are of nnosual interest, and will be engcrly reccivcd by all who unitc in'doing honour Lo the revcrcd name of Victoria.'l~'f01X;il~~
h?.

...

UNDER T H E NIENDIPS. Fifth 'rhousand.
trations.

With Illus-

Ss., cloth.

'I'HE MIS'I'RESS 01; T A Y N E COURT. 5s. Third Thousand. \\'ill1 Illustrations.

Ss., cloth.

IN T H E EAST COUN'TRY.

Fourth Thousand.

With

Ilh~stmtions. 5s.) cloth.

IN COLSTON'S DAYS.
tions, 5s., cloth.
-

Fifth Thousand.

With Illustra-

---

LONDON: SEELEY AWD CO., LIMITED, ESSES ST., STRAND.

A N E W A N D C H E A P E R E D U I O f V OF

Mrs Marshall's Earlier Works.
PRICE 3s. 6d.

VIOLET DOUGLAS.
CI-IRISTABEL KINGSCOTE.
HELEN'S D I A R Y ; or, Thirty Years Ago.
I-IEIGHTS AND VALLEYS.
LADY ALICE.
MRS MAINWARING'S JOURNAL.

Mrs Marshall's Popular Series.
Is. Sewed ; I s . 6d., Cloth.

T H E T O W E R ON T H E CLIFF. Ninth Thousand,

T H E T W O SWORDS. Ninth Thousand.
BRISTOL DIAMONDS. Ninth Thousand.
H E R SEASON IN BATH. Tenth Thousand.
UP AND DOWN TI-IE PANTILES. Ninth Thousand.
T H E O L D GATEWAY. Fourteenth Thousand.
ROMANCE O F T H E UNDERCLIFF. Sixth Thousand.
. -- .--

LONDON : SEELEY AND CO., LIMITED, ESSEX ST.,STRAND.

WORKS BY PICOFESSOII CHURCH.
-- .

TI-IE H A M M E R : A Story of the Maccabees.
Eight Illustrations. ss., cloth.

With

A YOUNG MACEDONIAN.

In the A r m y of
Alexander the Great. With Sixteen Coloured Illustrations.
ss., cloth.
Twenty - first ThouWith Coloured Illustrations. 5s., cloth.

STORIES FROM HOMER.
sand.

' A book which ought to bccome an English classic. I t is h ~ l lof the
p r e Homeric I1nvoor.'-Spcrlnfor.
STORIES FROM VIRGIL.
With Coloured Illustrations.

Fifteenth Thousand.
5s., cloth.

' S a erior to his ' I Stories from Homer," good as they wcrc, and perhaps
as pcrLct n specimen of that peculiar form of translation as cot~ldbe.'-TI'JIICS.
STORIES FROM T H E GREEK TRAGEDIANS.
Tenth 'Thousand. With Coloured Illustrations. ss., cloth.

' Not only R pleasant

and cntcrlnining book for the lircside, but a slurchowc of fncts Stom history to Ijc of real scrvice to them when they come
lo rend n Creek play for tI~e~~~sclres.'-Stn~zda~-d.

STORIES OF T H E EAST FROM I-IEIIODOTUS.
Eighth Thousand. With Coloured Illustrations. 5s., cloth.
For a school prizc n morc suitnblc book will hardly
L i t z ~ n r yC h ~ r ~ r h s r n ~ ~ ,
' h very quaint and delighthl book.'-Spcrfdov.

111:

found.'-

T H E STORY O F TI-IE PERSIAN WAR FROM
HERODOTUS. Fifth Thousand.
lustrations. 5s., cloth.

With Coloured Il-

' W e are inclined to Lhinlc this is the Ixst volumc or Professor Church's
scries sinec the escellent " Stories from I-Io~~~er."'-Allrr~~n'tirr.

S T O R I E S FROM LIVY. Sixth Thousand.
Coloured Illustrations. 5s.) cloth.

With

' T h e lad who gets this book for n present will' Ilavc got n gcnuine
classicnl trcas~~re.'-Scafs~~rarr.

ROMAN L I F E IN THE DAYS OF CICERO.
Fifth Thousand.

With Color~redIllustrations. ss., cloth.

' Thc Lcst prize-book of the season.'-jott~rral

of Ed~tmfio~r.

1c

